

Braden Parker Bourne

"So word by word, and line by line,
The dead man touched me from the past,
And all at once it seem'd at last
His living soul was flash'd on mine."

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BORDEN PARKER BOWNE AS AN EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHER

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Chapter I.

Introduction

Among the students of philosophy whom America has produced, few have received more honorable mention than Borden Parker Bowne, though many have been more widely known and more loudly acclaimed. J. Cook Wilson has described him as the

"..most important of modern American philosophers." 1

Rudolf Eucken called him

"..distinctly America's first philosopher." 2

To the mind of W. O. Hocking

"..there is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American metaphysical writings than that of Bowne on 'The Failure of Impersonalism.'" 3

Dr. James Iverach of Aberdeen, whom Dr. James Hastings has described as knowing as much about modern philosophy as any man in the British Isles, writes that

"He is of all one of the foremost of American thinkers of my time." 4

It is about this man that we are to study. Though he was actively engaged in educational work for some thirty-four years and was always practical minded in the application of his philosophical views to life, he made no effort to interpret these views to the field of education itself. This task he left for others. It is this task that we are here attempting, our purpose being to evaluate him from the point of view of present day educational philosophy.

1. and 2. Brightman, E. S., "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 165.

3. Hocking, W. E., Methodist Review, May-June, 1922, p. 374.

4. In a letter to The Personalist, April, 1920, p. 32.

Problem.

Becoming more explicit, our problem is to give an exposition and evaluation of the philosophical view of Professor Bowne together with an application to education. Writing in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first ten years of the twentieth century, he was largely instrumental in formulating and introducing the philosophical system known as "personalism." We hope to discover some of the ways in which educational principles would be influenced, if this view of life and reality were to be made basic in their application.

Sources of study.

For such a study as this we have a wealth of available materials. The primary sources will be the published works of Professor Bowne (seventeen books), a recent and only biography, and the leading textbooks in the field of educational philosophy. Additional references will be made to books in the history of philosophy, and those articles and books which in any way relate to his life and times.

Method of procedure.

The method which we shall pursue in carrying out this study is, briefly stated, threefold. In the first place a study of the background of Professor Bowne will be made in order to determine the influences, primarily philosophical, which molded his thinking. Secondly, an analysis of his works will be made in order to reveal his philosophical and educational views. In this process it will be possible to determine, to some extent, his intellectual indebtedness. The third and final step will consist in an evaluation of his work

in the light of the writings of present day educational philosophers. This last will not consist so much in evaluating systematic positive statements from Professor Bowne, which are lacking, as in estimating his views in the light of current educational thinking.

Chapter II.

Sketch of the Life of Borden Parker Bowne

At the close of the first decade of this present century there died a man who has been called the greatest Methodist teacher of this generation.¹ He was far more than a Methodist teacher, however. His own words showed him to be a Christian gentleman too large to be bound by denominational limits when he said,

"God grant us a baptism of good sense and loyalty, not to Methodism or any other ism, but to Christ and his kingdom." 2

Though we have struck a religious note here at the outset, Borden Parker Bowne's life and work class him as a philosopher even more than as a teacher of religion. Professor Coe, one of his early followers, sums up his life endeavor in saying:

"...that he strove to raise religion to a high plane of ethical endeavor and clear thinking, and to set forth and defend the rationality of its fundamental principles,"

at the same time adding this tribute:

"Professor Bowne's special province was in the sciences of the mind, often reputed to be dry subjects, but his students found themselves introduced to a garden instead of a herbarium. He was one of those rare teachers who vitalize whatever topic they take up. Incisive, breezy, pithy illustrations, comments, and 'obiter dicta' blossomed along his line of strenuous and solid thought. ... Virile, earnest, he was a beloved teacher of spiritual realities." 3

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1. Borden Parker Bowne, Born January 14, 1847, died April 1, 1910. Cf. "The Greatest Methodist Teacher of this Generation," in Current Literature, Vol. 48, Jan.-June, 1910, pp. 638-640.
 2. Coe, G. A., "Borden Parker Bowne," in the Methodist Review, July-August, 1910, p. 513.
 3. "Quoted in editorial," The Outlook, Vol. 94, April 16, 1910, pp. 827-828.

In the introduction to his book entitled "The Philosophy of Personalism" Professor A. C. Knudson speaks of this modern philosophical system as having received from Bowne

"..its clearest, most systematic, and most thoroughgoing expression.² 4.

Professor Bowne was a thorough scholar and he devoted a long and active life to the building up of a personalistic philosophy which, in a word, asserted that the only kind of world worth living in and in which people can realize their highest potential selves is a world of persons. He was keenly interested in proving that the process whereby individuals progress from religious need to religious faith is highly rational.⁵ Nor was he ever content to merely build up a system of thought. There was good warrant for the editor of The Outlook to say in the day of his passing,

"His idealist philosophy culminated, not in a set of propositions but in a living experience of the Father and of the communion of the saints."⁶

It is to this combination of the warm, virile Christian and the brilliant careful scholar that we look for an explanation, not merely of the love and veneration in which he is held, but also of the point of view which is reflected in all his writings. His genius can best be understood by sketching briefly the main points of his life.

4. Knudson, A. C., The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 13.

5. Cf. Coe, Op. Cit., p. 513.

6. "Quoted in editorial," The Outlook, Vol. 94, April 16, 1910, pp. 827-828.

In the year 1631 there settled in Salem, Massachusetts, William and Ann Bowne, English Puritans. This is the first record of Borden Parker Bowne's ancestry in America. He, himself, was born some two centuries later at Leonardville, near what is now called Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey, on January 14, 1847. The setting is that of a rural farming section and a family of six children. The home had a wholesome, religious atmosphere, and the parents commanded the respect and love of their children in a very worthy manner. Of the father, we know that he was a man of few words, but of a deep moral sense which gave those words authority. Though he was a farmer, we find him acting as a justice of the peace, which office gave him the title of "squire" as well as a good income in legal fees. He also was a preacher upon occasion. Bishop McConnell tells us that

"The father's piety was of the substantial, weighty type which commanded respect from the children and from the neighbors." ⁷

No doubt the sincerity of his parents' religious beliefs and practice had a lot to do in molding the son's attitudes. The elder Bowne was also an opponent of the liquor traffic and of slavery in a day when most people found it far easier to compromise. ⁸ His mother, besides being a good housekeeper, had a strain of religious mysticism in her makeup, an outcropping of which we later find in her son. We are told that she, like her husband, was "equally rigorous in solid righteousness."

7. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 12.

8. Cf. Rowe, Modern Pathfinders of Christianity, p. 242.

The father being deeply religious and given to occasional preaching, it is not unusual that the home was frequently visited by itinerant preachers, many of whom were of a rather rough frontier type. Such visits not only served to broaden the mental horizon of the children but also introduced them to religious thought and topics through the conversations to which they listened. One can well imagine also the valuable training in the proper placing of false piety, bigotry, mental laziness, and such like traits in such a family's attitude towards them as they were all too frequently exemplified in preacher guests. That he received such training is evident as his attitude towards such traits was later given special note by his friends, one of whom writes

"He was intolerant of every form of pretentiousness and bigotry, whether it shielded itself under the magical name of modern science or under the cloak of religion, and the fierceness of his polemical onslaughts, in no way mitigated by a withering sarcasm, made him an opponent much to be dreaded." 9

Of his early school training we read but little, it apparently having little to redeem it except as it aroused in him an active interest in worth while books and imparted a certain strict order and discipline. Completing his schooling at about sixteen years of age he followed the example of many of the more studious minded and put in a winter at teaching school. No doubt it was some inward desire for larger experience which led him to give up his teaching the next year and push on to the big city. In Brooklyn he secured a job as driver of a delivery truck. Though he seems to have

9. Wilm, Emil C., in an "editorial" in the American Journal of Theology, Vol. 14, pp. 422-425.

taken a great interest in the active, bustling life of the city to which this gave him access, he soon gave up his job in order to prepare himself for college entrance.

It is in his college preparation that we get the first strong intimation of his unusual mental ability, not only as exhibited in his ability to grasp essentials, but even more in his ability to discipline and control himself. While he worked his way financially, and received much help from Pennington Seminary which he entered in 1865, he showed the ability to master a field of study by himself. He set for himself the following daily schedule: fourteen hours study, one hour meals, one hour exercise, eight hours sleep. Persisting in such a schedule it is small wonder that his college preparation took less than a full year. Passing his college entrance examinations with distinction, he entered New York University in the fall of 1867.

From 1867 to 1871 Bowne was a student of the University, receiving his degree of Bachelor of Arts in June of this latter year. Those who remember him as a student recall the impression of intellectual strength which he made upon them and this is attested to by the fact that his grade average was over ninety-six percent, and that he was chosen valedictorian of his class. He made the Phi Beta Kappa honor society and won a number of prizes for his work, one being a special prize for greatest excellence in the entire course. He later received the degree of Master of Arts in 1876, and Doctor of Laws in 1909.

Later on, when we shall discuss the times in which Bowne lived,

we shall go more into detail. It is well to call to mind now, however, that this period was the post-civil war period and the ferment of that struggle had by no means completely subsided. Also this period saw the opening of the evolutionary discussion with the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species just a few years before. It was a time of much oratory, patriotic and otherwise, and the college students were often drawn to the old Cooper Union auditorium to hear the leading orators of the day. Though he greatly enjoyed listening to the fast flowing eloquence and mighty climaxes which marked such speaking, Bishop McConnell tells us that he came to rank oratory rather low due to the usual dearth of reason¹⁰ which underlay such fiery utterances. It is likely that his concern in public questions which later resulted in his writing of "Principles of Ethics" was first aroused through these oratorical experiences.

Having joined the Seventh Street Methodist Church, New York, in 1865, and having been granted a local preacher's license in October, 1867, Bowne now entered the New York East Conference with the class of 1872. He was ordained local deacon and was sent to Whitestone, Long Island, in that same year, to a church of about eighty members. The concensus of opinion seems to be that as a preacher, Bowne was somewhat too intellectual for his people to easily follow. Consequently, when he had an opportunity to go abroad that same year he accepted it and did not rejoin his Conference till 1878.

During his stay abroad which extended from 1873 till 1875, Bowne

10. Cf. McConnell, F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, p. 29f.

studied mostly in Paris, Halle, and Göttingen. Though this period of study made no radical changes in his philosophical point of view or his religious attitudes, it naturally opened up to him many new avenues of thought. In Germany especially, where he was a student under Ulrich and Lotze, his best training was received. Though he later made little acknowledgement to Ulrich beyond mere mention,¹¹ he dedicated the first edition of his "Metaphysics" to Lotze and toward the end of his life wrote that he largely agreed with Lotze, though he felt that he transcended him.¹² It was during this period of study in Europe that he made a notable study of Herbert Spencer. He also started a line of contributions to the Methodist Review and other publications which continued steadily until his death in 1910.

Returning to America he became assistant professor of modern languages in the University of New York, his Alma Mater, at the same time acting as religious editor of the New York Independent. About this time the Methodists were casting about for men to head up the work of their new University at Boston and Bowne was drafted as the head of the department of philosophy. As this work was very much to his liking he threw himself whole-heartedly into it, later becoming also dean of the graduate school, and for nearly thirty-five years brought honor and scholarship to the institution. Although he later had many fine offers from other schools, he preferred to remain in this congenial place. Here he became a guiding power in

11. Cf. Bowne, B. P., *Studies in Theism*, p. vi.

12. Cf. Bowne, B. P., in a letter dated May 31, 1909, and printed in The Personalist, 1921, p. 10.

the lives of many young theological students. At the present time there is a chair endowed in Boston University in honor of his name.

As a teacher Bowne set about clarifying and solving the problems which beset his students. He attacked the problem of knowledge in an effort to determine how man acquired his knowledge. His next great problem was that of the nature of reality. What lay behind and constituted the essence of all things? A third major problem which he attacked was that of ethics, the grounds of obligation, the moral imperative. He was a good teacher because he had a grasp upon the basic problems of philosophy and was able to think things through to definite conclusions. The answers to the above problems which he systematized in book form cover fairly well the field of philosophy.

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His interest in religion and its problems was almost a part of his philosophical interest. In this field he also attempted to clarify popular thinking as demonstrated by his little books entitled "The Christian Life," "The Christian Revelation," and "The Atonement." This does not include his larger and more systematic works in the Christian religion, especially in its theistic aspects.

In 1883 Bowne visited Europe spending some time in Sweden. Later on he planned a trip around the world, and his plans materializing, spent eleven months in carrying them out. In the Orient he received a very warm welcome, especially in educational circles, being honored in many places.

12. Cf. Rowe, *Modern Pathfinders of Christianity*, p. 245f.

Without warning, on the first day of April, 1910, while lecturing to a class he was seized with a heart attack, and although he was able to reach home, passed away the same day. To pass away while in harness was probably what he most preferred. Death held no fear for him as evidenced in his own words on the subject:

"In Christian thought death is no calamity, least of all is it an overthrowing or destruction; it is simply an event in the life of God's children, and they all 'live unto Him,' and they live unto us also." 13

That his life had been a success in terms of his own standard of success is also evident. A short time before his death he said, and this is an attitude highly consistent with his whole philosophy of life as revealed in his works:

"We are going to be through this life before very long. The longest life is short when it is over; any time is short when it is done. The gates of time will swing to behind you before long. They will swing to behind some of us soon, but behind all of us before long. And then the important thing will not be what appointments we had, or what rank in the Conference, or anything of that sort -not what men thought of us, but what He thought of us, and whether we were built into His kingdom. And if, at the end of it all, we emerge from life's work as discipline crowned souls, at home anywhere in God's universe, life will be a success." 14

We can do no better in bringing to a close this brief sketch of the life of one of our foremost American philosophers, than to repeat the tribute paid him by one of his friends.

