THE CRITICISM OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY FROM THE CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW

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INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of the Problem.

One of the most predominant influences in American thought today is the experimental humanism of John Dewey. It opposes theistic belief and therefore creates an urgent need for studies which will clarify the issues between it and the Christian faith. To some extent such studies have been made, and it is with them that this thesis concerns itself in hope of securing further clarity. The task at hand is to discover the criticisms of the philosophy of Dewey which have been made from the Christian point of view; to summarize them concisely; and to determine, by a comparative study, which of them are most emphasized by these Christian thinkers.

B. The Importance of the Problem.

Such a study as this may be considered important because of the extent and strength of the influence of Dewey, if for no other reason. His career to date as an educator and philosopher has extended over a period of fifty years. His influence has reached far through the prestige of the University of Chicago and Columbia University, the two schools in which most of his work has been done, which are outstanding universities in America. His writings have been so voluminous, and the attention given to him in the writing of others so great, that a listing of his bibliography

in 1929 comprised a fair sized volume.[1] The entire field of public education has been greatly affected by his thinking. It has been claimed that ninety percent of the teachers today are influenced by him. Further, Dewey's influence as a philosopher is generally recognized. Edgar Sheffield Brightman has spoken of him as "America's greatest philosopher."[2] American religious education shows many evidences of his influence. George Albert Coe, in the foreword of his book, A Social Theory of Religious Education, acknowledges his indebtedness to Dewey for the theories he presents in that book.[3]

This study may further be considered important because reactions to the philosophy of Dewey are at the present time forthcoming, arising particularly in the minds of Christian thinkers. A concise presentation attempting to cover this field of reaction to Dewey should be of value, and should make comparisons possible which will isolate certain criticisms as representative of the Christian position relative to Dewey's philosophy.

The study at hand may further be considered important because of the results it should yield. It should clarify the values and weaknesses of the Dewey philosophy. It should point out the emphases in it which contradict es-

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1 Thomas and Schneider, A Bibliography of John Dewey, New York, Columbia University Press, 1929, 151 pp.
2 E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, p. 74.
3 Cf., Coe, G. A., A Social Theory of Religious Education, p.x.

sentials of the Christian faith. And it should call attention to those which are in harmony with Christianity and can be incorporated into Christian living.

C. Sources of Study.

The sources of this study are the works of Christian critics of Dewey. Herman Harrell Horne was chosen at the outset as one of the critics to be studied because of the extent of the work he has done in evaluating Dewey's point of view. To date he has published three criticisms of Dewey which are considered significant. They are: The Philosophy of Education, Revised Edition, 1927, which devotes a chapter to a criticism of pragmatism; John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, a monograph criticizing Dewey; and The Democratic Philosophy of Education, an exposition and criticism of Dewey's book, Democracy and Education. Having chosen Dr. Horne on the basis of the work he has done, his advice was sought in the selection of the other critics. In an interview, he was questioned as to the outstanding critics of Dewey. He referred to Walter Albion Squires' book, Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, which is yet in manuscript form; to William Ernest Hocking's treatment of pragmatism in his book, Types of Philosophy; and, to Edgar Sheffield Brightman's book, The Problem of God. In Brightman's book reference is made to his criticism of Dewey's The Quest for Certainty in Religious Education for January, 1930. Since this article offers a more elaborate statement than is made in The Problem of God,

it is also included as a source of study.

D. Mode of Procedure.

There are two main steps in the procedure of this study. The first is to analyze the writings criticizing Dewey's philosophy from the Christian point of view and to present the specific criticisms they advance. The second step is to summarize these criticisms in concise statements, and by comparison of the objections offered by the four men studied, to isolate those which are major. Each critic's objections will be summarized as they are presented, and a comparison isolating the outstanding objections will be made after all the criticisms have been outlined. In the concluding chapter the investigator will be in a position to offer certain observations with reference to each critic's reaction to Dewey; to suggest what, in Dewey's philosophy, Christian people may wish to reject and what incorporate in Christian thought and life; and finally, to point to further lines of investigation growing out of this study.

CHAPTER II.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY EDGAR SHEFFIELD BRIGHTMAN

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There are two sources for the study of the criticisms of Dewey's philosophy made by Edgar Sheffield Brightman. One is his book, The Problem of God, and the other is his "Review of The Quest for Certainty," one of three articles in a symposium on that book published in Religious Education for January, 1930. The respective criticisms found in each of these discussions will be presented and then summarized in a series of propositions which crystalize Brightman's objection to the philosophy of Dewey.

A. Analysis of the Criticism in The Problem of God.

The mention which Brightman makes of Dewey in this book is in the chapter entitled "The Substitutes for God." Because of this it is to be expected that his remarks about Dewey will be relative to theistic belief. Such is the case as evidenced in the criticisms which follow:

First in this discussion of Dewey's philosophy, Brightman contends that Dewey's metaphysics is more in harmony with theism than with traditional atheism. This statement is based on the interpretation that Dewey rejects skepticism, materialism, and mechanism, together with traditional realism and idealism; that he regards nature as interaction; and, that he finds purpose to be a natural category.[1]

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1 Cf., Brightman, E. S., The Problem of God, pp. 54-55.

In the second place, Brightman contends that Dewey is so concerned about avoiding dogmatic belief in God that he does not consider accepting God as a working hypothesis. Brightman arrives at this conclusion as a result of following on from the interpretation of Dewey's metaphysics just referred to. He asserts that it might be expected of Dewey to "have sympathy with the essential heart of theism which is the faith that human values stand in living relation with a source of value beyond man."[1] He calls attention to Dewey's expression in Human Nature and Conduct, that religion is "the freedom and peace of the individual as a member of an infinite whole,"[2] as representing a very close approach to belief in God. Then he refers to the guarded statements in the Eleventh Lecture of The Quest for Certainty. Here Dewey speaks of religion as "a sense of the possibilities of existence and ..... devotion to the cause of these possibilities."[3] Brightman regards the statement, "a religious attitude would surrender once for all commitment to beliefs about matters of fact,"[3] introduced later in the paragraph, as being intended to make clear that "devotion to the cause of these possibilities" does not refer to God. For this reason Brightman assumes that Dewey's concern to avoid traditional theism is one of the elements in his temperament

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1 Brightman, E. S., The Problem of God, p. 55.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 55., See also Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 331-332.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 55., See also Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 303-304.

which keeps him from accepting God as a working hypothesis.[1]

In the third place, he contends that Dewey contributes more by way of substitutes for God than most traditional doubters of theism do because he is more concerned to make a case for experience than he is to refute theism.[2] This is largely justified by the substance of the two conceptions of religion referred to above. In the first, reference is made to "an infinite whole;"[3] and in the second, there is a positive element expressed in the term, "the possibilities of existence."[4]

In the fourth and last place, Brightman contends that Dewey's view of God falls short because it is based on an interest in only one aspect of personality. Its basic interest is in the will rather than the whole thinking, feeling, acting self. This criticism is the most direct one made by Brightman and in it he is not only criticizing Dewey but Lippmann, Russell and Neitzsche with whose substitutes for God he is also dealing in this chapter. His statements are most cogent and therefore attempt at paraphrase will not be made. He says:

> What we have here is an analysis of personality into abstractions. Every view which is based on an interest in one aspect of personality, taken by itself apart from the whole personal life, leads to an abstract and incomplete view of what

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1 Cf., Brightman, E. S., The Problem of God, pp. 55-56.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 56-57.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 55., See also Dewey, John, Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 331-332.
4 Cf., Ibid., p. 55., See also Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 303-304.

> religion is and, on account of its inadequate basis, arrives at an inadequate God. If we are to find out the truth about religion or about God, we must take all of the evidence into account. The evidence with which we start in religious experience is not feeling alone or thought alone or will alone, but it is the whole self, the feeling, thinking, willing person. If we start by examining the full evidence of human personality, it may be that clear thinking will compel us to arrive at a conception of a divine personality. [1]

B. Analysis of the Criticism in "The Review of The Quest for Certainty."

First in his criticism of The Quest for Certainty, Brightman contends that Dewey fails in not applying his empiricism to religion. This criticism is made in the introduction of the article and appears again with variations in the discussion. The argument is that Dewey sketches human and cosmic development as it appears in the light of secular experience and applies his results to religious experience and belief without having examined them in the same way as he has secular experience.[2]

In the second place, Brightman contends that Dewey's conceptions of religion are unempirical and abstract. Here two of Dewey's statements about religion are referred to[3] but the criticism is chiefly based on the one already mentioned which makes "the possibilities of existence" the object of worship. Brightman objects that this conception

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1 Brightman, E. S., The Problem of God, p. 58.
2 Cf., E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, p. 74.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 74., See also Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 47, 303.

makes "every consideration of possible future changes a religious experience."[1]

In the third place, Brightman holds that Dewey seems to be inconsistent in his conceptions of religion. This again is based on the conception of religion to which references have already been made. It is as follows:

> A sense of the possibilities of existence and ... ... a devotion to the cause of these possibilities as distinct from acceptance of what is given at the time..... a religious attitude would surrender once for all commitment to beliefs about matters of fact, whether physical, social or metaphysical. [2]

Brightman points out that "devotion to the cause of these possibilities" approaches somewhat the idea of God and recognizes partially the objective realism of religion. But over against this it is pointed out that Dewey denies the importance of personal relation to God and gives no place in the religious attitude for commitment about matters of fact. Yet it cannot be denied that devotion to "the cause of these possibilities" is a kind of commitment.[3]

In the fourth place, Brightman contends that Dewey is inconsistent in his emphasis on change. He himself is interested in an unchangeable devotion to change. This is not an essential part of Brightman's criticism but it comes out incidentally in his discussion of Dewey's application of the idea of change to religion.[4]

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1 Cf., E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, p. 74.
2 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 303-304.
3 Cf., E. S. Brightman, Op. Cit., pp. 74-75.
4 Cf., Ibid., p. 75.

In the fifth place, Brightman asserts that Dewey's agnostic attitude in regard to knowledge of God contradicts the religious experience of the race and his own experimental temper. This is the essential criticism arising out of the discussion of the application of the idea of change to religion. Brightman is not hostile to recognizing change in matters of religion if it means "that every religious conviction should be held as a tentative faith subject to improvement and instruction from future experience."[1] But as the tone of the entire argument of The Quest for Certainty would imply, it is taken to mean that it is futile to attempt to form any hypothesis about God or to seek to find a real God.[2]

In the sixth place, Brightman contends that Dewey is inconsistent in maintaining a metaphysics of his own. He implies metaphysical agnosticism in his conception of religion. Brightman points out that if Dewey were to be consistent he would have to confine all his thought to experiments in action without making any references as to the nature of reality. He feels that it is fortunate that Dewey is inconsistent because by so being he offers positive metaphysical ideas.[3]

In the seventh place, Brightman holds that there are certain aspects of religion in Dewey's philosophy. He

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1 E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, p. 75.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 75.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 75.

points out six characteristics of the philosophy of Dewey which have religious value.[1] They are as follows: (a) Dewey's philosophy emphasizes the activity of thought. (b) It emphasizes the purposive character of thought. (c) It emphasizes experience as opposed to abstract rationalism. (d) It views nature as "a moving whole of interacting parts."[2] (e) It treats empirically "the values dearest to the heart of man."[3] (f) It asserts that "purpose is a legitimate idea in describing nature itself in the large."[4]

In the eighth place, Brightman makes the assertion that if Dewey would extend his empirical treatment into the realm of religion, he would arrive at a more living religion than has yet been experienced by most men. This is the final criticism which Brightman makes in this article and it is probably the strongest positive concession that he makes to Dewey. He regards The Quest for Certainty as an antithesis opposing a thesis supposedly set up by traditional religion. The thesis is the proposition that "value is a static property of an antecedently perfect universe."[5] The antithesis is the proposition that "value is action to improve the present state of affairs."[5] Brightman proposes the synthesis which he holds Dewey vaguely hints at. It is the proposition that "value is action to improve the present state of affairs

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1 Cf., E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, pp. 75-76.
2 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 291.
3 Ibid., p. 107.
4 Ibid., p. 246.
5 E. S. Brightman, Op. Cit., p. 76.

through discovery and application to experience of antecedent tendencies (purposes) of a universe which is not yet and never will be perfect."[1] This according to Brightman is the desireable result which would accrue if Dewey would apply his empiricism to religion.

C. Summary of Brightman's Criticisms.

To summarize these criticisms by means of synthesis leaves the following series of propositions:

1. Dewey is unchanging in his devotion to change and in this is inconsistent.

2. Dewey is inconsistent in maintaining a metaphysics and at the same time implying metaphysical agnosticism.

3. Dewey's conceptions of religion are inconsistent.

4. Dewey's agnostic attitude in regard to knowledge of God contradicts the religious experience of the race and his own experimental temper.

5. Dewey wishes to avoid dogmatic belief in God.

6. Dewey's view of God falls short because he is interested only in the will and not in the whole thinking, feeling, willing person.

7. Dewey fails in not applying his empiricism to religion.

8. If Dewey were to apply his empiricism to religion he would arrive at a more living religion than has yet been experienced by most men.

9. Dewey makes a more positive contribution in the field of metaphysics than most traditional atheists do because he is more concerned to make a case for experience than he is to refute theism.

10. Dewey's philosophy is religious in that it emphasizes the activity of thought.

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1 E. S. Brightman, "Review of The Quest for Certainty," Religious Education, January, 1930, p. 76.

11. It is religious in that it emphasizes the purposive character of thought.

12. It is religious in that it emphasizes experience as opposed to abstract rationalism.

13. It is religious in that it views nature as "a whole of interacting parts."

14. It is religious in that it treats empirically "the values dearest to the heart of man."

15. It is religious in its assertion that "purpose is a legitimate idea in describing nature itself in the large."

CHAPTER III.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

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The source studied for William Ernest Hocking's criticisms of the philosophy of Dewey is Types of Philosophy. Attention is directed chiefly to chapter ten, entitled "Pragmatism Examined." As the title suggests, the discussion is not directly a criticism of Dewey but rather of the pragmatism of both Dewey and William James. Consequently, all of the criticisms may not be directly applicable to Dewey. Hocking regards his examination of pragmatism as giving greater attention to the type represented by James, but he does not seem to think it necessary to differentiate the two types as far as their theories of knowledge are concerned.[1] All except three of his criticisms are relative to the theory of knowledge, and these three in dealing with metaphysics do not seem to be dealing with matters foreign to Dewey's philosophy. For these reasons all of the criticisms will be presented.

A. Analysis of the Argument in Types of Philosophy.

First in Hocking's argument in Types of Philosophy, it is contended that there are truths which the pragmatic

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1 Cf., Hocking, W. E., Types of Philosophy, p. 143. He says: "These two branches, with their different interests, are likely to reach quite different metaphysical conclusions. So far as the theory of knowledge is concerned, there is nothing essentially incompatible between the two in the primary matters of principle."

test cannot detect. Taking Mussolini's pragmatic judgment that democracy is a failure because it did not work in Italy, he questions whether or not democracy has ever been tried. He does the same with the charge arising as a result of the World War that Christianity is a failure, and goes further to ask whether history can yield a pragmatic proof of any belief. The belief in immortality is cited and the difficulty pointed out which arises from trying to strike a balance pragmatically between the good and bad effects of such a belief.[1]

In the second place, Hocking contends that the human mind aims at knowledge which is independent of pragmatic truth. This he substantiates by three instances. We know that both of two contrary propositions cannot be true; but according to pragmatism if no evidence is to be had for or against either proposition, neither is true nor false. The human mind conceives of one object as distinct from another although they are exact duplicates, but as far as pragmatic truth is concerned, there is no such distinction. According to pragmatic truth, there might be several theories as to the nature of things which would work equally well and which therefore would be equally true, but the mind knows that the truth about the world is that character which allows it to assume these various appearances.[2]

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1 Cf., pp. 160-161.
2 Cf., pp. 161-163.

In the third place, Hocking contends that the element of choice entering into pragmatism makes a chosen belief subjective and therefore destroys it. He points out that belief is the reference of the mind to an object assumed to be real. In pragmatism the suspicion that our will has tipped the balance of evidence makes us suspect the reality of the object of belief.[1]

In the fourth place, he contends that the basic proposition of pragmatism, namely, that "all propositions that work are true," is not logically permissable. He points out that pragmatism is based upon a "false conversion" of the proposition that "all true propositions work" into "all propositions that work are true."[2]

In the fifth place, Hocking allows that a "negative pragmatism" would be of use in detecting error. This follows from the correct conversion of the proposition from which the false conversion of pragmatism is derived. "All true propositions work," therefore "no proposition which does not work is true."[3]

In the sixth place, Hocking contends that pragmatism is based on a non-pragmatic truth which it cannot prove. In order that the false conversion of the proposition, "all true propositions work," be made true, it is necessary to assume that the universe is entirely fit for our ex-

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1 Cf., p. 163.
2 Cf., p. 164.
3 Cf., p. 164.

istence. It would be necessary also to believe that true beliefs would at the same time be life-promoting and comforting. But pragmatism cannot establish this truth, for it must be used to establish pragmatism.[1]

In the seventh place, Hocking contends that in ethics pragmatism cannot determine what is right. We cannot determine that to be right which promotes welfare or survival or happiness, because we can only determine what makes for welfare and happiness by first determining what is right.[2]

In the eighth place, he contends that pragmatism can claim no support from scientific method in its emphasis upon choice. Scientific method is one of strict logical procedure which allows as little place as possible for the human equation. An hypothesis is verified by giving strict attention to the facts which follow from it independently of the interests of the observer.[3]

In the ninth place, he contends that pragmatism can claim no particular support from scientific method in its instrumentalism. In so far as instrumentalism is an extension of scientific method, it is not peculiarly pragmatic.[4]

In the tenth place, Hocking contends that pragmatism invalidates itself in its emphasis on plasticity

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1 Cf., pp. 164-165.
2 Cf., pp. 165-166.
3 Cf., pp. 166-167.
4 Cf., p. 167.

and change.[1] The idea of an experiment itself requires that something does not change. The "x" of the mathematician must remain the same throughout the problem if the problem is to have meaning. The mind which experiments must remain the same. The object of all experiment is to establish something that will stay learned once we have it. Hence he argues, "To make every habit and foundation tentative, and every standard provisional, would be like living in a house which was sliding in its place and melting over our heads."[2]

In the eleventh place, Hocking contends that the element of choice in pragmatism makes it ineffective in the realm of religion. Particularly in religion, objective truth is the only thing that can set us free; "God is nothing if not that on which we depend."[3] Every chosen belief and man-made idea about God depends too much upon us in pragmatism; our need for assurance is greatest in matters of religious belief. Choice can have no place in arriving at our religious beliefs, therefore pragmatism is ineffective in religion.[4]

In the twelfth place, Hocking admits that pragmatism does well to emphasize the fact that active effort is a necessity in arriving at truth. There is distinction, however, between the will to reach truth and the will to decide truth. Conviction comes, as pragmatism would have us to see, from an active effort to reach the truth and not

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1 Cf., pp. 167-169.
2 p. 168.
3 p. 170.
4 Cf., pp. 169-170.

from passively waiting to be convinced.[1]

In the thirteenth place, he contends that pragmatism does well in calling attention to the fact that there is a region of the world which is unfinished and plastic in which our actions change the facts. Treating a man as an enemy may make him such, and vice versa. The will to believe any enterprise a success or failure may make it such. This is the rightful field of pragmatism.[2]

In the fourteenth place, Hocking argues that pragmatism acquiesces too easily in the agnostic view of metaphysical truth. We have no right to give up in despair the age-long effort to know the truth. It is very likely that whatever in the universe can effect us is connected with us by lines which our knowledge can trace.[3]

B. Summary of Hocking's Criticisms.

These points of criticism restated in brief form in a series of propositions for the value of summary are as follows:

1. There are truths which pragmatism cannot detect.

2. Pragmatic truth does not satisfy the mind's conception of truth.

3. The subjective element in pragmatism introduced by choice tends to destroy beliefs.

4. The basic proposition of pragmatism is logically untenable.

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1 Cf., pp. 170-171.
2 Cf., p. 171.
3 Cf., p. 171.

