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THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASES OF MORALITY

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

BY
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1. a. A strange new thing is happening in the realm of morals. Other periods have witnessed a readjustment of moral standards; certain periods have been characterized by widespread disregard of moral law; but present-day civilization presents a new problem--a product of the times. It is the tendency to deny the authority, and even the existence, of the moral law, or what has hitherto been considered the moral law, itself. The very term "moral" has in certain intellectual circles come into disrepute, as smacking of a sanctimonious adherence to outgrown tradition, and to an unreasonable and detrimental Puritanism.

b. (1) The importance of this situation it is difficult to overstate. Says Andrew Gilles: "The significant thing about modern morals is not its striking similiarity to that of ancient Rome in her decadent period. It is the wide-spread and growing denial that there are any permanent moral standards whatever."¹ Thoughtful persons are questioning whether or not such a civilization can endure; a civilization, that is, which is not only failing to pay allegiance to the moral law, as did Rome; but which is denying the validity of the law itself, which neither Rome nor any other nation has ever done heretofore.

¹Andrew Gilles, "Religion and Morals", Biblical Review, Vol. 9, p. 526.

(2) Royce has pointed out that this questioning in regard to the foundations of morality is of significance to both science and religion. It

concerns both the seen and the unseen world, both the truths that justify the toil spent upon exact science, and the hopes for the love of which the religions of men have seemed dear. For what is science worth, and what is religion worth, if human life itself, for whose ennoblement science and religion have both labored, has no genuine moral standards by which one may measure its value?¹

(3) This strange new attitude in regard to morals affected education. The primary question of moral education is not now a question of method or content, it is a question of value. It is not, how shall we teach, or what shall we teach, but shall we teach morals at all and if so, why? The problem of the basis of the moral life presents itself anew, and with grave implications. The inquiry is whether, in the light of the new findings of science and psychology, a system of philosophy can be found or formulated which offers any satisfactory bases for morality whatsoever.

The most important philosophical issue of our times is whether values, the ideals by which we live, are spun out of our own heads, dreams of our own imagining, or whether they are objectively real, universally valid, sprung from the eternal nature of things, and thus grounded in that spiritual Reality² from which the whole visible order of things has proceeded.

2. a. It is perhaps trite to say that man is a being in relations. He is in relations with the universe, including

¹Josiah Royce, "The Philosophy of Loyalty," N. Y., 1914, p. 6.

²Rufus Jones, "Fundamental Ends of Life," N. Y., 1924, p. 21.

other beings like himself. The universe is so constituted that it produces a certain effect on man; man is so constituted that he is affected in a certain way, by the universe; and human beings are continually influencing, and being influenced by each other. It is man's chief problem to adjust himself, as best he may, to the situation in which he finds himself. What ought he to do, is a question which continually confronts him; and this is true not only in respect to immediate adjustments, but to the final question of his relation to whatever he may conceive of as the ultimate realities. Philosophy has tried to answer this question by asking another, "What are the chief ends of life?" thus making man's action hinge on the end he desires to achieve.

b. Various schools of philosophy have answered the posited question in various ways. But one line of cleavage runs throughout the various answers, separating them into two distinct groups. This line of cleavage may be clearly seen, when, as a touchstone, the following question is applied to any philosophy: "Is it right for an individual to sacrifice himself for the good of the group?" In other words, is the universe so constituted that the good of the individual is the thing most to be desired; or is there some universal purpose, some upward trend of things, which would justify the loss of the individual, if the good of society as a whole could be furthered thereby? Or, pressing the matter a step further, may a unity be assumed, which, running through the cosmos, would justify the sacrifice of the in-

dividual for the good of the group, on the basis, not only that it brings good to a greater number, and thus furthers the upward trend of the cosmic process; but also, and chiefly, because in thus choosing to sacrifice his lower individual good to further the purpose of the cosmic good, the individual comes into his own highest self-realization. In this conception, the word "self-sacrifice" becomes a mis-nomer. The individual is not, in one sense, renouncing his welfare for the good of the group at all. He is coming into his own highest welfare and has attained a synthesis of the egoistic and the altruistic positions. He becomes a contributor to the great upward swing of things, and cries with Ben Ezra

"Rejoice, we are allied
To that which doth provide
And not partake;
Effect, and not receive."

3. a. It is the purpose of this paper first, to indicate briefly the lines of argument on which rests the assumption that it is right for the individual to give himself for the good of the group; on which assumption, it is held, any justification for morality must ultimately be based. Then, to examine four of the present-day philosophies to discover their attitudes toward this assumption. In this way, to ascertain what basis each offers for morality.

4. a. The study will include such a review of the history and content of each philosophy as is necessary to indicate, not only whether it does or does not offer an adequate basis for morality, but also what elements in the philosophy

itself contribute to the building of this basis, or are responsible for the lack of it. The writer's evaluation will appear throughout. The paper will deal with the naturalistic, the behavioristic, the pragamtic, and the idealistic philosophies.

CHAPTER II

THE ARGUMENT FOR ALTRUISM

1. Ethics is a normative science and postulates an ideal, an ultimate good, a goal towards which the individual, as well as the whole creation, moves. Hocking says,

An ethics is not a set of prudential rules indicating the most expedient ways of getting what we want; if it were, it would be a branch of the science of economy. An ethics is concerned with the difference between right and wrong; it is concerned with a standard (or 'norm') of some sort for our behavior, toward which we stand in the relation of 'ought', obligation, duty.¹

This paper cannot touch, except in a most general way, the great philosophical arguments relative to morals. What is the origin of the moral life? What is man's Highest Good? What is the final criterion of moral judgments? The most that is attempted here is a mere statement of the direction in which the answers are conceived to lie, and which may justify the affirmation that it is right for an individual to give himself for the good of the group.

2. One of the limitations of the philosophies based on naturalism, is, as we shall see, a failure to account for the origin of the universe. Two possibilities present themselves: There is either a Supernatural Creator; or, the universe is eternally self-existing and self-sustaining. But in this universe we find a surprising thing,--mind. If the universe is self-creating it has produced a thing greater

¹Wm. Ernest Hocking, "Types of Philosophy," N. Y., 1929, p. 301.

than itself. It stands above it. The question then is, "Is the Causal Ground of the universe Mind or matter?" It is surely rational to assume that it is Mind, since otherwise the lower must have created the higher; and that the Ultimate Reality is a spiritual, Supernatural Being. Since human personality cannot conceive of Reality in terms lower than itself, we attribute to this Being the elements of personality, love, intelligence, and will; and, since the universe is evidently rational, we attribute to Him righteousness as well. Otto holds this knowledge to be a priori.¹

3. Now, since ethics postulates an ideal, and since the Highest Good of man is evidently related to the Ultimate Reality, the Supreme Good of the universe, ethics cannot escape the religious point of view. The goal of ethics no less than the goal of religion, is a character which is in harmony with the Ultimate Good.

4. But what of the criteria by which the moral worth of an act is judged? The moral worth of an act depends on the pleasure it tends to produce for the individual, the Hedonists would say. The pleasure may be either immediate or remote; it may be pleasure of sense or of the intellect; pleasure perhaps depending upon prudence or justice or sympathy; pleasure arising from having furthered the good of many individuals; but at any rate, pleasure as an end in itself is, to these thinkers, the Greatest Good.

¹Rudolph Otto, "The Idea of the Holy," Marburg, 1925, p. 141.

The Utilitarians would affirm that the moral value of an act is to be measured by the greatest sum total of happiness which it produces, whether for the individual or the group. "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," was the basal principle of Bentham, the founder of this school; it was adopted by J. S. Mill, Spencer, Sidgwick, and others. That is right which is conducive to welfare, either of self or of the species. Pleasure, instead of being an end in itself, is the reward which nature attaches to moral action. Virtue is thus founded upon utility.

Now the truth of certain elements in these positions may be freely granted. Pleasure and pain are, in one sense, "sovereign masters", whose function it is to point out what we should do. But not all actions producing happiness are regarded as moral actions, and not all actions producing pain are wrong actions. Further, it may be argued, because of the complexity of human life, and the difficulty of dealing with human actions over great time-spans, it is often impossible to calculate whether the results of an individual action will be good or bad for the greatest number. Under such a scheme, that which is "right" is apt to degenerate into that which is merely expedient for the individual; and the moral standard thus becomes a fluctuating one.

The position which this paper assumes is that there is a higher synthesis, embracing and exceeding these views: an act is right, not because it contributes either pleasure or welfare to the individual or to the group; it is right

because it is in harmony with the Ultimate Reality. Because of this harmony it is truly pleasurable in the highest sense, since it makes for the greatest self-realization of the individual. It also tends toward the preservation of all the highest values for the race. But the serving of these purposes is not the factor which makes the act righteous. That lies beyond them.

This point of argument seems almost to have been reached by T. H. Green in his "Prolegomena to Ethics".¹ He says that the standard of ultimate good is "an ideal of a perfect life for himself and other men....in the sense of being the fulfilment of all that the human spirit in him and them has the real capacity of becoming, and which....shall rest on the will to be perfect." Green does not account for this ideal as of spiritual origin, but says, "However unable man may be to give an account of such an ideal, yet it has so much hold on him as to make the promotion of goodness for its own sake....an intelligible end for him."

It has been suggested that self-giving may be only another name for self-realization. In support of this view, it may be pointed out that self-sacrifice seems to run thruout the universe, from the seed which dies to live again to the mother who gives herself for her child.

It may be further argued from the nature of the case: If altruism is a duty, if the world is so constituted that I

¹Thomas Hill Green, Oxford, Reprint 1924, p. 461.

ought to sacrifice myself for others, then that self-giving must mean my own self-realization; else, if the demand were universally applied and met, it would mean universal loss, not gain; but this could be true only if the universe were irrational.

The assumption, then, on which the argument of this paper proceeds, is, that it is right for an individual to give himself for the good of the group because such action is in harmony with the nature of the Ultimate Good,--"that which doth provide, and not partake, effect and not receive"; and that this harmony makes possible the individual's highest self-realization. Why this is so may later appear. We shall consider the attitude of the Naturalistic Philosophy to this proposition.

CHAPTER III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURALISM

1. The naturalistic philosophy assumes that nature comprises the whole of reality. Its origin goes back at least 2000 years, to the atomic theory of Leuceppus. This theory held that matter is the only reality; that atoms are the indivisible units of matter,--infinitesimal solid particles, vibrating constantly in space.

a. The aim of physical scientists has always been, and rightly, to try to reduce the cosmos to a single unitary system. Toward the end of the nineteenth century this dream seemed about to be realized. Centuries of achievement had prepared the way. Copernicus had discovered that the sun is the center of our planetary system; Kepler found that the planets move in ellipses; Galileo proved that the earth moves around the sun. Finally, Newton discovered the law of gravitation; and it was assumed that the entire activity of the cosmos could be accounted for wholly on a mechanistic basis. The formulation of the laws of the conservation of energy and of the indestructibility of matter lent further aid to this theory.

b. At first there seemed little idea of trying to include living organisms in this process. But when Harvey discovered the circulation of the blood, possibilities in that direction began to appear. Descartes, influenced by the writings of Harvey, was the first to put forth a thoroly

mechanistic interpretation of life. "The body is a machine," said he. And, tho he himself held a dualistic philosophy, and did not deny that man is more than a machine, he is to be regarded as the father of modern mechanism.

The modern theory postulates a self-sustaining, self-directing physical universe, which might even be interpreted as self-creative. It assumes that living things may be regarded as physical and chemical mechanisms; and that their entire activity can be accounted for through the operation of the laws of physics and chemistry.

(1) The modern theory, insofar as it relates to living organisms, derives its chief impetus from the work of Charles Darwin. After the publication of his "Origin of Species", there was a general attempt to link organic life into a single system.

The elements of greatest significance in the Darwinian conception are¹: The theory of descent, by which is meant that all forms have a "community of ancestry"; the theory of gradual change, which holds that all progress of living forms from simple to complex has been brought about by "a process of very gradual change, extending over very great periods of time"; and the theory of natural selection, which means that those organisms, which by chance variations, have become adapted to their environment have survived and propagated their kind, whereas those not sufficiently adapted

¹Cf. Lewis Matthews Sweet, "To Christ through Evolution," N. Y., 1925, p. 38.

have been "weeded out".

In the attempt to conceive of the universe as a single system Darwinism seemed to offer much. While no explanation of the origin of life was forthcoming, it was held as not beyond reason to think of it as having sprung from the inorganic. Once given life in its very lowest terms, a "process of very gradual change, extending over very great periods of time", can be made to account for all things in heaven and earth, say the mechanists, not even excluding the philosopher and his philosophy. It is true, they would say, there are realms yet unexplored, but the sphere of science is ever widening, and when these regions are reached they, too, will be found to lie within the realm of the natural.

(2) Other considerations seem to bear out the theory that "living organisms may be regarded as physical and chemical mechanisms". It seems to have been established that living bodies are composed of matter containing the same chemical elements as non-living substances--no new material is formed in the body; also, all energy used in the body can be traced to sources outside the body; and the laws of the conservation of matter and the conservation of energy may be made to apply to all living things.¹ This implies that no energy can be produced by the body except that produced thru chemical reaction. The mind cannot originate activity.

The basis, then, of the naturalistic philosophy is a

¹ J. Scott Haldane, "Mechanism Life and Personality," N. Y., 1914, p. 2.

mechanistic universe, which operates like a machine. Human consciousness, with its appreciation of beauty, its sense of "ought", its imagination, and its aspiration, is regarded as merely a part of this mechanical process. Everything comes from nature. Nature is "the sum of things and events in space and time subject to a single system of casual laws. Physical nature is all there is."¹

2. Now it must be asked, how does the naturalistic philosophy regard the moral life? What is the best type of morals it is capable of producing? What is its relation to that "otherism", which is held to be the highest type of self-realization?

a. But before beginning this study, it may be well to consider the validity of the basic claims of mechanism in its own realm,--that of physical science. If these are found to be invalid, the pronouncements concerning morality which are based upon them must be equally so. Science itself has refuted so many of these claims that the leading scientists today are rejecting the theory as untenable.

(1) The age-old theory of atomic mechanism was refuted in 1911, when Rutherford broke up the atom by means of radio activity. It is now held that matter is not composed of solid particles, but is possibly a manifestation "of stresses and strains" in the ether. Says W. Carr, In the new theory of matter the old conception of an elemental solid base for the atom has entirely disappeared, and the atom is now held to be composed of magnetic forces, ions and

¹William Ernest Hocking, "Types of Philosophy," Harvard, 1929, p. 43.

corpuscles, in incessant movement, a balance of actions and reactions no longer considered indestructible.¹

And Hocking points out

There was a 'conservation' of matter and another 'conservation' of energy. Now it appears that matter and radiant energy are convertible one into the other..... If there is any conservation, it must be of some union of matter and energy rather than of either alone.²

(2) The Darwinian conception has been modified in many ways.

The experiments of H. de Vries show that "important variations can be produced suddenly, and transmitted regularly".³ Complexity of structure is found to occur through "mutations", as well as by "a process of very gradual change". The mechanistic conception of life has been persistently challenged by those who hold that there is some sort of "vital force" or life principle within the organism which coordinates its activity, and makes possible its maintenance, progress, and reproduction.

(3) These so-called "vitalists" insist that the adaptation of an organism to its environment cannot explain progress, that is, increased complexity of structure. Dr. Sweet criticizes the Darwinian interpretation in its assumption that, "the origin of variety includes not only

¹Herbert Wildon Carr, "Henri Bergson: The Philosophy of Change," Bury, Sussex, 1911, p. 29.

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 89.

³Henri Bergson, "Creative Evolution," College de France, 1911, p. 25.

general variability....but, specifically, variability in the direction of increased complexity of structure as an inherent power of the organism, the existence of which can be taken for granted".¹ He does not deny that such variability exists, but that it can be taken for granted in the sense that it need not be accounted for. "Increased complexity", he says, "involves a total reconstruction--a coordinated movement of advance 'all along the line', which involves among other things the fundamental organic principle of development." Bergson makes the same point in his "Creative Evolution". "Pure mechanism would be refutable....if it could be proved that life may manufacture the like apparatus, by unlike means, on divergent lines of evolution."² He then proceeds to prove that it does, by tracing the development of the vertebrate and the mollusk eye. Nor does he accept sudden variation as sufficient. In speaking of the development of the vertebrate eye he says: "If the variations are accidental, how can they ever agree to arise in every part of the organ at the same time, in such a way that the organ will continue to perform its function?" Can the first accidental variation wait? It would have no function to perform.

How in that case can the variation be retained by natural selection?.... But that all these simultaneous changes should occur in such a way as to improve or merely to maintain vision, this is what in the hypothesis of sudden variation, I cannot admit, unless a mysterious principle is to come in, whose duty it is to watch over the interest

¹Sweet, op. cit., p. 88.

²Bergson, op. cit., p. 64.

of the function."¹

Haldane,² one of the most outstanding of present day physiologists, holds that life is unexplainable on the physico-chemical basis. No machine ever reproduced itself. Every part of the body has a different kind of cell, yet they all come from the same cell. If a stone is subjected to disintegrating forces it is passive; but an animal body does something to resist such forces. Haldane concludes that organic matter is under the laws of physics and chemistry; but there is an organic creative power capable of guiding it. He does not seem quite able to harmonize the two, but holds that we must have both.

b. Let us now consider what relation the mechanistic view of the universe has to morals. What basis does it offer for the moral life? For, though the greater scientists have discarded it, the popular fallacies have grown up around it; and its influence may be found not only in the pages of present-day literature, but on the lecture platform and even in the pulpits of those who think themselves progressive.