"Professor Bowne's scholarly and active achievements loom particularly large when compared with his personal and social life, which, according to all accounts, was one of quiet modesty and self-effacement. He was a man of unobtrusive manner, a true friend and delightful companion, fine-grained and courteous to all he met (barring always rabid theologians

13. Quoted by: Coe, G. A., "Borden Parker Bowne," in Methodist Review, July-August, 1910, p. 513f.

14. Quoted in: "The Greatest Methodist Teacher of this Generation," Current Literature, Vol. 48, Jan.-June, 1910, pp. 636ff.

and 'atheists,' in whose presence the scholarly gentleman in him was transformed into the soldier in action); a man 'of singularly pure and lovable personal character and a practical Christian experience of the most convincing kind.'" 15

During the thirty-five years of active life as a teacher Professor Bowne published a large number of books and the most accurate count of his contributions to periodicals is about one hundred and forty-
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two, though a number of these were undoubtedly re-edited in book form. The books are as follows:

The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, The Methodist Book Concern, 1874
Studies in Theism, The Methodist Book Concern, 1879.
Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles, Harper & Bros., 1882.
Introduction to Psychological Theory, Harper & Bros., 1886.
The Philosophy of Theism, Harper & Bros., 1887.
The Principles of Ethics, Harper & Bros., 1892.
The Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Harper & Bros., 1897.
Metaphysics, Harper & Bros., 1898.
The Christian Revelation, The Methodist Book Concern, 1896.
The Christian Life, The Methodist Book Concern, 1899.
The Atonement, The Methodist Book Concern, 1900.
Theism, The American Book Company, 1902.
The Immanence of God, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905.
Personalism, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1908.
Studies in Christianity, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1909.
The Essence of Religion, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910.
Kant and Spencer, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1912.

Many men have written as steadily as did Bowne but few have done it with more regard for accurate and smooth flowing style. He wrote incessantly and did not take the time to work out indexes for his books. During his later years, although he dictated most of his work, he still maintained his excellence of composition. It is said that he dictated his book "Personalism" in about six sittings of two hours each. Such a grasp of fact and clearness of thought as to enable a man to do this is indeed remarkable.

15. Edited by Wilm, Emil C., in American Journal of Theology, Vol. 14, p. 422f.

16. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., pp. 282-286.

For list of periodical contributions, see also Appendix number 1.

Chapter III.

The Times in Which He Lived

In order that we may the better understand the philosophical viewpoints of Bowne it will be necessary to look into the times in which he lived and the backgrounds of those times in so far as they give the proper setting. We shall leave it till later to trace Bowne's indebtedness back into these settings as that can only be well done after we analyze his own views. We shall therefore not follow currents through but rather try to give a philosophical, religious, and social perspective with his life as the center.

1. The Philosophical Background.

Perhaps strongest of all the influences molding Bowne in his student days is the philosophy of Germany in the nineteenth century, especially the idealistic school as exemplified in his teacher Lotze. It is hardly possible, nor indeed necessary, to orient all the varying schools of German thought, but it is very pertinent to our subject to show the growth of idealism and to relate to it the outstanding men with whom Bowne came most in contact.

Following Immanuel Kant through the first half of the nineteenth century we have the period of Romanticism in Germany. As a period of thought, it had been brought on to a certain extent by the strong emphasis of Kant upon the originality and activity of spirit. There were other influences such as the general unrest of that early period which found expression in France, in the French Revolution and

its idealistic trend, and in the "golden age of poetry" in Germany under such writers as Goethe and Schiller.¹ As Höffding expresses it, men had

"..the romantic craving for unity, the longing to revel in the absolute, to unite thought with artistic conception.." 2

Men felt that through religious faith on the one hand and artistic conception and creation on the other, humanity could best do justice to the fulness of life. Even those who thought from the strictly scientific point of view felt that critical philosophy was not satisfactory unless it deduced its principles from a single abstract principle. Kant had not been able to hold this viewpoint because of his doctrine of the "thing-in-itself," a something which knowledge always presupposes as being outside itself and which can never be approached, always escaping us. As this theory, or rather assumption, leads to self contradiction and is connected with his undefendable distinction between the matter and form of knowledge, the early romanticists thought to drop the assumption and taking Kant's doctrine of "synthesis as the essence of spirit," build from there a unified system of thought.³ In this way they felt that they were grounding themselves in Kant's deepest thinking.

The outstanding figure during the period of Romanticism is Hegel. Where Romanticism held to a sort of evolutionary pantheism in which single things not only had an inner relationship with the whole of life, but also exhibit this whole in a series of connected stages, Hegel carried it further into a philosophy of the cosmic

1. Cf. Höffding, H., A History of Modern Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 140.

2. Ibid, p. 129.

3. Cf., Ibid., p. 139.

reason.⁴ Where Kant's categories dealt with epistemology, that is human understanding, Hegel's were metaphysical and to him reality

"..is the Absolute cosmic spirit engaged in its own self-discovery and self-appropriation by means of its own movement." 5

He rested his doctrine upon two fundamental principles, the first being that "as a unity, the world must be conceived in terms of reason," and the second that "a rational world is essentially one of contradictions."⁶

This romanticism in philosophical thought as modified by Hegel was largely in vogue until about 1860 when it came into conflict with scientific progress. There were two great influences which began striking at the roots of idealism, and the great question arose as to how far the old could be held to if the new scientific way of looking at things were accepted. These two influences were: (1) the law of the conservation of energy, in which it was postulated that no energy arises or perishes, but only goes through transformations in definite quantitative relations; and (2) Darwin's theory of the origin of species in the struggle for existence.⁷

The reaction resulting from this inevitable conflict with science took, in general, three forms.⁸ The forms may be designated as modern materialism, positivism that includes the neo-Kantians, and idealism.

The German naturalists could not let their scientific views run

4. Cf. Cushman, A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 327.

5. Ibid., p. 331.

6. Cf., Ibid., p. 326.

7. Cf., Höffding, Op. Cit., p. 491f.

8. Cf., Ibid., p. 492f.

on side by side with their religious views and so they naturally tended to judge reality in terms of that part with which they were most familiar.⁹ They rejected the old ideas as illusory and took the view that matter was the "sole existent." In the field of biblical criticism we find David Frederick Strauss, for example, who made the Christian story out to be a myth. Another example of this materialistic trend was Karl Marx in the political field.

The second trend, that of the Neo-Kantians, which was led by F. A. Lange, raised the cry of "back to Kant," but in their interpretation of Kant they approximated the position taken up by critical philosophy and positivism. In Höffding's words they

"..emphasized the importance of the problem of knowledge, and asserted the independence of practical idealism over against empirical science, while at the same time they accentuated the right of experience to determine the actual content of our conception of the world." 10

Thus they kept science and metaphysics strictly separate, the value of the latter being practical and moral. The claim of this school upon Kant consisted largely in taking Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" by itself and construing it so that it endorsed positivism. They could do this since

"..it set forth the view that science alone fulfills the requirements of knowledge as uniting the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding with the data of experience." 11

Thus they would limit philosophy to "the critical examination of the presuppositions of science."

9. Cf. Falckenberg, History of Modern Philosophy, p. 598.

10. Cf. Höffding, Op. Cit., p. 492f.

11. Perry, R. B., Philosophy of the Recent Past, page 4f.

While the main trend of German philosophy remained Romantic, the trend in England was fundamentally realistic. Herbert Spencer stood out as a leading figure, and much of his work consisted in systematizing the thinking of the positivists. The phenomena of force underlying everything as something indestructible became for him the presupposition of science and of all facts. This systematizing process was carried further in relating all of his facts up to one common law, that of evolution.¹²

The third and most important trend, in the light of our study of Bowne, is that of idealism. Here we find those who

"..attempted to show that the fundamental assumption of the speculative philosophy of religion is also the ultimate and definitive assumption of the world-picture which scientific methods enable us to construct." ¹³

The most important member of this group is Lotze, Bowne's teacher. It was his desire to show how all development and all interconnection of the world were derived from one eternal idea, which eternal idea not only contained the basis of all happenings, but was also the ultimate explanation of their value. He was thoroughly trained in medicine and science, had a highly developed sense of the aesthetic and poetic, and acknowledged a large student's debt to Dr. Hermann Weisse, whom Höffding calls the most representative figure of his time in the field of philosophical theism. This peculiarly fitted him for his self appointed task, that of reconstructing an idealistic philosophy on a realistic basis.¹⁴

"Thus Lotze represented a regard for scientific fact, a recognition

12. Cf. Cushman, A Beginner's History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 367.

13. Cf. Höffding, Op. Cit., p. 492f.

14. Cf. Ibid., p. 509f., also Cf. Cushman, Op. Cit., p. 371.

of the universal necessities of thought, and beyond these, a speculative zeal for a metaphysical view which should satisfy not only the strictly intellectual demands, but the aspirations of man's moral, aesthetic, and religious nature." 15

For him the ultimate ground of all things was spiritual. While the mechanical conception of nature is founded upon a plurality of real elements in reciprocal interaction, yet these elements go back for their understanding to an infinite, all-embracing Being, of which they are phases. The spiritual constitution of these real elements consists in the fact that real in the physical sense means to be in dynamic relations, to "maintain identity while inducing or suffering change." This, in turn, requires an understanding in terms of feeling and unity of consciousness, a function that only spiritual subjects exercise. There are only two such ultimately real subjects: God, and our finite selves. Nature he regarded as composed of beings which

"..while being dependent upon God in the sense of being modes of his activity, nevertheless exist themselves, as having both feeling and will, and in some measure that capacity for self-identification more fully manifested in the self-conscious ego." 16

God, as the ultimate substance of things, and as possessing in a superlative degree that character of self-conscious personality which is the essential qualification for reality, is, in the last analysis, monistic. 17

In Lotze's system thought culminates in an ethical idea and metaphysics has to yield to ethics. Thus, in the ought we find the ultimate explanation of what is, and that becomes truly real which is intended and required to be so by the idea of the good. 18 Such are

15. Weber and Perry, History of Philosophy, pp. 522-23.

16. Ibid, p. 522.

17. Cf., Ibid., PP. 522ff., also Cf. Höfding, Op. Cit., pp. 509ff.

18. Cf. Höfding, Op. Cit., p. 519, and Ueberweg, A History of Philosophy, Vol. 2, p. 313.

the basic views of Lotze, the "most important representative of idealistic philosophy in the latter half of the century." Of the same general school of thought was Ulrich, though he is not as well known.


Into this setting, with the last two named men as teachers, came Bowne in his most formative years. The accompanying chart (no. 1) illustrates the discussion of the last few pages and shows Bowne's relation to these main trends. He criticized, from his idealistic viewpoint, such men as Strauss in the field of religious materialism, Spencer as a scientific positivist, the Darwinian theory of evolution, and made a careful study of Kant. He is often thought of as the interpreter of Lotze in America.¹⁹ This chart and the discussion are of course incomplete from the viewpoint of German philosophy, but they give the setting, under the influence of which Bowne came most strongly.

Turning now to American philosophical thought we find a number of the dominating currents of European philosophy early transplanted and carried on with a fair amount of intellectual originality. The early movements which arose and developed along the Atlantic seaboard are well stated as five in number:²⁰ (1) Puritanism, which sprang from English sources; (2) Deism, or free-thinking, as it began in reaction against a narrow Calvinism and ended with the revolutionary French scepticism; (3) Idealism, as it arose spontaneously with Jonathan Edwards, and was fostered by Berkeley, through his adherent Samuel Johnson; (4) Anglo-French materialism, as it came over with Joseph

19. Cf. Falckenberg, *History of Modern Philosophy*, p. 482.

20. Riley, J. Woodbridge, *American Philosophy*, p. 10.

EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF BORDEN P. BOWNE



Priestly and developed in Philadelphia and the South; and (5) Realism, or the philosophy of common sense, as it was imported directly from Scotland, and came to dominate the country until the advent of the German transcendentalism. These movements extended from about 1620 to 1820. In the early part of the second half of the nineteenth century, the scientific theory of evolution came to dominate philosophical thought.²¹

Going back into American history we find that the first real thinking had been done by the highly educated clergy, largely under the influence of Calvinistic doctrines and the writings of Locke. Most outstanding of this early group of theologians is Jonathan Edwards.²² About this time there was considerable interest aroused by views growing out of the period of French enlightenment. This influence was centered in the deism of Benjamin Franklin and the political work of Thomas Jefferson.²³ The first and strongest effort to throw off the dominating influence of theology was made in 1829 when James Marsh introduced the Romanticism of Coleridge and of the Germans. This was a time of many new intellectual influences and we have, for example, the Unitarianism of W. E. Channing. This movement becomes contemporary with Bowne's early years in the person of Ralph Waldo Emerson. Emerson was, in about 1860-1870, at the height of his genius and represented post-Kantian thought, as a transcendentalist,

"..in its romantic form and in its literary and popular manifestations."²⁴

As already mentioned, we have now the great upheaval of thinking

21. Cf. Perry, *Philosophy of the Recent Past*, p. 16.

22. Cf. Cushman, *Op. Cit.*, p. 390.

23. *Ibid.*

24. Perry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 16.

caused by Darwin's book on "The Origin of Species." Not only did the religionists feel that their foundations were being undermined, but scientists themselves were split. This, together with the introduction of Spencerian evolution by John Fiske, led to a strong trend towards naturalism, and we find Fiske heading up an "evolutionary philosophical cult."

The more conservative philosophy of academic circles was the Scottish realism which had been introduced by Witherspoon, and was now being upheld by James McCosh (1811-1894) and Noah Porter (1811-1892). This viewpoint provided a rational ground for the Protestant faith.²⁵

We have noted the chief philosophical trends of Bowne's days as being the transcendentalism of Emerson, the Spencerian Evolution of John Fiske, and the Scottish realism of McCosh and Porter, and have noted the influence of Charles Darwin. We should mention two other men who were contemporary with Bowne and with whom he had many dealings. These men are William James (1842-1910), and Josiah Royce (1855-1916).

William James, a leader in the field of experimental psychology, later introduced an empirical and pluralistic pragmatism. In a letter to Professor Knudson in 1905, Bowne mentions him as follows:

"Schiller's Humanism, Dewey's Pragmatism, and James' Will to Believe are all one-sided but useful. I find nothing in them beyond what you suggest -reaction against an overdone intellectualism." ²⁶

James and Bowne were friends and there is little doubt that James inspired Bowne by his clear-cut criticisms.