5. Pragmatism is based upon a non-pragmatic truth which it cannot prove.

6. Pragmatism cannot determine what is right in ethics because it is necessary first to determine what is right before determining what will promote welfare, survival or happiness.

7. Pragmatism is opposed to scientific method in its emphasis upon choice.

8. Pragmatism can claim no particular support from scientific method in its instrumentalism.

9. Pragmatism fails in its emphasis upon change; something must remain constant if there is to be meaning.

10. The element of choice in pragmatism makes it most ineffective in matters of religion.

11. Pragmatism acquiesces too easily in the agnostic view of metaphysical truth.

12. A negative form of pragmatism would be valuable in detecting error.

13. Pragmatism does well in emphasizing the fact that active effort is a necessity in arriving at truth.

14. It is true, as pragmatism reminds us, that there is a region of the world which is unfinished and plastic in which our action changes the facts.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY WALTER ALBION SQUIRES

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THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY WALTER ALBION SQUIRES

The source studied for Walter Albion Squires' criticisms of Dewey's philosophy is Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy. This book is yet in manuscript form and its use was permitted through the courtesy of Dr. Squires. As the title indicates, the book is given completely to a discussion of the philosophy of Dewey in its relation to present day religious education. Seven of its fourteen chapters are devoted specifically to a critical examination of Dewey's point of view. In the present study, Squire's criticisms will first be presented as they occur in each of these seven chapters and then synthesized into a series of propositions which summarize Squires' objections.

A. Analysis of the Argument in Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy.

1. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter II, "The Ancestry of the Dewey Philosophy."

First in Squires' argument, it is contended that Dewey's philosophy is a naturalistic monism. Squires arrives at this conclusion by raising two questions as to Dewey's conception of the nature of reality. The first is the question as to how many kinds of ultimate reality there are. He points out that Dewey's failure to recognize anything in the nature of the mental and the spiritual as having separate existence indicates that he believes in only one ultimate substance.

and is therefore monistic. The next question is as to the nature of this ultimate reality. Squires points out that Dewey is among the philosophers who regard the problem as no longer significant, but he goes further to assert his belief that Dewey assumes a solution of it. This is the naturalistic solution, the belief that the natural order, as we know it, is the ultimate reality. In this lies the objection that Dewey's philosophy is a naturalistic monism.[1]

In the second place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy is humanistic. He reaches this conclusion by seeking Dewey's answer to the question: What is the possibility of man's knowing the nature of ultimate reality? He points out that Dewey is generally accepted as both a positivist and a humanist. He would contend that the mind of man can know only the things revealed in sense and that there is no knowledge beyond these limits. Thus he locates divinity in man rather than in the cosmic powers controlling the universe.[2]

In the third place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy is pragmatic, basing this on Dewey's interpretation of the nature of truth. According to his philosophy, truth is not conformity to reality, it is a personal, relative and changeable quality. The emphasis is upon evanescent truths rather than upon eternal truth.[3]

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 31-34.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 37-38.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 39-40.

In the fourth place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy is a combination of anti-religious philosophies. This is based on the three foregoing criticisms. He points out that in answering the three questions as to the nature of reality, as to man's possibility of knowing ultimate reality, and as to the nature of truth, Dewey allies himself with three schools of philosophy all of which are anti-religious, namely, naturalistic monism, humanism and pragmatism.[1]

2. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter III, "Doctor Dewey's Conception of Reality."

First, Squires contends that Dewey assumes the materialistic solution of the mind-body problem.[2] This Squires concludes after examining Dewey's definitions of experience, mind, knowing, consciousness, and thought. He states the results of his study here. References to anything of a psychic or subjective nature and to consciousness as such are left out of Dewey's discussion of experience.[3] The mind is spoken of in Dewey's later writings in merely objective and materialistic terms.[4] Knowing is defined without the use of the terms mind and consciousness.[5] Dewey's conception of consciousness excludes the subjective and psychic qualities which for most people seem to belong to its in-

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 42-43.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 50-57.
3 Cf., Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 86.
4 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 224, 229.
5 Cf., Ibid., p. 295.

herent nature.[1] Thought is explained in terms of the physical and material, as a mode of action.[2]

Squires objects, in the second place, because Dewey contends that the mind-body distinction arose in modern times. As the basis for this criticism, Squires refers to Dewey's statement in Democracy and Education to the effect that the revolt of the sixteenth century was the cause which produced thought about the mind as isolated from the world.[3] He then quotes from Professor Pratt[4] by way of refuting this contention, emphasizing the fact that primitive men thousands of years before the Greek philosophers made the significance of the mind-body relation the starting point of their thought.[5]

3. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter IV, "Doctor Dewey's Conception of the Knowing Process."

First in the analysis of this chapter, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy eliminates the subjective aspects of the knowing process.[6] He refers to the evidence provided by the definitions examined in his preceding chapter as making this clear. He points out that Dewey does not regard knowledge as a fund of known material to be handed down by books and learned men, and that he lays stress on the activity of the learner in the educative process. The dualism

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 121.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 166.
3 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 340-342.
4 Cf., Matter and Spirit, p. 4.
5 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 58-59.
6 Cf., Ibid., pp. 62-63.

of "ready-made truth" and the activity of the student in the process of learning is a dualism which should be discarded.[1]

In the second place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy does not recognize antecedent reality. Squires bases this on parts of the discussion in The Quest for Certainty.[2] He objects that if the world exists and we experience it, and we come to know it through some knowing process, it follows that it existed before our apprehension of it. Suppose that in the knowing process we do make changes in the world, the true discovery is that the world possesses a changeable quality, and it is probable that it possessed it before our experimentation revealed the fact. He points out that change itself cannot be an object of knowledge except as it reveals a previous condition, the present condition, and the transition between the two.[3]

In the third place, he contends that psychology does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process. Squires refers to Dewey's argument from the field of psychology for the continuity of mind and body.[4] He points out that the connection of thought with nervous structure has long been recognized but that many of the greatest physiologists make no claim for this identity of mind and consciousness with changes in brain structure.[5]

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 389-391.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 21-23, 295.
3 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 64-66.
4 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 391-392.
5 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., p. 67.

In the fourth place, Squires contends that evolution as a biological hypothesis does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process. Reference is again made to Democracy and Education.[1] He points out that Darwin's development of the theory of evolution pointed plainly to mind or intelligence as an important factor in survival, and never regarded mind as consisting in modes of action. He points out the fact that evolution as modified by DeVries, Bergson, and Lloyd Morgan offers less support to the pragmatic conception of learning than Darwin's theory does, and suggests that Dewey appeals not to the biological hypothesis but to a philosophical theory of evolution such as that of Haekel. Squires calls attention to the fact that Dewey gains nothing from his appeal to lower forms of life for evidence unless it can be assumed that there is nothing in these creatures which can be called consciousness. Such an assumption would be contrary to such studies as those made by McDougall and Jennings.[2]

In the fifth place, he contends that experimentation as broadly conceived does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process. Further reference is made here to Democracy and Education.[3] Squires points out that it is a specialized conception of experimentation which excludes mind and consciousness, and makes overt ac-

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 392-393.
2 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 68-69.
3 Cf., Dewey, John, Op. Cit., pp. 394-395.

tions all important. Galileo's work in discovering astronomical facts did not exclude mind and consciousness. Pupin, Millikan, and Whitney are great scientists in the world today, yet all three keep faith in the reality of the psychic and the spiritual.[1]

In the sixth place, he contends that some of Dewey's conceptions make a greater demand upon credulity than the belief in consciousness does. Squires makes special reference to Dewey's use of the pellet theory of light as an illustration of his conception of knowledge-getting.[2] He shows how the extension of the conception thus illustrated makes the knowledge the cat gets through the sense of sight greater than that of man gained by vision, and makes the flood of new knowledge which produced the Copernican revolution a result of the minute changes in Jupiter, as the tiny pellets of light came to the earth and affected the eyes of Galileo.[3]

In the seventh place, he contends that Dewey uses an intellectual procedure to discredit intellectualism and in this is inconsistent.[4]

In the eighth place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy endows physical acts with most of the attributes of consciousness. The particular reference here is to Democracy and Education.[5] Squires cites the following as the re-

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 70-73.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 204.
3 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., p. 76.
4 Cf., Ibid., p. 76.
5 Cf., Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 394-395.

markable things overt action can accomplish: anticipate future consequences, observe present conditions, react seeingly and not blindly, note the consequences which follow actions, use these consequences to make predictions about similar situations in the future, use intelligence gained in previous experiences, test ideas for validity, take failures philosophically, and be seriously thoughtful throughout. It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of all of this taking place in the sphere of overt action.[1]

In the ninth place, he contends that Dewey conceives of the world which we experience as a real world, yet thinks of the gaining of knowledge in no sense as discovering antecedent reality, and in this is inconsistent.[2]

4. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter V, "Doctor Dewey's Rejection of the Absolute, Eternal and Universal."

First in the discussion in this chapter, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy maintains an atheistic attitude toward religion. He asserts that in denying the existence of the Divine Will, Dewey denies the existence of a personal God and takes a dogmatic stand against all theistic religion. He thinks, therefore, that atheism is the only term which fittingly describes the philosophy of Dewey.[3] In comparing Squires with Brightman in this point it will be noticed that Brightman regards Dewey as more closely approx-

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. p. 77.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 78.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 83.

imating theism than traditional atheism.[1] Atheism may describe Dewey's philosophy in so far as its practical implications are concerned, but in a technical sense it differs from the traditional form of atheism.

In the second place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy recognizes no absolute good in the universe. This objection comes out in connection with the discussion of Dewey's attitude toward religion.

In the third place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy denies the universal and exalts the particular. The reference here is to statements made in Reconstruction in Philosophy.[2] Squires points out that according to this philosophy, there is no universal law, universal truth, or universal principle. This makes intelligence carry a heavy load in the solution of moral problems, for action is not guided by principle but by analysis of the particular situation at hand. The question is raised whether intelligence, as Dewey defines it, is able to perform such a task. Squires goes further to show that belief in the existence of universal principles does not mean that there is a ready-made rule to be applied to every situation, but that thorough analysis is necessary for the application of the principle. The importance of moral problems is not in the opportunity for the use of the intelligence, but in the significance of their solution for life and character.

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1 Cf., Ante, pp. 7, 9.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 163.

In further discussing this point, he calls attention to Dewey's statement that the transfer of emphasis from principles to the detection of ills in special cases removes the causes which have kept moral theory controversial.[1] Squires argues that the study of universal principles of right and wrong has not always been controversial but that the development of these principles in human conduct is a matter of education. And education has not been barren of results. The one hundred and twenty millions of people in the United States are enabled to live together without coming into conflict because of the recognition of certain principles of justice and equity. Squires asserts that elimination of principles of right and wrong would increase controversy instead of overcome it.[2]

In the fourth place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy denies the eternal and exalts the temporary. This is based on Dewey's conception of reality. With knowing confined to overt action, and knowledge to changes wrought by action, there is no contact between ourselves and anything abiding. Squires contends that this pauperizes present knowledge and lays severe restrictions on every human goal. According to this theory, we live in a changing world but not in a world where change means progress.[3]

In the fifth place, Squires contends that Dewey's

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 165-166.
2 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 84-88.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 88-89.

philosophy denies the absolute and exalts the relative. The pragmatist gives no place to absolute good or immutable being, and regards everything as relative.[1]

In the sixth place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy opposes belief in absolute truth, goodness, and value. Reference is made to Dewey's statement in The Quest for Certainty, that such a belief has been a hinderance to mankind.[2] Squires thinks this "an attack upon the very citadel of religion."[3] This belief did not make Paul a weakling nor did it keep him from being practical in his relations with his fellow-men. The Hebrew prophets held this belief and they were never guilty of acquiescing in the evil at hand; it was the false prophets who did this and thought in terms of temporary and trancient standards. This charge of Dewey against religion is, according to Squires, practically identical with that contained in the Soviet dictum, "Religion is the opiate of the people."[4]

5. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VI, "The Pragmatic Interpretation of Morality."

First in this chapter, Squires contends that Dewey's rejection of hedonism is a start toward a valid definition of moral value. Squires is quite in agreement here with the distinction Dewey makes between experiences which are satis-

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. p. 89.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 35-36.
3 Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., pp. 91-92.
4 Cf., Ibid., pp. 90-93.

fying and experiences which are satisfactory. He inquires into the meaning of the statement that, "To declare that something is satisfactory is to assert that it meets specifiable conditions."[1] The term, "specifiable conditions" does not imply any reference to a personal God and a Divine Will.[2] Reliable principles of morality are not to be found in the lives of those who have lived nobly, not in "a revelation once had or a perfect life once lived."[3] All thoughts of guilt and sin are to be eliminated, blunders are merely mistakes in moral judgment.[4] For an act to meet "specifiable conditions" means that it "will do," that things resulting from it will continue to serve.[5] Squires points out that directed insight adds to the enjoyment which comes with moral choices not because of its intrinsic value but because it reveals abiding principles of truth. A sense of validity and authorization is also important in this enjoyment, but validity implies the discovery of something true and abiding, and authorization implies an authority which is reliable. Dewey's explanation of the basic causes of differences between enjoyments is pointless if universal and absolute principles of moral worth do not exist. There is one further element entering into moral judgment according to Dewey. This is the application of "operational thinking"

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1 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 260.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 42-43.
3 Ibid., p. 272.
4 Cf., Ibid., pp. 260-261.
5 Cf., Ibid., pp. 260, 267.

just as it is applied in connection with physical objects.[1]

In the second place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy rejects transcendental absolutism. Squires asserts that Dewey both rejects the thought of moral law as having its basis in a Supreme Being and the thought of absolute and eternal principles existing impersonally. This opposes theism as well as all interpretations of the universe conceiving of abiding principles which have significance for morality. Squires thinks that Dewey's theory of moral value is limited by his conception of experience. Those opposing him who assume the existence of mind and consciousness are able to think of experience in a vastly wider scope.[2]

In the third place, Squires contends that Dewey cannot logically rest moral value in the middle ground between hedonism and absolutism. He contends that Dewey's concern for the permanency of moral enjoyment has no resting place short of absolutism. Just how long must these enjoyments endure? He asks. Dewey's concern for the good of others also leads logically to absolutism. He asks further, how many people must we take into account? Can we stop short of universal and abiding good?[3]

In the fourth place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy considers standards, principles, and rules to be

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 96-100.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 101-102.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 103-105.

hypothesis only. Squires refers to the argument in Dewey's The Quest for Certainty, that standards, principles, and rules should be put constantly to the test of experimentation.[1] He calls attention to Dewey's dogmatism on this point, the very thing Dewey proposes to avoid in his emphasis upon experimentation.[2]

In the fifth place, he contends that Dewey's philosophy does not consider loyalty to moral principles a virtue.[3] If this is true, the world's martyrs and greatest statesmen have acted foolishly.[4]

In the sixth place, he explains Dewey's contention that belief in the immutability of ideals denies the possibility of improvement.[5] He calls attention to a confusion of two ideas brought about by Dewey's conception of reality. Our formulation of eternal and absolute principles is not identical with these principles as they really exist. If belief in eternal moral principles hinders the ethical development of man, Christianity is one of the greatest hindrances to moral progress the world has ever known.[6]

In the seventh place, Squires explains that Dewey contends that ideals are a cloak for insincerity, inactivity, and hypocrisy.[7] Squires believes that this charge against

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 227.
2 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 107-108.
3 Cf., Dewey, John, Op. Cit., p. 278.
4 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., p. 109.
5 Cf., Dewey, John, Loc. Cit.
6 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., pp. 109-110
7 Cf., Dewey, John, Op. Cit., pp. 280-281.

religious idealism is partly based upon the assumption that ideals are necessarily remote from life and conduct. But this is not true of ideals which are truly such. The remedy for the insincere attitude of the hypocrite is not in destroying belief in the reality of ideals but rather in strengthening belief in them. The fault lies in the character of the pretender.[1]

In the eighth place, Squires explains that Dewey contends that imperativeness to do good comes from the particular moral situation at hand, rather than from ideals connected with the will of God. He refutes this contention by using the story of Joseph in the house of Potipher; asserting that when Joseph faced impurity he did not stop to analyze the situation with a purpose of seeing how to act. He was rather moved by the ideals of duty, loyalty and purity connected with the will of God. Squires contends that this is a picture of the way moral victories are won.[2]

6. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VII, "The Pragmatic Interpretation of Religion."

