Transcript
Welcome to the second major lecture in Princeton Theological Seminary's Karl Barth Centennial Symposium. A couple of announcements. First of all, the book, The Nature of Doctrine, by Professor George Lindbeck, from whom we heard last night, is available and for sale just outside the door here on one of the tables if those of you would like to purchase that book at this time. One other announcement, please note from the schedule and the brochure that you received that
there is a reception this afternoon at 4:30 to which everyone is invited, all of those who are in attendance at this conference. This morning we are very fortunate to have Professor Michael Welker to further and deepen our reflections about Karl Barth's thought in the present period. Professor Welker is Professor of Systematic Theology at Tubingen University and comes to us well prepared to set Karl Barth's work in conversation with philosophical and scientific currents in both the
German and American context. He's the author of many works in German and let me risk rendering just a few titles into English translation for you. He's the editor of two works, one the discussion of Jurgen Moltmann's book The Crucified God, the second entitled Theology and Functional Systems Theory, Leumann's Sociology of Religion and Theological Discussion. He is the author of a book entitled The Process of Autonomy, a Philosophical Contribution to Understanding in Theological Reception and Criticism, and
the author also of another book The Universality of God and the Relativity of the World, Theological Cosmology in Dialogue with American Process Thinker Whitehead. Please welcome with me Professor Welker as he lectures on the topic Karl Barth's Theology and Process Theology. Thank you very much for your kind introduction. Happy to be here and happy that you invited me to join you in this celebration. Karl Barth never read texts of Whitehead. Moreover, Barth did not refer either
critically or positively to process theologians. That is, those who have in common that, in their fundamental ideas, they take orientation more or less strongly from Whitehead's theory. We do find Schubert Ogden mentioned shortly once in Barth's writings. However, the former is seen as a Boltmanian and numbered among the mob of Korach, as Barth chose to put it. Yehuda Golden has called the mob of Korach the first democratic movement in history. In Whitehead's work as well, no
traces are to be found which would permit one to conclude that Barth's theology or a way of thinking related to that theology had exercised any influence on him. Thus, if one returns to the sources and foundations and inquires after historically verifiable connections and differences, the topic, Karl Barth's Theology and Process Theology, seems to be treated quickly. The findings are negative. Nothing more can be said about the topic. The situation looks very different, of course, if one
does not try to relate one's thoughts back to the sources, the primary texts. Then we encounter a vital need among theologians and other religiously and philosophically interested contemporaries to learn from Barth and from Whitehead. In addition, we find theological and philosophical thinkers and texts which are looking to mediate Barth's Theology and Process Theology, at least from certain points of view. One can find impulses for such procedures, particularly in the work of Charles Hartshorne, who has connected
important thoughts of Whitehead with a form of thoughts of conventional occidental metaphysics. Several academic works, I emphasize those of John Robertson, Colin Gunton, and Sung-Hee Lee, have pointed out places at which the thought of Barth and that of Hartshorne intersect. That, of course, does not remove our initial observation that nothing more can be said about the direct relation between Barth's Theology and Whitehead's thought. That is, the possibility is not to be excluded that Process Theology
of the second and third generations has increasingly overlapped with Barth's Theology, precisely where the former has distanced itself from those forms of thought which are, in the strict sense, characteristic of Process Theology, namely the forms which go back to Whitehead's theory. So the possibility is not to be excluded that Process Theology of the second and third generations has increasingly overlapped with Barth's Theology, precisely where the former has fallen back upon other foundations and traditions, for example,
Anselm's Theology. The corresponding point is valid with regard to the fact that representatives of Process Theology as well as of Barthianism have opened themselves to Liberation Theology and Political Theology. This commonality does not yet prove a real relation of the respective foundations of Process Theology and Barthianism. Thus, in the broad field of many possible syncretistic forms, no clear answer is to be found to the question what connects Barth's Theology and what separates it from Process Theology.
