Transcript
Lord, by Thy Spirit, guide our thoughts in Thy truth, and grant that as we advance in understanding, so may we also grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ, through whom we pray. The last part of his famous dialogue, Cur Deus Homo, as I tried to show in reviewing his argument yesterday, is to convince unbelievers of the necessity of salvation through Christ by demonstrating the human predicament. And this demonstration is
conducted on ostensibly rational grounds, without reference to anything given through the Biblical revelation. Anselm, in other words, hopes to convince unbelievers by his analysis of the plight of sinful man, and that plight, as we saw, consists in the fact that man as sinner has incurred an obligation to render satisfaction to God for the injury done to the honor of God, an obligation which is inalienable, that is to say, man must discharge it, but which, when measured
by the measure of God, whose honor has been injured, is totally beyond the capacity of man. So here, you see, you have the human predicament in a nutshell that man must render satisfaction, and second, that man cannot render satisfaction. Now, the second book, all this is done, all this is done, you see, leaving Christ out of account as if nothing had ever been known of him. It's the indirect method. Now, in the second book, he turns
to the demonstration that Christ, and by this he means the entire Christian doctrine of salvation through Christ, satisfies the conditions which have been disclosed through this analysis of the plight of man. He begins in the fourth chapter by repeating the point that we have already encountered in most previous treatises. We have reviewed that unless salvation is made available for sinful man, God's purpose in the creation of man will be frustrated. This is the thought that someone
has called the divine dilemma. One might even say that this is the plight of God created through the sin of man, that if he executes his judgment and imposes punishment on man, then he defeats his own purpose in the creation of man. So then you see the divine dilemma is how can God extend salvation to sinful man without violating what Anselm calls the order of his kingdom? Then he repeats this thought in the fifth chapter of
the second book, introducing the rather dangerous, as he himself recognizes, the dangerous concept of necessity. You'll notice that he makes frequent use of this term, both in the first book and in the second. Indeed, he formulates his intention as that of demonstrating the necessity of salvation through Christ. But he is careful here to explain that by necessity, especially when he applies the concept of necessity to God, he does not mean some higher necessity to which God
is subject, but rather the necessity which is inherent in God's honor and objectively expressed in the order of his kingdom. God, in other words, cannot in fidelity to his Godhead act arbitrarily. God can only act in consistency with his being and nature as God. This is the necessity, not some higher necessity to which God is subject. Then next he turns to the question of the measure of the satisfaction. What precisely is the measure of the satisfaction
that is requisite to solve the human predicament? It already in the first book indicates that it is beyond the capacity of man. In view of the fact that the injury is committed against the honor of God, the satisfaction must be really commensurate with God. It certainly must outweigh the value of the whole universe. And clearly this is something which is beyond the capacity of man. Only God, or one equal with God, is qualified to render this
satisfaction. But at the same time it is man who is under obligation to render it, because it is man who has incurred the guilt. So now you see how the argument is moving towards its conclusion. The only solution to this problem is by the God-man. Here you have, you see, the answer to the question, could Deus homo? Why the God-man? Because the plight of sinful man before God is such that it can only be
relieved by one who is both God and man. Anselm then proceeds to argue, you'll find this illustrative of the extremely well-ordered and systematic nature of his thinking. He proceeds to argue on terms of Chalcedonian orthodoxy that he must be perfect God and perfect man. That is, he must possess both natures intact. For if one were changed into the other, in other words, if the first negative adverb of the Chalcedonian definition were violated, if one were
changed into the other, he would be either God or man. He must also possess them unmixed, because a mixture would make him into a third sort of being, neither God nor man. Finally, he must possess them unseparated, because if the man is other than the God, it would be impossible for both to act together within the unity of the person. It is necessary that the integrity of each nature be preserved, and equally necessary that they should
be united to form one person. Just as, and here Anselm introduces an analogy that was very frequently employed in the effort to make the hypostatic unit intelligible, just as the body and the soul are united to form one man. The God-man, he proceeds, the God-man must further assume the human nature of Adam, Chapter 8. And here you will notice, again, how we have moved, both temporally and geographically, from the time and the world of
Athanasius, who rationalizes the assumption of humanity by means of Platonic realism, treating human nature as a reality, as a really existing reality, which the Logos can impersonate as a whole. This mode of thought has decayed by the time of Anselm, so he explains Christ's assumption of humanity in generic terms. That is to say, he argues that he must become a member of the family of Adam. He must enter the human family, because the guilt of man
rests upon the human family in virtue of its descent from Adam. The explanation here, of course, of the difference is that Augustine has intervened, and the whole Augustinian theory of the transmission of guilt by heredity from Adam, the primal sinner, has colored the thought of Anselm. He proceeds to argue, then, that the God-man will not be subject to death, as other men are, because death is the wages of sin, but as he is sinless himself,
he is not subject to death. And another thing which I should have mentioned before this last point, he must be born of a virgin. Now, here is a very fascinating feature of Anselm's argument. He argues a priori for the virgin birth. Now, we well know how many people have difficulty in accepting the virgin birth, even a posteriori. But Anselm argues for it a priori. And his argument, which you will find in chapters eight, chapter eight, is
quite ingenious. He points out, you see, there are four ways, four possible ways, in which human beings can be brought into existence. One way is they can be brought into existence from a man and a woman, which is the common way. But it is not the only way, because God has demonstrated that he can also bring a man into existence with no previous man or woman. The example of that is, of course, Adam. God has also