First, Squires contends that Dewey teaches that a Divine Will is non-existent. Reference is made to Brightman's "Review of The Quest for Certainty,"[3] and to part of the discussion in the book itself.[4] Squires asserts that Dewey

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 112-113.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 114-115.
3 See Religious Education, January, 1930, pp. 74-76.
4 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 247, 47, 304-305.

will have a hard time to prove from history that worthy human aspirations have no connection with a belief in God and personal immortality. He substantiates his contention by references to conditions during the French Revolution, and to the decadence of the Roman Empire.[1]

In the second place, he explains that Dewey contends there is no need for belief in personal immortality. Nature and humanity as the eventual abode of all attained goods is all the prospect that man needs. Squires objects by saying that the world was once a waste and void, and that science predicts that it will sometime be so again. If there is no immortality, all of man's efforts are vain as far as anything abiding is concerned. Even altruism and service to mankind depend upon a belief in immortality, for man's worth is greatly lessened if he is only the creature of a day.[2]

In the third place, Squires contends that pragmatism makes religious standards mere hypotheses. He makes his refutation by again showing that history evidences that the worthiest lives were those which were governed by loyalty to principle.[3]

In the fourth place, he contends that pragmatism makes the Bible a merely human book. Pragmatism does more than other anti-religious philosophies in this respect, he

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 118-121.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 122.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 123-124.

thinks, in that it teaches that what may have been true in the times when the Bible was written is not necessarily true today.[1]

In the fifth place, Squires explains that pragmatism contends that there is no pre-existent truth to be progressively revealed in the Bible. This is true if the pragmatic conception of the knowing process is true. There is no more finality in the teachings of Jesus than in the imprecatory Psalms, and both alike are subject to change.[2]

In the sixth place, he contends that pragmatism makes wrong moral choices merely mistakes of judgment. Such mistakes are not sins for which one should be penitent. Squires conceives this belief as a natural result of the pragmatic conception of reality, of its denial of personal Deity, and its way of estimating moral value.[3]

In the seventh place, Squires contends that Dewey explains the origin of religious belief in terms of mere desire and imagination.[4] He contends that religion is far more than desire; it is bound up with problems of every-day living, and with the ultimate meaning of existence. Should one agree with Dewey as to the narrow field in which religion had its beginning, it would not necessarily follow that the things desired and the things imagined do not exist.[5]

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. p. 124.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 124-125.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 125.
4 See Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 292-293., Also Reconstruction in Philosophy, pp. 22, 24.
5 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., p. 129.

In the eighth place, he argues against Dewey's contention that religion was formulated into a system by a leisurely class of people. Squires asserts that this is a strange theory to those who have taken pains to become familiar with the history of religion. "True religion has sprung into life out of the soul struggles of people of lofty character who were immeasureably concerned with the outcome of human destiny,"[1] he declares, and asks, was Jesus an idle and impractical dreamer?

In the ninth place, Squires contends that Dewey condemns the church because it cherishes the dualism of nature and spirit.[2] This is supposedly a most injurious dualism. Squires does not try to defend the Church as being free from blunders either in the present or in the past, but he does defend it as an institution promoting social solidarity and universal brotherhood. He contends that the Church's insistence on the reality of the spiritual is its greatest contribution to moral progress.[3]

7. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VIII, "The Case Against the Dewey Philosophy."

First, Squires contends the human mind rebells against Dewey's solution of the mind-body problem. He points out that Dewey practically accepts the materialistic solution of the mind-body relation, and he quotes from Hocking

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1 Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. p. 130.
2 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 297, 308.
3 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., pp. 134-135.

to discredit this materialistic solution.[1] The difficulty in understanding Dewey's conception is not one of the solution itself but rather of the mind. Dewey himself once pronounced his present theory "unthinkable." The weakness of this solution of the mind-body problem weakens the whole of the philosophy of Dewey because it is its dominating thought.[2]

In the second place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy rests on opinions concerning the conclusions of natural science rather than on natural science itself. He refers to Dewey's claim for support from natural science,[3] and contends that his basis is not the findings of natural science but opinions at least once removed from it. He asserts that these same findings interpreted by opposing philosophers are used to support their own philosophical systems. Not many strictly natural scientists agree with Dewey; he receives rather his support from psychologists of the behaviouristic type. Reference is made to Robert A. Millikan, and J. Arthur Thompson, as natural scientists who hold views exactly opposed to those held by Dewey.[4]

In the third place, Squires contends that Dewey's philosophy depends upon metaphysics for its defense and ex-

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1 See Hocking, W. E., Types of Philosophy, pp. 96-97. He says: The microscopic inspection of a brain process, however perfect, would simply fail to discover any suggestion of what we mean by thought or feeling. We must hold to the clear insight of Descartes on this point: the essence of the mind is thinking, and thinking is not an event in space.
2 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 137-139.
3 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 44, 255-256.
4 Cf., Squires, W. A., Op. Cit., pp. 139-146.

istence, but denies opposing systems the right to use metaphysics. He refers to his argument just advanced, that Dewey can claim no particular support from natural science and contends that his philosophy has been built upon metaphysical speculation just as other systems. He points out that the difference is that these other systems have acknowledged the part reasoned thought has played in their origin and defense, while Dewey has not.[1]

In the fourth place, he asserts that Dewey's philosophy makes experience the supreme test of truth but abandons experience in its treatment of religion. This procedure is the exact opposite of Dewey's recommendation in other matters.[2]

In the fifth place, Squires contends that Dewey makes pragmatic standards supreme in life and conduct but denies pragmatic defense to religion. Squires holds that a strong defense for religion could be constructed on the pragmatic basis. Millions bear testimony to the fact that it works, and has reality and value. If pragmatism is applicable in religion, it discredits its own theory if it is not valid in all areas of reality.[3]

B. Summary of Squires' Criticisms.

To restate Squires' objections briefly, the follow-

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1 Cf., Squires, W. A., Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, in MS. pp. 147-148.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 149-150.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 151.

ing series of propositions result:

1. Dewey's philosophy is a naturalistic monism.

2. It is humanistic.

3. It is pragmatic.

4. It is a combination of anti-religious philosophies.

5. Dewey assumes the materialistic solution of the mind-body problem.

6. The laws of the human mind rebel against Dewey's solution of the mind-body problem.

7. Dewey contends that the mind-body distinction arose in modern times.

8. Dewey's philosophy eliminates the subjective aspects of the knowing process.

9. Psychology does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process.

10. Evolution, as a biological hypothesis, does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process.

11. Experimentation, as broadly conceived, does not particularly support his conception of the knowing process.

12. Some of Dewey's conceptions make greater demands upon credulity than the belief in consciousness does.

13. Dewey's philosophy endows physical acts with most of the attributes of consciousness.

14. Dewey's philosophy does not recognize antecedent reality.

15. It recognizes no absolute good in the universe.

16. It denies the universal and exalts the particular.

17. It denies the eternal and exalts the temporary.

18. It denies the absolute and exalts the relative.

19. It opposes belief in absolute truth, goodness and value.

20. Dewey's rejection of hedonism is a start toward a valid definition of moral value.

21. In his theory of moral value, Dewey rejects transcendental absolutism.

22. Dewey cannot logically rest moral value in the middle ground between hedonism and absolutism.

23. Dewey's philosophy considers standards, principles and rules to be hypotheses only.

24. It does not consider loyalty to moral principles a virtue.

25. Dewey contends that belief in the immutability of ideals denies the possibility of improvement.

26. He contends that ideals are a cloak for insincerity, inactivity and hypocrisy.

27. He contends that imperativeness to do good comes from the particular moral situation at hand rather than from ideals connected with the will of God.

28. Dewey's philosophy teaches that a Divine Will is non-existent.

29. Dewey contends that there is no need for belief in immortality.

30. Pragmatism makes religious standards mere hypotheses.

31. Pragmatism makes the Bible a merely human book.

32. Pragmatism contends that there is no pre-existent truth to be progressively revealed in the Bible.

33. Pragmatism considers wrong moral choices to be merely mistakes in judgment.

34. Dewey explains the origin of religious belief in terms of mere desire and imagination.

35. Dewey contends that religion was formulated into a system by a leisurely class of people.

36. Dewey condemns the Church because it cherishes the dualism of nature and spirit.

37. Dewey's philosophy rests on opinions concerning the conclusions of natural science rather than on natural science itself.

38. Dewey uses an intellectual procedure to discredit intellectualism and in this is inconsistent.

39. Dewey conceives of the world which we experience as a real world yet thinks of the gaining of knowledge in no sense as discovering antecedent reality, and in this is inconsistent.

40. Dewey's philosophy depends upon metaphysics for its defense and existence but denies opposing systems the right to use metaphysics.

41. It makes experience the supreme test of truth but abandons experience in its treatment of religion.

42. It makes pragmatic standards supreme in life and conduct but denies pragmatic defense to religion.

CHAPTER V.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE

CHAPTER V.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE

There are three sources for the study of the criticisms of Dewey's philosophy made by Herman Harrell Horne: The Philosophy of Education, Revised Edition, 1927, John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, and The Democratic Philosophy of Education. Each of these will be analyzed and the criticisms which they offer presented. Because of the amount of material these writings contain, three chapters will be devoted to the presentation of them. The present chapter will offer the criticisms as found in the first two works listed; and Chapter VI those found in The Democratic Philosophy of Education. Chapter VII will then summarize all of Horne's criticisms in a series of concise propositions.

A. Analysis of the Criticism in The Philosophy of Education, Revised Edition, 1927.

In this book, the mention of Dewey comes in the last chapter which is entitled "Pragmatism vs. Idealism, Twenty-three Years Later." This chapter was added in the revised edition to make the book abreast the times in which educational philosophy has been greatly influenced by the rise of Dewey's school of thought. The subject of the book being educational philosophy, education has predominant emphasis in the issues which are raised. Some of the criticisms therefore will be omitted from the present discussion

because they deal with implications of Dewey's philosophy with respect to specific pedagogical principles. This will focus attention upon the more purely philosophical issues. The way in which Horne has organized the material in this chapter justifies such a consideration. In turning to the discussion of how Dewey's philosophy affects the conception of the pupil, teacher, method, and curriculum, he says: "These contrasts continue when we pass from the general questions of educational theory to the specific matters of the school-room."[1] The specific matters of the school-room will not be in the discussion which is here presented. Another characteristic of Horne's chapter arises out of its nature as a textbook discussion. Dewey is not directly criticized. The method is to set experimentalism over against idealism and then to point out the issues, allowing the student to make his own evaluation in part. In presenting these issues we may assume that Horne takes the idealistic position, and thus the issues are stated as criticisms.

First in his discussion of Dewey, Horne contends that philosophy is a study of the whole of reality and is not limited to the field of social conflicts.[2] He points out that Dewey would like to substitute for philosophy attention to the social conflicts involved in democracy, industry and science for attention to the whole of reality.

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1 Horne, H. H., The Philosophy of Education, Revised Edition, 1927, p. 306.
2 Cf., p. 297.

This is a renewed expression of the positivism of Comte and Spencer against metaphysical and theological thinking, held by them to be fruitless. Dewey's philosophy limits itself to scientific method in dealing with human experience, whereas idealism accepts scientific method but supplements it with "reasoned conclusions concerning the implications of human experience regarding the nature of the whole of reality."[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that the philosophy of education is not the same as philosophy. To use his words, it is "an intellectual interpretation of the meaning of education in relation to the whole of reality."[2] He points out that Dewey would make philosophy identical with a general theory of education; it would include only epistemology and ethics. But this is not enough, it includes also ontology and cosmology.[3]

In the third place, Horne contends that intelligence is not only human, it is universal. He points out that Dewey conceives of human intelligence as capable of anticipating results beforehand and controlling the means producing them. He would lead man to rely exclusively on himself and remain noncommittal concerning what transcends human experience. But Horne contends that intelligence embraces everything that exists in realms below human, human, and superhuman. Man should rely on the Absolute as well as upon himself, and

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1 p. 297.
2 p. 298.
3 Cf., pp. 297-298.

should ever seek to know more about that which he can never fully know.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that education is not continuous growth alone; it is growth which in a finite way approaches the infinite.[2] He points out that this supplement to Dewey's definition does not of necessity imply a mystical element. It does involve man's ability to think beyond his own experience, and allows place for mystical communion. He says: "there must be a whole of experience, ... the whole is consequently partially revealed in the part, ...the part (our human experience) is essentially personal in character, ...the whole must then be not less than a Person."[3]

In the fifth place, it is contended that education is not its own end; it aims to increasingly realize the Absolute Idea for the individual, society, and the race. Attention is called to Dewey's statement of the aim of education, that "there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education."[4] The process itself and the outcomes realized comprise the end. Nothing is said concerning the origin of the process nor the state of affairs when the world ceases to exist. Horne points out that idealism includes in its aim of education an ideal social order, eugen-

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1 Cf., pp. 298-299.
2 Cf., pp. 299-300.
3 p. 300.
4 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 60.

ics for the future individual, and unending life for all individuals.[1]

In the sixth place, Horne contends that reality is not anthropocentric but theocentric. Here the contention is implied by Horne that man is concerned with more than the sensible realities of geography and history, he is concerned with a higher synthesis of these two. Religion is more than a community of interests with one's fellows; it is man's sense of personal relationship to spiritual order, and spiritual order is inclusive of the social order. God is more than a name for all the forces tending to better mankind, He is the personal unity embracing all of reality.[2]

In the seventh place, Horne contends that truth is not relative but absolute. He shows that according to Dewey truth is simply "a quality of ideas that work successfully as hypotheses in guiding experience;"[3] and holds in contrast that truth is "a quality of ideas that correctly represent facts."[4] Ideas are not true because they work, but they work because they are true. Ideas are able to represent fact as well as to control environment. Furthermore, knowledge need not necessarily produce physical change. Once a thing is true it is always true.[5]

In the eighth place, Horne asserts that Dewey's

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Philosophy of Education, Revised Edition, 1927, pp. 300-302.
2 Cf., p. 302.
3 p. 302.
4 p. 303.
5 Cf., pp. 302-303.

experimentalism has nothing specific to say about God. He refers to the three great philosophical ideas designated by Immanuel Kant as God, Freedom, and Immortality. These suggest the origin, nature, and destiny of man. Among these three great ideas Dewey deals only with Freedom. While he says nothing about God, idealism, on the other hand, regards God as the self of selves, the Author of life.[1]

In the ninth place, Horne asserts that Freedom is man's power of self-determination which sometimes is in line with his knowledge, but not always. Dewey speaks of freedom as the absence of outside restraint, and awareness that one's knowledge is directing one's conduct. Horne contends that man's power of self-determination is not necessarily in line with his own knowledge.[2]

In the tenth place, Horne objects that Dewey has nothing to say about Immortality. Idealism conceives of it as "the destiny of man made in the image of the Author of Life."[3] Horne points out that attitudes, feelings, and powers spring from these great conceptions in idealism —God, Freedom, and Immortality— which could never come from a glorification of humanity. They take nothing away from the values in Dewey's philosophy and add a plus quality to all that it contains.[4]

In the eleventh place, Horne contends that value

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1 Cf., pp. 303-304.
2 Cf., Loc. Cit.
3 p. 304.
4 Cf., pp. 303-304.

is not relative to man, it exists everywhere whether it is felt by man or not. He explains that according to Dewey the criterion of value is that a thing must be felt to be worthwhile by man. It is a purely subjective and individual matter. But idealism contends that all phenomena enter into the Absolute Experience and so have value in themselves although man may not know anything about them. Further, all value is not the same, Dewey contends. But idealism holds that those areas of knowledge which contribute to the formation of individual and social character, and to man's adjustment to the physical world, are of more value than the areas of knowledge which do not make such contributions.[1]

In the twelfth place, it is contended that interest is not sufficient in itself as motivation for tasks but must be supplemented by effort or discipline. Horne refers to Dewey's idea that interest, lying between a person and the goal to be accomplished by a task, is sufficient to involve the person in purposed activity. The assumption is that usually the immediate activity is a sufficient source of interest, but when it is not, the goal will supply a secondary interest which will be sufficient to motivate the immediate activity. In contending that interest is not always sufficient motivation, Horne does not propose to disregard the motivation which can result from interest, but insists that is has to be supplemented by discipline. Obedience in

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1 Cf., pp. 304-306.

moral issues sometimes has to be accomplished without any interest at all, one's sense of ought chiefly producing the action.[1]

In the thirteenth place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy is not complete in its attempt to establish continuity between dualisms. He says:

> The one philosophy stresses continuity between such usual opposites as interest and discipline, the empirical and the rational, subject matter and method, play and work, geography and history, naturalism and humanism, labor and leisure, intellectual and practical, physical and social, the individual and the world, culture and vocation, knowledge and its object, motive and act, duty and inclination, intelligence and character, the social and the moral, and others, but paradoxical as it may seem, this philosophy does not recognize and so does not introduce continuity into the one big remaining dualism, viz., between that part of reality which is human experience and the remainder of reality which is unexperienced and must always remain, because of its amount and quality, partially unexperienced. 1

The reason for this, Horne explains, is the fact that Dewey limits philosophy to the application of science to social problems. Idealism supplements Dewey's philosophy at this point; it completes the continuity and makes man and his sense experience one with the whole of reality; it maintains the idea of an Infinite which man can praise, worship and enjoy in communion.[2]

In the fourteenth place, Horne admits in criticism that "Pragmatism and Behaviourism combined give us an educational philosophy that is practical, functional, near-to-

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1 p. 314.
2 Cf., pp. 314-315.

earth, human, social."[1] As far as Dewey's philosophy goes in making for such influences as these it is greatly acceptable.[2]

In the fifteenth place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy needs to be supplemented by idealism. In giving this closing reaction, he says:

> But in addition (to the philosophies of behaviourism and pragmatism) an idealistic philosophy of education touches earth with heaven, sees men as children of the Infinite, is nonpractical as well as practical, believes in knowledge for the sake of knowledge as well as for the sake of life, acknowledges an absolute goal for life and education in pursuit of which man finds himself most truly, accepts the divine origin and immortal destiny of man, and finds living glorious because "heaven lies about us" in both our infancy and maturity. 3

B. Analysis of the Criticism in John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty.

This monograph by Horne gives a concise exposition and criticism of Dewey's argument in The Quest for Certainty. The exposition includes a statement of the argument in propositions, one for each chapter; a more detailed explanation of the argument of each chapter; and an explanation, chapter by chapter, of Dewey's ideas regarding religion. The criticism is comprised of eighteen elaborated propositions. It is the task of the present discussion to present these eighteen criticisms advanced by Horne. In addition two points of commendation will be included. These are of a more general

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1 p. 316.
2 Cf., p. 316.
3 p. 316.

nature but none the less direct, and are offered by Horne at the close of the monograph.

First, Horne contends that the genetic mode of refutation is unsatisfactory. This criticism is aimed at Dewey's assertion in his first chapter, that men came to believe in an unchanging order for social and psychological reasons which no longer obtain. He contends that ideas which originated under one set of social conditions may be true under another. The Ten Commandments are referred to as illustration of this. It is further pointed out that if the origin of an idea does not justify belief in it; it also follows, to the contrary, that it does not refute the idea. If, for instance, Spencer's explanation of the origin of the idea that man has a soul be accepted, the validity of the idea would not be disproven. Plato was dependent upon the social conditions of his times for his moral and political speculations but his metaphysics was independent of them.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey's denial of the objective reality of mysticism cannot be proven by his own principles. He states his conviction as to the source of strength upon which man lays hold in prayer; and contends that if it cannot be proven that God exists and is unchangeable, neither can it be disproven. He further holds that for a large number the practice of prayer has passed William James' pragmatic test of truth.[2]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, pp. 15-16.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 16.