On the level of historical investigation, one does not advance, on the one hand, the negative findings with regard to the relation between the primary texts and, on the other hand, the multicolored, confusing picture offered by the second and third generations of Process Theology and Barthianizing Theology, which bring in other forms of thought, other theologies. On the level of systematic comparison, however, more favorable conditions of departure afford themselves. In the following lecture, I shall conduct such a
systematic comparison and ask, first, what is common to Barth's and Whitehead's thought? Second, in the midst of these commonalities, what separates Barth's Theology from Whitehead's theory? And third, how can Barth's Theology and Process Theology mutually challenge and promote each other? To come to the first step, what is common to Barth's and Whitehead's thought? On an admittedly quite high level of abstraction, Process Thinkers and Process Theologians of the second and third generations have called attention to two
basic intentions which Barth and Whitehead undoubtedly share. It is a matter, firstly, of the critical reaction against classical theism and against the old European metaphysics which articulates and theoretically justifies that theism. Charles Hartshorne and the theologians indebted to his thought have continually given this aspect particular emphasis. Secondly, both Barth and Whitehead are interested in a new realism. A new realism, as above all Bernard Melland has clearly seen and repeatedly emphasized. They are seeking a new realism
which breaks free, I quote Melland, of the enclosure of mentalism which was imposed upon Christian thinking for more than 300 years and which had shaped the imagery of theological liberalism since the time of Kant. The first aspect, the criticism of classical theism, has in the meantime become familiar and widespread. It has in fact become a new attitude of consciousness for religious thought. Whether criticizing classical theism on the foundations of Christology and Trinitarian theology, as do Maltmann,
Jüngel and others, or in the name of a neoclassical theism as do Hartshorne, Ogden and others, Barthian and process theologians of all directions can quickly come to an amicable understanding with each other. The second aspect, the common interest of Barth and Whitehead in a new realism, is less apparent and less easy to make convincing. What in Barth's thinking is comparable to the new realism in Whitehead, which its imputation of a pluralistic, polycontextual reality? Where in Barth
can one find transformations of the concepts of the concrete and the objective, of subjectivity and reality, transformations which could be even remotely compared with the achievements of Whitehead's cosmology? In my estimation, one should not allow oneself to be led astray in the investigation of this question by the fact that, in comparison with Whitehead, Barth speaks a language which is more graphic, more plausible for the so-called common sense, and which bears the imprint of the symbolism
of the biblical tradition. That Barth, in fact, is interested in a new realism can already be shown with regard to the famous Barth-Harnack controversy of 1923. It can be shown that both theologians talk past each other because the liberal theologian Harnack and the dialectical theologian Barth base their discussion upon irreconcilable conceptions of truth to reality and of objectivity. Both, indeed, speak of truth to reality, of truth to theological reality, of relation to the object of
investigation and of objectivity. But each of them understands something else by those terms. Barth sees in the truth to reality and in objectivity the respect for and respecting of the fact that which is thematized in theology and science is not at our disposal, but instead irresistibly imposes and validates itself. If the investigation is true to reality, the object limits and breaks the subjectivity of the observer. It is necessary to regain the recognition of this superior power
with regard to the particular truth to reality, the particular object of faith and theology. Harnack, on the other hand, determines objectivity and truth to reality in terms of dependable, self-critically and methodically controlled communicability, openness to connection with other objects of investigation and conceivability. If one treats Harnack as representative of the dominant scientific theological direction of his time, a direction which in turn was dominated by mentalism, one can in fact say that Barth seeks to validate
a new, or in any case other, understanding of reality. Precisely formulated, he seeks to awaken understanding for the fact that God's reality validates itself. Criticism of conventional theism, breakthrough to a new realism. Certainly, in this regard, one can ascertain common intentions in Barth and Whitehead. However, with the catchwords criticism of conventional theism and effort to achieve a new realism, the commonalities have been established only in negation and in critical reaction against the tradition. In addition, this
establishment of commonalities still lies on a high level of abstraction. With the catchwords criticism of conventional theism and effort to achieve a new realism, nothing is yet said about the alternatives which Barth and Whitehead respectively develop. Nothing is yet made out regarding the constitution of these alternatives and regarding the question whether they are reconcilable with each other at all. With these catchwords, numerous concerns and forms of thought are not taken into account in which Barth and