Josiah Royce received a strong idealistic background from his

25. Cf. Perry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 17.

26. McConnell, *Borden Parker Bowne*, p. 149.

student days in Germany. Through his teaching at Harvard University he brought a very strong influence to bear upon American thought. In him we find an idealistic monism which showed a strong tendency to emphasize the human individual and put society first in conceiving his values.²⁷ He was strongly under the influence of Hegelianism. Royce had a high regard for Bowne and is probably the closest to Bowne's point of view among his American contemporaries.²⁸

So much for philosophical backgrounds. Just how they influenced Bowne we shall see later. We shall now look briefly at the political and economic influences which were dominant in the United States from 1870 to 1900.

2. Political and economic background.


The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a time of reconstruction and expansion in the United States. The settling of differences between North and South brought politics strongly to the forefront, and the political oratory of Bowne's college days gave him a lasting interest in national questions, even though it led to a distrust of oratory. Heavy immigration and the industrialization of our economic life were going on apace. It is interesting to note that from 1870-1890 our population increased from thirty-eight and a half millions to sixty-two and a half millions, a gain of sixty-two percent, while during the same time the value of public school property increased over one hundred and sixty percent.²⁹ The unrest and expectancy of this great period of national growth was no doubt reflected in the thinking

27. Cf. Perry, *Op. Cit.*, p. 141.

28. Cf. McConnell, *Op. Cit.*, p. 132.

29. Cf. Reiser, *Nationalism and Education since 1789*, p. 464.

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND OF BORDEN P. BOWNE



Re-arranged and adapted from:
Cushman, A Beginners History of Philosophy, p. 390

of the times and made it an opportune time for those thinkers who could see the fundamental issues underneath the popular currents. This set the stage somewhat for Bowne's criticisms of the Spencerian evolution.

The political situation in New York City during the seventies was probably instrumental in turning Bowne's thinking to the field of ethics. The graft scandals centering about William M. Tweed during these years were of a kind to cause every serious minded citizen to think.³⁰

3. Religious background.

Throughout his whole life, Bowne was intensely interested in religion. We have previously mentioned the preaching activities of his father and how his home was often a meeting place for visiting clergymen during his youth. We have also taken note of his mother's interest in the mystic side of religion. Whether inherently, or through his mother's expressed interest, we find that he early had a tendency in this direction which he felt must be curbed in order that it might not run to excess.³¹ The Bowne home was loyal to Methodism and we find this loyalty remaining strong throughout the son's life. In 1867 he was recommended for and granted a local preacher's license, his examination revealing a background of thorough training in the discipline and doctrines of Methodism.³² In 1872 he was ordained a local deacon and for a while had a parish of his own. All through his long and active life he was connected with a Methodist university and took particular interest in the theological students.

30. Cf. Roberts, New York, Vol. 2, p. 682.

31. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 14.

32. Cf., Ibid., pp. 22-23.

Chapter IV.

His Intellectual Indebtedness

To determine the intellectual indebtedness of a man is at best a difficult task. So indebted is each one of us to our intellectual and social heredity that it is hard to read even our own minds in the matter. Professor Bowne, moreover, suffered no lack of self confidence in the expounding of his own views as well as in his critical attacks upon his philosophical and religious opponents. Nor was his mind the type which accepted unreasoned conclusions. His was, for the most part, active, independent thinking.

His own acknowledgments of intellectual debt are few. During his student days at New York University he seems to have been impressed most by Professor Benjamin M. Martin and to him he pays tribute in the dedication of his first book, "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer." In the preface to his "Studies in Theism" there is mention of his German friends and instructors. He says:

"I shall always be under general obligation to my friends and former instructors, Professor Ulrich, of Halle, and Professor Lotze, of Göttingen." 1

A somewhat longer statement occurs in the preface to the first edition of his "Metaphysics" though here he gives chief mention to Professor Lotze, saying:

"I am encouraged...to hope that I have not gone wholly astray by the fact that there is nothing unheard-of in the results reached. Leibnitz furnishes the starting-point, Herbart supplies the method, and the conclusions reached are essentially those of Lotze. I have reached them, for the most part, by strictly independent

1. Bowne, B. P., Studies in Theism, p. vi.

reflection; but, so far as their character is concerned, there would be no great misrepresentation in calling them Lotzian. So much concerning pedigree." 2

The method of Herbart to which he refers is explained in a quoted letter of Professor Knudsen's who explains it as the "method of relations" in which the concepts of our common-sense experience are examined for their contradictions, they being in turn worked over by philosophy, particularly metaphysics.³ This method was followed by Bowne.

Toward the end of his life he came to regard himself as the leader of a somewhat new order, though he admits relationship to those who preceded him. He writes:

"It is hard to classify me with accuracy. I am a theistic idealist, a personalist, a transcendental empiricist; an idealistic realist, and realistic idealist; but all these phrases need to be interpreted. They cannot well be made out from the dictionary. Neither can I well be called a disciple of any one. I largely agree with Lotze, but I transcend him. I hold half of Kant's system, but sharply dissent from the rest. There is a strong smack of Berkeley's philosophy, with a complete rejection of his theory of knowledge. I am a Personalist, the first of the clan in any thoroughgoing sense." 4.

The above statements indicate the extent to which Professor Bowne acknowledged the values which he received from earlier philosophers. Perhaps more interesting will be a few words illustrating his apparent indebtedness in thought.

Somewhat the same indebtedness which Bowne has acknowledged is pointed out by two of his leading pupils who, at present, hold professorships in philosophy at Boston University. E. S. Brightman summarizes this in the following words:

"Borden Parker Bowne made an original synthesis of the contributions to personalistic thought made by Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze, -with

2. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, (first edition), p. vii.

3. McConnell, *Borden Parker Bowne*, p. 242.

4. Bowne, in a letter dated May 31, 1909, in *The Personalist*, 1921, p. 10.

perhaps more of Lotze than of the others, yet more personalistic and pluralistic than Lotze. In Bowne we find a typical personalist." 5

In the same article he attributes Bowne's doctrine of the "real as rational" to Hegel. He also regards Bowne as under the influence of Kant in regarding all knowledge as mental activity. This, of course, Bowne does as indicated in such a passage as this:

"The constitutive action of thought penetrates even into sensation as an articulate experience; and sensations become anything for thought only through the action of thought itself." 6

Thus the world of things is interpreted and built up by the mind into a world of mind.

In his book, "The Philosophy of Personalism," A. C. Knudson discusses the work of Lotze as the "chief protagonist" in the movement which resulted in a "typical theistic personalism," and gives Lotze credit as being largely responsible for the revival of theism of the last thirty years. He sees Bowne as being one of many who reflect this influence. 7

The activistic theory of the self is traced by Knudson in a way which illustrates one of Bowne's main lines of influence. 8 Before the time of Leibnitz and Berkeley, there had been a traditional conception of material substance or substances which made much of a so-called "soul-substance." These two men interpreted this conception in causal terms. To Leibnitz, materiality or extension was due to an underlying force which he conceived as spiritual. To him, therefore, the soul was the agent responsible for material phenomena and as such was active in nature. Berkeley added to this view by looking upon things as passive,

5. Brightman, E. S., "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," in Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, p. 162f.

6. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 38.

7. Cf. Knudson, The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 62f.

8. Cf., Ibid., pp. 71ff.

and mind as active and perceiving. Therefore the quality of things consisted of ideas in our minds which were there through this perceiving activity. The nature of this activity however remained vague.

The second stage in the development of this activistic theory came with Kant who analyzed the human reason and suggested the creative activity of thought. According to his view the mind creates or builds up its world for itself by virtue of certain immanent principles or categories which predetermine the framework of experience and make it possible. In this way the mind makes nature. Thus the idea of a soul-substance was further discredited, though Kant confused the issue by going behind this conscious self which we know, to a real, substantial self, which he said was unknown and unknowable. This makes a distinction between the empirical self and the ontological self, and as a result pictures consciousness as an effect or agent.

It was necessary to transcend Kant's idea of consciousness and this was done by Lotze who interpreted reality in terms of self-consciousness. For him there was no detaching of the mental agent from its activity. In this way he united the empirical and real, or substantial souls of Kant into one unified, active consciousness, which in its activity is subject and agent both.

This work of Lotze marks a third and final stage in the development of the activistic theory of the soul. In self-consciousness Lotze found an example of the "co-existence of unity and identity with multiplicity and change."⁹ He carried the idea of true reality and complete personality back to the Absolute as a person. It only remained for Bowne to take this idea and make it "the organizing principle of his system." This Bowne did by giving it a thoroughgoing and

9. Ibid., p. 85.

systematic exposition. As a result we have in the works of Bowne what Knudson calls "systematic methodological personalism."

The above paragraphs are an illustration of the intellectual indebtedness of Professor Bowne along the lines of his principal contribution to philosophical thinking.

In concluding this chapter it will be well to mention briefly Professor Bowne's indebtedness to those with whom he differed. In all of his writings his method is critical. He advances and makes positive his own point of view through dissecting the arguments which oppose it. Few things brought out his powers of critical thinking like the popular theories which built up large claims on bad logic. One outstanding example of this is the writing of Herbert Spencer. Bishop McConnell goes so far as to say:

"It would be possible to trace the growth of Bowne's powers in philosophic criticism, to a considerable degree, with only the Spencer material as guide, for that critical effort extended through a period of thirty-eight years." 10

He used Kant and Spencer as specimens to be dissected by his advanced classes. His first book was entitled "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer," and his last book, "Kant and Spencer," published after his death, is a revision of, and addition to the first.

As an example of this critical work we will examine a few of the conclusions at which he arrives, on the basis of Spencer's writings. He finds contradictions everywhere, and emerging from the study are the following:

"Religion is impossible, because it involves unthinkable ideas;
Science is possible, though it involves the same unthinkable ideas.

10. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 51.

God must be conceived as self-existent, and is, therefore, an untenable hypothesis;
 The fundamental reality must be conceived as self-existent, and is not an untenable hypothesis.
 God must be conceived as eternal; and is, hence, an untenable hypothesis.

To affirm the eternity of God, would land us in insoluble contradictions;
 To affirm the eternity of matter and force, is the highest necessity of our thought.

Our highest wisdom is to recognize the mystery of the absolute, and abandon the 'carpenter theory' of creation for the higher view, that 'evolution is a change from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations.'"

Professor Bowne well concludes that

"The discussion which involves all these harmonies is fitly called the 'laws of the Unknowable;' at all events, the ways of this logic are past finding out." 11

In the introduction of the volume he gives as a reason for his quoting so much of Spencer, the fact that people would not believe his unsupported word.¹² In his final estimate of Spencer many years later his critical views are unchanged.

"In a youthful book which I published many years ago, when there was not much fear of the proprieties before my eyes, I ventured to say of Mr. Spencer that he had painted a big picture with a big brush, and his disciples, who had found it easier to wonder than to understand, had concluded that he must be a great painter. For substance of doctrine, I still agree with this view." 13

The characteristic issues of Spencer which received special criticism were his doctrine of knowledge as recognition, his doctrine of sensations which did away with the need of the self as a unitary agent, and his doctrine of the Unknowable.¹⁴

11. Bowne, The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer, p. 271f.

12. Cf., Ibid., p. 5.

13. Bowne, Kant and Spencer, pp. 339-340.

14. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., pp. 58, 59, 65.

In the preceding pages we have attempted to point out the several lines of influence which reveal themselves most in the works of Bowne. As he was an independent and original thinker of no mean ability, the task is not easy, and, in the last analysis, can never be very thoroughly completed. Most of the conclusions of others of which he made use were also his own conclusions in a very real way. A more detailed study would therefore be largely a parallelling of likenesses.

Chapter V.

Philosophical Views

1. Introduction

The students of Professor Bowne have written concerning his interesting and pithy manner of lecturing. One student has further made mention of

"..the fierceness of his polemical onslaught, in no way mitigated by a withering sarcasm (which) made him an opponent much to be dreaded." 1

The same editorial refers to him as being very fine-mannered and courteous to all with whom he had dealings and then inserts this sentence in parenthesis:

"Barring always rabid theologians and 'atheists! in whose presence the scholarly gentleman in him was transformed into the soldier in action."

Something of this same sharp sarcasm mingled with a ready humor is discernible in his writings. The following are a number of examples of this sharp and ready wit:

"Such a deep draught at the well of truth could hardly prevent a fairly critical mind from speedily thirsting again." 2

"A great many professors from the academy at Laputa are among us, and all make a great show of logic." 3

"But when the complexity is hidden by the simplicity of our terms, and the implicit implications of our data are overlooked through the deceit of the universal, we advance with the utmost ease from any indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to any desirable definite, coherent heterogeneity, as per contract or schedule." 4

1. Wilm, E. C., American Journal of Theology, Vol. 14, Editorial, pp. 422-23.

2. Bowne, Theory of Thought and Knowledge, p. 220.

3. Ibid., p. 238.

4. Ibid., p. 247.

"The lurid rhetoric which is kept in stock for such occasions is turned on. Octopi and polpi, boa-constrictors and hydra-headed monsters crawl all over the subject. Vultures and cormorants flock in, and the whole region swarms with anarchists, Shylocks, and barons. This performance, which, in principle, is the gist of so much popular discussion in this field, is always exceedingly humorous, although at times it may, in addition, become dangerous. How to conduct a political campaign without it is quite beyond the heart of the natural man to conceive." 5

"The objector is earnest, but, however full of sweetness, is somewhat lacking in light." 6

Discussing one of Kant's notions:

"..but whatever its ground, and however great Kant's genius, this is certainly a case where good Homer nods." 7

"'Memory pills' are already advertised; and we may confidently expect the discovery of the thought microbe, to be followed by the preparation of 'cultures' for inoculation." 8

Observing the facts of mental psychology as essentially unpicturable rather than physical, he writes:

"The strict application of this rule would probably make a solitude and a grateful silence in this region." 9

The above quotations indicate somewhat the way in which Professor Bowne enlivened his long, philosophical writings and kept them from becoming dry and lifeless. Often-times there is considerable repetition for the sake of clearness in behalf of the one to whom he refers as "the beginner" or "the weaker brother." As to his actual method of presentation, he usually aims to win his point by refuting every possible argument of his opponents. Having driven them and their arguments into the barren places of abstraction, foolishness or solipsism, he then proceeds to bring out his own view as the only logical alternative open. This he does very thoroughly and in a way which shows

5. Ibid., p. 257.

6. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 149.