(1) In the first place, whether consciously or not, the Supernatural is ruled out, since all reality is comprised in nature. The moral life, as well as the religious life, is held to be the product of the social consciousness, and rests upon fear and expediency. In primitive societies the mutual dread, the dread of the chief and the fear of his

¹Ibid., p. 64 ff.

²Cf. J. Scott Haldane, "The Sciences and Philosophy," 1929.

ghost are said to form the basis of social, political, and religious fears.

This position has been forcefully challenged by Rudolph Otto who holds that the 'holy', that is, the religious consciousness, is a purely a priori category.¹ Kant long ago placed the sense of "ought" in the same category. Both arguments will be discussed in other connections.

(2) Besides ruling out the Supernatural, the mechanistic conception also rules purpose out of the universe. For a plan presupposes intelligence behind it. It is true, the mechanists would say, that design sometimes seems to appear; but that may be regarded as the result of chance occurrence, and explained through the operation of the law of averages. Bertrand Russell holds this view.

(3) This theory also does away with the uniqueness of man. If there is no purpose, there are no universal values. "Thought has no cosmic significance." Human self-consciousness is perhaps an accident, perhaps, even, according to Haeckel, "a tremendous mistake". Says Harry Elmer Barnes,

There is nothing which can in any way support the hypothesis of the supremacy of man in the cosmos. The combined implications of cosmic and biological evolution have destroyed completely any foundations for the hypothesis of human uniqueness or primacy.²

(4) Mechanism denies any ultimate moral ideal.

¹Otto, op. cit., p. 116.

²Harry Elmer Barnes, "History and Prospects of the Social Sciences," N. Y., 1929, Preface, p. 14.

A recent writer says,

The decay of belief in a personal God whose infinite purpose is the ground of all being and whose sovereign will is the inspiration of all life, inevitably means the denial of the objective reality of the moral ideal. That means the ultimate individualization of morals, and that in turn means the death of civilization.¹

Rashdall says our moral ideal can claim objective validity only "in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God."²

(5) Naturalism, by its exclusive emphasis on heredity, robs man of freedom. Here his mechanistic universe, like a Frankenstein, begins to turn upon him, and just here is the element which stirs up revolt in human consciousness. Man is not so constituted that he can with equanimity contemplate the idea that he is wholly at the mercy of an impersonal universe. Yet mechanism tells him that long before he was born the elements that determine, not only his destiny, but his every act, were operative. "There is not the slightest iota of choice allowed to any individual in any act or thought from birth to the grave," declares Barnes.³

(6) It follows that man is not responsible for his deed in the sense that he could have acted otherwise. A modern poet puts it succinctly:

"Here's what we call a rock, and here's a cliff, and
here's a man;

¹Andrew Gillies, op. cit., p. 532.

²Quoted by Gillies, op. cit., p. 530.

³Barnes, op. cit., preface, p. 15.

The rock rolls off the cliff and kills the man;
But can you blame the rock? Nor can you blame the
man
If he obeys the laws that pull him, and us, and all of
us,
Down, and ever down;
For if we sink, 'Reactions'; that absolves;
And if we rise, 'Reactions'; nothing more."

Mechanism holds that a man who acts in an anti-social way is an object of pity, in that his acts are the result of his character, which, however, cannot be other than it is. McDougall has very pertinently pointed out that our whole system of jurisprudence is based on the contrary assumption--that a man is morally responsible for his acts.

(7) As has been indicated, the lack of an ultimate moral ideal, which is found only in religion, necessarily results in an individualization of morals. As Ellwood puts it,

A religionless world would be one in which there are no absolute values. Values would thus tend to become individualized and to be at the whim and caprice of the individual. But human society cannot exist upon such a basis..... A religionless world would be a social world of uncertainties destitute of enthusiasm and of vision, reduced to the dead level of individual expediency.¹

We are reminded of the darkest period of Israel's history, of which the condemnation runs, "And every man did that which was right in his own eyes."

c. (1) Altho the value of the mechanistic conception as a scientific method has not been mentioned, and cannot be elaborated here since it has no direct bearing on

¹ Quoted by Gillies, op. cit., p. 533. (Emphasis Ellwood's)

our subject, let it not be supposed that such value is denied. The very great service which it has rendered to humanity in this respect is freely admitted. It is right that man should try to understand his universe, and to reduce it to an intelligible system. This has undoubtedly been furthered by conceiving of it as a machine, which, in some sense, it is. The quarrel with this conception is not that it holds the universe to be mechanistic, but that it holds it to be nothing else. It "attempts to erect the barriers of a single method (the scientific) upon the limits of reality."¹ As Sherwood Eddy puts it, "That the universe is mechanistic, no one will deny; that it is only mechanistic, no one can affirm."²

(2) The leading present-day scientists are committing themselves to the proposition that there is an unseen world where the laws of physics and chemistry are not applicable. Says Eddington,

Natural law is not applicable to the unseen world..... You cannot apply such a scheme to the parts of our personality which are not measurable by symbols any more than you can extract the square root of a sonnet. There is a kind of unity between the material and the spiritual world....but it is not the scheme of natural law which will provide the cement.³

Haldane has this to say:

Not by the widest stretch of the imagination can we conceive of structural machinery which goes on reproducing itself in-

¹Lewis Matthews Sweet, Class Notes, The Biblical Seminary in New York, 1926.

²Sherwood Eddy. *The New Challenge to Faith*. 7th ed. 1946. P.

³Arthur Stanley Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World," Cambridge, 1929.

definitely..... It may be that there are still some physiologists who believe that the progress of physiology is bringing us nearer to a psycho-chemical conception of life. But if there are, I can only say that their intellectual vision seems to me to be very defective.¹

3. a. Now the question arises, "What is the best type of ethics which the naturalistic philosophy, based on mechanism, claims to offer; what can it really offer; and how is this related to the conception that an individual finds his highest self-realization in giving himself for the good of the group?

(1) First, it must be said that there are various shades of belief among those who hold to the mechanistic interpretation. There are some who justify a sort of parallelism, and while mechanistic in their scientific thinking, leave room for purpose and freedom in their philosophy. Munsterberg is one who frankly admits that tho he cannot reconcile his scientific findings with his philosophy, he feels he must hold both, and await the synthesis. Such, of course, are not true mechanists.

Then there are those, who like Spencer, while building on a naturalistic basis, postulate the existence of an "Unknowable"; thus admitting a Cause, tho unknown, and with it, design. This is quite different from modern mechanism which is committed to the proposition that "the natural is all there is"; this conception rules out a Supernatural Cause, as well as purpose, for design implies intelligence.

¹John Scott Haldane, "The Sciences and Philosophy," Glasgow, 1928, p. 55.

(2) Herbert Spencer worked out a theory of morals based on the naturalism of the nineteenth century. He believed that the moral sense is the product of social evolution. He says,

I believe that the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition....which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility.¹

Now if our moral 'intuitions' are due merely to the modifications of our nervous system, handed down to us because our ancestors found them useful, they have no authority for us, because in our world conditions are ever changing. Hence, they carry no moral obligation. Spencer believed the highest satisfaction is attained when men work in harmony with the processes of natural evolution, for the preservation and enrichment, first of the individual then of the race. Spencer's ethics is egoistic but his philosophy seems almost to transcend it. He believed that the individual's first duty is egoistic; he must first care for himself, and develop himself physically and mentally. Otherwise he will not be able to be a blessing to others, which seems the final aim.

(3) Perhaps the writer who has best expressed the limitations of what the naturalism of today really has to offer in the way of morals, is Albert Edwards Wiggam. Such, to be sure, was not his intention. In his book, "New Deca-

¹Herbert Spencer, "Data of Ethics", 1873, Publ. N. Y., p. 142.

logue of Science", Wiggam, instead of personal choice, puts a mechanistic principle in control of man's activities.

"Heredity is the chief maker of men," is one of his chapter titles. He warns us that "the golden rule without science will wreck the race that tries it," and that "morals, education, art, and religion will not improve the human race." Man must look to science "if he is ever to see duty aright." Wiggam's chief thesis as to the improvement of the race is set forth in his chapters on "The Duty of Eugenics," and "The Duty of Preferential Reproduction." "Your own imagination will suggest," he says, "that the range of ancient moralities for a tribe cannot suffice for the ethics of a planet..... It is not a personal nor a tribal nor immediate morality, but a planetary, cosmic, generational, protoplasmic ethics that alone will make men really righteous."¹ His contention is that the race can be improved, not by the personal morality of individuals, but only by the production of a better germ plasm, which is to be accomplished through selection, controlled by science. Wiggam, in this purely mechanistic arrangement, does not reckon with the revolt of the individual; nor does he provide a dynamic for the operation of such a system. Why should anyone in a purely mechanistic universe care about the improvement of the race anyway? The universe will soon blot him out--human life has no cosmic significance; the logical conclusion of a thoroly materialistic philosophy would be to eat,

¹Albert Edward Wiggam, "The New Decalogue of Science," p. 19.

drink, and be merry for tomorrow ye die. And if adherents to this philosophy hold higher, more ethical views, it is not because the philosophy itself implies them, but because the adherents transcend their philosophy, and read into it something which its premises do not justify. Hocking rightly characterizes any system of naturalistic ethics as no more than "man's gesture of heroism on the scaffold of a universe which will eventually write a cipher as the sum of all his works."¹

(4) We have noted how Herbert Spencer worked out from naturalism an ethics whose aim was harmonious cooperation in society. But there is another who starts from the same point and arrives at a conclusion absolutely opposed. Nietzsche, too, bases his philosophy on naturalism; but instead of cooperation he sees the survival of the fittest. The "Over-Man" harks back to the "red law of claw and fang." He "knows neither pity nor sympathy nor tenderness nor justice. He knows but one law....the law of his own force, a law which is at once its own sanction and its own delimitation."² Nietzsche's reviewer says that Nietzsche was the first to call general attention to the fact that "serious reasons exist for preferring the immoral to the moral, the untrue to the true."³ Nietzsche held that "the greatness of

¹William Ernest Hocking, "Types of Philosophy," p. 87.

²Georges Chatterton-Hill, "The Philosophy of Nietzsche," p. 216.

³Ibid., p. 24.

a man is to be measured by his capacity to inflict suffering;"¹ the Over-Man is of the type of the brute, strong, ferocious, merciless.

Nietzsche denies not merely the reality of the altruistic sentiments, but the value of them. "Morality is partial paralysis of life."² "Reality there is none other than the Will of Power."³ The Over-Man himself creates the tables of values for humanity and for himself.⁴ How could the creator of values....tolerate a God above him? "If there be a God, how comes it that I am not God?" cries Nietzsche through his character, Zarathustra.⁵

It is evident that most thinkers of the mechanistic group, as well as others, repudiate such a theory. Yet are the mechanists in any position to say that Nietzsche is wrong? Green rightly holds that "a natural science is not in any position to tell a man what he ought to do. That would imply that there is something in man independent of the forces of nature which may determine the relation in which he shall stand to them. But this the naturalist has denied."⁶ If Nietzsche prefers high-handed immoral egoism to the "scientific egoism" of Spencer, who shall say he is wrong?

¹Ibid., p. 66.

²Ibid., p. 111.

³Ibid., p. 163.

⁴Ibid., p. 238.

⁵Ibid., p. 271.

⁶Green, op. cit., pp. 8 and 10.

It may be argued that such a system will wreck civilization; but this the "Over-Man" will not deplore, if only he may be supreme amid the wreckage.

4. a. In claiming that a system of morals can be built on a sense of "ought" which is of social origin, the mechanists are working on an unprovable assumption. Insofar as they have produced a workable system of ethics at all, they have possibly built on a moral sense that is innate, all the time assuming that they are building on a moral sense which is of social origin. There is no way of demonstrating that a system of morals cannot be built on the 'oughtness' which is a product of the social consciousness, for the simple reason that the real innate 'oughtness'--if such there be--cannot be extracted from the human personality while the experiment is being carried on.

That a system of morals such as Spencer offers would be workable in a society destitute of an innate sense of 'ought' cannot be affirmed. Enormous buildings have been erected above the sunken railroad tracks in New York City. A casual observer might imagine that they are supported by the roofs of the train-sheds; when, as a matter of fact, they rest on steel piers which have their bases on the solid rock below.

b. Now it will be seen that the truth or falsity of the mechanistic position could be practically decided if we could be sure that the sense of "oughtness" is innate; that is, that it is not the product of the social conscious-

ness. Immanuel Kant believed that the categorical imperative, the fact of obligation, is at least as certain as the fact of existence. Hocking summarizes Kant's position: conscience is to be regarded as valid, since the "mental traits which have come down to us from antiquity grow weaker as we recede from the source; but conscience....grows more sensitive....it moves ahead of ancestral requirements, and hence cannot be explained away as a mere biological inheritance."¹ To Kant conscience is "the one point in experience at which we touch absolute reality." It indicates something in man above the natural, for it calls upon him to rule his own natural impulses and desires. It follows that if conscience is valid, the will of man is free; for, "I ought" implies "I can."²

c. Otto arrives at the same conclusion thru an isolation of the distinctive element in the religious experience which he terms, the 'numinous'. He maintains that the 'holy' is a purely, a priori category and links with it obligation. "The rational ideas of Absoluteness, Completion, Necessity, and Substantiality, and no less so those of the good as an objective value, objectively binding and valid, are not to be 'evolved' from any sort of sense perception."³

5. In summarizing the characteristics of the naturalistic philosophy which render it inadequate as a basis for

¹Hocking, op. cit., p. 148.

²Ibid., p. 149.

³Otto, op. cit., p. 116.

morality, we note that the foundation on which it rests--a conception of the universe in which matter is regarded as the only reality--is being discarded by leading scientists yet many of the popular ideas afloat today may be traced to this source. We also note that, as a basis for morality, it furnishes no place for many conceptions in which the highest type of moral living has found its sanction and its inspiration, throughout the ages. The fact that the universe is regarded as operating mechanistically, like a machine, and human consciousness is accounted for on this basis, destroys man's belief in his own uniqueness; human thought and human life have no cosmic significance, and man's acts are of no more value than the reactions he may observe in a test tube, when he "sees the mixture seethe and swirl and spit, 'till all its atoms find affinities." It follows, also, that man is not morally responsible for his acts; he cannot do other than he does.

The Supernatural is ruled out of this scheme of things since "nature is all there is". There is no ultimate moral Ideal. The moral life is held to be the product of the social consciousness, and is grounded in expediency. The fact that the moral life of an individual sometimes goes counter to the social consciousness of the group--as in an Isaiah or a Jeremiah who opposes to the death the social order from which he has sprung--remains unexplained and unexplainable in this system.

Naturalism also rules purpose out of the universe.

Man is "child of a thousand chances, 'neath an indifferent sky". He is at the mercy of impersonal, non-purposive forces, with which he is powerless to cope.

This feature, which renders naturalism most objectionable as a basis for morality nevertheless serves a good purpose in that it incites revolt in the human mind. Man wants his world to operate according to law, but he feels that he should control it. So when a philosophy tells him that not he, but a mechanistic principle determines his destiny, he intuitively takes issue with the philosophy and begins to search for one more adequate. It is at this point that naturalism generates its own defeat. Since man is constituted as he is, it cannot be otherwise.

We have seen that the highest system of ethics which naturalism has offered is that of Herbert Spencer. This is much higher than the modern mechanistic conception, is justified in offering, and regard egoism as man's first duty. Wiggam, who holds consistently to the mechanistic idea that heredity is the chief maker of men, offers much less: a personal morality is of no consequence; if the race is improved morally, it must be through the germ plasm, depending upon selection, governed by science. But one may ask, since man is not free, how can he choose to improve the race? This is no idle question. If all the postulates of mechanism are true, its only basis for morals is an individualization of values, each man deciding for himself the rightness or wrongness of each particular act. The undesirable outcome of such proce-

ture has been indicated.

In the foregoing discussion it has been seen that the tendency to deny the authority and even the existence of any permanent moral standard whatever is a product of the times as was suggested in the introduction. The problem presented by modern morals is due at least in part to a naturalistic philosophy which is founded upon belief in a mechanistically operated universe. The belief is being repudiated by those most capable of knowing; but philosophy, ever slower to revise itself, still claims many adherents to this point of view. One serious phase of the matter is that this idea is still being presented to young people as adequate by professors in many college classrooms. It may be hoped such instructors will study more deeply the findings of science, and gain the point of view of the greater scientists of the present day.

It is evident that the conception of self-sacrifice as man's highest self-realization is at antipodes with the naturalistic philosophy. A certain confidence in life is needed if man would labor at his best, much more, if he would sacrifice himself for his fellowmen. There must be rules to the game of life, and values, if the game be worth the playing. Many popular ideas of the day, the "obsessions of the Zeitgeist," if logically traced to their source, would be found to be children of the "mechanistic dynasty". But we must look further for a philosophy which will justify an altruistic ideal.

CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURALISM (Concluded)

(The Mind a Mechanism)

1. a. Before concluding the discussion of naturalism it is necessary to consider an allied and interrelated movement, to which indirect reference has been made. It has been seen that the naturalistic philosophy has claimed all areas as its own: "Nature is all there is." The foregoing chapter has dealt with the claims of naturalism in the physical realm. The present chapter will deal with naturalistic claims in the realm of mind. If these could be substantiated, the boundaries claimed for a mechanistic physical world would be extended to include all mental and volitional realms as well. All aspiration, all purpose, all appreciation of truth and beauty, all "will to strive and pride of duty done", would be "one with the reactions done in Jena glass". This is the conception which the behavioristic psychology sets forth.

(1) It should be noted in the beginning that while behaviorism may be said to be the product of naturalism, and while it is thoroly mechanistic, it diverges from naturalism in important particulars. It was stated that the element in naturalism most likely to stir up revolt in the normal human mind is the fact that it places man at the mercy of an impersonal universe. Behaviorism may be considered as mechanism's protest against itself at this point. For behaviorism is

mechanistic; yet it endeavors to extricate man from the grip of the Frankenstein of impersonal laws and forces, and to place human conduct, at least to a degree, within his control. It claims to be able to do this by conditioning his environment. By arranging the stimuli which produce, first his reactions and finally his 'brain set', this new psychology claims to be able to make of man what you will.

(2) It will be seen that the psychology is unfortunate in being aligned with a cause whose sun is about to set. It has been pointed out that the greater scientists are discarding naturalism's mechanistic interpretation of the physical world as inadequate; how then can behaviorism assume that this interpretation will suffice for mind? But as Whitehead says, "Psychology is always adopting materials and methods which physical sciences are abandoning."¹ And Graebner points out:

There have been more than one hundred years of slow retrogression from the materialistic world view. And, strangely enough, the physicist and chemist, whose labors once gave scientific basis to materialism, led the van in rehabilitation of spirit, while the biologist reluctantly brought up the rear, and the psychologist who hugs his behavioristic delusion seems to insist on rounding out his forty years of wandering in the mechanistic desert.²

(3) But since behaviorism seems disposed to wander, we shall permit its assumption that a mechanistic interpretation of the physical world has not yet been refuted; in order, through an investigation of its methods and

¹Quoted by Sherwood Eddy, "The New Challenge to Faith," N. Y., 1926, p. 68.

²Theodore Graebner, "The Passing of Materialism," Biblical Review, July, 1929.

characteristics, to ascertain its status as a psychology. Consideration will also be given to its implications for philosophy.

b. Behaviorism is the attempt to explain all action hitherto considered mental or volitional, as the result of the automatic action of nerves, glands, muscles, and the like, traceable ultimately to the operation of the laws of physics and chemistry.

c. The behaviorist, however, applies to the study of human beings the same principles that have been used in studying animal psychology. Lloyd Morgan began this work in 1896. He formulated what is known as the "law of parsimony", by which is meant that "no higher mental process is to be ascribed to the animal than is barely necessary to account for the act observed." The whole system is based on the assumption that man is one with the animal creation differing only in being more highly specialized. Hence, all conduct can be explained in terms of either self-preservation or race-preservation. This idea has been challenged from many angles. Rudolph Otto believes that the study of animal psychology has little significance as applied to human psychical and emotional states. He says

It is a hopeless business to seek to lower ourselves into the mental life of a pithecanthropus erectus; and, even if it were not, we should still need to start from man as he is, since we can only interpret the psychical and emotional life of animals regressively by clumsy analogies drawn from the developed human mind. To try, on the other hand, to understand and deduce the human from the sub-human or brute mind is to try to fit the lock to the key instead of vice-versa; it is to seek to illuminate light by darkness.

d. (1) John B. Watson, the chief protagonist of the movement, starts with the aim of making psychology a natural science. He explains that, to be a natural science, it must dispense with "subjective subject matter, introspective method, and present terminology". In his early formulations there was not a denial of states of consciousness; his only contention was that, not being objectively verifiable, they could not become data for science. But later he asserts, "The behaviorist finds no evidence for 'mental existences' or 'mental processes' of any kind."¹

(2) Watson rejects the introspective method as inaccurate, since the only mental states the psychologist can analyze are his own; insufficient, since all the introspectionist claims to do is to reduce complex states to simpler states, and finally to irreducible units called sensations; and impractical, since it has failed to help people to understand why they behave as they do, and how to modify their behavior. All these defects behaviorism endeavors to correct.

(3) Watson defines psychology thus:

For the behaviorist, psychology is that division of natural science which takes human behavior--the doings and sayings, both learned and unlearned, of people--as its subject matter. It is the study of what people do, from even before birth until death.²

The attempt is to find the principle underlying behavior; to find what causes (stimuli) produce certain results (responses); and, conversely, noting the responses, to infer the stimuli.

¹John Broadus Watson, "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist", 1924, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 4.

The task for psychology is that of "finding the laws for the regulation of behavior".¹ "The goal of psychological study is the ascertaining of such data and laws, that, given the stimulus, psychology can predict what the response will be; or, given the response, it can specify the nature of the affective stimulus."² Watson exclaims,

Give me the baby and I'll make it climb and use its hands in constructing buildings of stone or wood..... I'll make it a thief, a gunman, or a dope fiend. The possibility of shaping in any direction is almost endless. Even gross difference in anatomical structure limits us far less than you think, I'll make him a deaf mute and I will build you a Helen Keller.... Men are built, not born.³

e. (1) We shall now consider some of the basic concepts of behaviorism. The system is built around the idea of the conditioned reflex, which was established through the study of animal psychology. Thorndike did extensive work in this field. In his observation of cats in their endeavors to release themselves from cages, he concluded that the initial successes were purely accidental; and that they were 'stamped in' because successful efforts were rewarded by food. Pavlov experimented with dogs; and experiments were made with white rats in mazes, with the same conclusions.

Watson studied animals, and also infants. He observed that the infant responds to a stimulus in certain ways, by fear, grasping, anger, crying, etc. These are simple reflexes

¹Ibid. p. 9.

²Ibid. p. 10.

³John B. Watson, "The Behaviorist Looks at Instincts," (Quoted by Harvey Wickham, "The Misbehaviorists," N. Y., 1928, p. 54.)

and are just as mechanical as the twining of a vine, or the discharge of a gun. Then Watson produced a 'conditioned reflex.' A baby was unafraid of a furry animal; but every time the animal was presented a loud gong was sounded behind the child's ear. The child showed increasing aversion, and finally cried when the animal appeared, although the gong was not sounded. Thus a 'conditioned reflex' was established. It will be seen that a conditioned reflex is exactly like other reflexes, except that it is acquired, while other reflexes are modes of response with which the child is born. They are equally mechanical, and behaviorism attempts to explain all human behavior including so-called moral behavior on the basis of these reflexes.

The behaviorists believe that there is nothing from within to develop. "If you start with a healthy body, the right number of fingers and toes, eyes and the few elementary movements that are present at birth, you do not need anything else in the way of raw material to make a man, be that man a genius, a cultured gentleman, a rowdy, or a thug."¹

(a) Bode, himself a sort of behaviorist, characterizes the reduction of purposive behavior to a series of conditioned reflexes as "a bit too simple". He inquires, "What holds the series together?" Thorndike postulates a "conduction unit"--which "includes all the responses which are

¹John B. Watson, "Psychological Care of Infant and Child," W. W. Norton and Co., p. 41. (Quoted by Henry King Bode, "Conflicting Psychologies of Learning," Columbus, Ohio, 1929, p. 141.

in a state of readiness or preparedness." According to this view all the responses start simultaneously,--not consecutively like cars in a freight train, as in the older view. Bode thinks if this were true, he could not pick up an apple and eat it, because the responses for reaching and those bringing it to his mouth would get in each other's way!

Bode points out that in child training, whether moral or otherwise, the whole process of learning centers on the building up of conditioned reflexes. Thus the whole movement is "away from an emphasis on initiative and creative activity, and is concerned only with the task of connecting certain responses with certain stimuli."¹

(2) The effort to explain memory mechanistically seems to have involved the behaviorist in some difficulty. He finally brings it under the category of "conditioned reflex" by regarding it as the result of sub-vocal speech. The theory is that we are continually 'verbalizing' --talking to ourselves. In this way happenings get themselves recorded in our nervous system and a certain stimulus will call them forth. The explanation seems not at all convincing, but having done away with any "self" to do the remembering the behaviorist has probably hit upon a theory as plausible as any other.

(3) The behaviorist is also hard pressed to account for attention. In the brain there are cells called

¹Bode, op. cit., p. 172.

neurones, each composed of a nucleus, of the cell proper and branches called dendrites; besides branches, the cell has a sort of tap-root, called its axone. There are three kinds of neurones, for receiving, associating, and sending, respectively. When an external stimulus occurs it is received by the receiving set of neurones, passed on to the association group, and finally to the sending neurones which determine the carrying out of the action, or response. Now the messages are conveyed from the axone of one cell to the dendrites of another. The important point is this: The axone is not in direct contact with the dendrites. There is a gulf between; and the response to any stimulus depends upon the connection which is made. This connection is called the synapse. Now what determines the particular dendrite with which the axone is going to connect? Do the association neurones have some choice as to which of a multitude of different dendrites they are going to connect with, or is this operation mechanically controlled?

The resistance offered by the synapses is found to vary, and it was discovered that when a neural impulse has once traversed a certain route it tended to follow the same path thereafter. The behaviorist then claims that the course of the neural impulse is determined by these "brain paths", and not at all by conscious attention. We may seem to consider and decide; but our action is really determined by our 'brain-set'. There must, however, be a first time; and herein lies the weakness of the behavioristic position; for if habit follows the line of least resistance, which this first time decides, then this first

time is the time of times,--but behaviorism has no other explanation than that it is determined by chance.¹

But some explanation of the phenomenon of attention is imperative for behaviorism, and it must be proved to lie within the domain of physical and chemical reactions, or the whole system breaks down. Once a psychical energy, capable of creating physical movement is assumed, the whole case is lost. The chain of argument for behaviorism is not stronger than this one of its many weak links--its explanation of attention.

The relation of these opposing viewpoints to morality is obvious. If a psychical energy is assumed, "the internal force of the free choice of a moral agent" comes into play; otherwise, the forces governing human action are purely mechanical, and man is therefore not morally responsible for any act.

f. (1) In the criticism of behavioristic psychology let it be understood that with behaviorism as a scientific method of procedure there is no quarrel. As such, it is as compatible with an idealistic as with a naturalistic point of view. In this sense it has been defined as, "a method of psychological research and laboratory procedure, the essence of which is the application of exact measurement to the physical reactions of organisms to stimuli, and the manipulation of the to alter the reactions."² If behaviorism went no further it

¹Cf. Harvey Wickham, "The Misbehaviorists," N. Y., 1928, p. 28ff.

²Winifred E. Garrison, in "Behaviorism a Battle Line," Ed. by W. P. King, Nashville, 1930, p. 150.

could be heartily endorsed; and in so far, it has actually rendered a great contribution to the understanding of human nature.

(2) (a) But current behaviorism of the Watsonian type goes far beyond this. It has gone so far in fact, that in its denial of mind and consciousness it has ruled itself out of the field of psychology altogether. Herein lies its first great inconsistency.

I. Roback writes a whole book the thesis of which is that behaviorism and psychology are, in reality, incompatible. He says,

The issue in the last analysis subsides into the question whether there is room for the study of the mind in the field of science. Behaviorism, that is the genuine product, reduces all psychology to a study of movements of limb and muscle or gland, more particularly movements of the body as a whole. Since movements are physical and not mental, it follows that psychology is concerned with physical manifestations alone..... Psychology, instead of describing, classifying and explaining states of consciousness, is transformed into an offshoot of a conglomeration in which physics, physiology, and biology are mixed in unequal parts.¹

It may be noted here that while the old mechanism explained mind as a form of matter, it did not reject it; but behaviorism denies consciousness altogether. Roback, pertinently puts it, "The modernism of our age has apparently not spared its very creator--Mind--and behold the spectacle of its being transformed into behavior."²

II. But if behaviorism is not a psychology, what is it? It considers itself a natural science;

¹Roback, op. cit., p. 23.

²Ibid., p. 27.

but with a dog-in-the-manger attitude it presumes to interpret all the facts in the field of psychology. Behind this presumption, of course, lies the undemonstrable proposition that all facts in the field of psychology are explicable by the scientific method; and that, conversely, "no reality falls outside the applicability of the scientific technique." Behaviorism can hold this assumption only by ignoring all "cognitions of subjective reference". Finney points out that behaviorists have recognized quite clearly that subjective cognitions--feelings and evaluations--are not data for science because they are solipsistic. He adds that behaviorists refuse to interest themselves in thoughts and feelings as such. "Behaviorism has no place among its categories for the concept of purpose. It is silent on the subject of values. All these realities are subjective, and hence behaviorism eschews them, as not data for science. Thus, in its zeal to render psychology scientific, it has withdrawn from the field of psychology altogether!"¹ Garrison states the matter succinctly:

Behaviorism is not really a form of psychology. At its best it is a supplement to it; at its worst a substitute for it. At its best it is a study of how bodies work; at its worst, a theory that nothing exists and works except bodies.²

Thus we note its second glaring inconsistency.

(b) Since behaviorism is posing as a natural science we have a right to insist that it stay within its own experimental field. The mechanistic interpretation is

¹Ross L. Finney, in "Behaviorism a Battle Line," p. 177.

²Winifred Ernest Garrison, in "Behaviorism a Battle Line," p. 153.

not the only interpretation of the universe; yet behaviorism dogmatically assumes that it is; Horne points out that

The theory that heredity and environment alone explain all the acts of man, adopted bodily from biology, applied without scruple to man as to the lower animals, obviously begs the question without discussing it.¹

(I) We now note that characteristic of behaviorism which is, perhaps, the most objectionable of all. It not only assumes a certain philosophical viewpoint, banishing all others without a hearing; it actually intrudes into the realm of philosophy (all the while decrying philosophy) with such statements as, "There is no mind, thought, consciousness, purpose, motive or intelligent end either in man or the universe." Such a statement cannot be proved by the scientific method; it is wholly philosophical. The cult of behaviorism --for it has forfeited the right to be considered either a psychology or a natural science--abounds in such philosophical assumptions.

(c) It is, perhaps, not possible to criticize as a psychology a system which by its rejection of the data of psychology has ruled itself out of that field. Yet its claims are made in the field of psychology. Behaviorism has been seen to reject the introspective method as "inaccurate, insufficient and impractical;" its stated aim is to correct these defects, and its task that of "finding laws for the regulation of behavior". And what of its success? It is evident that the very charges which behaviorism applies to introspection

¹Herman Harrell Horne, "Free Will and Human Responsibility," N. Y., 1912, p. 104.

come back like a boomerang upon its own head.

(1) (A) Behaviorism is inaccurate, since it denies, not only as data for scientific investigation, but also as reality, all mind, thought, consciousness, purpose and volition. Behaviorists seem serenely unaware that in this denial they are also denying the validity of reason itself, without which assumption any discussion of this or any subject would be "no more than an exchange of opinion on the part of lunatics and imbeciles". Harvey Wickham has attacked the illogical and unwarranted assumptions of this method with devastating effect in his brilliant book, "The Misbehaviorists."

(II) Behaviorism is insufficient, since it abandons the field of psychology and becomes physiology, chemistry, biology, neurology and what not.

(A) This weakness was well set forth by McDougall, who is said to have "punctured the bubble of behaviorism with a pin point". He suggested, in a debate with Watson, that Watson press a pin point into his (McDougall's) extended hand. The hand would be promptly withdrawn. He states that Watson might perform the same experiment on a thousand hands with the same result; then Watson would make an empirical generalization to the effect that sticking a pin point in a hand causes the hand to be promptly withdrawn. But if now McDougall should ask Watson to perform the experiment upon him again, and if this time the hand remained at rest, Watson could have no possible explanation for the phenomenon without the "introspective" report of McDougall.¹

¹Cf. Wm. P. King, "Behaviorism a Battle Line," p. 140.

(III) Behaviorism may thus be shown to be impractical. Its claim is that, given the stimulus it can predict the response; but can it? It is apparent that this claim is absolutely fallacious. It cannot do this even in the realm of animal life, much less in the realm of complex human nature.

(A) The refusal to consider motive, feeling, intent, purpose and the like makes it impossible to arrive at knowledge of any total act. Behaviorism is opposed at this point by the Gestalt psychology. This holds that man is a unit, a whole, and that large units of action involving the whole organism are of infinitely more value for study than simple or conditioned reflexes. In canvassing the failures of behaviorism, one feels impelled to indorse the conclusion reached by a modern writer: "The point of view of the behaviorist is not a point of view but a mistake."

g. (1) It has been evident throughout this discussion that behaviorism's implications for philosophy are tremendous. Tho it denies any interest in philosophy, it is rooted and grounded in the philosophy that "physical nature is all there is", and that "there is and can be no other technique of research than that of objective science". It intrudes beyond its own province with these and many other philosophical claims. Its influence on modern thinking has been great; many who accept it uncritically believe that mechanism has actually been extended to include mind. A large part of its

influence is due to the prestige which it has inherited from the old psychology.

(2) While Huxley rightly affirms that science should not concern itself with the philosophical implications of its findings, it has been very pertinately pointed out that "In every science there comes a time when philosophical auditing is not only appropriate, but imperative; and psychology, far from being the exception, rigidly illustrates the rule."¹

Every science works in a particular field; but it is not out of relation to every other field. Philosophy endeavors to present many sciences in their mutual relations. So while behaviorism may decry philosophy as "one of the two great bulwarks of medievalism"--religion being the other--it must, in the final analysis, be subjected to the test of its ability to fit into a tenable philosophical scheme. It is seen to have failed here as completely as naturalism has failed, and for the same reason.