demonstrated that he is able to create human existence of a man alone. Namely, Eve. So, you see, God has actualized those three possibilities of creating human existence. And Anselm fears, you see, that if it remained at that, the infidels, the unbelievers – and remember, all this isn't apologetic – the unbelievers would say, aha, there's one way he can't do it. It cannot originate a human existence from a woman alone. And therefore, to prove that God is
capable of this possibility also, he argues that the God-man must be born of a virgin. Well, as being sinless, he is not subject to death, which is the way to sin. But as God, as God, he has the power, as Jesus said, to lay down his life and to take it again. He is free to die voluntarily. But as sinless, he owes nothing to God. In other words, his death, his voluntary death, is not the
payment of a debt he owes to God. It is a voluntary offering. And since it is the death of the God-man, it is greater than anything except God. And therefore, it is commensurate with the satisfaction required by the sin of man against God. The satisfaction value of such a life, the life of the God-man, freely offered, is infinite. It outweighs not only the sin of those who slew him, but all sins, including those of
Adam and Eve. Now, to answer the question, how the satisfaction of Christ availed for the sins of others, how the virtue of his satisfaction can be communicated to others, we have already seen his answer to the question, what is Christ's title to act on behalf of sinful man, namely by becoming a member of the family of Adam. But how do the benefits of his satisfaction accrue to others? And here Anselm avails himself of another idea which
had been made available in the penitential system of the Church, to which I have already alluded to, and where also we can see the effect of the juridical mentality, so characteristic of the Western Church, because in the medieval Church, the penitential system was perhaps the most important operative factor in the faith, and it was the legalization of the penitential system that really formed the crux of Luther's protest at the Reformation. You remember, the very first of
Luther's 95 theses was about repentance. When our Savior says, repent, what Luther in effect said, I won't give you his exact words, but Luther in effect said, when our Savior said, repent, and it is useful to remember that according to both Matthew and Mark, according to one of them, this is the very first word of Jesus' public ministry, repent, the call to repentance. What Luther said in his first thesis is in effect. When our Savior said
repent, he meant something quite different from what the Church had developed in the sacrament of penance. What the sacrament of penance had made familiar to Anselm and to others was the notion of excess merit. The ideal was that in performing an act of penance, there was an imposed measure. In other words, as in to use current practice, if you go confessional, confess your sins to the priest, he imposes a certain penance. You've got to say 25
Hail Marys or something like that. But if you go beyond the prescribed measure, if you say 26 Hail Marys instead of 25, you thereby acquire an excess of merit, which is then under due ecclesiastical control. That is to say it is deposited in the treasury of merits in the Church and dispensed for a consideration. The sale of indulgences, as I possibly mentioned the other day, forgive me for repeating it, the sale of indulgences, you see, presupposed
the availability of these excess merits, which have been accumulated by works of supererogation and which were dispensed to penitence for a consideration. Christ's death then, you see, being voluntary, being entirely free, not a debt which he owed because of sin, but a free work of supererogation, which he performed voluntarily was of this order. And as such, it clearly called for a special reward from God. Such a reward, however, cannot be given to the son himself, since
he already possesses all things. So what is to be done with it? Anselm's answer, chapter 19, is that he may give it to others as he may choose. I quote chapter two, book two, chapter 19. Upon whom would he more properly bestow the reward accruing from his death than upon those for whose salvation, as right reason teaches, he became man, and for whose sake, as we have already said, and he rehearses the whole argument. He then
concludes that God will reject no one who comes to him in this name, provided always he comes in the way which scripture prescribes. And then Anselm concludes, and I call your attention particularly to this passage in chapter 20, that the whole arrangement, which he has analyzed, the whole arrangement demonstrates the mercy of God. Now we have found the mercy of God, which appeared lost when we were considering God's holiness and man's sin. We have found it,
I say, so great and so consistent with his holiness, or in the more familiar language of the dilemma, so consistent with his justice, as to be incomparably above anything that can be conceived. And Bozo concludes with an expression of his satisfaction that Anselm's argument has made the whole matter perfectly clear and convincing. Now I've spent a little time on Anselm for a number of reasons. The first is the tremendous impact which this had on subsequent thought,
not only Catholic, but as we shall see Protestant also. And although the Church, I'm referring primarily to the Roman Catholic Church, has never given express dogmatic status to any particular interpretation of the death of Christ, it has in effect canonized the theory of Anselm. Let me quote you the words of a Catholic historian of soteriology, Riviere, in his volume on the history of the Doctor of the Atonement, which occupies several volumes, writes, and this was long
before Vatican II, Protestants and Catholics all agree that Anselm's Cure Deus Homo was an epoch-making work, and they are right. Not only is his work the first real treatise on the Atonement, it is also here that we find for the first time distinctly formulated that theory of satisfaction in the light of which the foundations of the doctrine will be explored and which will soon become the classical theory of theology on this matter. Notice the contradiction
to Aulén. Anselm's work, which is a masterpiece both by reason both of its influence and originality, gained its author a place among the ranks of the best of the fathers. And even today, it remains on account of its ideas and of the forms in which they are cast. The strongest, if not the most perfect production which Christian literature has brought forth, concerning the mystery of the Atonement. Higher praise could hardly be given than in those words.