7. Ibid., p. 334.

8. Ibid., pp. 347-8.

9. Ibid., p. 372.

good marks of scholarship and reason.

Throughout his writings, he is continually calling attention to certain fallacies which seem to inhere in a great deal of philosophical writing and thinking. These fallacies are well summarized under three headings: (1) the fallacy of abstraction as applied to principles; (2) the fallacy of the universal as applied to concepts; and (3) the fallacy of language.¹⁰ The fallacy of the universal consists

"..in mistaking class terms for things, and in identifying processes of our classifying thought with the processes of reality." 11

In other words we think that by classifying things we have changed their nature. Thus we speak of man in general and build up concepts which we could never in the world apply to our next door neighbor as an individual. In the fallacy of abstraction, we have the same difficulty as above, only here it is applied to principles. We are prone to lose ourselves in abstract theories and stray from practical fact. Under the fallacies of language, there is the building up of associations which gives certain words a force of their own which is often distinct from their logical connotations. In this way we come to use words for things and often fancy that a new word means a new thing. We argue from the metaphor involved in the word and mistake verbal consequences for logical consequences. We forget altogether too frequently that

"..back of all logic and conditioning its use, is the mental and moral sanity of the individual and of the community." 12

2. Epistemology

Under the title "The Theory of Thought and Knowledge" Professor Bowne takes up the subject of epistemology. In the next few

10. Cf. Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, chapter 11.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 244f.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 261f.

pages we shall endeavor to summarize briefly his point of view as it is positively stated. Limiting himself to our human thinking, he considers thought as mental activity whose aim is truth or knowledge. As such, mental life belongs to the field of logic. In so far as mental life is a fact, it belongs to the field of psychology. This latter, known as descriptive psychology, is omitted from his discussion. He is dealing rather with the nature, laws, and implications of mental activity. Thought differs from sensation in being an interpretation of sensations,

"..as the process whereby the mind works over the raw material of the sensibility into the forms of intelligence." 13

It differs from the association of accidental falling together, referring rather to rational connections in which associations are subjected to the rational ideal. He sees thought as both universal and objective. Our thoughts posit a system for which they are valid but which they do not make. Thus in our thinking we reach ends which are true and common to all minds,¹⁴ and reproduce an order of truth which is independent of ourselves. The conclusion reached is that

"..within our experience there is a special order of mental activity with laws and aims of its own, which is to be distinguished from the mechanical order of association and from the passiveness of mere impressibility." 15

The fundamental conditions of thought are given as: the unity of self, the law of identity, and the fact of objective connection.¹⁶

One of the biggest elements of thinking is the ability to make judgments

13. Ibid., p. 11.

14. Cf. Ibid., p. 16.

15. Ibid., p. 18.

16. Ibid., p. 35.

and judgment, he holds, is only possible through a mental subject which can distinguish, compare, and unite separate states in the unity of one conscious act. In this he sees the unity of consciousness as being identical with the unity of self, and concludes that thought exists only in relation to a conscious and abiding subject.¹⁷ The mind thus grasps objects by reconstructing them as a world of thought, and only in this way can a world of things exist for a conscious self.¹⁸

Having thus outlined the nature and conditions of thought, he takes up the categories of thought.¹⁹ Briefly stated they are as follows:

1. Time; the form under which we relate events, being primarily a law of mental synthesis.
2. Number, which has as its basis the succession of moments and events and involves the establishment of a unit and a process of counting. Most such units are relative and formal.
3. Space, which is primarily a law of mental synthesis whereby the mind relates its coexistent objects under the form of mutual externality. Secondarily it is the abstract form of external experience.
4. Motion; a mixed category implying both space and time yet not given in either or both. It is definable only in terms of itself.
5. Quantity, which has no absolute unit but is a ratio of one quantity to another in terms of equal, greater, or less.

The above five categories are phenomenal. The following are metaphysical, with "necessity" and "possibility" being somewhat doubtful:

17. Cf. Ibid., p. 22.

18. Cf. Ibid., p. 56.

19. Cf. Ibid., chapter 4.

6. Being, which in its broadest sense includes everything. Its leading forms are thing, soul, and God, and in experience these fall into the two classes of minds and things.
7. Quality or attribute, which, in the grammatical form of nouns and adjectives, is the only way in which we know metaphysical being.
8. Identity, which refers to the sameness of meaning or the continuity of existence.
9. Causality, whose essential meaning is dynamic determination.
10. Necessity, a category of rather doubtful meaning. The only clear necessity is the necessity of thought.
11. Possibility, the only real meaning of which is based upon the self-determination of a free agent.
12. Purpose, which is the elevation of causality to intelligent or volitional causality with its implication of plan and purpose.

The three factors of thought are given as the notion, judgment, and inference. The notion arises as a common element extracted from many particular cases and, as a concept, consists and exists in its abiding thought content.²⁰ The judgment is a mental act

"..in which an affirmation or negation is made with the conviction of its validity for the world of fact, or the world of reason." 21

Judgments may of course be of all degrees of complexity and may occur under all the categories. They are of three kinds. In categorical judgments the predicate is unconditionally affirmed or denied. A is B and we have simple connection. In conditional judgments we break away from the rigid monotony of the categorical and express relations of

20. Cf. Ibid, p. 119f.

21. Ibid., p. 153.

combination and movement. A is B if A is C; that is, A is B under the condition C and we are able to express the fact that reality is in motion. The third kind, disjunctive judgments, pass from intension to extension, as for example, breaking up the notion of man into its extensions of male, female, men, women, children, and the like.²²

Inference is the process of giving or analyzing judgments which themselves are given or assumed. It consists in drawing from one or more judgments, called premises, some others, called conclusions, which shall always be true if the premises are true. It implies imperfect knowledge and is therefore finite. For this reason a demonstrative inference is an ideal which is only seldom reached.

Passing on from his theory of thought to his theory of knowledge, with which it is very closely allied, we are first brought face to face with the dualism of things and thought. From the human standpoint this dualism is ineradicable. It is to be solved, however, by uniting these two into a transcendent third.²³ This transcendent third takes the form of a basal monism. There are three steps in this solution: first, recognizing the objective system as something independent of us; second, recognizing the finite thinker as something which can in no way be identified with this objective system; and finally, going behind both to their common ground and bond of union in a monism of the infinite. This is found to be the supreme condition of this monism.²⁴ Further, this thought must be a very complex activity involving the two elements of a thinker and a doer. In the words of the author

22. Cf. Ibid., p. 157.

23. Cf. Ibid., p. 296.

24. Cf. Ibid., p. 311.

"..creation is the only solution of finite existence in which our thought can rest." 25

The above view carries with it the idea of the phenomenality of space in which space is defined as

"..only the form of experience..and hence..absurd and impossible when abstracted from consciousness as its fundamental condition." 26

This basal, monistic thought is continually working out its purposes in and through finite minds. Thus in the consciousness and experience of the race there arise great universal beliefs. The many whims and errors along the road are accounted for by our freedom.

Along with these universal beliefs are the many judgments which our rational human minds work out and state in the form of propositions. In so far as the material which enters into these propositions is a contingent element of experience, this material can only be gathered in experience itself.²⁷ This mental action whereby sense elements are given a rational form and expressed, depends upon a constitutive action of the mind and must proceed according to principles which are inherently natural to the human intellect.²⁸ The method of actual life is to assume the trustworthiness of reason and of our own nature and not to doubt until compelled.

Our limitation of knowledge concerning what the cosmic purpose is keeps the careful thinker from all dogmatic finalities. For this reason our knowledge in concrete science is guided by our practical interests and must confine itself to "a reasonable degree of extension to adjacent cases."²⁹ Our knowledge must range from rational conviction

25. Ibid., p. 313.

26. Ibid., pp. 339-340.

27. Cf. Ibid., p. 364.

28. Cf. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 366.

to superstition in the declining order:

"..knowledge, belief, faith, opinion, assumption, postulate, and finally, whim, prejudice, and superstition." 30

Growing out of this discussion we have the author's definition of knowledge as being that which is self-evident in the very nature of reason, that which is immediately given in experience, and that which is cogently inferred from the given.³¹ We must therefore believe the necessary truths of intelligence and disbelieve whatever contradicts those truths, and we may believe the great body of practical principles in so far as they are necessary for our fullest and highest life.

3. Metaphysics.

Professor Bowne first formulated his metaphysical thinking for publication as a study of first principles in a volume published in 1882.³² About fifteen years later he published his epistemology in the book which we have just studied. This was followed the next year, 1898, by a revised edition of his metaphysics in which, though the general ideas and view were unchanged, the fundamental doctrine was more detailed and more systematically set forth, and the idealistic element received a greater emphasis.³³ The three main divisions of the subject are here given as ontology, cosmology, and psychology.

ONTOLOGY.

Basic to any metaphysical system is the science of being or reality. Basic to Professor Bowne's science of being is the recognition of the distinctive mark of being as consisting in some power of action on its

30. Ibid., p. 367.

31. Cf. Ibid., p. 368.

32. Bowne, *Metaphysics: A Study in First Principles*, Harper & Bros.

33. Cf. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, p. 411.

own part. On the impersonal plane it is possible to arrive at some element of real being which is common to all objects and, through the fallacy of the universal, to arrive at pure being. This is, however, logical manipulation, and is formal and impossible in concrete and

complete thinking.³⁴ Being in its real essence is a simple, unexplainable idea, which we must posit as the explanation of the incessant change and motion of the phenomenal world. It must therefore be both causal and active.³⁵

Thus we have on the one hand real things, substantial being, and on the other hand we have things which have conceptual being only, that is, non-being and without powers of self-action, phenomenal. The former must therefore contain the goal and explanation of the latter. The main difficulty of "common sense" thinking lies right here in its inability to distinguish these two. It confuses the ontologically real with the conceptual world of phenomenal things.

The author further holds that, among those things which are ontologically real, there is no common being which is common to all. The activity which marks them as real cannot be activity in general but must in the case of each thing be specific. Apart from their activities, things do not exist. Things are in brief, therefore, but "concreted formulas of action."³⁶

One of the major problems in this theory of being is the explanation of how things may be the same and have continuous existence and at the same time undergo changes. Change and identity must somehow be reconciled. This reconciliation is brought about and the problem solved

34. Cf. Ibid., p. 17.

35. Cf. Ibid., p. 15f.

36. Ibid., p. 31.

through conscious intelligence. The union of change and permanence, identity and diversity, is effected in the self-conscious spirit. In the permanence of thought, memory, and self-consciousness,

"The soul knows itself to be the same, and distinguishes itself from its states as their permanent subject." 37

At the same time the soul forever changes, almost always in the direction of growth, gathering up its past and carrying it with it.

We have indicated the author's theory of causation. He amplifies and clarifies it under three heads: the interaction of things, the determination of consequents by their antecedents, and in volitional self-determination. 38 Under the first head the popular conception of interaction is transformed into an immanent causality in a fundamental unitary being. Things whose activities are exhausted in interaction have no existence in themselves but only exist for others and are modes or phenomena of the fundamental reality. Things which, beyond this activity, have inner life are more than phenomenal. As finite spirits we may conceive of their interaction as that which is done for them and with them by the transcendent one which posits and co-ordinates them according to the cosmic plan and adjusts them to its demands. They are 39 therefore ontologically distinct and the interaction is only apparent. Under the second head, the determination of consequents by their antecedents, we find that causality cannot be tied down to impersonal activity upon the temporal plane. 40 This leads to the discussion of the third head and 41 here we reach the final conclusion:

"Volitional causality, that is, intelligence itself in act, is the

37. Cf. Ibid., p. 63.

38. Cf. Ibid., pp. 70ff.

39. Cf. Ibid., p. 82; See also "Theism" pp. 59ff.

40. Cf. Ibid., p. 88.

41. Ibid., p. 92.

only conception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest." 41

We have seen that the infinite is the basal cause of the universe and as such is active. A further conclusion is that it is one and
42
indivisible and forever equal to itself. Impersonal things are only phenomenal, a form of energizing on the part of the infinite. The personal spirit, the finite, we must look upon as created and so caused to be. Having a certain selfhood and being relatively independent in our thoughts, feelings, and volitions, we become persons and the term personality takes meaning. We must however realize that this life is not self-sufficient. Only from the side of the infinite can this life be fully understood or explained. In this free and active intelligence is to be found the plan of life.

In thinking of the infinite we will avoid many difficulties by
43
observing several cautions.

1. We must not attempt to construe the infinite spatially for God is in the world, not as spatial presence, but as that active subject by which all things exist.
2. We may not seek to construe the infinite mind, but must content ourselves with recognizing it. God is that with which all our inquiry must end; here is mystery.
3. Whatever conception we form in this field is of the nature of a limit rather than of a veritable apprehension.
4. Further positive word on this subject must come from the philosophy of religion.

COSMOLOGY.

Having given the author's views regarding being, the next phase of his metaphysics consists in a discussion of the cosmic forms and

42. Cf. Ibid., pp. 98-99.

43. Cf. Ibid., pp. 119-120; Cf. also his Theism.

manifestations of being. These are taken up as they are revealed in experience which is largely contingent, rather than by the impossible method of deducing them as necessary logical consequences of being.⁴⁴

Using his critical method he discusses space; time; matter, force, and motion; and nature.

In Professor Bowne's theory of thought we found space to be primarily a law of mental synthesis by means of which the mind was enabled to relate separate and coexistent objects under the form of mutual externality. In further defining space we find it to be an intuition rather than a sense perception of a mode of existence. The practical world is the seat of practical experience but its causes only are real and ontological. To give it reality in itself would be to build up a fictitious noumenal world. The real world is the world of mind and here there is no attempt to give space relations. On the other hand the practical, external world of space objects has its place and value and is entirely acceptable in daily language. It is only in the ontological realm that we must drop space conceptions. To speak of the objective world as being one which cannot at the same time be subjective is a case of bringing space conceptions into this ontological realm. Objects, to have identity, therefore, do not need to be in a real space,⁴⁵ they need rather to be a factor of the relational world.