(a) Finney remarks,

As a cult behaviorism unconsciously becomes a philosophy of life, and a very faulty one at that. For it is a philosophy with a blind spot, since it tends not only to ignore as data, but also to repudiate as reality, the whole category of conscious feeling. By so doing its logic maneuvers the thinker into a position where one experience has to be accepted as quite as good as another. Thus it leaves neither substance nor method out of which a philosophy of life can be organized. And this is serious; for in the present crash of ancient creeds and clash of novel circumstances there is scarcely anything the age more deeply needs than a new philosophy of human values. Our charge, therefore, against behaviorism is that it is obstructing one of the most important intellectual

¹Roback, op. cit., p. 98.

tasks of the time.¹

(3) And what of the direct implications of behaviorism for morality? Watson says, "The task for psychology is that of the finding of laws for the regulation of behavior." But when one puts the query, "Why?" behaviorism has no answer. If one experience "has to be accepted as quite as good as another" there is no reason why behavior should be regulated.

(a) The unique claim of behaviorism is that it is able to make of man what it pleases by conditioning his environment. This sounds very well; but if we examine its ethics to see what it may please to make of him, we find a surprising statement, and by Watson himself: "Psychology is not concerned with the goodness or badness of acts, or with their successfulness as judged by occupational or moral standards".² In one sense this may be true. It has been admitted that science should not concern itself with the philosophical implications of its findings. Perhaps Watson means that, altho he realizes there are moral standards, he, being a true scientist, will leave them for some other agency to discover. But he has disposed of the only agencies which were in a position to find them--philosophy and religion--as "the two great bulwarks of medievalism"! He refuses to consider the goodness or badness of acts, or to permit other agencies to do so. "Behaviorism", as Wickham points out, "has no ethics, no standard

¹Ross L. Finney, "Behaviorism a Battle Line", p. 177.

²John B. Watson, "Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist," p. 12.

of conduct."¹ There seems to be implied a purpose to improve humanity by conditioning environment; yet there is no indication of any standard toward which the conditioning should tend; no grounds for any choice as to whether the baby should be made "a gentleman, or a thug".

(b) Roback has pertinately expressed this lamentable lack of behaviorism in regard to morality. Says he, Ask behaviorism for a theory of ethics, a governing principle to act as norm. Can we reasonably attach culpability to any person on the basis of mere integration? Whom or what are we blaming? The reflexes? The neurones? The secretions? Is it really possible to dispense with consciousness as a center of reference, and above all as the prime condition of conduct?²

He adds,

It is idle to persuade ourselves that at some future date, when the proper technique is devised, we shall be able to view such states as intention, belief, knowledge, motive, and the like as neuromuscular or glandular events.³

(c) The time of philosophical auditing with regard to behaviorism has arrived. A recent anthology, "Behaviorism--a Battle Line", is written by various psychologists, philosophers and present-day thinkers, who take issue with the behavioristic position. Its avowed purpose is a protest against the "moral poison" instilled into the minds of college students by the implications of behaviorism. It is significant that this, the first concerted protest, is directed against behaviorism because of its attitude toward morality. In a review of this book, H. H. Horne remarks, "The victory (over behaviorism) is assured, though undated."

¹Wickham, op. cit., p. 57.

²Roback, op. cit., p. 116.

³Ibid., p. 137.

2. In summarizing the characteristics of behaviorism we note that it rests upon a mechanistic basis, and that the same objections that were urged against naturalism can be applied to it. Its point of view differs from that of naturalism chiefly in that it claims that environment, not heredity, is the chief maker of man; and that by conditioning man's environment and establishing his reflexes, he can be made what you will. Behaviorism is interested only in "the doings and sayings of human beings". It denies consciousness, and rejects introspection, hence, in reality, it abandons the field of psychology. It refuses to consider ends, purposes, concepts. It has no world view--no "Weltanschauung"--and no moral Ideal. It refuses to concern itself with the goodness or badness of acts or with their moral consequences. Hence, it has no standard by which to judge the sort of environment a man ought to have, in order to make him the sort of a man he ought to be. It does not say what sort of man he ought to be. Its position is, evidently, the same as that of naturalism, an individualization of values; each man being a law unto himself, or, more properly speaking, a subject unto his reflexes.

Here, evidently, we are farther than ever from a basis for that moral life which finds self-realization in the giving of self. We have not even any self! This fact alone shows the lamentable lack of logic in the position. The hope of the correction of this type of thinking lies in the characteristic of the human mind to grapple with ultimates. The human being is so constituted that, though he may suspend judgment for a while,

eventually he will make an effort to think his way through.

In behaviorism there is not only lack of a basis for morality; many thinkers feel very strongly that because of its disparagement of all that is characteristically human, it is undermining the foundations of morality.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGMATISM

1. a. Pragmatism, according to Mr. James, is "a temper of mind, an attitude; it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth; and finally it is a theory of reality".¹

A recent writer says,

It is characteristic of Pragmatism that it does not readily lend itself to summary definition. It can neither be identified with a fixed habit of mind, as Naturalism can be identified with the scientific habit of mind, nor can it be reduced to a single cardinal principle, as can Idealism.....it is not so much a systematic doctrine as a criticism and a method.²

More specifically, it may be defined as "the doctrine that the whole meaning of a conception is to be sought in its practical consequences, and the purpose of thinking is to develop beliefs which shall serve as general principles of conduct."³

b. To the pragmatist, as to the behaviorist, the idea of man's being at the mercy of an impersonal universe is intolerable. The behaviorist seeks to free man from this mechanistic control by suggesting the possibility of conditioning his environment. The pragmatist attempts to escape it by putting forth a "bio-centric" philosophy. Whereas naturalism claims that human life and thought have no cosmic significance,

¹ Prof. Dewey, "What Does Pragmatism Mean by the Practical?", Journal of Philosophy, Vol. V, p. 85. (Quoted by Pratt, "What is Pragmatism", N. Y., 1915, p. 9.)

² Ralph Barton Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", N. Y., 1921, p. 197.

³ New International Dictionary.

pragmatism would say (altho not discussing the cosmos) that human life is the only thing which does have significance.

(1) Naturalism, while depreciating mind, rather inconsistently "assumes the objective validity of scientific judgments", but "regards moral and aesthetic values as relative to human ends".¹ Pragmatism holds the same view of mind, but goes beyond naturalism in saying that truth itself is relative to human ends. Truth is that which 'has been found serviceable in the struggle of human life'. It is 'that which works'.

Boodin states the pragmatic position thus:

It is a commonplace now that human nature must be the starting point for all our theories concerning reality. We can only speak of those things as existent that make a difference to human nature, either directly as immediate experience, or indirectly as assumptions needed to account for such immediate experience..... If things make no difference directly or indirectly, perceptually or conceptually to human nature, they are mere fictions, and belong in a world of centaurs and mermaids. At any rate, we cannot say whether they are or are not.²

(2) Pragmatism accepts the naturalistic view of the biological origin of mind. It is on this conception that its theory of truth is founded. Thought, according to this idea, originated in man's effort to find solutions for specific problems, arising from life situations in a precarious universe. His aim being survival, those ideas which aided in survival were of value--they were 'true' ideas for him

¹Cf. Robert R. Rusk, "The Philosophical Basis of Education", N. Y., 1929, p. 68.

²John Elof Boodin, "Truth and Reality", N. Y., 1911, p. 165 ff.

because they 'worked'. Thought is thus no other than an instrument, forged in the effort for survival, which has proved serviceable to man, and hence has itself survived. It is a 'weapon in the struggle for existence'--as much so as the eye or hand, or hoofs or horns. An idea becomes a useful guide to action when the situation becomes so complex that it cannot be taken care of by reflexes and habitual action. Schiller says, "I cannot but conceive the reason as being like the rest of our equipment, a weapon in the struggle for existence and a means of achieving adaptation".¹ This conception does away with the commonly accepted interpretation that truth is a 'correspondence' between an idea and its object; and identifies truth with the serviceableness of the idea in furthering human purposes.

(a) This theory has been well stated by Perry: When there arises a necessity for action which cannot be taken care of by habit, the 'ideational process' steps in and 'construes' the situation, selecting certain elements and ignoring others.

Ideas are....'modes of conceiving' the given, a 'taking it to be' this or that. Discursive thought interrupts 'the continuity of habit' when a doubtful or ambiguous situation presents itself, which the organism has not a ready-made way of meeting. In other words, when one doesn't know what to do about it one thinks about it. Such an occasion constitutes one of those 'particular crises in the growth of experience' to which, according to Dewey, thought is always relative. On such an occasion the idea is the 'instrument of reconstruction', which delivers the agent from his predicament.²

¹F.C.S.Schiller, "Studies in Humanism", pp. 7-8.
(Quoted by R. R. Rusk, "The Philosophical Bases of Education", N. Y., 1929, p. 71.)

²Ralph Barton Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", N. Y., 1921, p. 202.

From this conception is derived the term 'Instrumentalism' by which Professor Dewey characterizes his philosophy.

c. Pragmatism is not only a protest against naturalism; it is also a protest against absolute idealism. Though related to idealism in its emphasis upon the uniqueness of man it condemns certain questions of interest to idealism as 'intellectualistic' and unworthy of discussion, since it holds they are too far removed from practical needs. A further discussion of this point is reserved for the chapter on idealism.

(1) It may be noted here, however, that pragmatists claim their opponents have accused them unjustly of seeing nothing but 'cash value' (James' term) and 'bread and butter consequences' in a situation. They claim to include in the 'practical' consequences such things as intellectual satisfactions, logical consistency, harmony of mental content, and the like. It would seem, though, that on this basis nothing could be ruled out; since any question whatever (provided it were a real question, and not merely a verbal distinction) would evidently be of interest to the person asking it; hence it would furnish mental satisfaction, and would be a legitimate pragmatic question.

As a matter of fact, pragmatists would probably hold that in the last analysis, value is dependent upon the practical, in the narrower sense of that term. Dr. Schiller himself says, "All consequences are practical, sooner or later." And pragmatists would say that all activities get their value

ultimately from the function they serve in guiding the reaction of the individual upon the environment.¹

2. a. Before further discussion, it may be well to consider briefly the history of the pragmatic movement. Though the present emphasis is modern, pragmatism according to James, is "a new name for old ways of thinking". Protagoras long ago formulated the classic statement which relates all things to human ends: "Man is the measure of all things, of those which are that they are, and of those which are not that they are not."

b. Various phases of the movement may be traced in the writings of the English philosophers, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. Locke says, "We shall not have much reason to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us;" and, "our business is not to know all things, but those which concern our conduct."²

c. In his "Critique of Practical Reason" Kant formulated principles which James later employed. It will be shown, however, that there are fundamental differences in the two conceptions.

d. (1) The modern movement received its name and its initial impetus from Charles S. Peirce, who published an article on "How to make our Ideas Clear" in "The Popular Science Monthly" in 1878.

¹Cf. James Bisset Pratt, "What is Pragmatism?" N. Y., 1915, p. 24.

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 153.

(a) Peirce felt that many of our ideas, as of force, freedom, God, have no "pictorial" meaning but: even so, an idea that cannot be conceived as a mental image may have a very definite meaning if it leads us to make predictions which can be proved. So Peirce formulated the principle that the meaning of every idea which has no corresponding sense-imagery, may be determined by the results or effects to which it leads; otherwise, it has no meaning at all. "Let us seek a clear idea of weight. To say that a body is heavy means simply that, in the absence of opposing forces, it will fall. This is evidently the whole conception of weight."

(I) Professor Hocking, commenting on this statement, says,

Such a method relieves us at once of many puzzles in our perhaps forever fruitless efforts to guess what Weight may be in itself, or force in general, or free will, or God. Consider simply what effects these entities have in experience. If they have no effects, they have no meaning. If two such entities have the same effects, they have the same meanings, though they have different names.¹

(b) The central problem of Peirce was, "What is truth, and how is it to be distinguished from error?" and his principle may be formulated, "every truth has practical consequences and these are the test of its truth".

(I) William James states Peirce's argument thus:

Mr. Peirce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce:

¹Hocking, op. cit., p. 153.

that conduct is for us its sole significance, and the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference in practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thought of an object then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.¹

(II) In refutation of this point Pratt points out that it is one thing to say that all concepts and beliefs result ultimately in action; and quite another to say that all their meaning consists in such resulting action. The distinction between a red house and a green house does not consist in a difference in action. Even granting that a difference in action or "attitude" does result, the resulting action does not constitute the whole of the distinction. Pratt rightly holds that since action or 'practice' cannot be taken to mean the whole of experience, there is no reason for saying it is the only type of experience which contributes anything toward the meaning of ideas. Sensational and emotional facts have their bearing also.²

(2) William James is perhaps rightly considered the 'father of modern pragmatism'. It was James' now famous 'California Lecture' on 'Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results' (August 26, 1898) which, according to Schiller, "baptized pragmatism, and flung it into the stream

¹William James, "Pragmatism", pp. 46-7. (Quoted by Rusk, op. cit., p. 67.)

²Cf. Pratt, op. cit., pp. 17, 18.

of philosophical controversy".¹ In this address James modified Peirce's idea, 'transmogrified' it, Peirce asserted.

(a) James saw the weakness of Peirce's formulation, indicated above, and tried to strengthen the system by making it more inclusive. He said, "I should prefer to express Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether active or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact that it must be active."

Thus James enlarges Peirce's conception that meaning lies wholly in action or 'practice', and holds that it may lie partially at least in some 'particular consequence', whether involving action or not, in 'our future practical experience'. The insistence that meaning attaches only to future experience has been repeatedly challenged by non-pragmatists.

(b) An important characteristic of James' philosophy is its attempt to escape agnosticism. Kant met the same problem in his 'Critique of Practical Reason', somewhat as follows: We cannot know the real meaning of God, freedom, and immortality; but there is a real basis for belief in them. This lies in the 'moral imperative', the sense of 'ought'. The 'I ought' implies the 'I can', and man has freedom, otherwise the universe is irrational. But the individual

¹F. C. S. Schiller, "William James and the Making of Pragmatism", (Quoted by Robinson, "An Anthology of Recent Philosophy", N. Y., 1929, p. 453.

never attains all that he feels is possible for him, the 'I can' never quite overtakes the 'I ought'. So there must be a future, in which this attainment may be completed. This postulates immortality. But we are called upon to obey the 'ought' whatever the personal consequences. It happens at times that some obey and suffer, and others disregard, and seem to prosper. If this world were all, we could not feel that the universe is just. But if these inequalities are to be righted there must be, not only a future life, but an Absolute Knower, to whom all the facts of this life lie open. Here we have the third postulate, God.¹

(c) James wishes to conserve the values which arise from religious beliefs, but he does so by a different process. With him there are no a priori truths, there is no 'moral imperative'. Many things in the universe can be neither proved nor disproved. But the human mind cannot always suspend judgment. It must act on some belief or other. So the will is called upon to decide the issue which the intellect alone could not determine. We may 'will to believe'. So prominent has this emphasis of James become that a philosophical writer of note said recently, "Pragmatism may be roughly defined as an appeal to the will to achieve conclusions in vital matters of belief, or to aid in achieving them".²

James says,

¹Cf. Hocking, op. cit., p. 149-50.

²Ibid., p. 141. (Emphasis supplied)

I wish to make you feel....that we have a right to believe the physical order to be only a partial order; that we have a right to supplement it by an unseen spiritual order which we assume on trust if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living.¹

James even goes so far as to say that belief in the unseen spiritual order is true. Not in the sense that such a spiritual order actually exists, but in the sense in which Pragmatism regards a thing true--the ability of the idea to function in human life. The last phrase in James' quotation is of prime significance, "if only thereby life may seem to us better worth living". James recognizes the value of belief in a religious Object as functioning in human life; he does not recognize the genuineness of the religious Object. He explains,

The Absolute brings 'religious comfort to a class of minds,' and....so far as it affords such comfort....has that amount of value..... As a good pragmatist I myself ought to call the Absolute true 'in so far forth' then; and I unhesitatingly now do so.²

(I) Perhaps it would be well to depart from the line of argument long enough to canvass this rather difficult position, by which pragmatism asserts that the truth of an idea lies, not in its correspondence with reality, but in its practical consequences. Pragmatism regards those things as true which 'work'. The test of a truth, then, becomes its verification. Before being verified it is a 'claim', but its verification makes it into a 'truth'. Verification, then, "ceases to be the process of proving a

¹William James, "The Will to Believe", N. Y., 1898, p. 52.

²William James, "Pragmatism", N. Y., 1907, p. 73.

claim true, and becomes the process of making it true."