In the third place, Horne asserts that there is evidence that some things do not change. He raises contending questions as follows:

> How can the irrevocable past change? How can truth change? Our view of truth may change. But "once true, always true." "Jesus Christ, the same, yesterday, today, and forever." How can universal extension change? How can duration change its rate? How can the multiplication table change? Or, mathematical relations generally? 2+2=4 not by the device of man but by the unchanging nature of things, or the will of God. [1]

He points out that the principle of change itself can be true only by remaining unchanged. If we conceive of man depending upon change and his dependence being quickened by the fact of universal change, we have an unchanging quantity in the fact of his dependence. Thus if the doctrine of change is accepted, there will be at least two changeless facts remaining; namely, change, and man's dependence upon it.[2]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that the continuity of knowledge and action may well be questioned in some cases. This is in refutation of Dewey's statement that "the idea which connects thinking and knowing with some principle or force that is wholly separate from connection with physical things will not stand examination."[3] Horne shows that there is no action in connection with knowing by introspection and intuition, or in knowing one's purpose

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1 Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 16.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 16-17.
3 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 5.

for tomorrow and in recalling what he did yesterday. The mental activity which takes place in connection with these is not the kind of activity which Dewey refers to. He means that knowing is proving by experimenting with things. But a son does not know his mother's love by experimentation.[1]

In the fifth place, Horne contends that science is not a substitute for religion. His insight here is keen, and his remarks will be quoted in order that the clear distinction which he draws may be carried over.

> Values are felt, and cannot be determined by the scientific method. Science may make the world a neighborhood; it cannot make it a brotherhood. Chemistry can teach us the use of chlorine; it cannot teach us whether to use it to make liquid gas to destroy life or to purify water to save life. The desire to put more values into human experience is not a product of the scientific method. There is love somewhere in the universe that quickens love. 2

In the sixth place, Horne asserts that the Greeks and the Christians controlled as well as accepted the world. This is directed at Dewey's objections to Greek thought and Christianity. Horne points out that besides accepting and enjoying the world the Greeks controlled matter and experience in their works of art. In the same way, Christianity has gone beyond the acceptance of the reality of the transcendent and has measureably controlled human society in the direction of the ideal. Horne contends that even if it were true that knowledge is continuous with action, it would not follow that we are not to believe in the transcendent. We

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 17.
2 Ibid., p. 17.

can control action and at the same time maintain belief in the real existence of the ideal.[1]

In the seventh place, Horne contends there is no true teleology in Dewey's philosophy.[2] He calls attention to the fact that for Dewey reality is reduced to events which just happen for no purpose at all. Purpose comes only through man's utilization of these events for the accomplishment of his own ends. But, Horne contends, the origin of man's purpose to control events cannot be explained apart from a creative intelligence other than and greater than his own; "otherwise, the greater comes from the less, the known from the unknown, and the thinker from the thoughtless."[3]

In the eighth place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy fails to distinguish between the nature of truth and the test of truth. He points out that truth may be tested in many ways, but the tests do not constitute the truth; they only make it evident. He says, "the idea that there is a knife in my pocket is already true or false; the presentation of the knife makes the inherent truth of the idea manifest; the inability to present the knife proves that the idea was false from the beginning."[4] An idea is not true because it can be verified but because it represents fact; an idea is not false because it cannot be veri-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, pp. 17-18.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 18.
3 Ibid., p. 18.
4 Ibid., p. 18.

fied but because it misrepresents fact. Truth is antecedent to the act which proves it, and the theory of truth which conceives of it as correspondence between idea and fact has never kept men from changing untrue ideas or unwelcome facts.[1]

In the ninth place, Horne contends that laws of thought are more than symbols, they are realities. This is substantiated by the citing of examples, one of which is the law that between two contradictions there is no middle ground. He says, "Define what you mean by 'open,' and the door is either open or not open. So it is and so we think."[2] We think the proposition that there is no middle ground between two contradictions because we hold it to be true; it is not true because it is thought. The laws of thought report things as they are. Formal logic and mathematics are more than symbolism and ideas at play.[3]

In the tenth place, Horne contends that experimentalism is inadequate as a seat of intellectual authority.[4] He objects to experimentalism as the seat of intellectual authority because, (1) it denies the immediacy of knowledge; yet we have immediacy of knowledge in axioms and self-evident propositions. (2) Experimentalism does not provide for the transmission of knowledge once attained. Truth is always true and may be transmitted as truth although it may need to be re-experienced and re-applied because social conditions

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 18.
2 Ibid., p. 19.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 18-19.
4 Cf., Ibid., p. 19.

have changed. (3) With experimentalism as the seat of intellectual authority, we are always seeking and never finding:

> Experimenting in a changing world gives us no body of authoritative acceptable truth but only a growing body of ideas to be ever trying out. On such a basis, gone is finality, an attitude of problem-solving, with conditions of the problem constantly changing, alone remaining. 1

In the eleventh place, Horne contends that "the naturalization of intelligence" cannot be effected by Dewey's theory that nature itself is neither rational nor irrational yet is subject to man's reason. In such a theory, there is a dualism between neutral nature and intelligent man. The only way that intelligence can be naturalized is for it to be rendered unintelligent. Horne shows that the better way out is not the naturalization of intelligence but the spiritualization of nature.[2]

In the twelfth place, Horne contends that this philosophy puts too much confidence in man, in his intelligent action, and in his method of experimental inquiry. Man was not made by his own intelligence, and yet somehow he was made. Experimental inquiry, although it may be as old as Galileo, is only an infant compared to man's progress. Horne says:

> As the thickness of a postage stamp lying on the top of Washington Monument is to the height of the

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1 Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 19.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 20.

> monument, so is man's intelligent control of nature by experimentation to his preceding progress. Life had existed on the earth some six hundred million years before man appeared. [1]

He does not object to man's relying upon himself to improve himself just as long as he leaves himself open to guidance and energizing from every available source.[2]

In the thirteenth place, the contention is made that social experimentation may prove to be a menace.[3] Horne admits that there is a moral and social lag in our day, but he holds that it is not caused by the unwillingness to reject convention in favor of experimentation. He says: "Our social experimentation with the commandments is notorious,"[4] and thinks our lack is not so much in the will to know what is best but in the will to do what we already know to be best. Experimentation with the commandments is not intelligent, neither is the great experiment which is being carried on by communistic Russia. Yet both of these are within the bounds of Dewey's conception. He says further:

> It is only characters that are true to known moral truths thatcan advance our knowledge of the unknown moralities. And my conviction is that when such advance is made it will be found to be a rediscovery or new application of something Jesus and the ethical geniuses of the race taught long ago. [5]

In the fourteenth place, Horne contends that men are more than agents and means, they are ends. It is pointed

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1 Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 20.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 20-21.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 21.
4 Ibid., p. 21.
5 Ibid., p. 21.

out that Dewey's philosophy omits treatment of self and personality, and that in his system there are no ends as distinct from means.[1] Personality is the supreme category of both reality and value, its worth is absolute. Everything else has value as it relates to persons. If man is not an end in himself, there is no purpose in the world.[2]

In the fifteenth place, it is contended that Dewey's philosophy knows no ought, intelligent desire being substituted for it. Good is not sanctioned by the constitution of things, nor is its ultimate victory guaranteed. Man is not held accountable to any Ultimate Being. Man's responsibility is strictly held within the realm of intelligent action in a social group. Human brotherhood is not grounded in any divine fatherhood. One is merely obliged to be social rather than selfish because that it the way to display intelligent control of experience.[3]

In the sixteenth place, Horne contends that existence revolves about a transcendent Knower. This is in opposition to Dewey's idea that human knowledge revolves about existence. He points out that Dewey does not deny the

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1 Cf., Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, pp. 278-279. He says: "The various modifications that would result from adoption in social and humane subjects of the experimental way of thinking are perhaps summed up in saying that it would place method and means upon the level of importance that has, in the past, been imputed exclusively to ends."
2 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, pp. 21-22.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 22.

existence of the Eternal but that he claims that belief in eternal value has not been beneficial. Horne contends that this latter idea can be disproven by the historic influence of such a belief over against that of positivism. Idealism does hold that all is known, but it conceives of knowledge as distinct from its objects. To be is to be experienced, but not necessarily by man; there is a completed experience which embraces fragmentary experience. Man's freedom and the existence of evil do raise problems here but they can be theoretically solved on an idealistic basis. And these problems are not easily solved practically on the basis Dewey suggests. He would reconstruct society so that external restraints would be removed and man would be free to express himself intelligently. But Horne contends such expression would be determined response to the situation, and not freedom to choose. Idealism does not reject the "idealism of action" for which Dewey is striving, but it would keep it in its correct relation to other things.[1]

In the seventeenth place, Horne makes the contention that Dewey's philosophy does not recognize thinking, the distinctive function of philosophy. Dewey regards thinking as only a function of action. But men will not stop theorizing; and if philosophers all became practical sociologists, important phases of life would be neglected. We would then recognize that man's intelligence has a specu-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 23.

lative and transcendent function as well as a practical and immediate function. The theoretical function faces reality as a whole, while the practical function deals with a part of the world. Man's practical life is completed by the theoretical.[1]

In the eighteenth place, Horne comments upon Dewey's attitude toward religion, citing two quotations from The Quest for Certainty[2] relative to religion, and then raising five objections.[3] (1) Dewey is mistaken in regarding Christianity as having its origins so largely in Greek philosophy rather than in Judaism, and the life and teachings of Jesus. (2) He misinterprets religion in saying that it is not concerned with present existence. (3) He also misinterprets religion in saying that its other-world is one which is not supposed to exist. (4) Again religion is misinterpreted in

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, pp. 23-24.

2 The quotations are as follows: "Theologians of the Christian church adopted this view (i. e., a life of knowing apart from and above a life of doing) in a form adapted to their religious purposes. The perfect and ultimate reality was God, to know Him was eternal bliss." See Horne H. H., Op.Cit., p. 24., See also Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 293. "...by definition, such (ideal) possibilities are abstract and remote. They have no concern nor traffic with the natural and social objects that are concretely experienced. It is not possible to avoid the impression that the idea of such a realm is simply the hypostatizing in a wholesale way of the fact that actual existence has its own possibilities. But in any case devotion to such remote and unattached possibilities simply perpetuates the other-worldliness of religious tradition, although its other-world is not one supposed to exist. Thought of it is a refuge, not a resource." See Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., p. 24., See also Dewey, John, Op. Cit., pp. 305-306.

3 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 24-25.

his contention that its other-world is not thought of as a resource. (5) The realization of possibilities is only one consideration in religion. Religion, Horne says, is "the worship of God as the Father of man and the service of man as the child of God."[1]

The two statements of commendation for Dewey with which Horne closes his discussion remain to be mentioned. The one is that Dewey's influence upon philosophy tends to make it more practical. The other is that Dewey's influence in religion tends to make us think more about man. Horne denies that it will succeed in making us think less about God. He identifies its emphasis upon the human element in religion as partaking of the social gospel of Jesus and of the Hebrew prophets.[2]

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1 Horne, H. H., John Dewey's Philosophy: Especially The Quest for Certainty, p. 25.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 26.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE

(Continued)

CHAPTER VI.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE (Continued)

C. Analysis of the Criticism in The Democratic Philosophy of Education.

The Democratic Philosophy of Education, published about a year ago, is a companion to Dewey's Democracy and Education, being a running exposition and commentary based upon it. Horne explains that his book developed out of his experience in using Democracy and Education as a text in his philosophy of education classes over a period of years. Because of the difficulty students have in understanding Dewey he thought an exposition of the book to be desirable, and since he had differing opinions to present at many points in the argument he considered it necessary to include his own comments.

The book is extensive, and so it will be necessary to present its criticisms of Dewey chapter by chapter, as was done in part with Religious Education and the Dewey Philosophy, by Squires. The problem of selection is again faced. Both Democracy and Education and The Democratic Philosophy of Education are chiefly interested, as their titles indicate, in philosophy as it relates to the educative process. Consequently, the principle followed in selecting the criticisms in The Philosophy of Education will be followed here. Those criticisms which deal with the more specialized application of philosophic principles in education will be

omitted, and only those will be included which are essentially philosophic in nature. Technical matters, such as questions relative to terminology and the method in presenting the argument, will also be omitted. Minor criticisms will not always be presented when they are repeated in the text.

1. Analysis of the Criticism in the Introduction.

Horne's first criticism is made in anticipation of all that is implied in Dewey's conception of philosophy. He contends that Dewey's idea that philosophy coincides with social science is not valid. The implications of such a conception are listed and its coincidence with Positivism, Agnosticism, Instrumentalism, Pragmatism, and Experimentalism made clear. He points out that historically philosophy is more than social science. All the various branches of knowledge which are now regarded as sciences were once philosophy. When developments came which made it possible to deal with these areas of thought by means of experience and experimentation, they ceased to be philosophy. Metaphysics is an area of thought which cannot, by its very nature, be dealt with by experimentation. Historically, philosophy has included metaphysics; and to the extent that it does include metaphysics, it does not coincide with the application of science to social relations.[1]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 2-4.

Horne grants that Dewey is at an advantage in his conception of philosophy in that it would utilize the energy in added concentration upon the practical endeavors of life, which would otherwise go into reflection.[1]

He contends, however, that Dewey is at a disadvantage in his conception of philosophy in that man simply will not be satisfied to live within the realm of experience alone. Human intellects by their very nature refuse not to think beyond the world of sense. Man's emotions are none the less active in reaching beyond experience; man naturally wants to worship. And further, human wills are not content to act within a realm thus limited; man wants to live in the light of eternity.[2]

2. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter I: "Education as a Necessity of Life."

In this chapter, Horne contends against Dewey for beginning his treatment of the philosophy of education with life, and not with the origin of life. Horne points to some of the different views as to the origin of life held by speculative scientists and philosophers, and goes further to show that it does make a difference which of these views is held. If life just came to be by chance, then it has no purpose. On the other hand, if life was created, then there is purpose in it, and self-conscious man is able in a mea-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 4.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 4.

sure to cooperate with the Purposer and His purpose.[1]

3. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter III: "Education as Direction."

First in the discussion in this chapter, Horne contends that Dewey under-estimates the place of direct personal appeal in social control. This criticism is made, together with the two immediately following, in objection to what Dewey says about directing the behaviour of children. Horne does not hold that re-discovery of truth by youth has no place at all in education. His contention is that much is to be saved by personal guidance, for by it the young are readily placed in touch with the discoveries of the race. Besides, the proportion of what the race has already acquired to that which the individual could possibly re-discover is very great. The maturing experience of every individual is a witness to the importance of the part the personal element plays in the process.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey under-estimates the place of sensation in the knowledge-getting process. This is directed to Dewey's idea that in the learning process it is not <u>things</u> that are important but rather the <u>use of things</u>. He first objects by calling attention to the completeness of one's limitation of knowledge when he has a sense affliction such as blindness or

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 7-9.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 30-31.

deafness. He admits that the emphasis upon sensation does not propose to separate sensation from use, but at the same time it is sensation and not the use which gives the knowledge. He goes further to show that there are many things of which one gains knowledge by sense which we cannot use at all; for example, the stars, the articles in a store window, or the clothes worn by the opposite sex.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that Dewey under-estimates the ability of the mind to transcend the physical use of things. In affirming that the mind has this ability, he illustrates by the aesthetic experience of visualizing a work of art, the moral experience of admiring another's good deed, and the spiritual experience of adoration and praise. The use of things is not necessary in certain intellectual experiences; for example, the distances between the earth and different stars can be known in terms of light years. Similarly, one may respond to principles of morality which have been possessed only as precepts. Horne explains that all three of these under-estimations made by Dewey in his conception of the learning process tend to limit the acquiring of knowledge to experimenting with physical things.[2]

4. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter IV: "Education as Growth."

First, Horne contends that Dewey's conception of

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 31.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 31-32.

growth lacks a goal. This is directed to the conception that "education is growth." According to Dewey, education has no ends beyond more education; and growth has no goal other than more growth. Horne contends that a school for gangsters could fulfill these requirements. Children need to have a worthy life set up before them as a goal and must be helped in the attainment of it. Goals are not objectionable, and when attained there will always be further goals to set up. Horne points out that in reality education as Dewey conceives it does have a goal, in that he thinks in terms of later results. The lack is in his failure to formulate them.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey confuses growth and development and in so doing confuses external stimulation and internal changes. In differentiating between growth and development, Horne says:

> By growth the tissue cells multiply; by development they become differentiated and mature. A little oak becomes a large oak by growth; an acorn becomes a little oak by development. A little chick becomes a chicken mainly by growth; an egg becomes a chick by development; it is also true that the appearance of new mental and physical powers as the chick becomes a chicken is by development. .... To repeat, growth is expansion of living tissue or mental function already present; development is the appearance of new tissue or function. [2]

According to Horne, growth and development normally take place together; and growth at the expense of development

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 52-54.
2 Ibid., 54-55.

will produce a sluggish individual, while development without growth makes for weakness. The one is brought about by external influences; the other is produced by internal changes. Growth is more a matter of nurture, while development is a matter of nature.[1]

5. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter V: "Preparation, Unfolding, and Formal Discipline."

First, Horne objects to Dewey's rejection of an infinite goal for human life. This, he holds, does violence to the experience of the mystics, to the practices of the world's religions, and to those powers of mind which enable us to know religious truth. That there is a realm of non-perceptual reality is witnessed by the a priori reasoning in Plato, by Kant's thing in itself, and by the emphasis upon substance in the mathematics of Bertrand Russell. These are all held by their respective exponents to be real, yet they are in no sense spatial or temporal realities. Dewey fails to disprove the validity of such realities; furthermore it can neither be proven nor disproven. An intellectual venture similar to faith is involved in every philosophy.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy needs to be supplemented by a third set of categories, namely, the "organic." The categories dealt with by Dewey are only the "static" and the "dynamic." The static is the conception that all things are changeless; and the

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 54-56.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 69-70.

dynamic is the conception that all things change. The organic is the synthesis of these two opposing conceptions. It is the conception that some things are changeless and rightfully so, while other things are changing and rightfully should. This criticism is suggested here by the fact that Dewey rejects the philosophies of Froebel and Hegel as static in his discussion of education as unfolding. Horne contends that they are rather organic; and that the whole of reality is organic. We are progressing toward an infinite goal which is unchanging but our progress is made in a process of time and space. In no sense can our progress be said to be limited by this unchanging goal. We are ever growing toward it but in time and space we can never realize it. This is an organic and not a static category.[1]

In the third place, Horne objects to Dewey's naturalistic solution of the mind-matter dualism.[2] He explains that according to Dewey the self and the external world are not distinct. Horne's phrasing of this is: "The knower and the known are both inseparable constituents of the same naturalistic process."[3] He contends that Dewey's view is neither clear nor well founded. He refers to Lovejoy[4] as the latest student of the subject, and informs that he de-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 72-73.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 82-83.
3 Ibid., p. 82.
4 The Revolt Against Dualism, New York, 1930.

cides in favor of the dualistic solution. Horne asserts that if dualism is to be reduced to unity it will have to be an idealistic monism in order to satisfy him. He says:

> For ourselves, if there is to be a reduction of dualism to unity, it would have to be a unity of experience, a known unity, a conscious unity, an all-embracing unity, and hence some form of idealism. Intelligence that concludes less than this must perforce think meanly of itself. The origin of mind would not then be in by-products of the native tendencies to action but in the very nature of the one central reality of all. Man is not simply an organism with flexible responses; he is a self originating in a Self. [1]

6. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VI: "Education as Conservative and Progressive."