Whitehead differ or are simply not comparable. Thus, fundamental differences show themselves precisely in the realm of that commonality of Barth's theology and Whitehead's theory. As soon as we inquire somewhat more specifically about the introduction and carrying through of that which suggests itself to Barth and Whitehead as an alternative to conventional theism and mental realism. The second step, what separates Barth's theology and Whitehead's theory in the midst of their commonalities? The fundamental differences between Barth's theology and
Whitehead's cosmology in the midst of their commonalities can be set forth succinctly, but indeed criticize conventional theism. However, this criticism occurs in Barth on the basis of Trinitarian and Christological presuppositions. In Whitehead, in the name of a cosmological principle which he calls God, Whitehead sees this principle at work in a transformation of reality to higher forms of harmony which he designates as, among other things, love. So both indeed criticize conventional theism, however, this criticism occurs on
different basis. Both Barth and Whitehead are indeed concerned with a new realism. Barth, though, makes use primarily of the forms of thought of dialogical personalism. He shows a special interest in the figure of an I-Thou communication mediated by a hierarchy of authority. He's interested in that communication's difference from a symmetrical I-Thou relationship controlled by interest. By contrast, in Whitehead the effort to achieve a new realism occurs in the framework of a cosmological theory developed
over a period of decades which in its mature form is very complex and accessible only with difficulty. If one is interested in demarketing and opposing Barth's theology to a theology which builds upon Whitehead's cosmology, if one is even interested in stereotypes of friend and foe, on this level of observation those stereotypes then comfortably at one's disposal. One can ascertain that Barth's theology, at least according to its intention and claim, first, is grounded in Trinitarian theology, second,
is Christologically centered, third, takes its orientation from biblical theology, and fourth, is ecclesiologically functionalized. By contrast, a theology which builds upon Whitehead's cosmology cultivates the following boundary conditions. First, God is understood as the dynamic unity of a relativistically conceived world. Second, centering occurs on the actual occasion or creature which is in a process of concrescence. Third, orientation occurs in the framework of a cosmology which is formed in terms of a theoretical language. And fourth, the function
is to provide an interdisciplinary, primarily interscientific, contact theory, a new type of metaphysics. The possibilities for placing Barthianizing theologians and process theologians in mutual confrontation are unfathomably rich. For example, here Barthianizing, primary interest in God. There, following Whitehead, primary interest in the world. Here, primary interest in Jesus Christ. There, primary interest in the creature or in a theoretical concept of the creature. Here, primary interest in the vitality of the biblical witness. There, primary interest in a
universalistic theory which takes account of new developments in the natural sciences. Here, theology as function of the Christian church and in service to the church. There, an undertaking which at most can be called philosophical theology and which seems to fit exactly into the pattern of the liberal tradition which Barth criticized so vehemently. From the perspectives of process theology, the opposition presents itself thus. Here, following Whitehead, a theoretical construct which seeks to do justice to the total
cultural relevance of faith. To the meaning of the churches for world society and to the universal scientific responsibility of theology. There, following Barth, a way of thinking which has been squeezed into dogmatic cultural forms remote from our own. A way of thinking which is embedded in representations of God which are obsolete or which for the honest intellect are impenetrable and incommunicable. And so forth. Such representations of self and other by self and other are familiar to
us. One leaves behind this level of the long standing ritualized and now fruitless polemic between Barth's theology and so called liberal theology. As soon as one no longer communicates by mean of mere claims and counterclaims. But instead seriously inquires where at which points the stereotypes of the opposite side do not apply. As soon as one sees one's conversation partner as following certain identical intentions but in another way. And as soon as one thus asks where at
which points the conversation partner escapes from the traditional patterns of exclusive demarcation. The conversation begins to become fruitful. One directs attention not to that which separates in a way destructive of commonality. Or which allows only self justification and self stabilization over against the other side. Rather one attains to that which separates in the midst of commonalities. The assertion that the other side starts not from God but rather from human being belongs to the familiar stereotypes of
the opposite side which Barth constructed and cultivated. Precisely this picture though does not apply to the foundational theory of process theology. Many process theologians would give a great deal to find an anthropological grounding or even an anthropological centering or privileging in Whitehead's cosmology. Instead of being able to speak only about the series of actual occasions which the human beings are. If one asks further why Whitehead's theory does not comply with the clear alternative between starting from