The category time has been described as the form under which we relate events. We experience time as a temporal order of relations, and we know it only in association with the things and events with which it

44. Cf., Ibid., p. 123.

45. Cf., Ibid., pp. 143ff.

occurs. Time therefore has its source in intelligence and apart from intelligence has no ontological existence. Moreover, to carry time and change into intelligence would make thought impossible. Time is temporal and can only be explained from the standpoint of self-conscious intelligence and the temporal judgment is therefore relative to the range and contents of this self-consciousness. The non-temporal is not temporal coexistence but rather the immediate possession of objects by the conscious mind which must be experienced rather than pictured. Thus present experience may have the time form but consciousness is possible only as the conscious self grasps all of its elements in an indivisible act which is without time or non-temporal.⁴⁶

Turning now to matter, force, and motion, we find that matter is phenomenal, being the product of real forces as a resultant of their interaction. Thus in the dynamic relations of the ontologically real, in the working out of its purposes, matter takes form. Corpuscular and atomic theories arise through the human desire to picture this product.⁴⁷

The desire to bring causality into the explanation of matter gives rise to the concept of force. "Force" is the phenomenal way of explaining relationships or physical changes. It is not a something residing in the atoms but is rather abstracted from the various forms of atomic activity. The laws of force

"..are only the formulas which express the conditions of these forms of activity, and sometimes the rate of their variation." 48

46. Cf., Ibid., p. 193.

47. Cf., Ibid., pp. 196ff.

48. Ibid., p. 217.

Motion is relative and can only be defined in terms of itself.

It is a condition in which matter may or may not be, --a spatial manifestation of a peculiar state in the moving thing which distinguishes it from the thing at rest. It is inseparable from direction. ⁴⁹

Taking up the mechanics of matter, force, and motion from the idealistic view the conclusion is that theoretical mechanics is purely an abstract science, is independent of concrete facts, and cannot call its abstractions realities without raising an inquiry as to their real nature. ⁵⁰ This embodies three points by way of summary:

1. In so far as mechanics deals with the objective order, it is only phenomenal, and a good part of it must be viewed as of the nature of a device for calculation.
2. Phenomena have laws, largely spatial and temporal, which admit of geometrical and numerical expression. They are learned from experience. They are valuable only for the practical control of phenomena.
3. True efficient causality lies in a realm into which science as such has neither the call nor the power to penetrate.

At the end of the discussion of cosmology comes the author's complete view of nature. By definition it is

"..the sum-total of spatial phenomena and their laws." ⁵¹

Thus nature is throughout the effect of the real but contains in itself no causality or necessity. It is phenomenal and its laws have phenomenal existence only, in so far as they are within the order of nature. They do not penetrate to the seat of power.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Having summarized the metaphysics of being and its manifestations

49. Cf., Ibid., pp. 220-221.

50. Cf., Ibid., pp. 241-243.

51. Ibid., p. 262; Cf. also pp. 260ff.

in the natural order, we turn now to the metaphysics of the human mind. We are not concerned here with the details of descriptive psychology but rather with the basic ideas on which psychology rests. These basic ideas come under four heads; the soul as mental agent; the soul's relation to the body; the place of "mental mechanism;" and the freedom of the self.

We discover at once that Professor Bowne is a self psychologist, holding that psychology rests upon a real something, --a self or soul --which cannot be identified with the physical elements and which is the abiding subject of thought and feeling. Neither can this mental life be deduced from physical organization, nor can mental facts be described in terms of their physical attendants or conditions, though these may summon or excite the former. In this light we see that the organism is not the productive cause of the mental life, though there is mutual dependence in so far as the mind needs some fixed system for receiving and giving impulses in its interaction with other spirits and with the cosmic system.⁵²

As to the origin of these selves or souls the author falls back upon creation saying:

"There is nothing to do but to fall back on the world-ground, or God, and say that where and when the divine plan, which is the law of cosmic activity, calls for it, there and then a soul begins its existence and development." 53

This positing of the soul by the infinite is the first step in his solution of the body-mind problem. The second step is to see the body as simply an order or system of phenomena which, to a certain extent,

52. Cf., Ibid., pp. 344-348; Cf. also Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 11ff.

53. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 373.

reproduces aspects of the general phenomenal order and also attends the soul and is a concomitant of the mental life. It is therefore a vehicle through which the soul gives visible expression to its personality and gains a means of personal communion. It also becomes a means of controlling the inner life, to some extent. This existing or occurring together is the only interaction there is and only in this sense have we a physical basis of thought. To be dogmatic on this subject or to go further is unwarranted by our knowledge.⁵⁴

As far as mental mechanism is concerned, no mechanical representation of the mental activities is possible.⁵⁵ Mental life can be understood only in terms of itself. As a result of this, psychology must of necessity be largely descriptive and classificatory and not attempt explanation in the causal sense. The simple fact of consciousness is that we are conscious of certain things and this consciousness is something absolutely unique and can only be experienced.⁵⁶

So closely allied with the idea of a conscious self that it must be assumed to explain the relative independent activity of that self, is the idea of freedom. Freedom is implicit in the assumption of responsibility. The moral life becomes absurd without it. It seems to be involved in the very thought of a personal and rational life, and in thinking we have our purest illustration of it. Nor is this an abstract freedom but rather the power of self-direction whereby we have the power to form plans, purposes, and ideals, and to work for their realization.⁵⁷ It is this power in living men and women. Here we

54. Cf., Ibid., p. 373; Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 298ff.

55. Cf., Ibid., p. 381f.

56. Cf., Ibid., p. 384; Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 235ff.

57. Cf., Ibid., p. 405; Introduction to Psychological Theory, pp. 232ff.

escape the groundless becoming of the theories of necessity. Here we must also guard against the idea of pure lawlessness, which is not freedom, and realize that freedom presupposes a basis of fixity or uniformity and has only a limited sphere. This freedom is conditioned by a law of order. It does not violate the law of causation in that it makes the knowing and feeling soul, rather than a will abstracted from these, the agent of its activity.⁵⁸

4. Principles of ethics.

In his "Principles of Ethics" we see the fruition of an interest in public concerns which was very likely initiated by the political scandals and exposures of graft which marked the life of New York City throughout the seventies. This work however is not a detailed discussion of specific duties and virtues and Professor Bowne himself says in the preface that it is rather

"..an introduction to fundamental moral ideas and principles." ⁵⁹
It fits very logically into our discussion in the rounding out of his philosophical views. Having outlined his theory of thought and knowledge, and having traced his metaphysical thinking from being, through cosmology, into the psychology of the self, the free spirit, we now complete the process. We interpret life, as the field of morals, in its goal of ideal life for the free spirit. This is the practical side, the philosophy of conduct.

History reveals a great deal of confusion in the working out of moral theory. This, in large part, may be avoided, according to the

58. Cf., Ibid., pp. 413ff.

59. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. iii.

author, if two things are done: first, cut out the many irrelevant psychological questions which hide the main issues, and, second, deduce the moral theory from life rather than the moral life from a theory. The leading thoughts of this work may also be given as two: the necessity of bringing together the intuitive and experience schools of ethics to form a working system, and the realization that the goal of ethics is not abstract virtue, but rather, fullness and richness of life.⁶⁰

The fundamental moral ideas are good, duty, and virtue, though the last named is usually assimilated by the other two. This leaves the theoretical system of good, and the intuitive system of duty, both of which have claims of their own, and which, through attempting to do without each other, have largely failed.⁶¹

The ethics of the good attempts to make moral action rational and therefore seeks ends beyond itself. These ends are goods of some sort to which moral laws are instrumental. Therefore it is the result of conduct which is all important.

The ethics of duty, on the other hand, looks upon the motives of action as expressing a disposition or character. Therefore it places the motives of the agent, the intentions rather than the results, as all important.

It is easy to see that either of the above is incomplete in itself. The ethics of goods considers conduct apart from the living subject. The ethics of duty considers the good will apart from its conditions and objects. They must be united so that we have goods of some kind

60. Cf., Ibid., p. iv.

61. Cf., Ibid., pp. 25ff.

to give rational meaning to duty, and then we must make virtue the
⁶²
 free and loving performance of duty. Thus moral activity must take
 into account both intentions or motives and the good actually accomplished.
 Only in this way can the field of ethics become the field of life itself.

Having determined the fundamental moral ideas it is next necessary
 to set up standards. These standards, in large outline, are three. The
 first is that of moral obligation, an idea which arises within the mind
 itself as a free spirit imposes duty upon itself. In a world where
 conduct is possible this idea is a necessary function of free intelligence.
⁶³

The second standard consists in making the good will the deepest law
 of moral interaction. This is the recognition of

"The duty and good desert of acting from the good will, and the sin
 and ill desert of acting from an evil will.." ⁶⁴

As a later writer has expressed it,

"Morality is enforced by that constitution of things whereby evil is
 self-destructive and good is self-preservative." ⁶⁵

This standard stands in its own right and has meaning in experience and
 is demanded wherever mutual influence is possible.

The third standard is bound up in the moral idea as a process of
 growth in which there is the perception of the direction in which human
 worth and dignity lie. This is a standard which does not admit of clear
 definition, though the sense of direction implied is fairly constant and
 it, as an ideal, enlarges with the enlargement of knowledge and the
⁶⁶
 unfolding of life. It begins with potentiality and becomes actual as

62. Cf., Ibid., p. 36.

63. Cf., Ibid., p. 100ff.

64. Ibid., p. 106.

65. Horne, H. H., The Philosophy of Education, p. 141.

66. Cf. Bowne, Op. Cit., p. 117.

67

the gradual moralization of life and conduct. In this development there are several factors.

The first factor is a human nature which expresses itself volitionally through instincts, appetites, and passions. The second factor is the rational moral activity of the free spirit. Automatic activity is taken over by control by the self and thus becomes moral, raising the natural to the plane of the spiritual.

This relation of the natural to the moral results in a third factor: the lack of right reason leading to the evil will. Thus the natural, as the embryonic and imperfect condition of our moral life, exerts influence. The fact that moral life is essentially immature and that growth is from the animal or automatic to the moral and free, leaves the way open for moral growth at any level, thus making character possible.

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Further amplifying these factors are three directions of moral growth. These can well be summarized as inner sense, outer code, and universal application. The inner sense has to do with the unfolding of the moral ideal and the strengthening of the sense of duty within the moral person. The outer code refers to the applying of principles to action through the formation of corresponding codes and the development of institutions. Finally, we must extend the moral field to include the entire life of the individual, and to include at least all human beings within the sphere of moral relations.

In discussing the contribution of religion to ethics, Professor

67. Cf., Ibid., P. 124.

68. Cf., Ibid., pp. 132f.

Bowne does not say that religion is absolutely necessary. He does, however, point out the ways in which the Christian religion has helped ethics, especially in the field of extra-ethical conceptions which condition the application of morals, and along the line of inspiration.

69

These contributions are as follows:

1. Our conceptions of God, life, and death have been greatly clarified, thereby giving extension to moral principles and re-enforcing the sense of obligation.
2. It has affirmed an origin and destiny for man which give him an inalienable sacredness.
3. It has made the moral law not merely a psychological fact in us, but also an expression of a Holy Will which can be neither defied nor mocked.
4. It sets up a transcendent, personal ideal which is at once the master-light of all our moral seeing, and our chief spiritual inspiration.
5. Finally, it tells of a God whose name and nature is love, in whom we live and move and have our being, and who is carrying all things to an outcome of infinite goodness.

The author completes his discussion of moral philosophy in three chapters in which he makes specific application of the above principles to the life of the individual, the family, and society.

4. His personalism.

Two years before his death, Professor Bowne delivered a series of lectures at Northwestern University on the Harris lecture foundation. His system of philosophy had by that time become so closely built up about the purposive, personal idea of reality, that these lectures were later published under the title of "Personalism." Professor Knudson, in his book "The Philosophy of Personalism," says that, so far as he

69. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 200ff.; also his *Theism*, pp. 248ff.

knows, this is the first time this word had appeared on the title-page of an English book, though the word has been slightly used for some time.⁷⁰

Our present interest, however, is not in this book as a new contribution, but rather as a clear summary of his philosophy as stated in the other sections of this chapter. This summary may be briefly given in three points.

In the first place, the deeper and more real values of life are invisible and unpicturable. They dwell in the world of ideas and consciousness and are expressed by such incommensurable terms as life, feeling, love, hate, and the like. The function of space is symbolic.⁷¹

In the second place, the necessary inference of this invisible world of beings is a supreme Person and purpose.⁷² We are first led to the inference by the significance of man, who, as an inhabitant of this invisible world, is constantly projecting his thought and life upon nature, bringing it to completion. It is but a step further back and quite logical to think of a supreme person at the head of this world of persons. Certainly it appears that space objects have no substantial existence apart from intelligence. They become important as the

"..flowing expression and means of communication of these personal beings."⁷³

Considering the fundamental reality as an agent, to which the notion of divisibility has no application, we are able to explain the existence and community of the many as produced and coordinated by it. This

70. Cf. Knudson, A. C., *The Philosophy of Personalism*, p. 18f.

71. Cf., Bowne, *Personalism*, p. 268f.

72. Cf., *Ibid.*, p. 277f.; See also his *Theism*, pp. 199f.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 278.

explains man's lack of self-sufficiency.

In the last place, we see that nature is under an ever acting will and intelligence. On the practical side experience is the beginning and realm of verification of all our theories, and our theory of phenomena only forbids dogmatism. Here alone can we learn the practical trustworthiness of life. Thus we conclude that

"We are positivists in respect to science, and theologians as respects causation." 74.

74. Ibid., p. 302.

Chapter VI.

His Educational Views

In the preceding chapter the philosophical views of Professor Bowne were presented in summary form. In a later chapter we shall interpret these views in their relation to the underlying principles of education. The present purpose is to discuss the particular educational views to which he gave utterance, or which are exemplified in his work as a teacher.

As one who was not interested at all directly in the theory of applied education, but rather gave himself to the achieving of the product, Professor Bowne has quite naturally left little formal statement of his views on the educative process. It is necessary to piece together fragments from discussions which parallel this theme and to draw inferences from his classroom example. We are therefore limited to a somewhat disconnected sketch and cannot give the well rounded treatment we might desire.