First, Horne contends that knowledge is more than a tool; that knowledge of the past apart from any present problem cannot be said to have no value. He claims that the fact that some people enjoy pursuing knowledge for no practical reasons at all tends to contradict this view; and refers by way of example to Amiel, whom he calls "the introspective professor of Geneva."[2] Reference is also made to Palmer's rhythmic prose translation of the Odyssey, and it is pointed out that it hardly has value because, as Dewey would require, it increases "the meaning of the things with

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 82-83.

2 Cf., Ibid., p. 94. Amiel is quoted here as follows: "Moreover, to know satisfies me, perhaps even better than to possess, to enjoy, to act. My strongest taste is for watching, understanding, contemplating. And the theory needs to be universal, panoramic, spherical; it refuses to be shut up in a special case."

which we have actually to do at the present time."[1] Experience is greatly impoverished by urging that all knowledge must be used in facing present problems, and none enjoyed for its own sake.[2]

In the second place, Horne points out that the weakness of Dewey's philosophy is in its omissions. This criticism is made in the comment on the last section in this chapter which brings to a close the first part of Dewey's discussion dealing with "Education as a Need and Function of Society." The weaknesses which Horne points out have been touched upon in the foregoing criticisms and so will not be dealt with at length here. He holds that Dewey falls short in not allowing for the place of self in experience; this makes his conception of experience impersonal.[3] This specific objection is related very closely to his objection to Dewey's naturalistic solution of the mind-matter dualism already presented.[4] Horne also calls attention to the fact that Dewey emphasizes active adaptation to a changing environment and rejects passive adaptation to that which does not change. He contends that in order for a conception to be balanced it must include both of these.[5] This objection coincides very closely with the criticism already presented

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1 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 93.
2 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 94-95.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 99.
4 Cf., Ante, pp. 77-78.
5 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 99-100.

that Dewey's philosophy needs the additional category of the "organic."[1] As a third failure of Dewey's philosophy, Horne points out that his emphasis upon perception and activity indicates that the reconstruction of experience which he proposes is intellectual and practical rather than emotional and aesthetic. But the value of beauty for its own sake must have a place in experience.[2] This criticism parallels in some measure the criticism presented above that knowledge is more than a tool.[3] Lastly, Horne shows that Dewey fails in that he emphasizes education as including the result and so witholds any consideration of goals and the existence of absolutes. But the educative process is not complete without a goal, and the idea that spatial and temporal experience is all the reality there is opposes much of the philosophical thinking that has been done and is now being adhered to.[4] This corresponds closely to the criticism relative to goals which has already been discussed.[5]

7. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VII: "The Democratic Conception in Education."

First, Horne objects that Dewey's philosophy does not imply the superhuman in human relationships. It allows for nothing which cannot be determined by empirical means, yet, Horne contends, we acknowledge the existence of people

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1 Cf., Ante, pp. 76-77.
2 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 100.
3 Cf., Ante, pp. 78-79.
4 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 100-101.
5 Cf., Ante, p. 76.

whom we have not seen. Dewey makes no explanation as to the origin of the human, yet this is to leave a barrier between man and the whole of reality. To this extent his philosophy is neither a complete pragmatism nor a complete humanism.[1]

In the second place, he compares Dewey's conception of a democratized society with the Christian conception of the Kingdom of Heaven.[2] He points out that in content they are quite the same but that they differ significantly in their inspiration and motivation. Dewey's democratized society has its source completely in man and seeks no basis in assumptions about the superhuman, whereas the Kingdom of Heaven has its source and foundation in God. This is the thing lacking in Dewey's conception, the dynamic provided by belief in God. In pointing out the differences between the two, Horne says:

> The inspiration to the one is human, to the other is divine. The motive to the one is humanitarian, to the other is theistic. The central conception of the one is man, of the other is God. In the one we have brotherhood without universal fatherhood; in the other we have brotherhood because of fatherhood. Man alone, social man, is the maker of democracy, man as an agent of the spiritual principle of the universe is the maker of the other. [3]

In the third place, Horne points out that Dewey's use of history in presenting his conception of democracy in education is not strictly pragmatic. In the strictly pragmatic sense, a conception has meaning only as it leads to

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 109.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 113.
3 IBid., p. 113.

future consequences in sense experience. To refer to history in order to give concepts meaning is but to go away from sense experience. And to refer to the conceptions of Plato and Rousseau is to refer to concepts that never were projected in sense experience. Dewey's use of history is justified but it is not consistent with his own pragmatism.[1]

8. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter VIII: "Aims in Education."

First, Horne contends that mind is not identical with acting intelligently toward an end. Two major objections are raised here. The one is that Dewey unnecessarily distinguishes between intelligence and feeling. Feelings have a part in measuring consequences when mind is present, as well as when it is absent. Aims are not merely ends which we forsee, they are ends which we feel to be valuable. Our choice is between ends as well as between means and ends. And we must choose not only ends which are foreseen, nor ends which are desirable, but we are to take ethics into consideration and choose those ends which are believed to be desirable. The other objection is that man is not only a participator; he is a spectator. Being conscious of an object does not always effect changes in it. We enjoy a work of art which was produced independently of any action of our own. In our memory of the past there is no activity other than that which we are aware of by introspection.

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 129.

Predictions of the future, such as the foretelling of an eclipse, change in no way the objective nature of the event when it comes, yet there is knowledge of it. In all of these cases man is the spectator. The significance of this distinction is important in its implication as to the nature of life. Consciousness does not exist alone within action; and the world is theoretical, unchanging, and idealistic as well as practical, dynamic, and naturalistic.[1]

In the second place, Horne objects that there is no ought in Dewey's philosophy. This is pointed out in connection with the observation that there is no standard of worthiness among Dewey's criteria of good aims. Intelligent direction of activity is the substitute which Dewey makes for the sense of duty. But this is not sufficient, since an intelligently directed activity may be either bad or good. For this reason Horne suggests a fourth criterion for the judgment of aims. In addition to being an outgrowth of present conditions, to being flexible, and to representing a freeing of activities; an aim, to be a good, one must be democratizing, or it might even be contended that it should be in harmony with an absolute good. An external aim which is in harmony with an absolute good need not be in conflict with the other criteria of aims which Dewey sets up.[2]

In the third place, Horne contends that means and

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 133-134.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 137-138.

ends are not the same. This is directed at Dewey's idea that the distinction between ends and means is only a temporal one. Dewey refers to the farmer as an illustration of what he is trying to bring out, and says that if the farmer is interested in plants and animals his means become of value in themselves. Horne takes this same illustration and points out Dewey's admission that there is a distinction between the means of the farmer and his ends. For, if he is not interested in plants and animals he uses them as means to get something else, then the two are quite distinct. Horne goes on to object to the final implication toward which Dewey's identification of means and ends is directed. If they are the same, then all ends are means and life becomes a constant series of changes. Even man himself becomes a means and absolute values are rendered non-existent. Horne applies this objection to democracy, which Dewey conceives as an end. He says it is only partially realized now, and as long as it is only partially realized it remains an end distinct from means. In this sense it is one of the absolutes. But should democracy ever be realized, what would be the end toward which it would then be the means? Pragmatism has no answer to this question. It is more in line with experience and reason to recognize that there is a real distinction between ends and means.[1]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 138-139.

9. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter IX: "Natural Development, Social Efficiency, and Culture as Aims."

First, Horne comments that Dewey does not identify God with nature.[1] This arises from Dewey's discussion of Rousseau in his consideration of nature as an aim of education. It is explained that Rousseau did not identify God with nature because he was a deist, but Dewey does not identify God with nature because he makes no assumptions as to any realm beyond the world of sense experience. At the time of Horne's writing, Dewey had made no written statement about God. Horne says: "The term might be retained in his philosophy as an abstract noun covering the traits of potentiality in nature and of intelligence in man."[2] Dewey has written an article on God recently which justifies Horne's conjecture on this point.[3]

In the second place, Horne pays respect to Dewey as a person who exemplifies most consistently his conception of social efficiency. This is the final remark in the comments on the discussion of social efficiency as an aim of education. He says of Dewey:

> A writer of books and articles, giving interviews to reporters, lecturer, teacher, friend, husband, father, chairman of various educational and political committees, educational adviser to China, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, always on the pioneering front of thought and

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 152-153.
2 Ibid., p. 153.
3 John Dewey, "A God or The God," The Christian Century, February, 8, 1933., pp. 193-196.

action, during a long lifetime of fruitful goodwill to men, here is indeed social efficiency, humanism at its best. [1]

10. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter X: "Interest and Discipline."

First in this discussion, Horne contends that immediate interest is not sufficient in itself to produce effort. He calls attention to the fact that Dewey shows a greater preference to immediate interest; and as a result, matters of conscience and duty do not play a sufficient part in his system. The recognition of remote interest supplies what is lacking here. A person's immediate interest may lag and fail to provide sufficient motive for the doing of work at hand. It is at such times as that the possession of a remote interest will remind one of his duty and will urge him to go on.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey omits the personal and subjective elements in his consideration of interest. He explains that Dewey makes interest wholly a matter related to changes in the environment. Horne admits that for the most part this is true but he shows that it does not cover all the areas of interest. There are interests which are related to the self rather than the external environment, and these are the interests which this conception presented by Dewey denies. One instance is the

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 157.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 166.

fact that one can be interested in interest itself. This is not at all related to environmental changes. It is completely a matter of introspection and therefore personal and subjective.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that mind is more than the directive quality of events. He points out that Dewey's definition of mind, similar to his definition of education, limits mind to a mere process of facing problem situations in one's environment. The mind is capable of introspection, it frames metaphysical systems, it is the nucleus for selfhood, and it is able to realize its own permanence in reality.[2]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that interest needs to be supplemented by discipline. He holds, contrary to Dewey, that discipline is of value in itself and sometimes leads to interest. He cites the opinions of authorities in different fields of knowledge as to the value of discipline. Huxley, for example, said,

> The habit of doing that which you do not care about when you would much rather be doing something else, is valuable. It would have saved me a frightful waste of time if I had ever had it drilled into me in youth. 3

Horne regards deliberate effort as having played a very important part in the past progress of the race, and thinks

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 166-167.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 172-173.
3 Ibid., p. 174., See also Smith, Alphonso, Selections from Huxley, New York, 1912, p. 27.

that the basis of Dewey's conception of discipline is in considering activity as merely physical. If one conceives of the mind as being distinct from physical activities, interests take on a different meaning. They are no longer identified with the self but they rather become the medium through which the self is expressed. In this light activities which are of interest may be either mental or physical, and self being regarded as real, there is place for discipline in directing these activities.[1]

11. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XI: "Experience and Thinking."

First in this discussion, Horne contends that experience is not limited to physical environment alone, it also includes social environment. No analysis of experience is complete without the recognition that our fellows as well as ourselves are personalities. A child does learn from his physical environment, but he also learns personal qualities from his teacher. Horne points out that Dewey does not overlook the social element in other connections, and should not in a consideration of the nature of experience.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that the relational theory of mind is questionable, and offers two main objections to it. The one is that it makes the mind

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 174-175.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 184.

dependent upon the situation, but when the mind plays such an active part in controlling the situation it is hard to conceive of it as the dependent factor. The other objection is that it gives no place to feeling in consciousness. He contends that value lies in the desirable quality of an effect, and not as Dewey holds in the mere recognition of the connections between causes and effects.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that thinking cannot be limited to mere experimenting. He admits that we do think in terms of experience but he contends that we can also think beyond experience. Examples of this are Kant speculating as to the whole of experience; astronomers formulating theories about the formation of the earth; chemists knowing what elements to look for before they are found; mathematicians thinking in terms of the fourth dimension; Plato conceiving of eternal ideas only imperfectly expressed in the world of experience; the logician examining processes of thought as such without any reference to the concrete; and the introspective psychologist thinking about his own thinking.[2] Horne argues that the conception of thinking which does not limit it to physical experience implies changes in each one of the steps of reflection as pointed out by Dewey. He says:

> Concerning the steps into which the complete act of thought is analyzed, let us observe (1) that the in-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 184-185.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 185.

> complete situation may be mental as well as physical; (2) that the problem may therefore be intellectual without involving any changes in physical conditions; (3) that the hypothesis therefore may not be provable at all; and so (4) that the thinking may therefore be incomplete, but justifiable as philosophy, without attaining the step of tested thought which is science. [1]

12. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XII: "Thinking in Education."

The outstanding criticism in this chapter is Horne's contention that Dewey's analysis of reflective thinking is not original with him.[2] He identifies Dewey's formulation of the thinking process with the scientific method used from the very beginning of the history of science, and with the inductive thinking process presented in many logic texts of the present day. The singular thing in Dewey's use of this formulation of thinking is in making it identical with educational method. This, Horne contends, is its weakness. Where education is scientific it is strong, but where education is appreciative it is weak. He says: "education and life are more, much more, than scientific thinking."[3]

13. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XIV: "The Nature of Subject Matter."

First, Horne contends that the pragmatic theory of knowledge is not sufficient. This is brought out in connection with Dewey's discussion of "The Development of Sub-

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 192.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 209.
3 Ibid., p. 209.

ject Matter in the Learner." In presenting this, Dewey explains knowledge as the control of a situation, the practical use of information, and the use of information to gain further knowledge. Horne acknowledges that the pragmatic theory of knowledge is useful in connecting knowledge with action, but he sees that it is not inclusive enough in that there is much knowledge which we can enjoy but cannot use. Our reason enables us to know things which cannot be experienced, this is a realm of knowledge which pragmatism cannot touch. And there are many such matters of knowledge which contribute much to life though they cannot be used in practical situations.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey's theory of knowledge greatly limits the range of knowledge. This objection is made to Dewey's idea that information must be in use in order to be knowledge. Horne holds that we can have knowledge of facts of geography or history without ever making use of it in practical experiences. The knowledge which we get from another person is our knowledge when we understand it.[2]

In the third place, Horne contends that the appreciative side of experience is omitted in Dewey's treatment of the growth of subject matter in the individual. Science is given the most important place in this. Horne contends

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 245.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 245-246.

that subject matter is not complete unless there is the evaluating of knowledge, and this involves the emotional element in experience.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that the metaphysical is lacking in Dewey's consideration here. He calls attention to the fact that man is able to think about that which he is not able to know. This type of knowledge should be added to the three which Dewey has given, and be made the fourth stage of knowledge. If subject matter developed in the individual does not include metaphysical knowledge it falls far short of being complete.[2]

In the fifth place, Horne contends that the religious element is excluded in this. He says that when the appreciative element in experience is brought together with the metaphysical the natural tendency is toward religion, and this tendency should not be denied a place in the subject matter.[3]

14. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XV: "Play and Work in the Curriculum."

The significant objection in this chapter is that Plato was not pragmatic in his theory of knowledge. Dewey refers to Plato as presenting knowledge to mean technical skill, and discusses "The Place of Active Occupation in the Curriculum" on the assumption that knowledge first arose

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 246.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 246-247.
4 Cf., Ibid., p. 247.

having this meaning. Horne points out that Plato recognized an absolute knowledge as well as a practical knowledge. Practical knowledge he referred to as more in the realm of "opinion," and regarded it as changing. But he referred to absolute knowledge as more in the realm of "idea," and regarded it as unchanging. This of course has bearing upon Dewey's conception of knowledge if he assumes a foundation for his theory which he cannot justly hold.[1]

15. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XVI: "The Significance of Geography and History."

First, Horne contends that there are more than spatial and temporal meanings. This is directed to Dewey's discussion of geography and history which apparently assumes that the space and time relations with which they deal are all the relations that there are. Horne objects in order to supplement a third kind of meaning, the transcendent. He says:

> Such a transcendent world is suggested by Plato's doctrine of the ideas, by Aristotle's conception of God as the unmoved mover who thinks his own thoughts, by Spinoza's view of God or nature, by Bertrand Russell's account of relations that subsist between universals, like numbers, and by the religious conception of the Changeless One. [2]

Horne contends that before such a realm can be assumed not to exist, its existence must be refuted, and such a refutation cannot be made.[3]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 250-253.
2 Ibid., p. 275.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 275.

In the second place, Horne contends that nature is independent of man. This is an objection to the idea growing out of Dewey's discussion of geography and history that man and nature are interdependent. Horne admits that geography and history are interdependent, but he does not allow the deduction that man and nature are dependent upon each other. He holds rather, that most of the adaptations between man and nature are adaptations of man to nature or man's adaptation of nature to himself. Man's organism and his clothing are evidences of his adaptation to nature, his bridges and buildings are examples of his adaptation of nature to himself. Horne does allow that if an idealistic metaphysics is held there is a sense in which the self of nature is dependent upon the self of man, but he states that this is not Dewey's point of view.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that history does not begin with the present. This is pointed to Dewey's discussion in which he relates the study of history to present social life by making all history revolve about its application in present social situations. Horne holds that history is of value for its own sake. It is of value in helping to solve present problems, but there is also much of it which is of value not in solving present problems but in cultivating personality. Horne points out a difficulty in studying history with the present as a starting point.

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 280-281.

namely, that there are many different origins of culture and many different lines of history through which it has developed. If history is studied with the present as the starting point, the unity would be lacking which would draw all of these together. Another difficulty he suggests is that to study history with the present as the starting point is to study backward; and that is to proceed from effects to causes, a somewhat confusing procedure. To use the present as the locus in studying history, making the connection by comparisons and contrasts is conceivable. Such a study would give us an elemental understanding of the institutions of the present, but we deny progress if we think of primitive life as a pattern for present society to follow.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne objects because Dewey gives no spiritual interpretation of history. It is pointed out that there can be no such interpretation of history when all of creation is considered to be man-centered. The moving force of the progress which is seen in history, according to Dewey, is man's intelligent activity. But Horne points out that if the theory of evolution is to be accepted, man made most of his progress before intelligence was acquired and so it becomes necessary to account for the origin of this intelligence. Horne's solution is that there is a non-human force at work in the world which makes for progress.[2]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 286-288.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 288.