God and starting from human beings. One sees that Whitehead's thought does not at all fit into the dialogical pattern which is so important for Barth. Barth seeks to trace back to either relations generally to one to one relations all important theological themes and figures of thought. Be it a question of the self understanding of the triune God, God's relation to human beings or inter human relations. By contrast Whitehead's fundamental structures of thought grasp one to many
and many to many relations. Structures of thought that are very difficult to conceive. It is idle to argue which of these forms of thought is better or theologically more appropriate. One can set forth dialogical thinking as impressive, highly plausible and confirmed by many elementary human experiences not lastly by many biblical events. Our service this morning gave another example how powerful this centering of this correlation can be. One can disparate dialogical thinking as a primary form of
communication of five to twelve year olds as for example Salmon and Habermas impressively worked out. As such this form of communication is unable to grasp and to make sense of more demanding forms of social order. Or even cosmological questions. The structure of this form of communication is thus multiply superseded in human development. One can emphasize theologically for example that dialogical thinking allowed the development of Trinitarian theology to become frozen on an unsatisfactory level. In that way
the relation between the one God and the many human beings is grasped only reductionistically and Christological and anthropological orientations are blurred. In short the stagnation of the development over the past decades of above all pneumatology and ecclesiology can with good grounds be traced back directly to the plausible and apparently so innocently obvious figure of dialogical thinking. However the many to one and many to many figures of process theory are also burdened with material and theological problems.
In contrast to dialogical thinking they are as yet very difficult to imagine and to render plausible. Whitehead himself must make a great expenditure of theoretical language in order to represent and conceptually control that which he sets forth as reality. Whether this theory language in individual cases gives rise to fascination or alienation, common sense and the semantic of faith bar themselves as a rule against the direct use of that language. In fact up to this point that
language has not really succeeded in penetrating specifically religious systems of symbols to a degree that would have proved that language superior to dialogical thinking in for example the illumination of complex religious states of affair. So on the one side we have very plausible dialogical one to one relations which allow for both the inclusion and the exclusion of an anthropological starting point. On the other side we have one to many and many to many relations which escape
from the conventional picture of starting from human being but which only with difficulty attain the level of the representational world of common sense and of religious systems of symbols. Once again we seem to have indeed emerged from the field of conflict but at a price of falling into a situation of simple irreconcilability. This impression changes when one considers the theory of religion and religious development which Whitehead develops in religion in the making. There Whitehead describes the
development of high religions as a central factor in the cultural process in which the individual increasingly frees him or herself from being bound in his or her immediate environment. It's a process in which the individual increasingly frees him or herself from being bound into the immediate environment in order to gain an increasingly extensive circle of experience and operation. Already in very archaic rituals the agents renounce actions which have as Whitehead says direct relevance to the preservation
of their physical organisms. The agents accept an at least partial and temporary distancing and alienation from their direct natural environment in order to gain a more extensive social environment. Whitehead is persuaded though that the bonds of the social routine are also partly dissolved by higher religions in order to gain even more extensive reference to the world. Today for example through the communication by means of mass media. In this process, solidariness and disclosure of the world are
simultaneously heightened. Something occurs simultaneously which at first seems counterintuitive. We become increasingly solitary and yet expand the realm of our experience and influence. Our experience becomes simultaneously more abstract and more concrete. According to Whitehead the high religions stimulate precisely this process. Thus the central determinations of religion in Whitehead's book Religion in the Making are in no way contradictory. Rather they describe precisely the developments field of tension. Those central determinations are as follows. First I quote, religion
is what the individual does with his own solidariness and second religion is world loyalty. Whitehead is persuaded that high religions establish a field of tension which serves the covariant heightening of both the experience of solidariness and the formation of consciousness of the world. It is of the greatest importance to see that this field of tension is not established simply by means of a pressure towards abstraction and generalization. Although according to Whitehead's persuasion all highly developed religions