Dr. Schiller says, "Truths are logical values", and adds, "it directly follows from this definition that all 'truths' must be verified to be properly true". Pratt points out the absurdity of this assertion by saying that "the premise to such a conclusion must evidently be that no belief can be true unless it is known to be true, and the logical consequence is, of course, that there are no such things as true but unverified beliefs, and that before a belief is verified it is either false or else neither true nor false".¹

Pratt shows that pragmatism "fails to distinguish between 'truth' as a known fact, or mental possession, and 'truth' as trueness or that quality or relation characterizing a true idea which makes it true". He points out the road by which pragmatism seems to have moved from its position on the nature of "a truth" to the meaning it has given to the truth relation. One of the great and excellent aims of pragmatism has been to banish the abstract from philosophy so far as possible, and to substitute for it the individual concrete. Human truths do not dwell apart in a Platonic realm; they are all of them concrete mental facts. Now pragmatism endeavors to use the same concrete method in dealing with the further question of the trueness of ideas. If truth in this sense be a relation, it must, insists the pragmatist, be a concrete relation. Truth is not mere correspondence, it is "the chain or succession of things or events or

¹Pratt, op. cit., p. 88.

experiences that are to be found between a judgment and its vindication". Not only therefore is "a truth" concrete ; its trueness is also concrete; it is a "chain of intermediating things or experiences'---and these not only prove a claim true, they make it true, they constitute its truth. The truth relation therefore, "consists not in the mere fact that our object is there as we think it, but in the actual experiential process of getting at it or as near it as may be".¹

(II) Keeping in mind these conceptions of truth, we are not surprised that James classifies religious faith with scientific theory. He says,

In such questions as God, immortality, absolute morality, and free-will no non-papal believer at the present day pretends his faith to be of an essentially different complexion, (from a scientific theory). But his intimate persuasion is that the odds in its favor are strong enough to warrant him in acting all along on the assumption of its truth.²

In his preface James states,

If religious hypotheses about the universe are in order at all, then the active faiths of individuals in them, freely expressing themselves in life, are the experimental tests by which they are verified, and the only means by which their truth and falsehood can be wrought out. The truest scientific hypothesis is that which, as we say, works best; and it can be no otherwise with religious hypotheses.

In other words, a religious hypothesis--say belief in God--is true because (and if) it functions in human life. But with the pragmatist "truth cannot be defined as the correspondence of thought with reality". Even if there is not a God, belief in God might very well function advantageously

¹Ibid., p. 83ff.

²William James, "Will to Believe", p. 95.

in human life. If it did so, it would be a true belief. Indeed James thinks that some sort of belief in God is necessary for human satisfaction. He says,

Some outward reality of a nature defined, as God's nature must be defined, is the only ultimate object that is at the same time rational and possible for the human mind's contemplation. Anything short of God is not rational, anything more than God is not possible, if the human mind be in truth the triadic structure of impression, reflection and reaction which we at the outset allowed.¹

Here James seems to grant all any absolute idealist could ask. But one must weigh carefully the statements of a pragmatist. He says, "Anything short of God is not rational"; but when we look at the preceeding sentence we find he implies "anything short of God is not rational" as an "ultimate object" of the human mind's contemplation. The human mind needs such an object of contemplation--James would even go so far as to say such an object of worship. Whether the Object of contemplation and worship really exists or not we can never know, and we should be sure to remember that we can never know. Lest this agnostic position of pragmatism's most religious advocate should seem an overstatement, the reader is referred to the preface of "The Will to Believe" where James remarks, "It is only when they forget that they are hypotheses and put on rationalistic and authoritative airs that our faiths do harm."²

(d) (I) In James' "Varieties of Religious Experience" he holds that religious emotions are ordinary

¹Ibid., p. 116. (Emphasis James')

²James, "Will to Believe", p. 95.

emotions of love, fear, awe, etc., directed toward a religious object. Conversion is simply the organizing of personality around a new center. It is only with 'sick souls' that there is a real religious experience, people who are normal do not need it. Dewey says that James "devoted himself primarily to the moral aspects of this theory" (instrumentalism) "particularly to its destructive implications for monistic rationalism and for absolutism in all its forms".¹

(II) When James first set forth his doctrines regarding religion, in "Varieties of Religious Experience" and "The Will to Believe", many thought that in pragmatism religion had found a strong friend and ally. The postulates of religion were seen to rest upon a basis equally valid with those of science; and religious faith came to have a philosophic standing which it had never before possessed. Religious hypotheses as well as scientific hypotheses were to be tested by experience. But while Kant had founded his right to believe upon the moral nature of man which pointed to a Reality beyond nature, James' right to believe rested on expediency alone. Kant thought belief was obligatory, since it rests on our consciousness of our moral nature. With James belief is optional--one might, on his premises, just as well will-not-to-believe. A belief is true if it 'works', but no standards are offered as to that of which 'working' consists.

¹John Dewey in "An Anthology of Recent Philosophy", compiled by Daniel Sommer Robinson, N. Y., 1929, p. 442. (Article is a reprint.)

Pragmatism would have no refutation for a Nietzsche who would insist that unbelief is preferable to belief, and the immoral to the moral. It was not at once detected that this emphasis on expediency might tend really to vitiate the faith is sought to cultivate. Many have since pointed out the impossibility of belief in a Reality, whose existence is at the same time held to be only a matter of probability. The human mind does not work that way. At best, it is characterized as a sort of attempt to life oneself by the bootstraps; at worse, it is playing fast and loose with the mental integrity, and has been termed 'mental mal-practice'. Eddington remarks that "it is not sufficient to be told that it is good for us to believe this....that it will make better men and women of us. We do not want a religion that deceives us for our own good."¹

(3) (a) The philosophy of Professor Dewey owes much to the theories of both Peirce and James, but varies from them in important respects. Dewey began his philosophical career as an absolute idealist, and the teachings set forth in his earlier writings are at extreme variance with his present position.² His major emphasis today is on experience, and his latest book deals with the experimental method of knowing. With Dewey "thinking is experimental inquiry; it

¹ Arthur Stanley Eddington, "Science and the Unseen World", Cambridge, 1929, p. 68.

²Cf. Dewey, "Psychology", N. Y., 1891, pp. 419-424.

directs operations". "A theory corresponds to facts because it leads to facts which are its consequences, by the intermediary of experience. And from this consideration the pragmatic generalization is drawn that all knowledge is prospective in its results..... Every proposition concerning truths is really in the last analysis hypothetical and provisional.. ..logically absolute truth is an ideal which cannot be realized....."¹

Knowing does not consist in having the right conception of an antecedent thing or condition, it is merely an instrument for the testing of a consequent thing or condition..... We see that general ideas have a very different role to play than that of reporting and registering past experiences. They are the bases for organizing future observations and experiences This taking into consideration the future takes us to the conception of a universe....still 'in the making' 'in the process of becoming', of a universe up to a certain point still plastic.²

This 'philosophy of change' with no absolute values, a universe 'in the process of becoming', reality itself 'in the making' receives major emphasis in the new pragmatism. The "Quest for Certainty" is not the 'search for truth' of classic philosophy. Its object is to show us that there is no truth--in the sense of which truth is considered certainty.³ Non-pragmatists object to this summary dismissal of the past as meaningless for thought, and argue that knowing may relate to the past as well as to the future.

(b) Dewey does not believe that there is any real distinction between theoretical and practical activity. Knowing which has been regarded as theoretical is, in fact, wholly practical. The "search for truth" is purely

¹Dewey, "Anthology", (Ed. by Robinson), p. 440.

²Ibid., p. 441.

³Cf. H. Wildon Carr, Review of "The Quest for Certainty", The Personalist, Jan., 1930.

utilitarian, and the value of knowledge is not logical but economic. It may be noted that this position is at antipodes from that of the great Aristotle, who held that the practical life is only justifiable in that it makes the higher, speculative life possible....the speculative life, however, not being with Aristotle a life of inactivity.¹ Since knowledge is always instrumental, Dewey holds man's excellence is that he has perfected the instrument. Idealism would say that man's glory lies rather in that he has 'clothed life with value'.

(c) To James religion belonged in this world because it works. Dewey finds no place for the Supernatural in his scheme of things. He believes that "the other-worldliness, found in religions whose chief concern is with the salvation of the personal soul....is a retreat and escape from existence--and this retraction into life....is the heart of subjective egoisms".²

With Dewey, "the arbiters of values are not to be looked for in past revelations, or in a perfect life once lived....for reliance upon precedent, upon institutions created in the past, upon rules of morals that have come to us through unexamined customs, upon uncriticized traditions, are other forms of dependence."³ Dewey's attitude toward the Supernatural is the logical outcome of the postulates of pragmatism.

¹John Burnett, "Aristotle on Education", Cambridge, 1926, p. 9.

²Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty", N. Y., 1929, p. 275.

³Ibid., p. 272.

The surprising thing is not that he reached these conclusions, but that James tried so hard to avoid them.

(d) Dewey would transfer the experimental method from the technical field of physical experience to moral, political and economic affairs. He foresees the objection that most people would make, that such an adoption of the experimental method would be a surrender of all standards and regulative authority; but points out that when familiar and traditionally prized values are surrendered, our directive standards will come from the findings of the natural sciences. Judgments of moral values (like everything else) are to be framed solely on the basis of consequences, hence must depend in a most intimate manner upon the conclusions of science.¹

We see here pragmatism, after a long and circuitous effort to escape naturalism, finally bringing up in the naturalistic camp. "Man is the measure of all things" but science regulates all things for him--even his religion and his morals!

(I) Without doubt the general 'flux' in moral standards and values, and the widespread 'experimentation' along this line is directly traceable to this, and kindred philosophies. The standards of the past, most of which have doubtless survived because best fitted to survive, are discarded, and humanity is being encouraged to begin at the beginning and work out a new system of morals. It is one

¹ Ibid., p. 273.

of the fatal weaknesses of pragmatism in every department in which it is applied, that it fails to count the terrific cost of learning by the trial and error method. The values of the past are not conserved. As a result of the application of this principle to morals, at the present time humanity faces a situation already indicated, when the fate of civilization itself seems to be threatened.

3. a. (1) The critics of pragmatism have not been slow in noting its internal inconsistency. It denies the absolutist doctrine of truth and considers all things as in a state of flux, all truth as relative. Yet the fact that 'all things are in a state of flux' is taken to be absolutely true. Therefore, absolute truth is presupposed in pragmatism. Spaulding has pointed out this inconsistency.¹ Miss Calkins thinks there is no escape from it.²

(2) The confusion of terms by which the 'truth' of an idea is identified with the test of its validity has been indicated. The non-pragmatist would agree that true ideas usually do 'work' better than ideas that are not true. However, this 'working better' is only a test of their 'trueness'. It is only a sort of tag which may help identify them, but it is not their 'trueness'. The 'trueness' of a thought lies in the fact that 'the thing is as I think it'. The truth is that which works; but it is not true because it

¹E. G. Spaulding, "The New Rationalism", p. 134ff. (Quoted by Mary W. Calkins, "The Persistent Problems of Philosophy", N. Y., 1929, p. 405.)

²Ibid., p. 405.

works--it works because it is true.

(3) The effort of pragmatism to escape postulating reality is, of course, its attempt to get away from the Supernatural. In its scientific emphasis it swings toward naturalism and behaviorism; hence, it holds that all knowledge is 'of phenomena'. It refuses to think of such problems as man's origin and destiny, or his relation to anything more ultimate than himself.

The correction of the errors of such thinking lies, as has been previously suggested, in the nature of the human mind itself. Ladd has well expressed it:

Fortunately, it is usually vain for one who maintains that all knowledge is 'of phenomena'....to be quite happy in his mind. The reason is not that he could not fairly well adjust his practical interests....to such an agnostic position. The real reason lies deeper than this..... Truth is not judged and accepted....chiefly on the ground that it yields practical fruits. Truth commends itself primarily by the satisfaction which it offers to the reason itself..... The reason craves assured commerce with reality. It tolerates doubt as to what things really are, and, as to what they are actually doing, only as a necessary stage on the way to knowledge which shall better represent and explain the real and the actual.¹

(4) This denial of reality might cause one to question whether pragmatism can legitimately be called a philosophy at all. Dewey has seen this objection and modifies the definition of philosophy. He says,

Philosophy has generally been defined in ways which imply a certain totality, generality and ultimateness both of subject matter and method....but in any literal and quantitative sensecompleteness and finality are out of the question..... The very nature of experience as an ongoing, changing process forbids..... Totality does not mean the hopeless task of a quantitative summation. It means rather consistency of mode

¹George Trumbull Ladd, "What Can I Know?" N. Y., 1917, p. 216.

of response in reference to the plurality of events which occur.¹

And, even more significantly, he goes on,

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education.²

Dewey then discusses the intimate connection between philosophy and education; and implies that, if isolated from practical ends which the community is concerned to achieve, the disclosures of science would be a matter of indifference.

Philosophy thus has a double task: that of science, pointing out values which have become obsolete with the command of new resources, showing what values are merely sentimental because there are no means for their realization; and also that of interpreting the results of specialized science in their bearing on future social endeavor.³

His conclusion is, "The most penetrating definition of philosophy which can be given is, then, that it is the theory of education in its most general phases."⁴

Dr. Herman Harrell Horne criticized this position of Dr. Dewey in a paper read before the American Philosophical Association in New York City in December, 1929. He logically held that it unduly limited the scope of philosophy, and that it was "legitimate only on the basis of an anthropocentric universe".

¹Dewey, "Democracy and Education", N. Y., 1920, p. 379.

²Ibid., p. 383.

³Ibid., p. 384.

⁴Ibid., p. 386.

b. As an educational method, however, pragmatism has made a real contribution, in spite of its limitations. It emphasizes those things that 'function', gives attention to social needs and interests, and strives to make the curriculum 'life-centered' by relating it to the interests and capacities of childhood. The 'experimental' feature has doubtless been overstressed. Pragmatism encourages originality, inventiveness, and initiative; it neglects and disparages idealization, and conceives of morality only as social adjustment. It has no fixed goals, and identifies the end to be attained with the process by which it is attained. The goal of education is not objective, but lies in experience itself. Dewey defines education as "that reconstruction or reorganization of experience, which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience."¹

c. The relation of pragmatism to naturalism has already been noted. Originally a protest against naturalism, pragmatism opposes it in its emphasis upon human purpose; in its denial of the more than relative value of scientific judgments; in its admission of the reality of mind; and in its conception of all reality as 'in the making'. In so far as it is a philosophy at all however, and not merely a 'theory of education in its most general phases', pragmatism must be classed in the mechanistic group. One fact alone is sufficient to place it there--its denial of the Supernatural.

¹Ibid., p. 89.

James neither denied nor affirmed the existence of a religious Object; but the impression one gains from his writings is that such Absolute as he acknowledges is subjective, made out of mind-stuff; and not far removed from the 'conscious fictions' of Hans Vaihinger's "Philosophy of As If". Dewey and other present day pragmatists are frankly agnostic.

d. Pragmatism starts out with the naturalistic assumption of the biological origin of mind, and it never gets beyond this. So it is not surprising that in its latest development it has swung over into behaviorism. "The psychological tendencies which have exerted an influence on instrumentalism", says Dewey, "are closely related to the important movement whose promoter in psychology has been Dr. John Watson and to which he has given the name behaviorism."¹ The brain is an organ for the coordination of sense stimuli for the purpose of bringing about appropriate motor responses. The psychological tendencies of pragmatism thus emphasize the objective and the biological, and have as great an aversion as behaviorism for introspection.

e. (1) (a) In considering what pragmatism is able to offer as a basis for morals, it is at once evident that many of the objections urged against naturalism and behaviorism apply to pragmatism as well. In the first place, it offers but a partial view of reality, limiting it to what may be known by the experimental method, and explained by human purpose. According to Dewey, "Ultimate moral motives and

¹Dewey, "The Quest for Certainty", p.

forces are nothing more nor less than social intelligence, the power of observing and comprehending social situations-- and social power--trained capacities of control --at work in the service of social interest and aims."¹

In spite of James' attempt to leave a place for the Supernatural, the present interpretation really offers none. It is 'humanistic' through and through. Walter Lippmann makes the issue clean-cut between the 'modern' 'humanistic' point of view and 'the popular religion'..... He chooses the former, and says,

Modernity destroys the disposition to believe that behind the visible world of physical objects and human institutions there is a supernatural kingdom from which ultimately all laws, all judgments, all rewards, all punishments, and all compensations are derived.

He says that religion "rests on the belief that faith is justified by overwhelming evidence supplied by revelation, unimpeachable testimony, and incontrovertible signs"; and concludes: "It follows that, in exploring the modern problem it is necessary consciously and clearly to make a choice between these diametrically opposite points of view. The choice is fundamental and exclusive, and it determines all the conclusions which follow."²

(I) One must agree with Lippmann in his insistence on the mutual exclusiveness of the two points of view. An argument for belief in the Supernatural might

¹John Dewey, "Ethical Principle Underlying Education," (Outline by Editor), Chicago, 1903, p. 33.

²Walter Lippmann, "A Preface to Morals", N. Y. 1929, p. 143. (Emphasis supplied.)

be put forth, however, along lines not included in Lippmann's enumeration, and not dependent exclusively on evidence supplied by "revelation, testimony, and signs". As Sweet has pointed out, since something exists, it is evident that Something is self-existent; and it is logical to suppose this 'Something' to be Mind rather than matter.¹ The only refutation of this argument seems to lie in a disparagement of the reason itself, a thing of which pragmatism is, in fact, guilty. This is, of course, a sword that cuts both ways; and, if admitted, invalidates the argument the pragmatist is interested in sustaining, as well as the one he is seeking to disprove.