That he was a master in the use of this educative process is evident. Several of his former students have strongly testified to this, even going so far as to look upon him as "pre-eminently a teacher." It is said that he drew his students to himself with a peculiar magnetism that gave lasting power to his influence. This magnetism seems to have been compounded of a number of things. There was his understanding of life which came through his insight into the fundamental problems of thought. His remarkable gift of expression, in which a thorough grounding in his subject gave facility and ease in choice of words,

sparkled with spontaneous wit and well chosen illustrations. He was often humorous, though not for its own sake. On top of all this he had a well developed system of thought and was sure of himself, being¹ forceful rather than dogmatic, however. His critical ability and his very evident scholarship impressed his students, and his sympathetic interest inspired them to greater efforts. On this point we have the further testimony of Gerge Herbert Palmer that

"In the college classroom..he stood...the acid test of the true teacher, since the effect upon his students was to elicit and enlarge, not to oppress and extinguish, the intellectual impulse of those who came under his influence." 2

His ability in the use of the English language is further and much more adequately indicated by Dr. William W. Guth in an article entitled "The Literary Style of Borden P. Bowne," which appeared soon after his death.³

We may judge, somewhat, his views on educational method by the course which he himself followed. Some have complained that he did not give a thorough introduction to the whole field of philosophy. This, however, was not his purpose. He rather believed in expounding his own view in order to give the student a point of perspective from which⁴ to secure the broader outlook. This indicates his belief in the worth-whileness of having students react to the personality and message of the teacher rather than to just the problem and content of material under discussion, as some modern theorists teach.⁵

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1. Cf. Knudson, A. C., "Bowne as Teacher and Author," in The Personalist, July, 1920, pp. 5-14.
 2. Quoted from letter to editor Wilm, E. C., Studies in Philosophy and Theology, p. 15.
 3. Cf. Guth, W. W., "The Literary Style of Borden P. Bowne," in the Methodist Review, May-June, 1911, pp. 416-430.
 4. Cf. McConnell, F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, p. 240.
 5. Cf. Dewey, John, Democracy and Education, p. 188.

Professor Bowne was well able to carry out the above purpose, for his philosophy was a way of life which he ably exemplified. Though he seems to have left it to his pupils to make the first advances, he amply repaid in time and helpful friendship all those who sought a closer acquaintance with him than the classroom afforded.

In carrying on the classroom work he followed the regular procedure of delivering lectures and checking up through quizzes. His lectures were models of good form which never strayed from the subject at hand, and while attendance was not required, the missing of a period was a real loss to the student. In the quiz period new problems would be used to test both the pupil's grasp of the principles and his originality.⁶ Thus his goal of teaching involved a two-fold emphasis; the assimilation of new knowledge, and the development of originality.

We have mentioned already his ability to keep to the subject in hand. His followers concur in pointing out his greater achievement of being able to focus attention upon the problems of deepest practical significance.⁷ Teaching was a very real and vital task to him and he took it seriously. He was essentially life-centered in method. His joy lay in seeing his pupils make a worthy and usable philosophy truly their own or in helping to iron out the religious difficulties which detracted from happy, purposeful living.

School was more than working for degrees. In his student days in Germany his professors urged him to remain longer and secure his doctor's degree but he did not consider it worth the extra time and expense.⁸

6. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 243.

7. Cf. Coe, G. A., "Borden Parker Bowne" in the Methodist Review, July-August, 1910, p. 513f.

8. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 37.

Some fifteen years later he was of the same opinion as indicated by a remark made in another connection.

"Degrees are not worth much, anyhow; but, such as they are, they ought to give some kind of indication of the nature of the work done." 9

This was after he had been closely connected with a large part of the higher degree work of his institution for many years.

In a letter written the year before his death he gives his estimate of the teaching profession. He writes:

"The teacher's life is rarely a showy one, and to many it is a root out of dry ground, but for real and permanent influence no one has more of it than the effective teacher." 10

In the light of the foregoing we must conclude that, even as personality was the central line of his intellectual patterns, so was personal influence made the central force in his teaching. But it was not an influence devoid of proper stress upon good content. If Bowne looked upon teaching as a means of influencing lives, it was in a clear cut direction and necessitated the use of the best subject matter available. Present educational theory often puts method in the forefront as all important and regards learning as problem-solving, with considerable less emphasis upon the material basis of the problem. Mind and thinking are looked upon as "response to the doubtful as such." 11 But this would not have satisfied Bowne. For him method always had to be backed by good content. 12

Nor was good content itself sufficient. He further held that education should be well balanced. Without trying to make a case for

9. Bowne, "A Word about the New Education" in The Independent, April 9, 1885, p. 1.

10. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., (letter to W.S. Bovard) p. 249.

11. Dewey, John, The Quest for Certainty, p. 224.

12. Cf. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 240.

the study of the classics he was quick to see the danger in an over-balanced scientific training.

"On the value of the classics in a scheme of liberal education we offer no opinion. Of the danger and belittling influence of a one-sided scientific education we are fully convinced." 13

Such a view is fully in accord with the more detailed exposition of his views in which science is given an important and rightful place but is judged dangerous when it attempts to become the judge of what is most real. That a tendency to enthrone science in this way is quite prevalent today will hardly be denied. Some educators see such a tendency in present day thought and apparently approve of it. 14

Among the choice words of modern educators is the word "environment." The pupil is said to learn best through reacting to a "conditioned environment," which is largely physical in many cases. Occasionally environment is made out to be the determining factor in the educative process. 15 Such an emphasis is good and has a rightful place but here two extremes are quite possible. Professor Bowne felt that any lasting improvement in character involved forces far deeper and stronger than physical and social environment. Discussing the efforts of some reformers he says:

"And they (the reformers) have a deal to say about the influence of environment, and sometimes they are sure that a proper environment would insure right character. Well, environment is important, and we should always aim to improve it so far as we can; but no deep and lasting reformation of man and society can be reached in this way. Some hygienic virtues and elementary decencies may be thus secured, but the root of the matter lies deeper. For life tends to make its own environment, and the environment becomes an image of those who

13. Bowne, Op. Cit., p. 1.

14. Cf. Kilpatrick, W. H., Education for a Changing Civilization, p. 20.

It is interesting to note that his more recent works indicate that there can be no science of education but rather science in education.

15. Cf. Howerth, I. W., The Theory of Education, p. 179.

are in it." 16

A distinction should be made just here. To look at environment as a valuable aid in the technique of teaching is one thing, but to seek to embody or to find the highest goals or motives of life in the social environment is quite another. Bowne would no doubt have heartily agreed to the modern emphasis as touching the former, but he is here criticizing the latter. The deeper root to which he refers is found in "seeking the kingdom of God." His logic, if applied to present methods of character education in the public schools, would closely follow that of Dr. W. A. Squires who pictures the present broadening of the conception of personality and the enlarging of the school task as resulting in a demand for character education. This in turn points to, and should require the necessary facing of, the ideal character of history.¹⁷ This character, the Galilean Teacher, is the one who has most clearly defined for Professor Bowne the "kingdom of God."

Many of the literary efforts of his later years were directed toward religious topics. Always a deeply religious man himself, he strove to make religion real and vital to others. He would not have religious values legislated into being, however. On the relation of religious teaching to the public school we have his very definite views well set forth in an article to the Zion's Herald written in the eighties. He here writes:

"And the introduction of technical religious instruction into our public schools would, we are persuaded, work endless confusion and mischief, without the slightest corresponding advantage. If the religious life of the home and the churches grows too weak to leaven

16. Bowne, "Law of Successful Living," in the Zion's Herald, June 15, 1904, p. 449.

17. Cf. Squires, W. A., Educational Movements of Today, p. 10f.

the social lump, the appearance of the catechism in the public / schools will not save us." 18

His views on the religious education of children appear both sound and in line with the best of modern theory. In this connection we get a striking glimpse into his educational views. Religion, he felt, was not something that could grow best through what he termed "Salvation army" or "revival" methods. Religion must conquer the world rather by "colonizing it from the Christian home."¹⁹ The spread of religion can best come through the education of children.

In this educating process he protests strongly against giving children undigestible adult ideas and concepts. In one place he summarizes these views and though they are familiar to us now they still need stressing. Under three heads he writes:

1. "We must carefully avoid the error of expecting from childhood the religious experience and manifestations of maturity."
2. "We must allow the child to be a child, but we must teach of the Father in heaven, and of the Lord Jesus, and must help him to live his life with reference to pleasing God by doing His will."
3. "The insight that the child must be a child in religion as well as in other things, and the further insight that every normal stage of life is legitimate in the Divine plan, should help us to look with a kindlier eye on the child life and prevent any interference with its normal manifestations in the supposed interests of piety." 20

Thus in the natural way of all teaching the child first learns love and duty in relation to its father and mother. It must first have a simple experience that does not necessarily follow any particular mold. The lesson is given and the child learns it and that is sufficient. To force the child into experience that is beyond its level leads to an

18. Bowne, "Religion in Education" in Zion's Herald, March 31, 1886, p. 97.

19. Cf. Bowne, "Childhood Piety" in Zion's Herald, February 4, 1903, p. 138.

20. Ibid.

unreal way of talking and thinking. The appointed task is all that is necessary and deeper insights will come with growing years and intelligence. In short:

"..let the child be a child even in his religion, and when he becomes a man, with the unfolding and deepening of his experience, he will necessarily put away childish things. But to hasten the work can only result in mischief." 21

The above views indicate an educational viewpoint regarding the education of children that is wholesome and modern.

If in the preceding pages we have wandered about and failed in the large outline of the picture it is because we have been recording intimate and spontaneous glimpses of one who was not here posing for a picture. We know that he was a great teacher and we conclude that his educational views were as sound as his philosophical views. He carried both into practice and as a result many rise up and call him blessed. One of his leading pupils concludes a discussion of him as a teacher in a glowing tribute with which we also close this chapter.

"The general impression which he made on those who knew him and his works best, may be summed up in the following statement. He was 'one of the great thinkers of his day, brilliant in wit, profound in thought, luminous in exposition, rich in his literary output, author of a system of philosophy of enduring worth, vigorous defender of the faith, possessed of extraordinary power of excitation as a teacher, of towering nobility of soul, an idealist of idealists, unforgettable.'" 22

21. Bowne, "The Religion of Childhood," in The Independent, June 10, 1875.

22. Knudson, A. C., "Bowne as Teacher and Author," in The Personalist, July, 1920, p. 14.

Chapter VII.

His Influence

Twenty years have now elapsed since the death of Professor Bowne and it should be possible, to some degree, to evaluate the fruits of his life work impartially. The force of personal friendship will effect this evaluation for many years to come, perhaps even with some bias, for it is necessary that we go to those who have studied him most carefully, and they, with few exceptions, were his warm personal friends.

In order to put this subject clearly before us, we will, in the next few pages, compare the judgments of those best fitted to pass judgment, as to just where his chief contributions lie.

Perhaps the most impartial statement available is one from a leading British thinker, Dr. James Iverach of Aberdeen, whom Dr. James Hastings has described as knowing as much about modern philosophy as any man in the British Isles.¹ He wrote of Bowne as follows:

"He is of all one of the foremost of American thinkers of my time. I have known Royce and James and I have read for many years the *Philosophical Review*, and from it have learned much of present tendencies in philosophy in the States, but in my judgment Bowne is the equal of any other thinker in his knowledge of the history of philosophy, in the keenness of his intellectual grasp, and in the clearness of his exposition. His contribution to Theism is of the highest value." 2

From the point of view of thorough acquaintance and mastery, there are three men pre-eminently qualified to discuss this present theme. These three are Professors E. S. Brightman and A. C. Knudson, and Bishop Francis J. McConnell.

1. In a letter to the editor, *The Personalist*, April, 1920, p. 32.
 2. Ibid., p. 32-33.

Professor Brightman is Bowne's successor at Boston University and is officially known as the "Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy." Through his brilliant gift of exposition he has won a wide hearing for personalism among philosophers and laymen.³ He has summarized Bowne's influence so thoroughly and well, and is withal in such a good position to do this, that we quote him at length.

"Bowne's influence, which we have now to consider, is difficult to determine objectively. There is great difference of opinion about his importance.

Of his hold upon his students at Boston University there can be no doubt. Every student in the college was required to study under Bowne; and substantially every student in the School of Theology elected to do so. From 1888 to 1910, he was dean of the graduate school and a good proportion of the advance degrees conferred by the University were for work done in philosophy under him. His reputation drew students to Boston from all parts of this country and from foreign lands. Many of them later became university teachers of philosophy or allied subjects. Among these, now on the faculty of Boston University, are Dean W. M. Warren of the College of Liberal Arts, Dean A. C. Knudson of the School of Theology, Professors G. C. Cell, F. L. Strickland, and others. In other institutions are such former students of Bowne as Professors G. A. Coe (Teachers College), G. A. Wilson (Syracuse), R. T. Flewelling (University of Southern California), H. A. Youtz (Oberlin Graduate School of Theology), L. R. Echardt (De Pauw), H. C. Sanborn (Vanderbilt), J. R. Beiler (Allegheny), and many others. Several are college and university presidents, including President Daniel L. Marsh of Boston University. The distinguished theologian, Henry C. Sheldon, was a colleague of Bowne's and learned much from him. His entire conception of systematic theology was based on Bowne's personalism.

Bowne exerted a profound influence on leaders of religious thought. He played a large part in keeping his denomination from yielding either to fundamentalism or to positivistic humanism. But his ideas made themselves felt far beyond his denomination among men of all creeds. The religious leadership of the past two generations owes much to him. Eminent clergymen and scholars like Bishop Randolph S. Foster, Bishop Francis J. McConnell, Lynn Harold Hough, S. Parkes Cadman, Charles E. Jefferson, Harry Emerson Fosdick, Dean Charles R. Brown, J. W. Buckham, J. H. Snowden, and many others, acknowledge their indebtedness to Bowne. His chief contributions to religious thought were his theistic interpretation of evolution in the light of the immanence of God, his emphasis on

3. Cf. McConnell, F. J., Borden Parker Bowne, p. 270.

social ethics, and his fight for intellectual freedom in religion.