move towards a rationalistic metaphysics which endeavors to express the most general concepts adequate to the all inclusive universe as Whitehead says. Although all higher religions move into this direction of abstraction it is neither possible nor permissible for attitudes of religious consciousness and theologies to be either identified or to be aufgehoben in a metaphysics. For example, the Christian religion cultivates the field of tension between experience of solidariness and consciousness of the world by emphasizing a number of
fundamental facts and experiences in centrally plausible first hand intuition which at the same time open the way for claims to ultimate truth and unconditional obligation. Admittedly it is only vaguely that Whitehead points to such as he says fundamental facts. He points out that the, I quote, the reported sayings of Christ are not formulaized thought. They are descriptions of direct insight. His sayings are actions and not adjustments of concepts. He speaks in the lowest abstraction that language
is capable of. End of quote. The clearest determination of the tremendous fact exhibited by the gospel as Whitehead says occur with regard, in Whitehead with regard to Christ's experience of solidariness on the cross and the divine realization of a universal harmony without physical compulsion purely through the power of loving persuasion. In addition, in religion in the making, Whitehead put forward the notion of solidariness as a basic fact common to all high religions. Give another quote. The
great religious conceptions which haunt the imaginations of civilized mankind are scenes of solidariness. Prometheus chained to his rock. Mahomet brooding in the desert. The meditations of the Buddha. The solitary men on the cross. It belongs to the depth of the religious spirit to have felt forsaken even by God. End of quote. At this point, I should not yet like to direct attention to those considerations in order to discuss whether or not Whitehead's interest in the covariance
of processes of individuation and universalization correspond to genuinely religious thought. I should also not like to undertake considerations as to whether Whitehead has grasped the central facts of the Christian religion with sufficient sharpness or even with rough accuracy. At this point, it is more important to me to emphasize Whitehead's conviction that religiousness is necessarily bound to a selection from facts of lived experience and from direct experiences. I quote, religions commit suicide when they find their inspirations
in their dogmas. The inspiration of religion lies in the history of religion, but by this I mean that it is to be found in the primary expressions of the intuitions of the finest types of religious lives. End of quote. This necessary foundation of religion in a selection of concrete facts and experiences does not, of course, exclude processes of rationalization and dogmatization. On the contrary, by dogmatic expression is necessary, for whatever has objective validity is capable of
partial expression in terms of abstract concepts, so that a coherent doctrine arises which elucidates the world beyond the locus of the origin of the dogmas in question. At this point, Whitehead localizes the function of theology, which he compares with the function of the natural sciences. Theologies have to bring those primary facts in a coherent relation, and that means on a certain level of abstraction and in a system of conceptual reference. A dogma is, as Whitehead says,
simply the expression of a fact as it appears within a certain sphere of thought. On this level, one has sufficient grounds for discussing and coming to an understanding as to whether Whitehead's or Barth's selection of the central facts and the system of reference, which allows for dogmatization, is more appropriate to the Judeo-Christian tradition to which both of them refer. Yet in addition, one should remember that Whitehead himself is primarily interested in a further process of
generalization which follows upon dogmatization. The longest, most important, and most influential parts of his mature theory concentrate on this further step, the transition from dogmatic systems to a new type of metaphysics. In order to emerge from imprisonment of the usual field of conflict between Barth's theology and liberal theology, Barth's theology and process theology, one must clearly differentiate two tasks. One is the task which Whitehead ascribes to theologies as to natural sciences. The other, the task which
he assigns to metaphysics. Whitehead is persuaded that theologies and natural sciences move in the realm of tension between facts, concrete experiences, and their dogmatization. Theology and natural sciences are differentiated through selection, generalization, and systematization of facts and concrete experiences. By contrast, Whitehead understands by metaphysics, I quote, the science which seeks to discover the general ideas which are indispensably relevant to the analysis of everything that happens. It would be simplistic and would lead back into pre-modern
forms of thought if one wanted to regard the task of metaphysics as higher over against theologies and natural sciences. And wanted to work at all the thoughts of one surpassing the other. The heightened power of generalization, which is proper to metaphysics, is bought at a price. Namely, metaphysics live and experiences secondhand, so to speak. Whitehead is convinced that metaphysics today can be established only as a contact theory aiming at universal understanding. Metaphysics is formed with regard