(b) Horne contrasts the experimental with the idealistic viewpoint:

The one view limits itself to the scientific method of thinking about human experience; the other accepts the findings of science and supplements them with reasoned conclusions concerning the implications of human experience regarding the nature of the whole of reality.²

(2) Pragmatism discredits reason, in that it makes it a mechanical thing of biological origin, and merely a weapon in the struggle for existence. Rusk points out that its view of reason is far from complimentary. Instead of being the source of man's moral ideals and cultural products, it is merely his power to see when better adjustments are made.³

¹Louis M. Sweet, Class Lectures, Biblical Seminary in N. Y., 1926.

²Herman H. Horne, "The Philosophy of Education", N. Y., 1927, p. 298.

³Rusk, op. cit., p. 80.

Reason is also subordinated to feeling and will. One has a right to 'will-to-believe' in matters of religion if this belief will function in his life. Opponents have suggested that one has not a right to will-to-believe without the sanction of the intellect; for such a belief, if not true, will stultify the desire to search for truth. One psychologist affirms that the will-to-believe will not function for more than one or two generations. It has no inherent dynamic.¹

(3) Like the other philosophies which are at heart mechanistic, pragmatism depreciates human personality. While seeming to exalt man, it postulates a universe in which nothing irrelevant to man exists; by this very process it lowers him, ignoring the 'universal aspects' of his mind.

(4) Some pragmatists seem to offer a very high system of morals; but as was noted in the study of naturalism, philosophers frequently transcend their philosophy. They borrow from other sources (doubtless unconsciously) ideas and ideals which, with great adroitness, they endeavor to incorporate in their philosophical systems; although the premises of such systems may be very far from justifying such conclusions.

(a) Herbert Spencer was seen to have been guilty--to the credit of the man if not of his logic--of such inconsistency. John Stuart Mill was another who tried to stretch his utilitarian system far enough to include all the values of Christian idealism. He said,

¹Albert Clarke Wyckoff, Class Lectures, Biblical Seminary in N. Y., 1926.

As between a man's own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbor as one's self, constitutes the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.

In his attempt to show that such utilitarian morality is really a product of social evolution, Mill puts forth a fallacious argument which Carlyle later showed to be ridiculous. Mill's statement is: "Happiness is a good; each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." Carlyle says that this is equivalent to saying that since each pig want all the swill in the trough, a litter of pigs in the aggregate will want each member of the litter to have it's share--a conclusion certainly not justified by the premises. Hyde, who cites this discussion says, "It requires something deeper and higher than Epicurean principles to lift men to a plane where Christian altruism is the natural and inevitable conduct which Mill rightly says it ought to be."¹

(b) Pragmatists who write on morals are very apt to fall into Mill's fallacy. Felix Adler will be a good representative of the present-day tendency. In a volume of "Essays in Honor of John Dewey", Adler writes on "Personality". His problem is, "How can selfhood and service be compatible?" He concludes that the spiritual law is, "Live in promoting life." But his motivating agency proves that his

¹Wm. DeWitt Hyde, "The Five Great Philosophies of Life", N. Y., 1927, p. 64.

philosophy is indeed humanistic. The advanced students in his school "act as volunteer pupil-teachers of the less advanced....after school hours", and so "the habit of promoting development in others with a view to self-development is thereby encouraged."¹

(5) In contrast to this interpretation, which is pragmatically egoistic, is the spiritual idealistic view. Hyde has well expressed this view in describing the philosophy of Jesus.

Translated into modern, ethical terms His philosophy of life is a grateful and helpful appreciation; first of the whole system of relations, physical, mental, social, and spiritual as Personal like ourselves, but Infinite, seeking perfection, caring for each lowliest member as an essential and precious part of the whole; and second, of other finite and imperfect persons, whose aims, interests and affections are just as real, and there to be held just as sacred as our own.²

4. In summarizing the characteristics of pragmatism, it will be seen why pragmatism cannot possibly give the spiritually altruistic emphasis imperative for morality. In the first place, it does not deal with the whole of reality. Though James conceived of it as a theory of reality, the only reality modern pragmatism postulates is the reality of the fact and process of change. It regards truth as relative, as that which works. This reduces the 'right' to the 'expedient', and judges the moral worth of acts by consequences, not motives. Truth, according to pragmatism, does not consist in the correspondence of an idea with Reality, but in its ability

¹Essays in Honor of John Dewey, New York, 1929, p. 14.

²Hyde, op. cit., preface.

to function in human experience, to the furtherance of future experience. But there is no end or goal to this experience. The process itself is the goal. There is no ultimate Ideal, no a priori truth, no moral imperative. Reality is 'something that grows'. Life has no goal, and there is "no ultimate interpretation of life, destiny, or origin."

Pragmatism fails to conserve the values of the past, moral or otherwise. Its universe is a universe of uncertainties, 'unclosed, in the making'. Moral and scientific experimentation are placed on the same level. Values are subjective. Pragmatism disparages human personality, since the mind is regarded merely as an instrument forged in the struggle for existence. Earlier statements of pragmatism admitted the value of religion in human life, without asserting the reality of the religious Object. The present position is agnostic. To pragmatism the universe is anthropocentric; there is nothing more ultimate than man himself.

The central defect of this philosophy both as a philosophy and as a basis for morals, is that it lacks a unifying element. There is no adequate principle of integration either for the individual or for society. There can be no motive for caring for each lowliest member unless each is conceived of as a precious part of an Infinite whole. Here pragmatism fails. It has made an effort to supply coherence by emphasis on the social aspect. But while the desirability of altruism is admitted, it is 'with a view to self-development'. And why self-development?

The human mind seems to run out beyond its philosophy and to inquire, "What then?" Then the philosophy turns on its creator and says, "You cannot know; you must not ask." But this is not conclusive. One way of getting human beings to think about a thing is to insist on their not doing so. The 'quest for certainty' will never be abandoned.

The only basis pragmatism can offer for morals is that there is no basis. A basis implies something fixed and substantial on which a structure may be erected. This pragmatism has denied. The result is an individualization of values and, as has been stated, a frank emphasis upon the desirability of moral experimentation. This is a far cry from the conception which holds that man attains his highest self-realization through self-sacrifice. There seems to be need of a philosophy with a different point of departure.

CHAPTER VI

THE PHILOSOPHY OF IDEALISM

1. a. "Idealism, in one form or another, permeates the whole history of philosophy," says Adams.¹ Idealism is "that philosophy which holds that reality is of the nature of the mind".² "Our world, whatever it may contain, is such stuff as ideas are made of," says Royce.³ This philosophy consistently maintains that whatever is ultimately real in the universe is not of the nature of stones and metals, but is of a mental nature--"the thinker and his thought, the will and its doings, the self and its self-expression".

"Idealism contends that the material and physical universe known to science is an incomplete expression of reality, that it exists but to subserve, and requires to compliment it, a higher type of reality, a spiritual universe."⁴

b. Idealism is not primarily a way of knowing, like pragmatism; it is a metaphysics, a world-view. As has been noted, naturalism and behaviorism have limited their conception of reality to that which can be measured by a single method, the scientific. Pragmatism offers nothing

¹Adams, "The Evolution of Educational Theory", (Quoted by Rusk, "Philosophical Bases of Education", N. Y., 1929, p. 127.)

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 247.

³Josiah Royce, "Spirit of Modern Philosophy," N. Y., 1896, p. 351.

⁴Robert R. Rusk, "The Philosophical Bases of Education", N. Y., 1929, p. 94.

more; it is not interested in origins or ends. Idealism, in contrast to these philosophies, attempts to formulate a systematic view of all things. Its attitude toward morality is an outcome of its conception of man as related not only to the material and temporal universe, but to things spiritual and eternal as well.

Perry shows that, in respect to a mechanistic interpretation of nature, idealism is revolutionary; through it "the spectator again became the center of the system". He says further,

Its central motive is the restoration of the supremacy of spirit..... That very mechanical cosmos which had served to belittle man, is now made to glorify him through being conceived as the fruit of intelligence. God, the discarded hypothesis of science, is enthroned again as the master-knower of whom science itself is only the imperfect instrument.¹

2. a. The historical development of idealism is full of interest. Such phases of it will be sketched here as seem to relate, sooner or later, to its attitude toward morality. Hocking points out that idealism has its sources in intuitions very ancient in the race; and, while intuition is an insufficient basis for philosophy, he justly holds that no true philosophy can be achieved without it. The intuitions leading leading to idealism are:

First, that the ultimate and controlling facts of the world are not the obvious facts. Reality does not lie on the surface of things. The very plausibility which a naturalistic

¹Ralph Barton Perry, "Present Philosophical Tendencies", N. Y., 1921, p. 118.

interpretation of the universe offers on first view is not in its favor but against it. Second, it is very easy for the human mind to conceive of the world as an illusion. The intuition of the absence of finality is strong. Third, animism is impulsive. If prayer is instinctive, as James held, it is because there is a prevalent intuition that nature is the manifestation of will. Fourth, a subjective revelation seems to be involved. The "locus of supreme certitude" is "felt to be somewhere within the experience of the thinking subject".

The first three intuitions may be thought of as discovery of a self behind the world; the last, the discovery of a world within the self.¹ Idealism may be regarded as "the attempt to bring reason into the spiritual intuitions of mankind".

2. b. Plato is the earliest representative of metaphysical idealism; Aristotle and Augustine both felt the ideal element to be dominant in reality. Plato formulated his theory in the interest of ethics and in opposition to the theory of Heraclitus, that everything is in a state of flux and flow.

(1) Plato believed that matter is crude, indefinite, unorganized stuff; but that behind the world of phenomena there is another world, the real world of "ideas". These "ideas" are eternal, unchanging "forms" of all possible things, "incorporeal essences", "patterns", according to which the Deity fashioned the phenomenal world. Reality does

¹Cf. Hocking, op. cit., p. 251ff.

not lie in the individual, material object, as for instance in a plant or bird, but in the "general idea", plant or bird.¹

(2) In the ancient philosophies there was slight disjunction between science and religion, largely because teleology-purpose-was assumed.² With Plato, this was fundamental. His 'Absolute' is defined as good, and ethics is placed at the head of all the sciences. "The excellence or beauty or truth of every structure, animate or inanimate, and of every action of man, is relative to the use for which nature or the artist has intended them," he says.³

c. (1) It is seen at once that Plato's system is dualistic. The same may be said of that of Descartes, who inaugurated the beginnings of modern philosophy. He held that there are two kinds of reality, spiritual and material. He laid the foundation for his philosophy by trying to find if there was anything at all about which he could be certain; and concluded that there was nothing which could not be doubted except his own existence. "Cogito, ergo sum." His certainty of himself is implied in his very doubt of it. "For if I doubt", he argued, "I must exist". From this philosophical thought, Descartes inferred the existence of God. His argument for God, however, is not considered so con-

¹Cf. McClintock, "Cyclopedia of Theological Literature," Vol. 4, p. 465.

²Cf. Perry, op. cit., p. 31.

³Plato's "Republic", Jowett's Tr., p. 479. (Quoted by Perry, op. cit., p. 115.)

vincing as his argument for the self.¹

d. (1) Leibniz believed that the universe consists of a number of immaterial soul-like substances called "monads" all dominated by a supreme monad, God. He was the first to suggest that extension and motion, as well as color, sound and fragrance, are but modifications of consciousness; and reached the conclusion that so called non-spiritual, "corporeal" realities, or material substances, are in the end, spiritual. Thus he escaped the dualism of Descartes, and laid the foundation for modern idealism.

e. (1) In modern thinking it was Berkeley who first gave idealism classic expression. His system, like that of Leibniz, is qualitatively monistic and spiritualistic; which is to say, he believed that there is but one kind of reality, and that this reality is spiritual. He assumes, however, as did Leibniz, that this all-of-reality consists of a multitude of individuals; hence his system is said to be numerically pluralistic.² The question had not yet been raised as to whether the plurality of individuals is truly real; or whether they are but manifestations of a single underlying One, who is alone the Ultimately Real.

(2) Locke, Berkeley's predecessor, had maintained that matter may be divided into primary and secondary qualities. Primary qualities are those inherent in matter

¹Mary Wilton Calkins, "Persistent Problems of Philosophy", N. Y., 1929, p. 21ff.

²Ibid., p. 111.

itself; as, extension and solidity. Secondary qualities are subjective, as heat, cold, sound, color, fragrance. Berkeley, following Leibniz' thought, argued that there is no more reason for considering Locke's primary qualities objective than his secondary qualities. All qualities of matter are subjective, said he, and held that "the qualities of supposed objects cannot be perceived distinct from the mind that perceives them; and these qualities, it will be allowed, are all that we can know of such objects."¹ All, therefore, which really exists is spirit, or the thinking principle--ourselves, our fellow-men and God.

(3) In substantiation of his theory regarding primary qualities, Berkeley called attention to the fact that all perceptions vary with the condition of the perceiver. "Suppose," says he, "one of your hands hot and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water in an intermediate state; will not the water seem warm to one hand and cold to the other?"² But if hot and cold were qualities belonging to the water, independently of consciousness, then one must suppose that the water has at the same time two opposite qualities, heat and cold. This Berkeley held to be absurd. In like manner he amplified and emphasized the arguments of Descartes and Locke

¹McClintock, "Encyclopedia of Biblical Literature", Vol. 4, p. 466.

²"Dialogues" I., Open Court Edition, p. 18.
(Quoted by Calkins, op. cit., p. 119.)

with regard to odor, taste, sound, and color, as being "ideas in the mind and not qualities of things independent of consciousness". On this point Locke and Descartes agree with modern science.

The physicists teach us that there is nothing in the physical world exactly corresponding to the different colors, sounds, degrees of heat and cold, flavors, and odors of the nature world as we know it. Colors and the rest, they teach, are mere ideas, and the real causes of these ideas are forms of vibration. Thus the external world of the physicist is essentially the corporeal universe of Descartes and Locke, a silent, colorless world of form and motion.¹

(4) But, as has been indicated, Berkeley does not stop here. He holds that extension, motion, and solidity also vary with the perceiver, hence are ideas in the mind as truly as are color and taste. Vision does not really present us three dimensions, though the "solidity" of the perceived physical world depends on three dimensions. We see certain "signs"--for instance those indicating distance--and the mind infers facts not directly present to consciousness. So we think distance, and "interpret vision in terms of touch and and muscular motion; and so take as an outward fact what is really the work of the mind".²

(5) We see then, that with Berkeley, "Reality consists of perceptions and their perceivers; thoughts and their thinkers;" "to be is to be perceived": "esse est percipi." With him, not only are color and sound denied as

¹Calkins, op. cit., p. 121.

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 256.

qualities of things independent of consciousness; the very vibrations which--according to science--have caused them are likewise denied. Says Calkins:

The doctrine of Descartes and Locke concerning the physical world--which is, as has been shown, the doctrine of modern science--is thus, in Berkeley's view, utterly inconsistent. According to this familiar way of thinking, colors, sounds, tastes, and odors--the secondary qualities--are ideas in our minds, caused by "real" material qualities of form and motion. But the argument which convinces Locke that color, taste, and the rest are no real qualities, inherent in material things, is the fact that they vary with the perceiver; and form, hardness, and weight are variable in precisely the same way: they are, therefore, as truly as color and taste, ideas in the mind. There is, in a word, no reason for distinguishing this one group of thing qualities--form, motion, and solidity--from the others.¹

We have here the initial formulation of subjective idealism.

(6) (a) There are objections to Berkeley's argument which he admits and answers. Two are of chief importance: First, he seems to destroy the difference between reality and illusion. He states this accusation himself, and denies it. He says,

It will be objected that by the foregoing principles, all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the world: and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes place. All things that exist, exist only in the mind....what, therefore becomes of the sun, moon, stars?.... Are all these but so many chimeras and illusions of the fancy? To all whichI answer....Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive or understand, remains as secure as ever and is as real as ever..... That the things which I see with mine eyes and touch with mine hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.²

Then Berkeley shows "wherein consists the reality of

¹Calkins, op. cit., p. 122.

²Berkeley, "Principles", p. 34, 35. (Quoted by Calkins, op. cit., p. 124-5.)

these immediately seen and felt things, which--tho real--are ideas." The reality which distinguishes "real things"--namely, ideas imprinted on the senses--from the "mere ideas" of imagination, may be stated in definite terms. Hocking has well summarized Berkeley's argument.¹

Reality is vivid, strong, lively, distinct; it has order and coherence, we can trace it out, and it does not vanish under our hand as dreams do; it has biological consequences,--it causes pleasure and pain, the real fire burns, the real food sustains us....; it is for the most part external to our body, which of course does not mean external to our mind..... But all these qualities are qualities of experience, not of any substance beyond experience. They imply that reality is simply standard experience, and illusion is experience which fails to come to the standard..... Hence the world retains, under Berkeley's view, all the reality it can have in the mind of any man who is not misled by abstract ideas.

It is real in this sense that "it has an internal standard which corrects illusion." But, as will be shown, "it is not real as an independent, self-sufficient being: its reality is derived from the life behind it."²

A final characteristic of Berkeley's "reality" seems worthy of special discussion. It is that reality is active or a product of external action. To quote Hocking further: "I do not make it (reality). I have no choice what I shall see when I open my eyes. This means to Berkeley, that it is produced in us by the only active thing we know, namely, a living spirit outside ourselves, certainly not by an inert material substance."³

¹Hocking, "Types of Philosophy", p. 259.

²Ibid., p. 262.

³Ibid., p. 260.

(b) But, it might be inquired, does not such a system leave out of consideration unperceived objects? If "to be is to be perceived" what shall we say of the unobserved interior of the earth, the other side of the moon, undiscovered stars, and the like? Can we deny their existence because no human mind perceives them?