Before we proceed to explore our own reaction to it, I may just at this point quote the summary verdict of Harnack, the Protestant historian of doctrine on the other side. Harnack writes, it has so many defects that the theory is completely unacceptable. We must say that in spite of Anselm's good intentions and in spite of some right insights, never was so bad a theory given out as ecclesiastical. Let me try to offer a little judicial summing
up between these two attorneys, the one for the defense and the one for the prosecution, and then you can be the jury and after reading the treaties for yourselves, you can form your own judgment. First of all, we have the major problem to consider whether this method of theological ratiocination is sound. This is the basic problem of Anselm's theology and it applies also to his ontological proof of the existence of God. But he has given this
classic statement of the problem of the relation between faith and understanding or faith and reason. And as I tried to indicate yesterday, he does it both ways. He can move both, as it were, from reason backwards into faith and then from faith forwards into reason. Unquestionably, the merits, the merits praised by Riviere over against the theories current in his time, notably Alain's classic theory of the triumphal encounter between Christ and the devil, is obvious. The outstanding
merit here is that Anselm focuses unmistakably on the guilt of man. Whereas in Alain's classic theory, man is left somewhat in the role of a spectator, an interested spectator, indeed one whose destiny hangs in the balance, but who is not so affected by the issue as he is in the case of Anselm. And here man is clearly pictured in the posture of the sinner facing the judgment of God, saddled with the obligation of rendering satisfaction. And
secondly, of course, Anselm wrestles very valiantly, as everybody has to, who tackles this theme with the relation between justice and mercy. He has this profound sense of the inviolability of the divine order of justice, the order of God's kingdom, the necessity which God has to uphold his honor, to maintain the honor of his kingdom without which the cosmos would fall into a state of chaos. This is the premise of his argument, and it is one which
it is always very hard to preserve intact. Questions begin to arise, of course, when we look at the notion of satisfaction. The first question that we may ask ourselves about this is, is it biblical? Always a good question to ask about any theological interpretation. Is it biblical? Well, certainly the word is not, at least not in the sense. In one of the servant songs in Isaiah 55, I think it is, where the prophet speaks of the
servant, that he shall see of the travel of his soul and shall be satisfied. At least that's how the King James Version has it. But clearly the concept of satisfaction there is something quite different from the sense in which it is used in Anselm. And yet, as I suggested yesterday, perhaps the concept is implicit in some of the parables of Jesus, which picture man analogously or parabolically in a situation analogous to that employed in Anselm's interpretation.