to several, by tendency all, systematized or dogmatized contexts of experience. Metaphysics understands itself, in Whitehead's perspective, as systematization of systematizations. Since the latter must themselves be continually examined for accordance with experience, and in given cases revised, metaphysics is in principle subject to a permanent process of revision. Likewise, metaphysics is subject to a permanent criticism of its abstractions. Metaphysics does not tell reality how the latter is constituted. Metaphysics is not the queen of the sciences, but rather
their center for understanding their interface. One can argue whether this theory, which reacts to the modern differentiation of the systems of reference of empirical sciences, whether this theory should still be called metaphysics at all. Whitehead himself spoke as a rule not of metaphysics, but of ametaphysics, and left little doubt regarding his differences from Aristotelian thought. Here you see one of the major differences between Whitehead and many of those who wanted to follow him. It can be
clearly seen that, according to Whitehead's conviction, and in opposing to many who would like to appeal to Whitehead, ametaphysical theology, without further determination, is a contradiction in terms. Although ametaphysics of the Whiteheadian type will naturally also attempt to give a systematic place to the idea of God, such ametaphysics cannot understand itself as a theology or as the latter's equivalent. A process theology which appeals to Whitehead's theory and wishes to work with his forms of thought should
not blur this difference. It is this type of metaphysics which not only differentiates Whitehead's theory from conventional forms of thought, but also makes a fruitful exchange between Barth's theology and process theology in principle conceivable and possible. So the last step, how can Barth's theology and process theology mutually challenge and promote each other? Ametaphysics, as comprehended by Whitehead, certainly can and will proceed from a determinate scientific, respectively dogmatic, system of reference. Ametaphysics can have its origin and
its home in, for example, a theological dogmatics or a particular natural science. However, the immediate stabilization and cultivation of the system of reference from which ametaphysics proceeds does not belong to its tasks. Rather, ametaphysics alienates itself from that system of reference insofar as ametaphysics does not have direct recourse to the concrete facts of experiences which ground that system. Instead, ametaphysics has recourse to those aspects of the fundamental facts and to those formations of the system of
reference, which can also be discovered in other dogmatics and in other scientific systematizations. One should not understand this being geared to high-level abstraction and universal structures as an interest in transformation and unification of specific systematic complexes, of specific dogmatics, of specific systems of symbols. On the contrary, the more clearly the specific systems of symbols are delineated and the more sharply the specific dogmatics are formulated, the greater are not only the challenges but also the chances
of development for ametaphysics. For the more clearly the specific systems of symbols are presented, the richer is, on the one hand, the foundational material on which ametaphysics can fall back, and the smaller is, on the other hand, the danger of abstractive distortion and of trivializing, a danger to which every ametaphysics is subject. The cultivation of a specific system of symbols, less abstractly formulated, the cultivation of a dogmatics grounded in Trinitarian theology, Christologically centered, taking its orientation
from biblical theology and ecclesiologically functionalized, the cultivation of this reference system, is precisely the concern of the theology of Carbad. It is characteristic of Barth's theology and of all those who legitimately declare themselves obligated to his thought, stubbornly to defend and to preserve this concern against all philosophical and other conceptual supersessions and relativizations of the dogmatic theological system of reference. Barth saw clearly that supposed supersessions and relativizations of the system of reference of theological dogmatics threaten
on two fronts, so to speak. Firstly, they can occur in the name of a higher level of generalization. In the framework, for example, of ametaphysics, a philosophy, a theory of culture, or even a systems theory. As we could show, however, an interest of this type in supersession and relativization is not present in Whitehead. His metaphysics does not claim to replace or even to correct theological work. His metaphysics consciously pursues another task on another terrain. Relativizations of
the work of theological dogmatics can also, however, occur on the level of concretion through new determinations and assumptions regarding the facts and experiences central for religiousness and theology. At this point, one will indeed have to ask whether Whitehead, with his notion of solitariness and his interest in the covariant heightening of processes of individuation and universalization, one can ask whether Whitehead has not under-determined the relevant facts of religion in general and the Christian tradition in particular.