(I) Berkeley's reply is somewhat as follows:

The fragmentary world of direct perception is made, by scientific thought, into a complete and continuous whole. Of this supplement to perception it is obviously in the first place, for us, an object of thought; and thoughts are not out of the mind. Science does not use "substance": it only uses law, the rule by which experiences follow one another, depend on one another, and so are always supplementing one another to make up a complete world-picture.

When we say, then, that nature exists when no man perceives it, we can only mean that the laws continue to hold, backward as well as forward; and this may be true if there existed an Eternal Mind to think them. The mind of God is the guarantee, and the only guarantee, for the eternal endurance and order of nature.¹

This fine argument of Berkeley's serves to reveal the cosmic sweep of idealism. By its very nature it cannot stop short of an Infinite Mind.

The system of Berkeley has been given at some length because it presents one of the principle sources of contemporary idealism, and also because it indicates in part the process of thought by which "God, the discarded hypothesis of science," is again "enthroned as the Master-Knower". Another system we shall need to examine is that of Kant. His formulation was, in part, an answer to the theory of Hume.

¹Ibid., pp. 260, 261. (Emphasis supplied.)

f. (1) Hume followed Berkeley in the denial of matter, holding that the mental life alone is knowable. But this "epistemological idealism", which led to dualism in Descartes and Locke, and to subjective idealism in Berkeley, led to "solipsism" or scepticism in Hume. Hume began where Berkeley left off and went further--one might well add, too far. He denied the reality not only of the object perceived, but of the mind which perceives it. He believed that we do not even know that one thing depends upon another in the relation of an effect to its cause. Belief in causality lies in the fact that we expect it will be so. It is only probable, not certain, that every event has a cause.

This distrust of reason leads to the conclusion that there is nothing certain except the fact that nothing can be known. It was seen to lie behind the philosophy of present-day pragmatism, and to lead to the rejection by that philosophy of universal truths, unchanging ideals, and fixed goals.

g. One of the most fascinating things about the study of philosophy lies in the revelation of the tendency of the human mind to correct its own errors. No sooner is an erroneous position clearly stated than some philosopher, or group, comes forth to refute it. Hume's scepticism is a brilliant illustration of this fact; and in refuting it Immanuel Kant formulated a system which has influenced philosophical thinking ever since. Kant himself says that Hume awakened him from "dogmatic slumber" and that "the Kritik of Pure Reason was inspired by this Humian doubt."

(1) One of Kant's distinctive theories was that of the subjectivity of time and space. He held that time and space are mere forms of perception, "sense-forms". They seem to belong outside us but are merely "conditions in us of our seeing and feeling things, forms of our sense,"¹ and they are not real, except as facts of consciousness.

(2) Kant held that "all matter may be reduced to sensations, actual or possible, in the subjective forms of space and time and ordered by the categories." But he also believed there are unknowable things-in-them-selves, that is, things not dependent on our experience of them for their reality.

(a) Objection has been raised to this theory on the ground that it is dualistic. Horne points out this objection; and sets forth the formulation of modern idealism, which resolves the difficulty by taking into account an "all embracing experience". He says,

Kant got into trouble when he asserted a peculiar human type of temporal and spatial experience, beyond which were realities, noumena, "things-in-themselves", neither temporal nor spatial in character. This introduced duality into his world. It is obvious that the things beyond experience must in some sense be experienced in order to be asserted. Thus all reality falls within one all-embracing experience. If all experience is one, and time characterizes what we men know as a part of this experience, it also in some sense characterizes the whole of experience. This need not mean that the whole of experience is in time....but it does mean that time is in the whole of experience, that time consequently is one of the real experiences of the Absolute, if we may introduce this term for the whole of reality, and that consequently time is one of the

¹Josiah Royce, "Spirit of Modern Philosophy", Cambridge, Mass., 1892, p. 124.

realities.¹

(3) We have noted Hume's denial of causation. "Impressions we know", he says, "and ideas we know; but whoever yet saw causation, or experienced necessity?" "In this world of sense there are facts, but there are no links; you see things happen; you can't see why they must happen."²

Kant explains causation, as well as time and space as one of the forms of our thinking. Royce has well summarized Kant's subtle argument:

In so far as the world is seen by us in our sense forms of space and time, it is bound to appear to us as conformable to their laws..... If it is the fundamental fashion of our thinking to become conscious of objects as orderly, then orderly they will be for us. Then our world will have in it not only conjunction, but connection of facts. Our understanding will think the linkages in our show-world. The dutifully bound seeming universe of our experience will obey the law of the inner life, whose thought it is.³

And again,

The unknown things-in-themselves give us sense experiences. These we first perceive in the forms of space and time, because that is our way of perceiving. Then, being coherent creatures, we order this our world of sense according to the laws of causation, and the other "categories" which are forms of thought. Thus we all alike get a world, which, while it is in all its sanity and order an inner world, is still for each of us apparently an outer world,--a world of fact, a world of life. The unity of our personality demands the unity of our experience; this demands that our show-world of nature should conform to the laws of thought; and thus causality, necessity, and all the other categories of the understanding are realized in the world through our constructive imagination, which working in the service of the understanding actively puts them into the world.⁴

¹H. H. Horne, "Idealism in Education", N. Y., 1910, p. 166, 167.

²Quoted by Royce, op. cit., p. 127.

³Royce, op. cit., p. 127.

⁴Ibid., p. 131.

This position, too, has been modified by the conception of the "one all-embracing experience" .

(4) The great argument of Kant from the moral imperative to freedom, immortality, and God has been discussed in the chapter on pragmatism. But he also developed this argument man-ward. Since man is free--not merely a biological machine--he is worthy of respect. Kant asserts, "Now I say man exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means."¹ This fact lays upon us an obligation in regard to man: and it is a "command without an if"--a categorical imperative; "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person, or in any other, in every case as an end withal, and never as a means." This followed, would make it impossible for any man to exploit another; and it furnishes a substantial basis for right treatment of other individuals, lacking in the philosophies which regard man merely as "a conscious automaton".

Hocking rightly holds that this view of man as worthy of respect by virtue of his being "something different from the causal or biological machine", "puts a necessary foundation under the whole ethical business". He continues, "The worth of persons is objective, independent of our variations of mood, because based on what a person is, namely, a free being, capable of seeing an ethical point, and so of being a member of a society of rational creatures."² "Act only on

¹Fundamental Principles of Metaphysics of Morals", tr. by Abbott, p. 55. (Quoted by Hocking, op. cit., p. 310.)

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 311.

that maxium of which thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This is merely saying in philosophical terms what Jesus stated so simply and personally that the way-faring man though a fool could not err therein, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them."

This principle aims to eliminate those modes of action which "would show themselves to be self-contradictory if they became general". A man does not steal, because he would not will a society where his property rights would not be respected. He does not lie, because he does not will a society where the general habit of untruthfulness would prevent his statements from being regarded as dependable.

We feel that here, somehow, Kant is getting close to the heart of moral life; he feels a sense of "ought" "at least as real as his own existence"; from this the deduction is made that man is free--else the universe is irrational; and the "ought" leads in the direction of action which is conceived of as so right that one would wish all people to act in the same way,--here at last, one begins to find a sense of something real and substantial which may perhaps serve as a permanent foundation for morality.

h. Kant's system of thought has been modified by later writers, as has been indicated. In order to understand the position of contemporary idealism it is necessary to note some of these modifications. We have seen how Leibniz and Berkeley had conceived of reality as idealistic and spiritualistic. Hume was likewise an idealist, but went so far as

to deny the reality of the thinking subject. Kant reinstated the personalistic view, and brought back the older conception of a universe of concrete selves; but he still held the idea of things-in-themselves behind the selves, a dualism which Leibniz and Berkeley had avoided.

There was a problem however, which no one had adequately considered: this was the relation of the selves to each other and to the Absolute Self. Both Leibniz and Berkeley had held that the universe is composed of immaterial substances, of which one, the supreme monad, God, is superior to all others. But neither of them had explained the relation of these substances to each other; nor had they attempted to show the relationship of the infinite, complete, divine Self to these lesser selves. Their systems were monistic in that they conceived of all reality as spiritual; they were numerically pluralistic, in that they held there are many spirits.

A century before, Spinoza had put forth a great conception of a single spiritual reality--one substance. His idea had failed to influence Leibniz and Berkeley, but was developed by the post-Kantian group, Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Hegel, and was worked out into a unified system by Hegel.

i. (1) Fichte developed Kant's thought of the transcendental "I". For him "the thing-in-itself vanishes, and the transcendental Self becomes an absolute though impersonal self, inclusive of finite selves whose deepest reality consists in their moral striving to apprehend and to

realize their own infinity".¹ The criticism of this system lies in the impersonal nature of its Absolute--which Fichte sometimes inconsistently treats as personal; for Fichte could not conceive of the personal except as limited. The idea of the self-limitation of the Absolute had not been suggested.

(2) Fichte postulates freedom, as do other idealists; and he is concerned with the kind of freedom man possesses. He says,

To the general question whether man is free or not, there is no general answer; for, just because man is free in the lower sense, because he begins in indecisive vacillation and hesitation, he may be free or he may not be free, in the higher sense of the word..... On the other hand, he, whose life is possessed by the truth and has become life direct from God, is free and believes in freedom in himself and others.²

j. (1) Schelling, like Fichte, rejected Kant's thing-in-itself, and held to an unconditioned but impersonal "I" "differentiating itself into limited selves and not-selves, particular 'I's' and their objects."³ In his later teachings he names the Absolute as personal God; but conceives of God as having developed, in time, from the pre-personal to the personal plane.

k. (1) Schopenhauer's theory of the Absolute Self was of a personality though inadequately conceived. The ultimate Reality was for him a single One, and was of the nature of will. This involved ceaseless longing and striving, which

¹Calkins, op. cit., p. 310.

²Fichte, "Addresses", Eng. Trans., p. 120. (Quoted by Rusk, op. cit., p. 180.)

³Ibid., pp. 336-342.

led inevitably to pessimism. Upon this his ethics was founded.

m. (1) Hegel is considered by Haldane as "The greatest master of abstract thought that the world has seen since Aristotle died."¹ We have noted how Fichte and Schelling conceived the ultimate Reality to be a single unity, but failed to admit personality as a characteristic of this Reality since personality seemed to them to involve limitation. Hegel's doctrine is clean-cut in its assertion of an Absolute Self, and its conception of every finite reality as an expression of this infinite Self. This contribution is one of the most important that has been made to the idealistic system. The argument by which Hegel seeks to prove the existence of this infinite and inclusive Self is most challenging:

(a) First, he asserts that ultimate Reality is not undetermined and therefore unknowable, as his contemporaries had held; pure, or undetermined Being would be nothing, since there is nothing which is perceivable or thinkable about it. But ultimate Reality has at least the attribute of being thought about. Therefore, it is, to some extent, determined, and we are justified in trying to discover its nature.

(b) But, it may be objected, our objects of knowledge are limited by the limitations of our own consciousness; they are known to us, as Kant has shown, under

¹Quoted by Calkins, op. cit., p. 360.

the forms of space, time, causation and the other categories. Now must we not suppose that ultimate Reality is free from the limitations of our categories? Back of every phenomenon or appearance there is doubtless a reality--but must it not remain forever unknown to us? Such was Kant's position, and such is the belief of many present day thinkers.

To this Hegel replies by pointing out that those who believe in an independent unknowable reality unrelated to objects of consciousness, admit that this reality has relation to the facts of experience. Kant, indeed, attributes to the things-in-themselves causation, since they are source of sensations, and also multiplicity; if an unknown force is assumed as the reality behind phenomena it is assumed merely as an explanation of the phenomena. Hence it is not independent of the fact of experience but closely related to it. There seems to be no reason then why ultimate Reality should be regarded as "outside the pale of our possible objects of knowledge".

Hegel then presents his positive argument leading to idealistic monism; the thing he wished to prove is that ultimate Reality is One, and is spirit.

(c) He first opposes the doctrine that an ultimate or "irreducible" Reality may be very limited, and holds that no strictly limited or isolated reality is irreducible. He argues that, if ultimate Reality is but one among many, it possess at least the quality of self-identity. This involves another characteristic. If I am identical with my-

self, I am by that very token, other than someone else. The self-sameness implies that otherness.

But both the self-sufficiency and the otherness imply a relation between the supposedly distinct reality and other realities; also, it follows that it has as attributes likeness and unlikeness, since it must either resemble or differ from the others. Therefore a supposedly unrelated reality, because it is inevitably like or unlike others "cannot, in distinction from the others, be regarded as ultimate Reality".

Miss Calkins summarizes this argument of Hegel's, which, she says, "has become invrought with the common fibre of philosophical doctrine":

A limited reality, he teaches, may not be supposed to exist preeminent among others, yet unrelated to them, for it cannot be conceived except as related to these others. In its aloofness and isolation, therefore, such a single reality cannot be ultimate Reality--the final goal of the truth-seeker. For it is at least identical with itself; and this identity implies an otherness with which the identity, the likeness and the unlikeness is an integral part of itself; and otherness, likeness and unlikeness require the existence of realities outside itself. Because, then, its own existence is bound up with that of other realities, no particular limited reality can be ultimate.¹

(d) Hegel goes on to show that every limited reality (including the alleged unrelated reality) is dependent on others. Hence he reaches the conclusion that other limited realities must be thought to exist, but does not prove that they do. Calkins thinks this step may be supplied:

My consciousness of my own limitation is a direct witness to the existence of more than one reality. Thus, in knowing the limited reality as related to whatever else may exist, I know

¹Calkins, op. cit., p. 372. (For whole argument concerning Hegel, cf. Calkins, pp. 360-94.)

it as related not to an ideal other (or others) but to an actual other.

(e)

This result makes a farther reaching conclusion necessary. What has just been proved of any partial reality, however simple, must hold true of every partial reality however complex. It must hold true, therefore, of anything short of complete reality. It follows that ultimate Reality....must be conceived as all-that-there-is.¹

(f) Space forbids a canvassing of the argument by which Hegel showed that ultimate Reality is not a composite of all particular realities; but an Individual. He holds that the Absolute Self, differentiated into the world of nature and of limited spirit is "no lifeless or abstract thought, but concrete self". "The highest extremest summit is pure Personality, which alone--through that absolute dialectic which is its nature--encloses and holds all within itself."²

Hegel's fundamental teaching, then, is that ultimate Reality is a spiritual personal Self, absolutely one, yet "including in its unity--as subordinate yet essential to it--all the varied reality of the world as we know it". In his writings he tried to apply his doctrines; and his influence on ethics has been great.

The procession of events, Hegel teaches, is the progressive apprehension of this absolute Self under more and more adequate forms; goodness is the adequate relation of human beings to each other as all related to this larger Self; beauty is the absolute Self's expression in sense forms; religion is the

¹Ibid., p. 374.

²Hegel, "Logik" Werke, V., p. 339. (Quoted by Calkins, p. 389.)

personal relation to the Absolute Self; and philosophy is the reasoned apprehension of the Absolute.¹

This conclusion at which Hegel arrived represents very well the subsequent attitude of idealism toward the conception of God.

n. (1) But what, according to idealism, is the purpose of nature? The Post-Kantian group finds an explanation for the purpose of nature in the fact that it furnishes an opposition which the mind needs. Hocking has summarized Fichte's position:

Fichte took the essence of mind to be will: will must express itself in action: action means the forming of stuff, or the overcoming of obstacles. There must be stuff, obstacle, or else no will and no mind. In 'work' man wins his first moral victories..... In order that man should be moral, there must be a material world..... If, then, we can conceive that the dutiful man is an object of value to the world-mind, we can see a purpose in the presentation of nature....for Fichte duty is the gateway to the understanding of nature. Without effort, no morality; without opposition no effort; without a world of physical facts, no opposition. Nature exists because it is a necessary condition of the moral life of finite minds.²

(2) Schelling and Hegel find a further meaning in this "opposite of mind" which is called nature, in that it enables Mind to attain self-conscious self-possession.

Royce's philosophy is permeated with this daring but very reasonable conception, and we will permit him to state Hegel's point of view:

Nature, in fact, is a phenomenal embodiment of the categories --an embodiment which exists just because the Absolute, in order to be true to its own dialectical nature, must first

¹Calkins, op. cit., p. 389.

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 284.

express itself in what appears to be an external and foreign form even in order to win, through the conquest over this form, a consciousness of its own complete self-possession. But again, the Absolute is viewed as conquering its natural or apparently foreign form of expression, in order thereby to win a conscious self-possession, and constitutes, in contrast with external nature, the world of finite minds. A finite mind is a process whereby the Absolute expresses itself as some special instance of a conflict with nature, with chance, with the accidental. Through this conflict, through vicissitudes....the Absolute wins a consciousness of its conquest over its own self-alienation. For....the only way in which self-consciousness can attain its goal is through such a conquest over self-alienation, through a becoming finite, through suffering as a finite being, through encountering estrangement, accident, the unreasonable, the defective, and through winning thereby a self-possession that belongs only to the life that first seeks in order to find. Assuming a natural guise, being subject to finite conditions, the Absolute wins in human form its self-possession at the moment when it comes to regard this human life as an embodiment of an absolute, that is of a divine life.¹

This idea of the self-limitation of the Absolute, and its account of the seemingly irrational and evil as resolved and conquered, is one of the highest conceptions which the human mind has attained. It is the basis of the idealist's confidence in life, and it is the dynamic which inspires to the giving of self, "if it might somehow serve the greater Good."