In the fifth place, Horne contends that ethical value does not arise from history as such but from appreciation of history. Dewey couples the intelligent understanding of history with a sympathy out of which will come the moral advances of mankind. But Horne contends that one's understanding of history may be coldly intellectual, and that the appreciative element must enter to make moral values felt. This appears to be largely a contention for the subjective and personal which are neglected by Dewey.[1]

In the sixth place, Horne contends that history is more than science. He holds that Dewey's treatment of both geography and history as sciences confuses the method of studying history with the nature of history. External nature, as we are able to observe it, is the result of the operation of certain laws, but the events of human nature are the results of intended acts of personality. We cannot therefore regard history as nothing more than a science. We may use the method of science to make cause and effect connections in the events of history, but there is purpose working in these events which is beyond science. This also may be true of the sciences dealing with external nature; they may be conceived as observing outward operations which are expressions of the purpose of an all-embracing self. In this light, history can be considered a science revealing

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 288-289.

with all other sciences the outward expressions of a purpose purposed by this ultimate personality.[1]

16. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XVII: "Science in the Course of Study."

First, Horne contends that a transcendental philosophy is of practical value. This is directed at Dewey's assertion that the qualities of speculative theorizing are in "permanent dislocation from practice."[2] In making his contention Horne says: "It would be truer to fact to say that man's speculations have been in permanent articulation with practice."[3] He holds that the influence of the transcendental in history has been far more powerful than the influence of the pragmatic. He refers to the historic philosophies and religions of the world as evidences of this. Further, if speculation is not connected with practice, it is harmless, and there is no necessity for attacking it. The real position of Dewey is that speculation affects action in ways he considers to be unwholesome. This makes the question become one as to whether or not we live in a transcendent world. Horne follows the argument to another extremity. The fact that speculation exists and always has been a habit of man gives a new problem of evil if it is so undesirable. According to Dewey's philosophy, human nature must be regarded as bad to the extent that it tends in the direction

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 289.
2 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 266.
3 Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., p. 304.

of speculation. Horne says that a better view would be that man is a small entity reflecting an all-embracing entity of which he is a part, and that it is natural and desireable for him to think about that which is beyond the world of experience.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that Dewey expects too much of science. In stating the limitations of science he says:

> After all, science is a method of experimental inquiry and a resulting, changing, body of knowledge. And this is all it is. It is not beauty, it is not morality, it is not sociality, it is not living itself, it is not loving, it is not appreciation of value. It is an intellectual method and an intellectual result. All these other things may be studied scientifically but the scientific study is no substitute for the realities studied. [2]

Horne admits that science is a means in helping to attain ends, but he denies its ability to determine these ends. He thinks: "It is just as scientific to use dynamite to blow a man to pieces as to blast rock."[3] Nor can it be correctly contended that science is the only means of social progress. There have been great individuals who have wielded great influence for social advancement who were not motivated by science. Here Rousseau, Washington, Lincoln, and Wilson are cited. Besides, there have been great social movements not motivated by science which have influenced decidedly for good, for example, Hebrew prophetism, Christianity, the

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 304-305.
2 Ibid., p. 305.
3 Ibid., p. 306.

Renaissance, the Reformation, and the French Revolution.[1]

In the third place, Horne objects that pragmatism leads man to rely completely upon himself. He points out that such an emphasis makes Dewey's advocacy of the use of science in education an expression of the new humanism of August Comte. The whole universe is completely man-centered and there is no place for prayer, praise, and worship. Man's only motive is the inspiration of his own possibilities. This view has the strength in it which man using science is able to provide, but it lacks the strength which is able to face great calamities man is unable to control. It conceives of science in no sense as reflecting the thoughts of God. Horne contends that science could be given a place in the education of man which would enable him to make the greatest use of his own powers and still be taught that there is a Personality in control of the whole universe which science imperfectly reflects.[2]

17. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XVIII: "Educational Values."

First in this discussion, Horne contends that value is not man-centered but reality-centered. This is directed at Dewey's belief that a thing has value only as it is seen to be valuable in human experience. Horne objects to this belief, first, on the basis that it denies the existence of

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 305-306.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 306-307.

value in nature itself. He conceives it to be entirely possible that if nature knows no value man, who is a part of nature, is unable to realize values. Again, he argues that such a belief sets up a dualism between man and nature, for man has value and nature does not. Horne holds rather that value should be considered as centering in reality. In this light man does not so much create value as he discovers value already existent in the very nature of reality. Horne says: "Man does not create logical truth, emotional beauty, and ethical worth; he discovers them, and re-creates them in individual thought, feeling, and conduct."[1] Such a view has fuller meaning and is free of the difficulty of the dualism between man and nature presented by the former view.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that experience is not necessarily essential to learning. The issue involved here becomes most pointed when teaching concerning vice is considered. Must vices be learned through experience? If experience is necessary to learning, children would have to experience vice in order to know that it should be avoided. This evil may be overcome by allowing that experience is not always necessary to learning. There is such a thing as observation without participation, and there is also learning from the advise of others.[3]

In the third place, Horne contends that Dewey's

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 325.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 324-325.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 326.

conception of value is inconsistent with his conception of truth. He points out that Dewey conceives experience as having value in itself or in leading to another experience in which value lies intrinsicly. Horne points out that harmony can be supplied here either by making truth absolute so as to be consistent with intrinsic value or by making value identical with problem solving and so be consistent with pragmatic truth.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that Dewey's conception of intrinsic values is inconsistent with his conception of the universality of instrumental values. He points out that instrumental values tend to fade into intrinsic values, and therefore there is not a clear distinction between the two. It follows that instrumental values are not universal.[2]

In the fifth place, Horne contends that Dewey's conception of intrinsic values allows a conception of culture which is inconsistent with the conception which he has previously presented. Culture was presented as social efficiency, but if there are intrinsic values it is implied that it is an enjoyment which ends in itself. Horne expresses his preference for the latter view.[3]

In the sixth place, Horne contends that Dewey's conception of the limitations of instrumental values, as

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 334-335.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 335
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 335-336.

over against intrinsic values, is inconsistent with his rejection of a hierarchy of values. Horne points out that Dewey's reference to "greater instrumental value"[1] suggests a scale of values. He also points out that Dewey rejects the idea that some values are more significant than others because intrinsic values cannot be compared, and instrumental values cannot be foretold. But Horne holds that if education has an end, some pursuits are going to contribute more to this end than others, and it necessarily follows that some will be of more value than others. There is a hierarchy of values.[2]

In the seventh place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy does not overcome the dualism of the sensuous and the supersensuous. This criticism comes out in the comment on Dewey's discussion of "The Segregation and Organization of Values" in which it is made clear that continuity in experience is Dewey's chief emphasis. Horne makes this contention relative to what is said in this section and in anticipation of the syntheses of dualisms which are to follow. He says that in all of Dewey's concern to make the whole of experience continuous, there is one dualism that will never be resolved. It is a dualism common to all positivism and humanism. It cannot be resolved by experimental humanism but rather by some form of mysticism and absolutism.[3]

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 336. See also Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 284.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 336.
3 Cf., Ibid. pp. 344-345.

18. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XIX: "Labor and Leisure."

The outstanding criticism which Horne makes in this chapter is that the genetic mode of refutation is questionable. The objection arises here because Dewey conceives of the opposition of labor and leisure as arising in Greek civilization. In stating the issues which arise, Horne says:

> It is suggested that Aristotle held the views that he did because he was rationalizing the kind of society in which he lived and believed. It is also suggested that views which were the effect of one kind of society are no longer tenable when the social pattern changes. [1]

Horne holds that both of these propositions are to be questioned. As to the first, he says that a man's thinking is not completely independent of his times, but it is not limited to rationalizing on them alone. Abraham Lincoln, facing slavery, was thinking ahead of his times, not rationalizing upon them. As to the second, Horne holds that some thinking which arises out of any society may be ideal and is, therefore, true and applicable under any set of social conditions. In citing one example of this, he says: "Euclid's geometry has not been proven false by Reimann and Lobatchevski."[2] So it does not necessarily follow that the distinction between a liberal and technical education should be abandoned because Greek slavery no longer exists. To follow this line of thinking strictly would necessitate abandoning pragmatism itself. The first pragmatists were the Greek sophists, and

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 350-351.
2 Ibid., p. 351.

they lived under a different set of social conditions than we now find. Horne makes reference to a classical scholar and a contemporary scholar[1] both of whom concur with him in his position regarding the genetic method of refutation.[2]

19. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XX: "Intellectual and Practical Studies."

First, Horne contends that the opposition between changing experience and changeless reason cannot be rejected.[3] He contends that thought does hold a world which is changeless in character, and it can be shown to do so. The depth and conciseness of Horne's writing here is such as warrants quoting it fully:

> The very notion of change implies the changeless. Without the permanent there is no impermanent. The only constant may be change, yet there is a constant. If there were only change, we might not be conscious of it, as we are not conscious of the weight of the air which is always present but never sensed. Certain characteristics even of changing phenomena do not change; for example, all phenomena have both form and content, both figure and stuff. Here is a formal changeless truth about our changing world. There are many changing shades of blue, but the truth of the proposition that all sensory blues have some extension does not change. The illustrations are many of the fact that there is a changeless realm of truths, grasped by thought. The changeless conceptual order is one thing, the changing perceptual order is a different thing. And the changeless conceptual order permeates the changing perceptual order as changeless space permeates changing matter. These views remain in any actual or conceivable form of human society.[4]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 352-353., See also Field, G. C., Plato and His Contemporaries, New York, 1930, pp. 77., and Cohen, Morris, Reason and Nature, New York, 1931, p. 385.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 350-353.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 367-368.
4 Ibid., p. 367.

Horne substantiates this point by beliefs from other fields of knowledge. He quotes William James:

> Each conception thus eternally remains what it is, and never can be another..... The paper, a moment ago white, I may now see to be scorched black. But my conception "white" does not change into my conception "black." ....Thus, amid the flux of opimions and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or the things intended to be thought about, stands stiff and immutable, like Plato's Realm of Ideas. 1

This argues for the existence of a world of thought which is changeless from the standpoint of the psychologist. Keyser, a mathematician, also concurs:

> Transcending the flux of the sensuous universe, there exists a stable world of pure thought, a divinely ordered world of ideas, accessible to man, free from the mad dance of time, infinite and eternal. 2

In the second place, Horne objects that all intellectual pursuits should not be practicalized. This arises out of Dewey's close adherence to labor in his discussion of experience as experimentation. Horne says that education should be experimentation, but im addition to this it should give place for thought, appreciation, and pleasure. He holds that many problems worth thinking about are not necessarily matters of practical nature. Experimentation does not include all of experience. There emotional factors in experience, and experimentation is purely intelectual and practical. The love we experience in our families

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 367-368., See also James, William, Psychology, pp. 239-240.
2 Ibid., p. 368., See also Keyser, C. J., The Human Worth of Rigorous Thinking, Columbia University Press, New York, 1925, p. 57.

is not to be experimented with. Experience also contains an element of intellectual curiosity which is quite different from the intellect which operates in experimentation. Further it would be unreasonable to limit research to merely the realm of applied science. The more speculative type of research always precedes the practical; Clerk Maxwell and J. J. Thomson preceded Marconi. We do not know today what will be the practical results of the work being done by Millikan, Eddington, Jeans, and Einstein; but it would be foolish to refuse them the privilege of carrying on their research. If, however, they are considered to be doing practical work, then Plato and Aristotle must be allowed a place among those who are of practical value although much of their work was done in the intellectual realm.[1]

20. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXI: "Physical and Social Studies: Naturalism and Humanism."

First, Horne contends that the unity of man and nature was not as generally accepted among the Greek thinkers as Dewey presents it to be. In giving the historic background of this dualism, Dewey says that it is not to be found among the Greek thinkers who had the dualism of labor and leisure; but that it rather arose with the Romans and in mediaeval times. Horne holds that many of the Greeks were dualistic on the question of man and nature, just as they

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 381-383.

were with the problem of labor and leisure. He points to Socrates as discounting the knowledge of nature and emphasizing the knowledge of man. Plato is also pointed out as seeing a dualism between the human and the natural. He made his curriculum a study of man rather than a study of nature, and made room for abstract thinking. He regarded man as a child of heaven rather than a child of nature; he did not depose nature but he conceived of an ideal world which transcended it and was more real.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that evolution is not a basis for belief in the unity of man and nature. He points out that in the realm of biology the doctrine of evolution is still a theory and not a proven principle, although it is accepted quite generally by scientists. And as a theory of evolution it still needs a philosophy. Dewey does not use a philosophy of evolution in supporting the belief in the unity of man and nature, but he rather uses a biological theory. Horne points out that there are philosophies which attempt to answer the why of evolution. Among them is the theory of theistic evolution which makes man a creation of God rather than a product of the natural order as such.[2] It is interesting to compare this criticism with the one offered by Squires on this point. Horne says that Dewey uses evolution as a biological theory to support the

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 388-389.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 401-402.

continuity of man and nature, while Squires says that Dewey uses a philosophical theory of evolution at least once removed from the biological hypothesis. They are together in recognizing the biological hypothesis as one thing, and the philosophy of evolution as another, and that the biological hypothesis does not necessarily preclude a theistic philosophy of evolution.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that experimental method does not overcome the dualism of man and nature. He points out that Dewey's use of the experimental method assumes that it makes man and nature one, but it fails to do so in that nature is conceived as having means, and man is conceived as having ends. In order to have a monism here, nature and man must both be conceived as having both ends and means. This is to be done on an idealistic basis rather than on the grounds of naturalism.[2]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that it is dangerous to apply the experimental method to social questions. He holds that there are many social questions which are already settled in principle, and that it would be a great waste for our present society to start all over again to test the validity of moral and social principles which have been proven by the experience of the race.[3]

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1 Cf., Ante, p. 30.
2 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 402.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 402-403.

21. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXII: "The Individual and the World."

First in this discussion, Horne contends that the conception of the mind as individual is **not** modern but ancient. This is pointed to Dewey's argument that the conception arose in mediaeval times and, by implication, it should therefore be rejected. Horne cites the Sophists, Hebrews, and early Christians as examples of those living before mediaeval times who conceived of the mind as individual. Among them was a distinct emphasis upon individualism, and the conception which Dewey claims to have first appeared in mediaeval times is the continued expression of the early Christian view. Jesus, ten centuries before mediaeval times, taught that the individual was of supreme worth, and that a person survives bodily death. No one can be induced reasonably to reject belief in the mind as individual on the basis of this argument of Dewey.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that the mind is more than an agent of reorganization. He asserts that the whole trend of Dewey's philosophy is depersonalizing; the mind is of course an agent of reorganization, but it is far more in that it is a self. In supporting this, he says:

> We are more sure of sound sensations than of air vibrations; of sight sensations than of ether vibrations; of awareness than of the specific object of which we are aware; of what we meant to say than of what we said. There may be behaviour without an

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., **The Democratic Philosophy** of Education, pp. 408-410.

> observer, but there can be no observation of behaviour without an observer. There may be action without a self but no conduct without a self. ... ... You, not I, think your thoughts, feel your emotions, make your decisions. The occurrence and awareness of these processes are private. This is not to deny the influence of environment on the self or the influence of the self on the environment; it is to affirm the privacy of one's awareness. In one sense it is true that we all live in the same world; this means that there is a subjective world of individual consciousness forever closed to all others. You can tell me how you feel and think and decide, but I can not feel your feeling or think your thinking, or decide your decision. 1

In the third place, Horne contends that mind is not body. He points out that in the discussion of "Educational Equivalents," Dewey seems to allow a place for individual consciousness which is somewhat contrary to his conception of mind as an agent of reorganization. This criticism is made more as a caution than as direct objection to Dewey's discussion. Horne admits that mind never works apart from the body but he contends that mind is more than body. It has a body and it has social relations but it is a reality in itself which is more than a mere product of its physical basis.[2]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that Dewey's conception of freedom is little more than determinism. He points out that according to Dewey, freedom inheres in physical and social conditions which permit thinking to take place. This does not make room for the self; and there is

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 421-422.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 426-427.

no freedom of choice but only freedom to think, and even that is limited by circumstances. This is no more than determinism because it makes no allowance for man to better his conditions. There is freedom to think on a level of response to circumstances, but there is no freedom of the will which would enable one to make moral choices.[1]

22. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXIII: "Vocational Aspects of Education."

First, Horne contends that Dewey has a program and a metaphysics, as well as a method and a methodology. He does not find himself in agreement with those critics of Dewey who say that he has no program nor metaphysics. Horne is not concerned here with Dewey's metaphysics. It would be interesting to have his statement of Dewey's metaphysics corresponding to the statement of Dewey's program which he presents here. Dewey's program is an ideal society in which everyone is usefully employed according to his own aptitudes. It is both individual and social. The elements of value recognized are history, science, economics, civics, politics and readaptability.[2]

In the second place, Horne contends that experimental method is not able to make the transformation in society which Dewey proposes. The chief difficulty which he foresees is that it impoverishes life in so many ways in order

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 427-428.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 453-454.

to enrich life in its scientific areas. He says that there should be a larger place in this ideal society for health considerations, for the appreciative side of life, for speculative thought, and for religious experience. Dewey's program without these is pure naturalism, humanism and positivism, and withal ineffective.[1]

23. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXIV: "Philosophy of Education."

First, Horne contends that there are elements in Dewey's system which come from educational and philosophical systems which he rejects. Specifically, these are Herbart's educational system and Hegel's system of philosophy. Dewey's conception of the relation of philosophy to education comes from Herbart but his social experimentalism is quite opposed to Herbart's realism. Dewey's emphasis came to him from Hegel, but he applies the method only in social problems whereas Hegel applied it to the whole of reality.[2]

In the second place, he points out that Dewey's method in dealing with metaphysical problems is to include those which are problems to himself and to omit those which belong to systems of philosophy which he rejects. He does not intend his philosophy to be metaphysical and omits such problems from his consideration, at the same time implying a metaphysica. He points out that Dewey is unable to avoid

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 454.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 470-471.

a metaphysics. In order to argue that there is no metaphysics, it is necessary to assume one. And for Dewey, metaphysics becomes the ongoing process of man and the sense experience of the known world. This metaphysics is no more capable of proof than a metaphysics which deals in terms of an absolute world. Consequently Dewey's emphasis upon the human, empirical, and natural is purely an emphasis, and not an established fact.[1]

In the third place, Horne contends that Dewey's philosophy is not total. In this connection he says Dewey illustrates

> .....one of his own views that philosophy takes sides and not his other view that philosophy keeps the balance between sides. His bias is on the side of the scientific as against the languages and literature; he does not recognize the a priori, and the transcendental element in thinking; he does not care for speculative philosophy; he does not acknowledge the experience of the mystic; he is not interested with another pragmatist, William James, in "the varieties of religious experience." In these respects his philosophy does not exemplify the disposition of "totality." [2]

24. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXV: "Theories of Knowledge."