In my estimation, everything speaks for the view that, with those determinations, Whitehead has offered a systematic reformulation of central experiences of the wisdom texts. However, this systematization is insufficient for the comprehension and accurate rendering of the traditions which are most important for Christian theology. Insufficient especially for the determination of the tremendous fact exhibited by the gospels. Here, a theology which follows Barth should challenge those who wish to make use of Whitehead's thought. Does that mean that
the theology which follows Barth should assert the validity of Barth's basic figure of dialogical personalism over against the theology which follows Whitehead? Should the theology which follows Barth, in addition, appropriate the interest characteristic of Barth's thought in a theological hierarchy of power between God and human being, a hierarchy whose validity Barth frequently seeks to assert by means of ideas of spatial and temporal priority, God first, God above, and so on? It can easily be shown that
dialogistic thinking, religiously presupposed without question, as well as the religious interest in the power code, are precisely the points at which Whitehead's thought reacts allergically to Christian theology. Over against the dialogical point of departure, Whitehead denied that religion is essentially a social phenomenon. It is only, I quote, in a primitive phase of religion, dominated by ritual and emotion, that we are dealing with essentially social phenomena. Conversely, religion in its decay sinks back into sociability. Over against
the interest in the theological hierarchy of power, an interest so strongly imprinted upon the first volumes of the church dogmatics, Whitehead emphasized over and over, I quote, the worship of glory arising from power is not only dangerous, it arises from a barbaric conception of God. In the light of the theology of Karl Barth, one will have to test, and I think correct, both reservations. One will have to ask whether and how the facts of religious experience
observed by Whitehead are to be brought together with God's communication with human beings, the communication to which Barth gave central position. Further, how are Whitehead's observations to be brought together with the communication of faith and with the thoroughly non-barbaric demonstrations of the spirit and of the power of which the Christian complex of symbols speaks? In this regard, Barth's theology can offer a manifold challenge and stimulation for process theology. However, it is not a question of
a one-sided challenge of the form which would, on the one hand, enable one to assign to Barth's theology, on the basis of its material appropriateness and competence, the care of the specifically Christian system of symbols, and which would, on the other hand, require on either to Barthianize process theology or to deport it into the realm of competence of metaphysical theory formation. Instead, the forms of thought which Whitehead developed and which encounter us today in different
variants, in culturally influential theories, call into question the means, the means by which Barth emphasized the sociality of religious life, a sociality which is, in fact, foundational for Christian faith and Christian theology. One will have to examine whether the dialogical relation has, in fact, been adequate as the basic theological figure. One will have to examine whether the I-Thou correlation has, in fact, been the adequate figure for formulating the doctrine of the Trinity, ecclesiology, anthropology, and
even covenant theology. One will have to examine whether the more complex one-to-many and many-to-many structures to which the best thinkers of liberal theology and post-liberal theology, as we heard yesterday, gave high-level development as early as the previous century, should not be newly validated in a genuinely theological system of reference. In this respect, Whitehead's theory and process theology could offer numerous challenges and impulses for thought to a Barthanizing theology. It is
significant to see, and I come to the end, that Barth himself, above all in his later work, sought to further develop and to supersede his own popularized dialogical forms of thought in precisely that direction. The strongest contributions which Barth himself has to give in this respect are to be found in his, I think, magnificent new approach to Christology in the church dogmatics doctrine of reconciliation. There, Barth undertakes a transformation of conventional theological dogmatics, which thoroughly corresponds