Bowne's influence on technical philosophers has been less evident. Nevertheless his books have been widely read and reviewed; some of his works were translated into Japanese and Spanish; he was called to John Hopkins, Yale, and Chicago, but declined; he was chairman of the Department of Philosophy at the St. Louis Congress of Arts and Sciences (1904); he gave the Deems Lectures at New York University, and the N. W. Harris Lectures at Northwestern. William James spoke of some of his books as 'wonderfully able.' Eucken called him 'distinctly America's first philosopher.' J. Cook Wilson described him as the 'most important of modern American philosophers.' The founding by R. T. Flewelling of The Personalist, a quarterly review, in 1920, was a notable sign of Bowne's influence. So too was the Bowne memorial volume edited by E. C. Wilm with the title, Studies in Philosophy and Theology (1922); and also the Bowne number of the Methodist Review (May-June, 1922). In recent works of reference (the Hastings Encyclopedia, and the Mathews and Smith Dictionary), histories of philosophy (the new Weber-Perry and the fifth edition of M. W. Calkins, The Persistent Problems of Philosophy), and introductions (Leighton, Conger, Patrick, Brightman), Bowne is being more explicitly recognized than before. The forthcoming volume of Deberweg's standard Grundriss for the Nineteenth Century outside Germany, will do Bowne ampler justice than previous editions have done him.

Yet most histories of philosophy treat him casually. Woodbridge Riley omits him entirely from his American Thought, while including many less significant thinkers; A. K. Rogers in English and American Philosophy since 1800 barely alludes to him. He is but seldom quoted in philosophical discussions or monographs.

The limitation of his philosophy may be traced to various causes. Bowne's charming and modest personality helped win most of his students to his vision of truth. But in his writings he appeared to be severe, sarcastic, even impatient of opposing views. This repelled many readers. Further, he was ignored by his professional colleagues for the very human reason that, to a large extent, he ignored them. It is true that he counted among his friends and correspondents such men as Lotze, Ulrich, Eucken, Bergson, George Herbert Palmer, William James, Noah Porter, George H. Duncan, William Fairfield Warren, and numerous other distinguished scholars. Yet on the whole the statement made must stand. He rarely quoted other authors, and then mostly for polemic purposes. He did not join the American Philosophical Association. He did not contribute to the philosophical journals. His writings, moreover, had a pedagogical rather than a technical cast. He wrote textbooks or popularizations chiefly, rather than monographs. Thus he widened, rather than deepened, his influence. Further, his religious environment and nature led him to be fundamentally an apologist. His scientific training was largely in mathematics and physics rather than biology, -and that in a period when biology was in the center of scientific and philosophical interest. His appeal to life as more than logic

also somewhat restricted his influence among persons of a non-pragmatic type, in spite of the fact that his actual constructive procedure was rigidly logical and systematic. He sometimes, however, appeared satisfied with meager definitions. His basic view of personality, for instance, would probably have been more persuasive to his readers had it been more fully elaborated, especially in relation to biology and abnormal psychology.

Yet these limitations should not obscure the fact that Bowne was a genuinely great man. He was brilliant in polemic and synoptic in vision. He should be studied for his clear and pungent literary style; for the thoroughness with which he showed how the antinomies of thought on every level are solved by personality, -what Knudson calls his 'systematic methodological personalism,' and also on account of the relevance of his thought to the problems of contemporary epistemology and metaphysics. There is hardly any issue that has arisen since his death which one does not find treated, at least in germ, on his pages. His thought moved in the regions where the central and inevitable problems of philosophy are located. His personalism, therefore, is a way of understanding experience which will always have to be reckoned with, and which opposing views will have to consider." 4

The above paragraphs are taken from an address before the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy in 1926 and are the most inclusive estimate we have.

Approaching our subject from the philosophical angle more particularly we turn to Professor A. C. Knudson. Regarding his fitness for estimating Bowne we have the word of Bishop McConnell to the effect that he

"..has read practically everything available in any language bearing at all directly on personalistic philosophy and possesses an amazingly discerning skill in selection in philosophic interpretation." 5

In his book, "The Philosophy of Personalism," he writes:

"The type of personalism here expounded and supported is that which received from Borden P. Bowne its clearest, most systematic, and most thoroughgoing expression." 6

In line with this introductory statement Knudson feels that Bowne's greatest contribution consists in that to which reference has previously been

4. Brightman, E.S., "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, pp. 164-167.

5. McConnell, Op. Cit., p. 270.

6. Knudson, A. C., The Philosophy of Personalism, p. 13.

made, his "systematic methodological personalism." He was the first to build a metaphysical system on the personalistic conception of reality in a really comprehensive way. He took the Kantian epistemology, and transcended Lotze by introducing the thought of free self-activity, carrying the result through its many implications.⁷ For Bowne, reality could only be made reasonable by lifting it to the personal plane. Of this Knudson further says:

"It is the clearness with which Bowne apprehended this truth and the systematic thoroughness with which he elaborated it that make his philosophy one of the most striking individual creations in the history of metaphysics in America." 8

Ranking next to this contribution, following Knudson further, is the work Bowne did in summing up the various arguments for a Supreme Intelligence as the explanation of the order, apparent design, and intelligent beings about us. Of this work, under the published title of "Theism," he concludes:

"His Theism is, to my mind, the classic treatise on this subject." 9

Bowne's contribution in his doctrine of freedom is also held up for admiring comment as a "most characteristic feature." Only in freedom, which Bowne elevated to a place of transcendent significance, is it possible to harmonize the trustworthiness of reason with error. As "self-determination," Bowne made this one of the two powers of the soul which constitute volitional causality. The other power was of course the "unifying, self-identifying consciousness."¹⁰

Of less importance but of great value was the work of Bowne along several other lines. Knudson mentions the elaboration of Bowne upon

7. Cf., Ibid., pp. 85-86, 433.

8. Ibid., p. 246.

9. Ibid., p. 314.

10. Cf., Ibid., pp. 146, 224.

"structural fallacies" as

"...one of the most fruitful contributions to modern logic." 11

Also the clear and thorough way in which Bowne draws the distinction between phenomenal and metaphysical reality "is of permanent value."¹²

Bowne clearly showed how the category of causality is revealed and understood only in experience. He also shows, however, that this category is not derived from experience but is rooted in reason and stands in its own right. In this way he fuses apriorism with empiricism in his volitional theory of causality. On this point Knudson writes:

"This synthesis was wrought out more thoroughly and more convincingly by Bowne than by any other writer I know." 13

On the practical side Knudson calls attention to the fact that many of the protestant denominations, during recent years, have been engaged in bitter struggles over the evolutionary theory and the Fundamentalist-Modernist issue, and have been nearly split apart, while the Methodist denomination has been almost entirely free from it all. This, he says, is due in large part to the influence of Bowne through his Boston
14
University connection.

This religious reference leads on to the third angle of approach. Professor Bowne's influence along religious lines is frequently referred to by his friends. Here he was as much at home as in the more theoretical realms of philosophy. As one writer puts it:

"His theological writings are environed by no alien atmosphere, as of one invading another sphere than his own. 'Studies in Christianity' (1909) as well as his little volume 'Atonement' (1900) and 'The Immanence of God,'...place him among those who have done most to emancipate and broaden American theology." 15

11. Ibid., p. 168.

12. Ibid., p. 234.

13. Ibid., p. 221.

14. Cf., Ibid., p. 253.

15. Buckham, "A Group of American Idealists," The Personalist, April '20, p.31.

His times needed some one with religious sympathy to indicate clearly the distinction between naturalism as a scientific method and as a philosophical doctrine. It found such a leader in Bowne who brought a "saving philosophical faith" to the people in a time of great intellectual confusion. He did this by interpreting the evolution of Darwin in such a way as to save it from the materialistic evolutionism of Herbert Spencer.

16

We are indebted to Bishop Francis J. McConnell of the Methodist Church for the most complete interpretation of Bowne that has been written. In his biography of Professor Bowne we have a very intimate and well rounded picture, for Bishop McConnell is not only an outstanding student of him and his views, but he was also a close personal friend. As a leader in the denomination with which Bowne was affiliated he is well able to interpret him from the religious angle.

Throughout this book we find only the highest praise for Bowne's contributions to Methodism as well as religion in general. He is pictured as always loyal to the best interests of his denomination and as untiring in furthering them.

Bishop McConnell gives somewhat the same reasons for the limiting of Bowne's influence as were given by Professor Brightman.¹⁷ Bowne, in the first place, cared nothing for advertising, refused to join the philosophical societies, and remained at Boston University when he could have gone to institutions more famed. In the second place, Bowne was an avowed and militant theist, and theism is never very popular among

16. Cf., Ibid., p. 28.

17. Cf., McConnell, Op. Cit., pp. 270ff.

philosophers. The Dewey system, which has had a large following, has a blind spot for transcendent religion. Another reason for this lack of popularity is that he was not "a voice of his day" as was Spencer. He was content to deal with the more abiding, if less popular, issues. A further reason has to do with his writings. As a lecturer he was witty and his talk abounded with clever illustrations. In his books, however, he was much more serious and there was a lack of repetition and amplification. He never tried to coin popular phrases.

As in most biographies there is no specific attempt to rank Bowne's particular contributions. One can judge only by apparent emphasis and allotment of space for the most part. In this light his personalism and his ethics stand out on the philosophical side, while from the religious side, note is made of his theism as well as his practical efforts in defending biblical research, in giving religious guidance, especially to students, and in fighting against officialism in his denomination.¹⁸

Attention has been called, especially by Bishop McConnell, to Bowne's great work as a spiritual guide and advisor to a wide circle of friends and students. His wife, in a book of his sermons which she edited after his death, testifies to the service which he rendered in this way. She says that

"During his thirty-four years of service as a Christian teacher he was constantly sought, in his lecture-room and in his home, by those who needed him." ¹⁹

To these he gave new faith and courage as well as a better insight into Christian teachings. He wrote three little books, "The Christian

18. Cf., *Ibid.*, pp. 120ff., 131f., 163f., 179f., 207f., 228f.

19. Bowne, *The Essence of Religion*, p. v.

Revelation" (1898), "The Christian Life" (1899), and "The Immanence of God" (1905), which he later re-edited and enlarged in his book "Studies in Christianity." In the preface of each is to be found the same purpose, almost in the same words, -that of clearing up and removing difficulties and errors in popular religious thought.²⁰ That he was successful in these labors there can be little doubt for there are many who, to this day, remember him with thankfulness and love for such service.

Since his death in 1910, there have been three public recognitions of Bowne's life and work which are of special note here. The first is the founding of The Personalist in 1920 by R. T. Flewelling, the second is the Bowne memorial volume edited by E. C. Wilm, with the title "Studies in Philosophy and Theology," which appeared in 1922, and the third is the Bowne number of the Methodist Review for May-June, 1922.

In the first copy of The Personalist there is an opening statement by the editor, who is a friend and former student of Bowne, in which he makes a call for contributions, inviting others to aid him in carrying on the work of Bowne. He says in part:

"In his last public address Dr. Bowne said something about his work being done. To the students whom he had taught to bend the bow and aim the shaft he left the remaining task.

Since those words were spoken ten years have passed. With the passage of years the significance of his thought has grown upon us as the proportions of a mountain clear themselves with distance. The effect of those teachings, however, can be perpetuated only as they enter into the living thought of today through living channels. On this task many men have been working disconnectedly and fragmentarily. It is now time to furnish a focus for the perpetuation of that wisdom which has meant so much to us." 21

The success which this magazine has received from its start indicates

20. Cf., The Christian Revelation, p. 3; The Christian Life, p. 3.; The Immanence of God, preface; Studies in Christianity, p. v.

21. Flewelling, R. F., editorial in The Personalist, April, 1920.

clearly that this was no empty honor, conferred without cause.

In the other two recognitions of Bowne mentioned above there are a number of further testimonies as to his place in American letters.

W. E. Hocking looks upon his work as a distinctive contribution to American philosophy, mentioning especially his summary of "The Failure of Impersonalism," and saying of it that

"..as a summary account of the curve of metaphysical speculation since Kant, there is no more powerful and convincing chapter in American metaphysical writings.." 22

F. W. Flewelling, the editor of The Personalist, sees in Bowne "the morning star of this greater humanism," referring to the growing recognition of the place of personalistic thinking. 23

George A. Coe, in answering the question as to what was the most certainly true and important contribution which he made to the mental habits of his students, points to the insistent way in which he continually reverted to primary data. He believed in turning his students away from the dialectic or speculative factors to the more important, observable facts of religious and moral life. 24

We close with a tribute given Bowne by George Herbert Palmer:

"O man to love! Even those who differed from him I think pretty generally recognized him to be a truly great man, one from whom petty self-seeking was singularly absent." 25

Throughout this chapter we have had only praise for Professor Bowne. Some may inquire as to the views of those who opposed him. What are the negative criticisms and how do they effect the final evaluation? To this question there is but small answer. The strongest negative

22. Hocking, W. E., in the Methodist Review, May-June, 1922, p. 374.

23. Flewelling, R. F., Methodist Review, May-June, 1922, p. 379.

24. Cf., Wilm, ed., Studies in Philosophy and Theology, pp. 17-18.

25. Ibid., In a letter to the editor from G. H. Palmer, p. 14.

criticism is that of silence on the part of modern historians in this field. The causes of this ignoring have been given. As the starter of a new and distinctive movement in philosophy which is still gaining headway and which is now in the hands of his followers, he has largely passed from the field of possible criticism. The criticisms that now come will be leveled at those who have taken up his mantle.

Chapter VIII.

The Evaluation of His Work from the Viewpoint of Educational Philosophy

1. Introduction

Out of the study of the preceding chapters there has grown a picture of Professor Bowne as one admirably suited to give an authoritative word concerning the underlying principles of education. He was a teacher of no mean ability. The originality and freshness of his thinking is well attested. The results of his thought have been fully recorded in a number of logical, beautifully written volumes. Most important of all, the field of his mental endeavors was that which touches vitally the nature and goals of human life. Philosophy often goes far afield, deserting the common highway for the more abstract paths of speculative fancy. It was not so, however, with this man. Above all else he desired to give to life a consistent interpretation in the interest of more purposeful and abundant living here and now, as well as hereafter.