(3) Horne states the relation of the "Self" and the "selves" very clearly:

God is the self-conscious unity of all reality. Within His life falls the life of nature and of man. We are the content of His consciousness, and not we only, but all that which isall that we know is a part of the infinite fulness of the content of His consciousness..... The error of transcendent dualism consists in supposing the world is without, instead of considering it as within, the life of God..... The true doctrine of immanence is not that God is in nature and man, but that man and nature are in God....the world dwells in God, not God in the world. God is the including consciousness; the world is a part of the included content.

¹Josiah Royce, "Lectures on Modern Idealism", New Haven, 1919, p. 228.

Time is given its place thus,....

....the widening stream of time with its natural and human developments is a significant process in His consciousness, in which He is interested from before the foundation of the world, and which is interested in Him as rapidly as it becomes conscious of its own explanation..... This is the doctrine of idealistic theism to which education brings us as the only adequate interpretation of its own implication concerning the origin of man.¹

3. a. Contemporary idealism varies as to content in the hands of its individual exponents. Having as its chief sources the Berkeleyn and the post-Kantian conceptions it partakes of the nature of one or the other, and frequently of both. As was seen, the Berkeleyn idealism is pluralistic. While the world of objects is held to be one, not many, each individual forms his own idea of it and "has his own world in his own ideas". It is hard, in this conception, to avoid solipsism. The post-Kantian interpretation is monistic; this world is contained within the consciousness of an all-inclusive Being--the Absolute--"of which finite spirits are in some sort parts". This view seems more acceptable to modern thinkers.

b. Present-day idealists are, for the most part, personalistic. They start, with Descartes, from each individual's certainty of his own existence. This cannot be doubted or denied, since doubt is not possible without a self to do the doubting: Professor Marlatt has compiled a definition of a person which, in the opinion of the writer, is both true and adequate; space forbids elaboration:

¹H. H. Horne, "The Philosophy of Education", N. Y., 1927, pp. 269-71.

A person is an organic whole of reality--a microcosm reflecting the macrocosm--consisting of a psycho-physical complex, organized about an equally active, rational, dynamic center, and capable of carrying, creating, and perpetrating values.¹

c. Idealism's insistence on the rationality of the world-order, and its method of dealing with the problem of evil has been indicated. Horne says,

A caprice in nature indicative of an inherent irrationality has never appeared to the wondering and scrutinizing intelligence of man. If there be an unintelligible, unlovely and wilful element in the eternal constitution of things, not once in historic times has it unmistakably declared itself.... the very possibility of the ugly or the sinful implies an absolute experience within which they fall, are comprehended and overcome. This present object is ugly because the critic's experience is large enough to include it, and also a standard to which it should conform.²

This idea is in line with the doctrine of the self-limitation of the Absolute, which has been considered elsewhere.

4. a. (1) In evaluating the philosophy and comparing it with the others canvassed, it may be pointed out again that idealism is truly a philosophy, in that it deals with the whole of reality. In contrast to the others, it presents a system of thought which does not ignore anything about which man is capable of thinking. It takes into account and provides for the "universal aspects" of man's mind.

(2) In conceiving of the Ultimate Reality as of the nature of mind, idealism is fundamentally opposed to naturalism and behaviorism its ally. The divergence here is perhaps the most significant in the whole field of philo-

¹Earl Marlatt, "What is a Person?" Boston Univ. Bulletin, Vol. XIV, No. 15, p. 17.

²Horne, "Philosophy of Education", p. 282.

sophical thought. For naturalism matter is the only reality; and if mind is discussed at all it is with a view of finding out how matter happened to produce such an "epiphenomenon". Idealism starts with Mind as reality, and instead of asking how matter happened to produce mind, inquires how mind came to incorporate itself in matter.

Arthur J. Todd points out the failure of naturalism and its consequences:

There seems to be no other way out....than to agree with Dean Inge that since the attempt to explain mind materialistically and life mechanistically has failed, nothing remains but to explain nature spiritually.¹

Idealism claims that "consciousness cannot be derived from matter, but that matter exists only for consciousness".²

(3) Human life, according to idealism, is the embodiment of a Divine life. It is the arena in which the Divine life attains its own conscious self-possession. Idealism holds that it is impossible for a philosophy which attempts to deal with the whole of reality to avoid the religious point of view. Its position may be stated in the words of Dr. Robert A. Millikan. His view is also representative of that of the greater scientists of the present-day. When asked to give his views on the "Cosmic Mind", he answered,

Why not say God? I have never known a thinking man who did not believe in God. Science without religion may become obviously a curse rather than a blessing to mankind; but science

¹Quoted by Graebner, "The Passing of Materialism", Biblical Review, July 29, p. 345.

²E. Troeltsch, "Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics", Vol. VII, p. 90.

dominated by the spirit of religion is the key to progress and the hope of the future.¹

Ellwood, in "The Reconstruction of Religious Experience", says, "Religion is belief in an ever living God, that is a divine Mind and Will ruling the world and holding moral relations with mankind." William James recognized the need of religion as a dynamic in moral action. The atheistic leaders of the French Revolution failed in their attempt to found a nation without the recognition of religion and a religious motive; it is safe to say that in this respect history will repeat itself in Russia. Robespierre revealed his knowledge of the religious element in human nature in his remark: "If there were not a God it would be necessary to invent Him."

(4) Idealism holds that nature exists as a necessary condition of the moral life. It is the obstacle against which that life may pit itself and grow strong.

b. (1) In considering idealism as a philosophy adequate to furnish a basis for morality, it may be asserted that the chief concern of idealism is with the moral problem. This is seen in the common use of the term. Though the strictly philosophical use of the word was idea-ism, the "l" being added merely for euphony, the popular connotation has to do with the doctrine of ideals--of that which ought-to-be.

(a) It will be readily seen that this is necessarily so. If the purpose of the universe is conceived

¹Quoted by Graebner, op. cit., p. 351.

of as that of offering the means whereby the Absolute may "win in human form its self-possession",¹ then that upward reach of the human personality by which this is achieved is the most significant occurrence in the whole cosmic process. Why should not idealism be concerned with morality? It is concerned with that which goes deeper than morality--with the relation of man to the Absolute--that upon which morality must finally rest.

(b) We now seem to be arriving at a point glimpsed vaguely and from afar in the opening pages of this paper. A tentative idea was advanced in the introduction, to the effect that the sacrifice of the individual for the good of the group was justifiable on the ground that the individual himself thereby came into his own highest self-realization. The philosophy of idealism shows us why this is so. If the universe exists in order that the Absolute may win a conscious self-possession through finite beings,--if finite beings came into existence for this very purpose--then in achieving the purpose for which they were created they come into the highest self-realization possible for them. This statement is true of course, only on the assumption that the universe is rational; otherwise, it is held, there would be no value in discussing this or any subject whatsoever.

When the finite becomes conscious of its harmony with the Infinite in nature and motive, then man no longer wills

¹Royce, "Modern Idealism", op. cit., p. 228.

to strive for self, but for all selves--for the furtherance of the cosmic purpose. He knows that he who loses his life in line with that purpose saves it, for he has achieved that for which he came into being. His glory is that he is allied with the Infinite--

"That which doth provide, and not partake;
Effect, and not receive."

Life is given infinite meaning in such a conception.

Rusk puts it practically:

In striving after the truth, in realizing the beautiful, and in battling for the right, man is not merely seeking his own individual satisfaction, as pragmatism suggests; he is co-operating with the Divine, and the universe is the richer for his efforts.¹

(2) In view of these qualities of idealism, it is obvious that it preserves values long cherished both by the intuitions and the reason of mankind.

(a) It holds, as has been seen, to the conception of the personality of the Absolute Self. God is the "Master-Knower". He is the including consciousness, of which nature and man are the included content.² Naturalism, on the other hand, puts an impersonal principal in control.

Idealism's insistence on the personal nature of the Absolute is a contribution of inestimable value to idealism, as a basis for morality. Human beings refuse to conceive the Infinite in terms lower than themselves. Gillies has put the issue involved here very pertinently:

¹Rusk, op. cit., p. 74.

²Cf. Horne, "Philosophy of Education", p. 270.

That which men need above almost anything else is that life should possess unity and value. They must feel themselves an integral part of a real moral uni-verse. And what is more to the point, human loyalties are ultimately personal..... As personality is the heart of all being, so it must be the heart of all life. And that is just where religious sanctions manifest their social value. They universalize moral values, and so give them stability and permanence. They confer upon morality adequate authority by grounding it in the slowly unfolding purpose of a personal God, and making it part of an endless moral process.¹

(b) The ultimate Moral Ideal, denied by both naturalism and pragmatism, is thus preserved by idealism. Righteousness is that which is in harmony with this Ideal. It is much more than mere expediency. The practical value for morality of this conception is strikingly set forth by Gillies:

Rashdall says our moral ideal can claim objective validity only in so far as it can rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally existing in the mind of God. True. And the necessity is practical, not simply philosophical. It has to do not merely with the abstract conclusions of the metaphysician in his cloistered security, but with the every day interests of the man in the streets. It is one thing to face the inescapable conflict involved in the free life feeling that man is 'child of a thousand chances, 'neath an indifferent sky', and decidedly another to undertake it in the calm confidence that not a sparrow falleth to the ground but He knoweth. If history proves any one thing it would seem to be that the reaction of a group that agree with Heine that 'the world is an age long riddle which only fools expect to solve', is bound to differ radically from that of those devout believers in the fact that there is 'one far-off divine event toward which the whole creation moves.'²

(c) Closely related to this point and involved in it, is idealism's insistence upon universal purpose. Naturalism affirms that the universe is a mechanism,

¹Gillies, op. cit., p. 530.

²Ibid., p. 530.

and pragmatically insists that mental life is "for the sake of action of a preservative sort". Idealism, while not denying that mechanism is universal, holds with Lotze, that it is secondary to teleology; and that, since it involves design, it is an expression of an infinite Intelligence. There is an infinite goal, and it is the ever unfolding purpose of the Absolute. Also, finite intelligence partakes of the nature of the Infinite; and that its highest prerogative lies in its ability to come into ever increasing harmony with the Absolute.

Nor is this all. To idealism the human being has a meaning in the cosmic order. The finite mind is the furthest reach upward of the Infinite Mind as it has incorporated itself in matter, by which the Infinite Mind "wins a consciousness over its own self-alienation"; and in this process the finite wins its highest self-realization as well.

(d) One of the points on which idealism differs most radically from the other philosophies is its insistence on the uniqueness of man. To them man is continuous with nature--a biological organism. Hocking has pointed out that such a scheme cannot provide even the fundamentals of the moral life:

As for these fellow-men of ours....'What are they?' Answer that without metaphysics if you can. If they are biological organisms and nothing else, subject to the laws of cause and effect, they must be so treated. In that case their worth varies through a long gamut and there are 'many too many' of them: it is no use pretending any sentiment of universal respect or fraternity; the principle of 'equality' is either a falsehood or a pragmatic assumption for small homogeneous communities, quite inapplicable to humanity at large. Obversely, if that sense of fundamental equality which is the basis of justice as well as benevolence is to be given a

lease of life, we must assume that men are something else than organisms.¹

(e) Idealism postulates the freedom of choice and the moral responsibility of the human being. It is perhaps at this point that adherents to the naturalistic philosophy have shown their greatest inconsistency. Their philosophy cannot logically posit "one iota of choice from birth to the grave"; yet the mechanists, since they are human beings, are unable to get along on that assumption. It is well that some of their braver spirits have stated the position so unequivocally as has Watson. Such a statement leads to the rejection of the philosophy, for the mind of man represents the idea of being controlled by impersonal forces.

Many writers have commented on the inconsistency of naturalism in asserting that man has no freedom, and then treating him as if he were free. This weakness cannot be too strongly emphasized. It is fundamental, far-reaching, and unavoidable; and it eliminates naturalism completely as a basis for morality.

Adams comments on what he terms the "strange combination of pure mechanism and ethical exhortation". In Mark Twain's book, "What is Man,", man the machine is "moved, directed, commanded by exterior influences solely". He originates nothing, not even a thought. But--curious thing--"though his whole life is an unbroken chain of mechanical reactions, he is to have his ideals and somehow or other carry them out".

¹Hocking, op. cit., p. 308.

He is told to "diligently train your ideas upward toward a summit where you will find your chiefest pleasure in conduct which, while contenting you, will be sure to confer benefits upon your neighbor and the community".¹

Wiggam is also guilty of a similar inconsistency. Bennett in "The Human Machine" does the same thing, except that he smuggles an ego into his machine. "These writers begin by calling man a machine, and then proceed to treat him as a machine plus something else. In real life none of them would exhort a machine, and when they do so they are begging the whole question of the nature of man."

Horne shows the inconsistency of this position by accepting the premise of the mechanists, and permitting it to refute itself:

If we are told that heredity and environment alone make man, we are expected to accept the idea and be guided by it in improving heredity and environment..... So the individual is an agent....and to be an agent is to have a hand in one's own making.²

Since naturalism holds the moral life to be the product of the social consciousness and denies the objective reality of the moral Ideal, it encourages moral experimentation, and the individualization of values. According to Dewey, ultimate moral motives and forces are nothing more nor less than social intelligence, the power of observing and

¹John Adams, "Evolution of Educational Theory," London, 1912, p. 8.

²Horne, "Christ in Man-Making", N. Y., 1926, p. 85.

comprehending social situations--and social power--trained capacities of control--at work in the service of social interest and aims.

Idealism holds that "capacity for morality is inborn". Kant believed a sense of "ought" to be as certain as self-existence, and modern idealism rests on this foundation.

Rufus Jones remarks,

The consciousness of 'ought' is one of the most tremendous affirmations that human experience knows, and it cannot be explained away, i.e. reduced to something else any more than the enjoyment of beauty can be. It is unique..... It is, as Emerson said, 'a voice without reply'. It is a fundamental end of life, and it brings us into relation with an ultimate reality of a wholly different order from the things we see and touch.¹

(f) In its postulation of immortality, so strongly argued by Kant, idealism offers a powerful dynamic for moral action which the other systems are powerless to supply. Man labors for values that do not pass away, his face is set toward an infinite goal; and as Hocking puts it, "He alone can labor with endless resources and patience for what may yet be, for he knows that the nature of things is with him."²

Closely related to this conception is another which might be regarded as its counterpart: If ethical standards are grounded in the constitution of things, as idealism holds, it cannot be a matter of cosmic indifference whether they are obeyed.³

¹Rufus M. Jones, "Fundamental Ends of Life", N. Y., 1924, p. 21.

²Hocking, op. cit., p. 447.

³Cf. Ibid., p. 321.

5. In conclusion, it may be said that because of these characteristics of idealism, it does offer an adequate basis for morality; and that it leads directly to the assumption that it is right for the individual to sacrifice himself for the good of the group; from the fact that the universe is so constituted that in bringing about the good of others and thus furthering the cosmic purpose, he comes into his own highest self-realization.

CHAPTER VII

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Since it has been found that the idealistic philosophy is the only one of those considered which is capable of furnishing an adequate basis for morality, it might be well to view again in brief summary its points of divergence from the other positions.

Idealism, while not incompatible with a certain type of psychological pragmatism, is at variance with the doctrine that there is no fixed truth already in existence; it considers philosophy as more than a study of social relationships, and morality as of deeper significance than expediency. It opposes the pragmatic assumption of an anthropocentric universe, in which the only certainty is change. It rejects the proposition that all value is subjective, and that all thinking is for the sake of doing. It holds that religion is more than man's will-to-believe; it is a personal relationship with an Object of belief. Finally, idealism contends that any philosophy which judges actions by consequences and not by motives, as does pragmatism, makes morality impossible; and that any scheme of thought which limits Reality to what can be measured by the scientific method is not properly a philosophy at all.

In opposition to naturalism and its ally behaviorism, idealism holds that Mind is the creator of matter, and not matter of mind; it regards man as something more than a biological organism, and believes that mechanism, while uni-

versal, is secondary to teleology. It contends that man is a self, possessing consciousness, as well as a mechanism possessing reflexes; and while not denying the contribution of heredity and environment in man's development, it insists that he also has a part in his own making. It believes that the word, "Reaction", cannot absolve man from guilt, but that he is morally responsible for his acts.

Idealism is interested in morals, because it holds that morality is grounded in the constitution of things, whereby "good is self-preservative, and evil is self-destructive". Morality, man's relation to the finite, is secondary only to religion, his relation to the Infinite. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God....and thy neighbor." Jesus regarded this as the whole duty of man. Modern psychology regards it as "a positive command for the integration of all the mental powers".¹ Idealism holds that in carrying out the purpose for which he was created man achieves his own highest self-development; and this purpose has to do with the good of others, while furthering his own.

The goal of idealism is "the increasing realization of the Absolute Idea, for the individual, society, and the race".² It does not deny the real values of the other philosophies but includes the best in their goals, "with splendid additions": The eugenics of naturalism; the ideal

¹G. Burnman, "The Normal Mind", p. 43.

²H. H. Horne, "The Philosophy of Education", N. Y., 1927, p. 301.

environment of behaviorism; the importance of the practical aspect of truth of pragmatism; and beyond all these an infinite goal, whose dynamic alone is sufficient motivation for the realization of the goals of the other conceptions.

CHAPTER VIII

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