to Whitehead's requirement that theology begin with facts and first-hand experiences. Barth emphasizes, and I quote, The meaning of the true deity cannot be gathered from any notion of supreme, absolute, non-worldly being. It can be learned only from what took place in Christ. Barth saw clearly the relative strangeness, even the harshness, of this theological thinking, which has its point of departure in concrete facts. Again and again he emphasized that to dare to speak of God's
identity with this, I quote, Man who was born like all of us in time, who lived and thought and spoke, who could be tempted and suffer and die, and who was in fact tempted and suffered and died, that this is something very bold and profoundly astonishing. Yet Barth continually emphasizes the fact that it is the center of Christian faith and the point of Christian theology to cling to and to impress upon its hearers the following truth,
give another quote, who God is and what it is to be divine is something we have to learn where God has revealed God's self and God's nature, the essence of the divine. That assertion precisely does not raise claims to speak of a God who could be ascertained in all conceivable systems of reference. In critical distancing from his own tendencies in his early work, Barth steadfastly warns Christian theology against centering on an abstract God and an abstract
human being. It is in Christ that God becomes a creature, human being, flesh, that God, Barth says, enters into our being in contradiction. If we think that this is impossible, it is because our concept of God is too narrow, too arbitrary, too human, far too human. In this concentration on the tremendous fact exhibited by the gospels, a point of convergence, a starting point of understanding between Barth's theology and process theology, could be determined. If one begins
with a situation described at the outset of this lecture, a situation of conflict, incompatibility and confusion, much is attained with the determination of such a point of departure. Little enough seems accomplished, however, if one acquires after the more precise dogmatic and systematic determination of this fact, if one acquires after appropriate generalizations and concretizations which do not lead to an abstract God but to Christ's presence in the Spirit. Little seems attained if one asks how the basic
dialogical figures and the assumptions of the religious centrality of the experience of solitariness could be altered. And in the exchange of ideas between Barth's theology and process theology. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the fact that we have moved from irreconcilability and the exchange of criticism and pretensions to the level on which the theologies connected with Barth and process theology can develop common theological, systematic and material important questions. Still more is accomplished though than merely pointing to
a possible common point at which to begin conversation and to certain fields of tension of common questions. A regress into the old difficulties of understanding and conflicts can be prevented by the grounded differentiation of, on the one hand, theological work and, on the other hand, a type of metaphysics which Whitehead has altered and adapted to the development of modernity. It was the uncontrolled mixing up and mistaking of theological and metaphysical tasks which led to some strange
theological phenomena and to terrible stereotypes of the other side. In the Barthians, intolerant pretensions to universality and, at the same time, dogmatic narrowness. In the process theologians, monsters of theoretical language given out as theology, soteriologically powerless and ecclesiologically incommunicable. Such distortions should belong to the past. Certainly, Barth is primarily interested in the concrete grounding of faith in more cultivated and richer complexes of theological system symbols and soteriological power and in enabling the community of faith, communicability
of the contents of faith. By contrast, Whitehead and many process theologians are primarily interested in developing and having at their disposal a theory which inquires after analogies to important forms of the Christian faith in other systems of symbols, religious, scientific, general, cultural. The two tasks are most certainly not to be simply identified, yet both tasks are requisite to the inner and outer orientation of faith. Only the adoption of both tasks characterizes a realistic theology which is
responsibly related to the world. Thank you. Let us take a five minute break and then return back here for hearing from our major respondent and from your questions. Five minutes.