First in this discussion, Horne calls attention to the fact that Dewey makes elaborate use of the literary and dialectic methods, the methods he discounts, in preference to the experimental method, the method he proposes. Dewey has chosen to present his beliefs rationally and in

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 471-472.
2 Ibid., p. 474.

writing, instead of working them out by experimentation in accordance with the beliefs which he presents in this way.[1]

In the second place, Horne contends that divisions in society do not cause dualisms in epistemology. He points out the naturalistic theories of knowledge of Democritus and Lucretius in societies in which there was class division. Similarly the monistic theories of knowledge of Leibniz and Spinoza arose under conditions of social and religious division. Also, dualistic theories of knowledge such as those of Montague[2] and Lovejoy[3] have arisen under the same identical conditions which have given rise to Dewey's philosophy. Dewey himself regards our present society as only nominally democratic, yet it has produced his philosophy which emphasizes continuity.[4]

In the third place, Horne contends that experience is not able to know anything. This is directed at Dewey's emphasis upon experience in the knowledge-getting process which excludes the self and makes existence little more than a stream of experiences. Horne contends that in order for a thing to be known there must be a self, and the way to overcome dualism is not to deny the distinction between the knower and the known but to recognize that there is a unity in the substance that underlies both. Recognition of the

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 483-484.
2 Montague, W. P., The Ways of Knowing, New York, 1925.
3 Lovejoy, A. O., The Revolt Against Dualism, New York, 1930.
4 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., p. 484.

fact that the self of man can know itself may suggest that the self of the universe is able to know itself.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that psychosis is not neurosis. He points out that Dewey goes beyond the hypothesis that there is no psychosis without neurosis, and asserts that psychosis is neurosis. The hypothesis is not completely proven to say nothing of the idea that the two are identical. This is purely a naturalistic position. Horne says:

> Just how the carpenter's organism works successfully without the mental image of the future box his board is to help make is not clear. Aristotle recognized four classes of causes: the material cause, the wood of which the box is made; the efficient cause, the maker of the box; the formal cause, the pattern by which the box is made; and the final cause, the purpose for which the box is made. The text recognizes the material and efficient cause. It does not recognize the formal and final cause. [2]

This theory makes the mind no more than its functions, there is no place for awareness of self. There are many other theories of the mind-body relationship, and Dewey's theory has no better foundation than these. It is unproven and is therefore no more than a speculative theory.[3]

In the fifth place, Horne contends that the doctrine of evolution requires a philosophy before it can have philosophic significance. This criticism is directed at Dewey's statement in which he says: "The philosophical significance

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 484-485.
2 Ibid., p. 486.
3 Cf., Ibid., pp. 486-487.

of the doctrine of evolution lies precisely in its emphasis upon continuity of simpler and more complex organic forms until we reach man."[1] Horne again declares that the theory of evolution is not yet a principle.[2] Then through a long series of questions he makes clear that, should the doctrine of evolution be accepted as a biological fact, its purpose would yet have to be explained.[3] The use which Dewey makes of the doctrine of evolution is to assume that it means for the knowing process that the individual is only a participator. His fallacious use of evolution as a basis for the idea, leaves it with that much less support. And Horne says that it is much more reasonable to believe that the individ- is an onlooker in the knowing process if we think only of the doctrine of evolution. For how could the doctrine have been formulated were the individual not able to review past experience of the race as an onlooker.[4]

In the sixth place, Horne contends that Dewey's use of the experimental method is is inadequate.[5] He calls attention to three outstanding limitations. There are types of knowledge which the experimental method does not give to us. Experimentation cannot tell us that objects exist only in space, yet we have such knowledge. And deductions such as those of geometry may be proven by experimentation but

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1 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 392-393.
2 Cf., Ante, pp. 107-108.
3 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 488.
4 Cf., Ibid., pp. 487-489.
5 Cf., Ibid., pp. 489-491.

it is not necessary to get the knowledge in this way once the deductions have already been made. Again, there are truths which do not need further experimentation for proof; experimentation is not necessary to further prove the multiplication table or to find out that laws are necessary for the control of man's social relationships. Besides these limitations of Dewey's use of experimental method the fact remains that there are unsuspected realms in which the experimental method may be applied, as for example, "one may use the experimental method in the devotional life."[1]

In the seventh place, Horne contends that democracy in society is not a cause for pragmatism in epistemology. He points out that Perry and Hocking are both advocates of democracy yet not pragmatists; the former is a realist and the latter an idealist. Horne holds rather that pragmatism is more derived from the biological sciences than from democracy. He refers to Dewey's acknowledgment of the influence of Darwin.[2] He points out that another difficulty lies in the fact that pragmatism as a theory of knowing is individual while democracy is social.[3]

In the eighth place, Horne contends that pragmatism is inadequate as an epistemology.[4] He supports this criticism

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 491. Reference is made here to Wieman, H. N., Religious Experience and the Scientific Method, New York, 1926.
2 See Dewey, John, The Influence of Darwin, New York, 1910.
3 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 499-500.
4 Cf., Ibid., pp. 501-503.

by pointing out that pragmatism falls by its own standard.[1] The fact that it works for pragmatists and not for those who are not pragmatists robs it of a workable standard of judgment, and it is not provable by its own standards short of extreme individualism. He points out further that there is no ought in pragmatism which obliges men to adopt its truth.[2] But the non-pragmatic theory places an intellectual obligation upon men to accept the truth. He points out again that according to the pragmatic theory truth is not an end product but a constantly changing process which must be rediscovered in each new activity.[3] But pragmatism proves to be inconsistent here if the dialectic method is applied. Its doctrine that truth is constantly changing is considered to be a truth which does not change. And it is considered to be true because it represents a real situation. Finally, Horne points out that there are instances in which there are several ideas which will work equally well and yet only one is true. Pragmatism cannot detect the one which is true according to non-pragmatic standards and isolate it from the others which work equally well.[4] One example of this which is mentioned is that of the clever robber who steals a painting which is a masterpiece and substitutes for it a perfect copy which cannot be distinguished from the original. Accord-

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 501.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 501.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 502.
4 Cf., Ibid., pp. 502-503.

ing to the epistemology of pragmatism there is no distinction between the two pictures.

25. Analysis of the Criticism in Chapter XXVI: "Theories of Morals."

First in this discussion, Horne contends that there is a dualism between the inner and outer of moral considerations. This is directed at Dewey's argument for the continuity of the two. Horne points out that it is possible that there is a conflict in the body between the tendency to tell the truth and to tell a lie when a moral situation involving such possibilities is faced. And attention is called to the fact that in multiple personalities like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and in deranged personalities, the continuity between the inner and outer is greatly disturbed. Should it be possible that it would ever be proven that there is psychosis without neurosis the independence of the inner would be established. He goes on to contend that the outer does stand by itself, and this upsets the proposed continuity. The reflex actions of the body are actions which are independent of the inner. Horne further contends that Dewey, in his own discussion of this continuity, does not overcome the dualism between the two. Dewey says:

> We may distinguish, of course, the more explicitly conscious phase of the continuous activity as mental or psychical. .....Our conscious thoughts, observations, wishes, aversions are important, because they represent inchoate, nascent activities. 1

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1 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, pp. 403-404.

The distinction pointed out here Horne considers to be a virtual recognition of the dualism Dewey has been laboring to overcome. He suggests that if the inner does exist independently of the outer it is possible that progress lies in its increased freedom from material occupations. He suggests that it might be well to take mental holidays, such as the writing of poetry or other appreciative activities provide.[1]

In the second place, Horne points out that there is no ought in Dewey's ethics. He says:

> Let us note first that there is no ought in this ethics, no universal binding moral principles, no obligatory duties, no rapturous apostrophe with Kant to the starry heavens above and the moral law within, no clear universal distinction between the right and the wrong. Instead there are preferences of the individual, there are contrasts between growing and limited selves and there is interest in one's occupation. The most used string on Dewey's harp is "occupation" and the most played tune is "continuity." [2]

But, Horne contends, an ought does exist. Every individual has received more than he has given, and for it he owes a debt. This is his ought which he must fulfill whether he is interested in doing so or not.[3]

In the third place, Horne contends that interest is not an adequate motivation for work. Dewey's emphasis on interest is overdrawn. Work done by coercion is not done through interest but because of external complusion of some

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 508-510.
2 Ibid., p. 516.
3 Cf., Ibid., p. 516.

kind, either in the form of rewards or consequences. And probably most of the world's work is done by external compulsion.[1]

In the fourth place, Horne contends that self is not identical with interest. This criticism is directed at Dewey's statement that "self and interest are two names for the same fact."[2] The self is not interest, it is the possessor of interest. It is the center of all experience and not only is able to be interested but able to think and have purposes.[3]

In the fifth place, Horne contends that Dewey fails in establishing continuity between duty and interest. He calls attention to Dewey'ss statement that "it is the nature of a readjusting of habit to involve an effort which is disagreeable —something to which a man has deliberately to hold himself."[4] This, Horne holds, is an acknowledgment that effort and duty do have a place in the motivation of tasks. He recognizes the fact that Dewey considers these times in which effort must operate as only transitional. But all of the philosophy of Dewey is a constant transition, so the conflict becomes perpetual. This concession of Dewey really allows the dualism that he has been attempting to deny in this section on "The Opposition of Duty and Interest."[5]

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 516-517.
2 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 408.
3 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., p. 517.
4 Dewey, John, Op. Cit., p. 409.
5 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op, Cit., pp. 517-518.

In the sixth place, Horne objects that Dewey discusses character without any mention of conscience. He points out that conscience is apparently regarded as no more than perception of undesirable consequences, and no distinction is made between it and intellectual or aesthetic judgment. Horne contends to the contrary that there is a moral judgment in man which urges him to do right and avoid wrong. It may be provided by conditions relative to the individual's birth and training, but the judgment is a possession of every person. It can be cultivated or it can be deadened; and the only way to cultivate it is to obey its dictates and sincerely seek to learn what is right conduct.[1]

In the seventh place, Horne contends that knowledge is not virtue. Dewey's position on this point is quite the same as that of Socrates and Plato. But, Horne contends, we see that this is not the case when a man with fifty years of good life behind him yields to evil. Here knowledge fails to perpetuate virtue. Aristotle, the follower of Socrates, saw that knowledge does not necessarily control conduct, and he saw also that it was possible for the individual to do either right or wrong. It is not knowledge but love of virtue which produces goodness.[2]

In the eighth place, Horne contends that Dewey's ethics has no adequate criterion of right and wrong. Apparently

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 522.
2 Cf., Ibid., pp. 522-523.

Dewey thinks of moral knowledge as always knowledge of the right, but there is knowledge of wrong, and it is necessary that there be a standard to distinguish the two.[1]

In the ninth place, Horne contends that it is confusing to identify the moral and social. He contends that experience has both personal and social aspects, and that the moral is more closely a part of the personal. When the morality of a person expresses itself in acts which affect society then it becomes social.[2]

In the tenth place, Horne contends that Dewey's definition of virtue lacks a criterion distinguishing good and evil. Dewey's definition of virtue is as follows: "To possess virtue.... means to be fully and adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices of life."[3] Horne contends that this definition is too broad and must be supplemented by the qualitative element. He suggests that probably the term "democratic" would supply what is needed here.[4]

In the eleventh place, Horne commends Dewey in that no one would be able to read his Democracy and Education without being moved to such action as he suggests.[5] In paying him tribute, Horne says:

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 523.
2 Cf., Ibid., p. 527.
3 Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 415.
4 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., p. 527.
5 Cf., Ibid., p. 529.

> With St. Paul he rejects an abundance of things as the secret of the good life. With St. James he rejects fine sentiments without corresponding deeds. With Leigh Hunt he writes at the head of the list the one who loves his fellowman. 1

In the twelfth place, Horne points out that Dewey is not a theist. He quotes two statements from Dewey here, the one is:

> The universe of moral and spiritual values exists only in the sentimentalism that generates them. 2

and the other:

> The demand of righteousness for reverence does not depend upon the ability to prove the existence of antecedent Being who is righteous. 3

Horne points out that many feel that the best life cannot be lived without a sense of relationship to the Infinite. At the same time he calls attention to those who feel such a debt to Dewey for what he has given that they do not like to criticize him for what he omits.[4]

In the thirteenth place, Horne calls attention to the fact that Dewey offers no theory of feeling. He points out that the emotions are mentioned in several different connections but there is no theory of feeling corresponding to the theories of knowledge and morals offered. There seems to be a neglect of the whole appreciative side of life.[5]

In the fourteenth place, Horne contends that in

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1 Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 529.
2 John Dewey, "Is Nature Good?", Hibbert Journal, Vol. VII, p. 827.
3 Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 304.
4 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 529-530.
5 Cf., Ibid., p. 530.

spite of Dewey's rejection of dualism there are divisions in his aims of education.[1] He points out that individual growth and social efficiency are two aims maintained in Democracy and Education which are not brought together. Horne quotes Geyer's expression of this observation:

> The two distinct aims or ends which seem to be set up for education in Dr. Dewey's outline are on the one hand a preparation for sharing and improving the community life, and on the other a growth of the child's powers simply for the sake of growth. [2]

In the fifteenth place, Horne calls attention to the fact that Dewey does not give any significance to personality. He points out that the emphasis is on the democratic experience and not on the worth of personality. Personalities are almost completely omitted here, yet it is personality that has the experience.[3]

In the sixteenth place, Horne makes the assertion that "pragmatism is not alone among modern philosophies in accepting the scientific method and providing a theory of democracy."[4] This comment is directed to the fact that Dewey presents his philosophy as one with the scientific method and as democracy in the knowledge-getting process. Horne quotes from Creighton who says:

> Pragmatism has no exclusive claim to be a philosophy of democracy, or a philosophy which is open-eyed to

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1 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, p. 531.
2 Denton L. Geyer, "The Wavering Aim of Education in Dewey's Educational Philosophy," Education, XXXVII, p. 484.
3 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op. Cit., pp. 531-532.
4 Ibid., p. 532.

> the results and methods of the sciences. I make this remark because writers of this school frequently convey the opposite assumption. [1]

In the seventeenth place, Horne contends that the naturalistic view of intelligence is inadequate as a basis of school procedure.[2] Horne contends that intellectual and ethical ideals are necessary to complete moral development and these are excluded in the naturalistic emphasis of Dewey. He quotes here from Creighton and Swabey who concur with him in this objection. Creighton says:

> The description of intelligence exclusively in terms of "planning," "reorganizing," "reconstituting," "purposive activity" may be necessary to bring it under a naturalistic category, but it is surely a caricature even of the imperfect life of reason that ordinary individuals realize. [3]

Marie Swabey says:

> Whereas it is the merest platitude to assert that our biological makeup has something to do with the character of our thinking, it is the extremest dogmatism to claim that all thought finally expresses nothing but an activity of adjustment on the part of the organism to its surroundings. [4]

In the closing comment of his book, Horne points out that Dewey is a philosopher of revolt and consequently some of his emphases are extreme.[5]

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1 J. E. Creighton, "Review of Democracy and Education," Philosophical Review, XXV, p. 739.
2 Cf., Horne, H. H., The Democratic Philosophy of Education, pp. 532-533.
3 J. E. Creighton, Op. Cit., p. 741.
4 Swabey, M. C., Logic and Nature, New York, 1930, p. vii.
5 Cf., Horne, H. H., Op, Cit., p. 533.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE

(Continued)

CHAPTER VII.

THE CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY ADVANCED BY HERMAN HARRELL HORNE (Continued)

D. Summary of Horne's Criticisms.

To bring together all the criticisms presented in the two preceding chapters, and to synthesize them by classifying them according to subjects, the following series of propositions results:

1. Criticisms Relative to the Definition of Philosophy.

1. Philosophy is a study of the whole of reality and is not limited to the field of social conflicts.

2. Philosophy is more than the philosophy of education.

3. The advantage of Dewey's conception of philosophy is that it would utilize for practical endeavors of life the energy which would otherwise go into reflection.

4. Dewey is at a disadvantage in his conception of philosophy in that man is not satisfied to live in the realm of experience alone.

2. Criticisms Relative to Man.

5. Intelligence is not only human; it is universal.

6. Reality is theocentric, not anthropocentric.

7. Dewey's philosophy puts too much confidence in man, in his intelligent action, and in his method of experimental inquiry.

8. Pragmatism leads man to rely completely upon himself.

9. Dewey's philosophy does not allow for the superhuman in human relationships.

3. Criticisms Relative to Education.

10. Education is not continuous growth alone, it is growth which in a finite way approaches the Infinite.

11. Dewey begins his treatment of the philosophy of education with life and not with the origin of life.

12. In spite of Dewey's rejection of dualism, there is division in his aims of education.

4. Criticisms Relative to Teleology.

13. There is no true teleology in Dewey's philosophy.

14. Dewey rejects an infinite goal for human life.

15. Dewey's conception of growth lacks a goal.

16. Education is not its own end, it aims to realize increasingly the Absolute idea for the individual, society and race.

17. Means and ends are not the same, as Dewey would make them.

5. Criticisms Relative to Religion.

18. Dewey's experimentalism has nothing specific to say about God. He clearly is not a Theist.

19. Dewey has nothing to say about Immortality.

20. Dewey, as well as Rousseau, does not identify God with nature.

21. His denial of the objective reality of mysticism cannot be proven by his own principles.

22. He is mistaken in regarding Christianity as having its origins so largely in Greek philosophy, rather than in Judaism and the life and teachings of Jesus.

23. Dewey misinterprets religion in saying that it is not concerned with present existence.

24. He misinterprets religion in saying that its other-world is one which is not supposed to exist.

25. He misinterprets religion in his contention that

its other-world is not thought of as a resource.