And the parable of the talents in particular lends at least an appearance of justification to Anselm's employment of the concept of satisfaction. Well, we have the other problem, two problems in particular, but one is his interpretation of the title or right of the god man to act on behalf of sinful mankind by basing that on his membership in the family of Adam. Yet again, this is something which is biblical, but should not be forgotten, that Matthew
and Luke both begin their story, their history of Jesus, by tracing his descent, one from Adam, one from Abraham, I forget which which. But this is an important thing, that this man of whom they are to narrate is in fact descended from the family of Adam. We may accept this in principle, but if we associate with it the thought of the transmission of guilt through the process of generation as it was developed on the Augustinian doctrine,
then we run into difficulties. From this point of view, the Athanasian ground for the solidarity of Christ with humanity as based in Platonic realism would seem to be preferable because it avoids this notion of hereditary guilt. And particularly offensive is the notion that the hereditary guilt is transmitted by the process of generation. If you refer back again to the chapter which I treated perhaps rather too frivolously about the virgin birth, he makes here the point, which
is a clear echo of the Augustinian doctrine, that this fourth possibility, that is to say the possibility of birth from a virgin, is a nobler and purer manner of originating existence than any of the others. Certainly it's not clear how it is nobler or purer than the origination of Eve from the side of Adam or of Adam from no parentage at all. But Anselm is here reflecting the popular sentiment that the births of the Savior from
a virgin alone is a nobler and purer method of originating human existence than from the ordinary sexual concourse of man and woman, which according to the Augustinian doctrine is attended by concupiscence and thereby forms the channel or conduit for the transmission of original sin. But interestingly enough, Anselm fails to follow through on this point because according to the Augustinian doctrine, the virgin herself, having been conceived in the normal manner, herself carries the tape of original sin
and therefore is presumably capable of transmitting it to her son even if he is born without sexual concourse. Of course, in order to overcome this difficulty, the Roman Church eventually dogmatized, elevated to dogmatic status, the notion that the virgin herself, at her conception in the womb of her mother, was miraculously cleansed from the taint of original sin by the retroactive efficacy of the merits of person. And this, of course, is the doctrine of the immaculate conception,
which was proclaimed in 1850, I believe, anti-dating the dogma of papal infallibility, which was promulgated at the First Vatican Council in 1870. Now, it is part, you see, of the papal argument for the promulgation of a new dogma that it's not new. Actually, only two, you see, have been promulgated. One before the actual, the formal proclamation of the papal infallibility itself, namely the dogma of the immaculate conception in 1850, if I remember correctly, and then
the dogma of the bodily assumption of the virgin about 100 years later. But it is a, that it is a basic argument in the promulgation of such a dogma that the pope does not, although he's infallible, does not act on a whim, but is expressing the mind of the church. He is merely making explicit what, according to the argument, has always been implicit in the mind of the church. But, of course, this argument is an extremely
difficult one to sustain because if you interrogate the fathers and the theologians of the past as to their position on a specific matter like this, say the immaculate conception of the virgin, you will find them divided on both sides. Therefore, the effect of the proclamation of a dogma like that of the immaculate conception is, in fact, to relegate many of the fathers and theologians of the past into the camp of the heretics. Anselm here seems to
be involved in a partial contradiction. On the one hand, accepting the birth of a virgin is nobler and purer than birth of a male and female. At the same time, he quite explicitly rejects the notion of the immaculate conception in Chapter 16. For although the conception of this man be pure and free from the sin of fleshly gratification, yet the virgin herself from whom he sprang was conceived in iniquity and in sin did her mother bear.
And this, of course, was Psalm 51, which is one of the great proof texts of the Augustinian doctrine, of course, completely wrongly interpreted, in sin did my mother conceive me. And here he explicitly denies the implication that was later made explicit in the doctrine of the immaculate conception. And then finally, the core of Anselm's argument. He contends at the end that he has beautifully adjusted the relative claims of justice and mercy, of God's honor and God's
compassion. He claims that he has worked out an equation which does violence to neither, but he has done it at a terrible price, as many critics have pointed out. He has done it at the price of driving a wedge between the father and the son. He has given the son a degree of latitude which is denied to the father, even though ostensibly the father is the author of the whole arrangement. Even though the whole process of
man's salvation is initiated by the father, the son in the execution of this arrangement is given a degree of latitude which the father himself is incapable of exercising, namely the transference of his merits to others. This argument which Anselm uses here is that a man is entitled to do what he wills with his own. And therefore the reward given to Christ in virtue of his work of superegregation is his to dispense to his brethren of mankind
as he wills, as an act of compassion. But if an act of compassion is possible for the son, it is denied to the father who is tied to the honor of his kingdom. And therefore, as unkind critics have put it, what Anselm demonstrates is that God the Father has instituted an elaborate legal process in order to circumvent the requirements of his own justice. Or to put the same point perhaps in a more peremptory manner, where is
forgiveness in all of this? The Creed says, you remember, I believe in the forgiveness of sins. But where is forgiveness here? The whole thing is worked out as a matter of commutative justice. God is not required upon to forgive. He receives the satisfaction which his law or his honor or the order of his kingdom demands. He doesn't need to give or forgive. He receives his due. He receives due compensation for the honor done. If Anselm, he
has set out to explain forgiveness, he has explained it away. Let me say a word briefly about, well, I think the hour has almost run out on us. Next day, tomorrow, that is, I will talk about Anselm's great rival and temporary Abelard, and then take a jump from that to see how the reformers adopted and at the same time modified in a significant manner Anselm's problematic, which we have reviewed. Thank you.