26. The realizing of possibilities is only one consideration in religion.

27. Dewey's democratized society lacks the dynamic provided by belief in God.

6. Criticisms Relative to Epistemology.

28. The continuity of knowledge and action may well be questioned in some cases.

29. Dewey's philosophy fails to distinguish between the nature of truth and the test of truth.

30. Experimentalism is inadequate as the seat of intellectual authority.

31. Dewey under-estimates the place of sensation in the knowledge-getting process.

32. He under-estimates the ability of the mind to transcend the physical use of things.

33. Experience is not necessarily essential to learning.

34. Experience is not able to know anything; knowing requires a self.

35. Dewey's analysis of reflective thinking is not original with him.

36. Thinking cannot be limited to mere experimenting.

37. Dewey's theory of knowledge greatly limits the range of knowledge.

38. All intellectual pursuits need not be practical.

39. Knowledge is more than a tool; it may be an end in itself.

40. The appreciative side of experience is omitted in Dewey's treatment of the growth of subject matter in the individual.

41. Metaphysical and religious elements are lacking in Dewey's treatment of the growth of subject matter in the

individual.

42. Plato was not pragmatic in his theory of knowledge, as Dewey assumes.

43. Division in society does not cause dualism in epistemology; and democracy in society is not a cause of pragmatism in epistemology.

7. Cricitisms Relative to Nature.

44. Dewey confuses growth and development, and in so doing confuses external stimulation and internal changes.

45. "The naturalization of intelligence" cannot be effected by Dewey's theory that nature itself is neither rational nor irrational yet subject to man's reason.

46. Nature is independent of man.

47. The unity of man and nature was not generally accepted among the Greek thinkers as Dewey represents it.

48. Evolution is not a basis for belief in the unity of man and nature.

49. The doctrine of evolution requires a philosophy before it can have philosophic significance.

50. Experimental method does not overcome the dualism of man and nature.

8. Criticisms Relative to Experimentalism

51. Dewey expects too much of science.

52. Science is not a substitute for religion.

53. Experimental method is not able to make the transformation in society which Dewey proposes.

54. It is dangerous to apply the experimental method to social questions.

55. Dewey makes elaborate use of the literary and dialectic methods, the very methods he discounts in preference to the experimental method.

9. Criticisms Relative to Personality.

56. Dewey does not think personality significant.

57. Men are more than agents and means, they are ends.

58. Dewey omits the personal and subjective elements in his consideration of interest.

59. Dewey offers no theory of feeling.

60. Dewey under-estimates the place of personal appeal in social control.

61. Experience is not limited to physical environment alone, it also includes social environment.

10. Criticisms Relative to Ethics.

62. Dewey's philosophy knows no real ought.

63. Interest is not sufficient in itself as motivation for work but must be supplemented by discipline.

64. Dewey fails to establish continuity between duty and interest.

65. A dualism does exist between the inner and outer of moral considerations.

66. Dewey discusses character without mention of conscience.

67. Knowledge is not virtue.

68. Dewey's ethics has no adequate criterion of right and wrong.

69. Man's power of self-determination is not always in line with his knowledge.

70. Dewey's conception of freedom is little more than determinism.

71. It is confusing to identify the moral with the social.

11. Criticisms Relative to the Transcendent.

72. Existence revolves about a transcendent Knower.

73. There are more than spatial and temporal meanings.

74. Truth is not relative but absolute.

75. Value is not relative to man, it exists everywhere, whether it is felt by man or not.

76. Dewey's conception of value is inconsistent with his conception of truth.

77. Dewey's conception of intrinsic values allows a conception of culture which is inconsistent with the one he presents.

78. His limitation of instrumental value as over against intrinsic value is inconsistent with his rejection of a hierarchy of values.

79. His philosophy does not overcome the dualism of the sensuous and the supersensuous.

80. Dewey's philosophy does not recognize thinking, the distinctive function of philosophy.

81. Laws of thought are more than symbols, they are realities.

82. Dewey's method in dealing with metaphysical problems is to include those which are problems to himself and omit those which belong to systems of philosophy which he rejects.

83. There is evidence that some things do not change.

84. The opposition between changing experience and changeless reason cannot be rejected.

85. The Greeks and the Christians controlled as well as accepted the world.

86. The transcendent is of practical value.

12. Criticisms Relative to Mind.

87. Dewey gives a naturalistic solution to the mind-matter dualism.

88. Mind is more than acting intelligently toward an end.

89. The mind is more than an agent of reorganization, it is a self.

90. Self is not identical with interest, it is more than interest.

91. The conception of the mind as individual is not modern but ancient.

92. Psychosis is not neurosis.

93. The naturalistic view of intelligence is inadequate as a basis of school procedure.

13. Criticisms Relative to History.

94. Dewey's use of history in presenting his conception of democracy in education is not strictly pragmatic.

95. History does not begin with the present.

96. History is more than a science in that it reveals purpose.

97. Dewey gives no spiritual interpretation of history.

98. Ethical value does not arise from history as such but from the appreciation of history.

14. General Criticisms.

99. Dewey has a program and a metaphysics as well as a method and a methodology.

100. Dewey is a philosopher of revolt, and consequently some of his emphases are extreme.

101. The genetic mode of refutation is unsatisfactory.

102. There are elements in Dewey's system which come from educational and philosophical systems which he rejects.

103. "Pragmatism is not alone among modern philosophies in accepting the scientific method and providing a theory of democracy."

104. The weakness of Dewey's philosophy is in its omissions, it is not complete.

105. It is not complete in its attempt to establish continuity between dualisms.

106. It needs to be supplemented by a third set of categories, namely, the "organic."

107. It needs to be supplemented by idealism.

15. Commendations.

108. "Pragmatism and Behaviorism combined give us an educational philosophy that is practical, functional, near-to-earth, human, social."

109. Dewey's influence upon philosophy tends to make it more practical.

110. Dewey's influence in religion tends to make us think more about man.

111. Dewey himself exemplifies most consistently his conception of social efficiency.

112. No one could read Dewey's Democracy and Education without being moved to such action as he suggests in it.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE MAJOR CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEWEY FROM THE CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW.

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THE MAJOR CRITICISMS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF DEWEY FROM THE CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW.

A. Introduction.

The foregoing analysis has summarized the criticisms of the philosophy of Dewey made by Brightman, Hocking Squires, and Horne. It is the purpose of the present chapter. therefore, to ascertain the major points of criticism as may be determined by a comparative study of all the criticisms offered by the four authors analyzed. The foregoing summaries of criticisms were compared point for point, thereby revealing those criticisms in which two or more of the authors concurred. Twenty-two such criticisms resulted from this comparison. These will be presented in the order of importance as signified by the number concurring in making the criticisms. The specific objections revealing these major criticisms are variously stated by each author and so will be presented with each major criticism.

B. The Criticisms in Which Four Concur.

All four critics object to Dewey's agnostic position in regard to metaphysical truth. Brightman thinks Dewey is inconsistent in maintaining a metaphysics and at the same time implying metaphysical agnosticism. According to Hocking, pragmatism acquiesces too easily in the agnostic view of metaphysical truth. And according to Squires, the philosophy of Dewey does not recognize antecedent reality. It denies the universal and exalts the particular; it denies

the eternal and exalts the temporary; it opposes belief in absolute truth, goodness and value. And finally, Horne objects that existence revolves about a transcendent Knower. There are more than spatial and temporal meanings. Dewey's philosophy does not overcome the dualism of the sensuous and the supersensuous.

C. Criticisms in Which Three Concur.

(1) Three of the critics point out that Dewey is not a theist. Brightman thinks that Dewey wishes to avoid dogmatic belief in God. According to Squires, Dewey's philosophy teaches that a divine will is non-existent. Horne argues that Dewey's experimentalism has nothing to say about God. Dewey does not identify God with nature. Horne states specifically that Dewey is not a theist.

(2) Three of the critics object to Dewey's emphasis upon change. Brightman holds that Dewey is unchanging in his devotion to change and in this is inconsistent. According to Hocking pragmatism fails in its emphasis upon change; something must remain constant if there is to be meaning. Horne contends that there is evidence that some things do not change. The opposition between changing experience and changeless reason cannot be rejected.

(3) Three of the critics concur in objecting that Dewey's ethics lacks a standard of judgment. Hocking contends that pragmatism cannot determine what is right in ethics because it is necessary first to determine what is right be-

fore determining what will promote welfare, survival or happiness. Squires objects that in his theory of moral value, Dewey rejects transcendental absolutism. He says that Dewey cannot logically rest moral value in the middle ground between hedonism and absolutism. Horne holds that Dewey's ethics has no adequate criterion of right and wrong, and that Dewey discusses character without any mention of conscience.

(4) Three of the critics concur in questioning the support Dewey seeks from science for his epistemology. Hocking thinks that pragmatism can claim no particular support from the scientific method. According to Squires experimentation as broadly conceived does not particularly support Dewey's conception of the knowing process. Horne points out that Dewey's analysis of reflective thinking is not original with him.

(5) Three of the critics welcome Dewey's emphasis upon the place of the active and the practical in philosophy. Brightman thinks that Dewey's philosophy is religious in that it emphasizes the activity of thought, and in that it emphasizes experience as opposed to abstract rationalism. According to Hocking pragmatism does well in emphasizing the fact that active effort is necessary to arrive at truth. Horne acknowledges that Dewey's influence upon philosophy tends to make it more practical.

D. Criticisms in Which Two Concur.

(1) Two of the men studied criticize Dewey because he does not carry his experimentalism into the field of religion. Brightman thinks that Dewey fails in not applying his empiricism to religion. And Squires points out that Dewey's philosophy makes pragmatic standards supreme in life and conduct but denies pragmatic defense to religion. It makes experience the supreme test of truth but abandons experience in its treatment of religion.

(2) Two of the critics object to Dewey's indifference in regard to immortality. According to Squires, Dewey contends that there is no need for belief in immortality. And Horne observes that Dewey is silent on the subject.

(3) Two of the critics object to Dewey's indifference in regard to mystical experience. Brightman holds that Dewey's agnostic attitude in regard to knowledge of God contradicts the religious experience of the race and his own experimental temper. Horne contends, likewise, that Dewey's denial of the objective reality of mysticism cannot be proven by his own principles.

(4) Two of the critics object to Dewey's emphasis upon truth as relative rather than absolute. According to Squires, Dewey's philosophy denies the absolute and exalts the relative. It considers standards, principles and rules to be mere hypotheses. Horne contends that truth is not relative but absolute.

(5) Two of the critics concur in pointing to the erroneous conception of truth upon which pragmatism is based. Hocking contends that the basic proposition of pragmatism is logically erroneous; the proposition that "all true propositions work" cannot logically be converted into the proposition that "all propositions that work are true." According to Horne, Dewey's philosophy fails to distinguish between the nature of truth and the test of truth.

(6) Two of the men studied criticize Dewey because of his neglect of the senses in the knowing process. Squires points out that Dewey conceives of the world which we experience as a real world, yet he thinks of knowledge-getting in no sense as discovering antecedent reality. Horne thinks that Dewey under-estimates the place of sensation in the knowledge-getting process.

(7) Two of the men studied criticize Dewey because of his neglect of the subjective element in the knowing process. Squires says that Dewey's philosophy eliminates the subjective aspects of epistemology. Horne holds that experience is not able to know anything since knowing requires a self.

(8) Two of the critics object to Dewey because of the lack of the element of duty in his ethics. According to Squires, Dewey's philosophy does not consider loyalty to moral principles a virtue. Dewey contends that imperativeness to do good comes from the particular situation at hand rather than from ideals connected with the will of God.

Horne says that Dewey's philosophy knows no real ought. He thinks that Dewey fails in his attempt to establish continuity between duty and interest.

(9) Two of the critics object to Dewey's philosophy on the basis that it is humanistic. Squires says specifically that such is the case. Horne makes several objections on this score. He contends that intelligence is not only human, it is universal. Reality is not anthropocentric but theocentric. He says that Dewey's philosophy puts too much confidence in man, in his intelligent action, and in his method of experimental inquiry. Pragmatism leads man to rely completely upon himself. Dewey's philosophy does not imply the superhuman in human associations.

(10) Two of the critics object to Dewey's philosophy in that it is a naturalistic monism. This is the objection made specifically by Squires. On this point Horne makes several criticisms. He says that "the naturalization of intelligence" cannot be effected by Dewey's theory that nature itself is neither rational nor irrational but subject to man's reason. Nature is independent of man. The unity between man and nature was not generally accepted among the Greek thinkers as Dewey presents it to have been. Evolution is not a basis for belief in the unity of man and nature. Experimental method does not overcome the dualism of man and nature.

(11) Two of the critics join in questioning the claims Dewey makes for natural science as supporting his

philosophy. According to Squires, Dewey's philosophy rests on opinions concerning natural science rather than on natural science itself. Horne contends that evolution is not a basis for belief in the unity of man and nature, as has just been indicated above. He says that the doctrine of evolution requires a philosophy before it can have philosophic significance.

(12) Two of the men studied criticize Dewey because he fails to recognize the place that personality has in life. According to Brightman, Dewey's view of God falls short because he is interested only in the will and not in the whole thinking, feeling, willing person. Horne calls attention to the fact that Dewey does not give any significance to personality, and that he offers no theory of feeling.

(13) Two of the critics object to Dewey's naturalistic solution of the mind-body dualism. Squires criticizes Dewey because he assumes the materialistic solution of the mind-body problem. Horne, likewise, says that Dewey gives a naturalistic solution to the mind-matter dualism. But he objects that psychosis is not neurosis, and that the naturalistic view of intelligence is inadequate as a basis of school procedure.

(14) Two of the critics make objection to Dewey's argument that the mind-body dualism is recent. According to Squires, Dewey claims that the mind-body distinction arose in modern times. Horne also is arrested by this argument by Dewey and contends to the contrary that the conception of the

mind as individual is not modern but ancient.

(15) Two of the critics call attention to the inconsistency between Dewey's use of intellectual methods and his advocacy of experimental methods. Squires thinks that Dewey is inconsistent in his use of intellectual methods to discredit intellectualism. And Horne says that Dewey makes elaborate use of the literary and dialectic methods, the methods he discounts, in preference to the experimental method, the method he proposes.

(16) Two of the critics concur in acknowledging the value of Dewey's influence in strengthening the human element in religion. According to Brightman, Dewey's philosophy is religious in that it treats empirically " the values dearest to the heart of man." Horne's commendation on this point is that Dewey's influence in religion tends to make us think more about man.

CHAPTER IX.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

A. Restatement of the Problem and Procedure.

The foregoing study has sought to ascertain the criticisms of Dewey's philosophy from the Christian point of view and has attempted to determine by comparative study which of these are major criticisms. The writings offered by four Christian scholars criticizing Dewey have been analyzed. An exposition of the criticisms offered by each has been given, and these have been summarized in each case into a series of propositions concisely presenting that which approximates the critic's total reaction to Dewey. The four men whose writings were thus studied were Edgar Sheffield Brightman, William Ernest Hocking, Walter Albion Squires, and Herman Harrell Horne. On the basis of the summaries of the specific criticisms offered by each of these men, a comparative study was made which revealed twenty-two major criticisms of Dewey's philosophy from the Christian point of view.

B. The Philosophic Emphasis of the Critics.

There are certain reactions relative to the work of these four scholars criticizing Dewey which have grown out of the present study. These have taken two main forms. The one has been the recognition of the emphasis of each man in his disagreement with Dewey. The other has been

the sensing of the nature of the criticism, each of which reveals, somewhat, his own particular position. Each of the men, therefore, will be discussed briefly on the basis of both of these reactions.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman was first in the order of the foregoing analysis. It was of interest to observe that most of his criticisms were made with reference to religion. Twelve of the fifteen criticisms which were listed deal with religious considerations. As to the nature of Brightman's criticisms, it appears that he is in agreement with more of Dewey's philosophy than either a Christian or a theist can safely accept.

William Ernest Hocking was second in the order of analysis. It was noted that practically all of his criticisms were made in the field of epistemology. He touched upon logic, ethics, metaphysics, and religion in some of the criticisms listed; but in all of them he dealt with epistemological considerations. There was little in what he had to say which revealed his philosophic position with particular reference to Dewey. This was because his discussion was not specifically concerned with Dewey's philosophy but rather with pragmatism as such. It is clear, however, from what he had to say, that his epistemology, contrary to that of Dewey, is in harmony with theism and Christianity.

Walter Albion Squires was next analyzed. It was observed that his criticism of Dewey was made from the orthodox Christian point of view and that it dealt quite extensive-

ly in the fields of epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and religion. The reaction to the nature of Squires' work was that it appeared at times to be somewhat lacking in evidence, and consequently some of his criticisms seem extreme. Though the writer shares the convictions which Squires sought to defend, yet he was unable to go all the way with him in certain of these extreme expressions.

Herman Harrell Horne was the last whose writings were analyzed. It was observed that his reaction to Dewey was made predominantly from the viewpoint of an educator. At the same time his work was very comprehensive, touching upon the fields of thought with which the other critics dealt and additional fields. The nature of his criticisms seems to be one of consistent dependability. He frequently and unhesitatingly makes references which reveal that Christ has an unquestionable place in his convictions.

C. Implications Resulting from the Present Study.

There are certain implications resulting from the present study which now may be suggested:

(1) Christians will wish to reject Dewey's indifference to personality. Jesus taught that persons are of infinite worth, but with Dewey experience is the all important thing.

(2) Christians will also wish to reject Dewey's agnostic attitude in regard to the transcendent world. They will wish to reject his indifference about God and immortal-

ity, his lack of belief in moral standards and in man's sense of duty, his belief in truth as relative rather than absolute, and his lack of belief in mystical experience. They will also wish to reject the counterpart of this which is belief in the natural order as comprising the total of reality, and in man as sufficient in himself to control his own life and the affairs of his world.

(3) Again, Christians will wish to reject Dewey's conception of the order in which we live as being in a constant state of change. For the Christian, life centers about the changeless personality of God revealed in Christ, from whom emanate certain standards and principles which are the same for all eternity.

(4) On the other hand, there are emphases in Dewey's philosophy which Christians will wish to incorporate in their life and thought. They will wish to recognize the place of the active and practical in life so much emphasized by him. When it is remembered that Jesus' life was consistently one of action and that His spiritual occupations were such as contributed the most practical results to the life of man, it can be seen how completely this emphasis harmonizes with Christian living.

(5) Christians will also wish to accept, with modification, Dewey's emphasis upon man's ability to control his environment. Increased knowledge of the natural order and added control of nature's resources do not disprove the fact that the power working in nature is from God. In fact

man must continue to seek the help of God if he is to know how to use these newly discovered powers wisely.

(6) Further lines of investigation are also implied in the present study. Whether or not these criticisms are justified is a question which might well be asked in response to all that has been said. To investigate this question will involve a study of Dewey's writings to determine what he has to say to each issue raised by his critics.

(7) Another single study or series of studies which might well follow this point would investigate any one of many possible fields of Christian activity to determine the extent to which it is influenced by the philosophy of Dewey. Probably the first field to be approached should be that of present-day religious education.

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