It is only natural that philosophy should have a determining word concerning the motives and goal of the educative process. This word differs with the particular system, however, and as a result we have many varying points of view in education. Thus the gamut is run, from goals that seek the solution of contemporary social problems or the adjustment of many values, to those which seek to adjust man to his Creator. With a majority of his views centering upon the importance and worth of human persons, Professor Bowne should have a very stimulating point of view in the study here contemplated. This study

is, in brief, an attempt to answer the two following questions: What is Professor Bowne's point of view on the leading topics in the field of educational philosophy? How do these views compare with those of the leading writers of the present day in this field?

2. Securing an Objective Standard.

We are faced with several difficulties at the start. In the first place the books of Bowne, though excellently written, in no case contain indices. This difficulty is in large part taken care of through the previous study and for the rest we must rely upon a careful searching of his pages. The next problem is that of discovering who the leading writers are in the philosophy of education, what their leading topics are, and what views they express upon these topics. We must secure an objective yard stick against which to measure Bowne.

For this latter purpose we shall make use of a previous study made¹ by the writer in a different connection. The stated aim of that study was

"..to determine the principal texts being used (in the philosophy of education), the philosophical approach to the subject most prevalent, and the comparative content of the most prominent texts." 2

In carrying out this aim the school catalogues of over ninety percent of the universities and colleges of the country were carefully examined. They revealed that some fifty-four widely distributed institutions of higher learning in the United States were offering courses in this subject. Of this number approximately three-fourths made answer to a brief inquiry, giving the point of view from which they taught the subject

1. Cf., Mack, H. W., "Comparative Content of Educational Philosophy Text Books," APPENDIX NO. 6.

2. Ibid., p. 2.

and the three texts, in order of importance, which they valued most.

It was interesting to note that of those who gave their philosophic viewpoint, more accepted the view most akin to Professor Downe's than any other. These views were as follows:

<u>Number</u>	<u>Viewpoint</u>
12	Idealism
10	Pragmatism
5	Eclecticism
3	Behaviorism
9	Eclectic mixtures distributed as:
2	Idealism, pragmatism
2	Personalism, pragmatism
1	Personalism, instrumentalism
1	Idealism, pragmatism, behaviorism
1	Positivism, pragmatism, behaviorism
1	Idealism, <u>realism</u> , behaviorism
1	Historical approach

Carrying the study further the replies were analyzed to determine the leading text books in use, these in turn being carefully studied on the basis of leading topics discussed. As a result of this study there was secured a fairly objective guide as to the leading textbooks in recognized use throughout the country. These books, to which we shall refer frequently in the following pages, were found to rank as follows:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Authors</u>	<u>Texts</u>
1.	52	Kilpatrick	Source Book in the Philosophy of Education (Also syllabus)
2.	46	Dewey	Democracy and Education
3.	27	Chapman-Counts	Principles of Education
4.	15	Horne	Philosophy of Education
5.	6	Bode	Modern Educational Theories
6.	4	Henderson	Principles of Education
7.	4	Hewerth	Theory of Education

To determine the leading topics of these books required a somewhat detailed estimate. The percentage of content devoted to the main topics was worked out and the topics were ranked. The several lists were then

brought together and synthesized. Out of this process emerged a list of ten subjects relatively placed.

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Topic</u>	<u>Number of texts discussing topic</u>
1.	Individual	4
2.	Method	3
3.	Thinking	3
4.	Democracy	2
5.	Environment	2
6.	Personality	2
7.	Society	2
8.	Interest	3
9.	Vocational education	2
10.	Morals	2

Considering the varying views held and the individual method of approach used by each writer, the above list represents about as objective and as representative a norm as it is possible to work out. If we are able to discover Professor Bowne's views on these topics and to relate them to the views held by the writers here involved, we will have gone far in the achieving of our purpose.

The study will be further rounded out by comparing these authors and Bowne in two other respects. The one, that of their final definition of education, we shall leave until the end. The other has to do with their philosophical viewpoints. A careful analysis of these texts indicate that they are of the following views:

<u>Textbook author</u>	<u>Philosophical viewpoint</u>
Kilpatrick	Eclectic, though mainly pragmatic
Dewey	Social and pragmatic
Chapman-Counts	Eclectic, mainly social
Horne	Idealistic
Bode	Pragmatic, broadly behavioristic
Henderson	Naturalistic and pragmatic
Howerth	Naturalistic and socialistic

From our preceding study it is quite clear that Professor Bowne would come under the head of "Idealistic, strongly Personalistic." This

indicates that Bowne belongs to the minority group as far as textbooks are concerned. Whether this means that his views will be more or less valuable to education is a matter of judgment which the following discussion will help clear up.

3. The Evaluation

Upon the basis of the foregoing we have now to examine the views of Professor Bowne on the following ten topics; the individual; method; thinking; democracy; environment; personality; society; vocational education; interest; and morals. Growing out of, and in addition to this, we should arrive at a definition of education from his point of view.

Our method of handling each topic shall be three-fold. First the views of Professor Bowne will be set down; then they will be contrasted with the views of leading present day writers in this field; and finally, growing out of this comparison will come our evaluation and conclusions. This we now proceed to do.

The Individual.

This topic is limited so as not to overlap the discussion of personality.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

Professor Bowne looks upon the individual as a dual being having a body and a soul (or self). The mind refers to the soul (or self) in its intellectual activities. Thus in his own words:

"The true man is the soul, but the soul is connected with an organism which conditions the mental life. The body, however, though other than the soul, has still the profoundest significance for the soul in all its activities. It is an instrument for eliciting and guiding the mental development, and for putting the soul into relation with

the world of things. This conclusion, moreover, does not rest upon our ignorance of brain psychology, so that advancing knowledge may at any time displace it. It rests rather upon the essential nature of consciousness, and the insight that the unity of consciousness can never result from the interaction of any plurality of things." 3

Thus the soul (or self) is the real essence of the individual, and as such is individually produced (created) by the infinite in connection with the individual organism. As the abiding subject of thought and feeling it is the ground of understanding the mental life which cannot be explained by deducing or producing it from physical organization. The body then is a "system of phenomena." It gives visual expression to personality and is a means both of personal communion and of somewhat controlling the inner life. On the other side, it reproduces to some extent features of the general phenomenal order.⁴

The views of Bowne would further stress the freedom of the individual as an active agent in the rebuilding of environment to better express purposes. Thus in the expression of human volition the individual demonstrates his superiority to his physical environment.⁵ As for the importance of heredity, here also the individual is superior, the Divine Purpose being causal.

"Parents are not creators. They and their deeds are only the occasion on which the world-ground produces effects and introduces new factors into the system!" "The fact is simply a certain similarity between parents and children...all else is theory." 6

The individual, moreover, is subordinate to society only in so far as the law of good will regulates one's rights or duties in relation to the common good. If the common good demands it, society may restrain and coerce the individual, in this sense making him subordinate.⁷ Society

3. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 36.

4. Cf. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 368f.

5. Cf., Ibid., pp. 268 and 284; 406.

6. Ibid., p. 375.

7. Cf. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, pp. 214; 247ff.

therefore defends, though it does not found, the great fundamental rights and interests of the individual.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Professor John Dewey is not so much interested in the nature of the individual but rather with his role in education. That role consists in the breaking away from the authority of custom and tradition as standards with the aim of redirecting and reconstructing accepted beliefs. This calls for intellectual freedom and makes valuable the cultivation of individual differences, especially for a progressive society.⁸ In so far as this is a reaction against customs and traditions as such, Dewey is much more radical than Bowne. As descriptive of the method of the individual's mental growth it is similar to Bowne's statement that

"...a world of things can exist for us only as the mind reconstructs it as a world of thought." ⁹

We have previously called attention to Bowne's stress upon the importance of the individual in such statements as:

"...man is no impotent annex to a self-sufficient mechanical system, but is rather a very significant factor in cosmic ongoing, at least in terrestrial regions." ¹⁰

Such a view is much disputed by present day writers. The individual is looked upon as subordinate in various ways. To one he is subordinate to society,¹¹ to another the individual is dependent upon heredity, being an experiment in racial evolution.¹² A third makes the physical environment the fundamental and determining fact and the social group all important.¹³ This last writer also mentions freedom in a natural-

8. Cf. Dewey, John, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 346, 356f.

9. Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, p. 56.

10. Bowne, *Personalism*, p. 277.

11. Cf. Bode, *Modern Educational Theories*, p. 324f.

12. Cf. Henderson, *Textbook in the Principles of Education*, p. 140, 148.

13. Cf. Howerth, *The Theory of Education*, pp. 105, 362.

istic way saying

"..there is no freedom but the freedom which comes from the adjustment of the individual in his subordinate relation." 14

Of these leading writers in the educational philosophy field, only one is in close accord with Bowne. This one is Professor Horne, who views man in relation to the whole cosmic process, giving his origin as God, his nature as freedom, and his destiny

"..to grow unceasingly into the likeness of the Infinite Being." 15

Their definitions of freedom are also quite similar, Horne defining it as

"..the freedom of consciousness to realize in some measure, through efforts of attention, its own selected ends," 16

while Bowne says

"..we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization." 17

Among present day writers there is considerable emphasis upon individual differences. As to the importance of this, Bode says it has been greatly over-rated,¹⁸ while Howerth recognizes its importance but dismisses these differences as a "commonplace fact of general observation," long taught by biology as the "principle of variation."¹⁹

Chapman and Counts in their "Principles of Education" however, make this most important. In as much as, to them, the nature of the individual determines the educational program, the individual differences should and do receive considerable space. As a result of this view they hold

14. Ibid., p. 116

15. Horne, The Philosophy of Education, p. 273, 283.

16. Ibid., pp. 276-277.

17. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 405.

18. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 305.

19. Howerth, Op., Cit., p. 305.

that the curriculum should be quite flexible.²⁰

Throughout his writings Bowne recognizes the individual as of supreme importance. This world is a world of individual persons. However he is interested in the individual as being a bearer of "the ideal of humanity,"²¹ and while his views are consistent with those given above he does not carry his discussion into its educational implications.

3. Conclusions.

In summing up these views of the individual we note the following points.

(1) Professor Bowne has a more idealistic view than most, emphasizing the cosmic importance of the individual, his relative freedom of self-direction, and his nature as a created spirit, -mind and purpose being greater than body.

(2) The present day trend stresses the subordination of the individual to his physical and social environment, and his physical and social heredity.

(3) Present day writers naturally carry their views to their implied applications in education more adequately than does Bowne.

(4) Professor Bowne's views find support in the educational philosophy of today and are nowhere ruled out as outworn or disproven though in some instances they are the views of a minority.

Taking up our second topic we now turn to the discussion of method.

Method.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

In the many volumes which he has written, Professor Bowne gives a masterly example of his ideas regarding method, both as scientific and as metaphysical. Critical for the most part, and very logical, he is careful in seeing that his reasoning does not refute his own first

20. Cf. Chapman and Counts, Principles of Education, p. 50f.; 186.

21. Cf. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 209f.

principles. His works are free from self-contradiction, though not studiously so. They rather reflect a consistent viewpoint which is maintained throughout.

We have previously mentioned that one of Bowne's recognized contributions to modern logic is his discussion of the more common fallacies of applied methods. Chief among these are: the fallacy of the universal as applied to concepts, in which we mistake class terms for things; the fallacy of abstraction as applied to principles; and the fallacies of language. Of these last, the more common are: using the word for the thing; calling verbal consequences logical consequences; arguing from the metaphor involved in the word; and fancying that a new name means a new thing.²²

In discussing the method of research he shows the necessity of both induction and deduction, the former to help us to premises, and the latter to draw the conclusions. He analyzes the "great method of research" as follows:

"First, we observe the facts and form a provisional theory or hypothesis. Secondly, we deduce the conclusions from the hypothesis; and thirdly, we compare the inferred facts with the observed ones. Disagreement disproves the theory. Agreement strengthens our faith, and, when extended, confirms it."²³

Moreover the word "hypothesis" is synonymous with "theory" and means:

"..an ideal conception whereby the mind seeks to reduce a set of facts to rational order and make them intelligible to itself."²³

He calls attention to the fact that hypotheses demand an act of intuition, thus going beyond logic to individual insight, and for this no rule can be given.

The scientific method, which a study of reality must largely follow,

22. Cf. Bowne, *Theory of Thought and Knowledge*, pp. 239-263; 147.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 206ff.

is shown to follow this procedure:

"Decompose the fact into its simplest elements and seek for the elementary laws which govern their combination. Then the fact may be exhibited as the result of its components if it coexist with them, or of its antecedents if it succeeds them. All wholes must be understood from their parts, all compounds from their components, all complexes from the simple factors." 24

Being scientific, however, rather than metaphysical, it deals with phenomena and discovers phenomenal connections. Science itself is limited, never reaching anything final, and giving only a partial view. It overlooks the invisible dynamic system which is most real, dealing simply with the world of sense experience. 25

The world of sense experience is not belittled. It has its rightful place in the practical concerns of everyday living. Science is necessary for progress, and the world of sense experience is its field of activity. It is only in the world of volitional causality that we must restrict it. Here explanation comes to purpose or final cause, the ultimate ground of which is found only in free intelligence. 26

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Even a brief survey of present day writers would indicate a strong tendency to make the so-called "scientific method" the only real method. The leader in this move is Dewey who says pragmatically

"Method is a statement of the way the subject matter of experience develops most effectively and fruitfully." 27

For him it is developing in the direction of social efficiency. Chapman and Counts praise the method which most economically secures the highest quality of product, the product being good study habits. 28 Another writer

24. Ibid., p. 223.

25. Cf., Ibid., 223ff.

26. Cf. Bowne, *Metaphysics*, p. 233f.

27. Dewey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 211.

28. Cf. Chapman and Counts, *Op. Cit.*, p. 541ff.

views scientific method as being the process by which man secures control over his destiny and sets his intelligence free.²⁹ Howerth's view is even more mechanical and naturalistic, method here being:

"..essentially an attempt to control a natural force through the application of a natural mechanical principle." 30

This view of method naturally reflects itself in its treatment of the cultural or classical side of learning. Learning is made subject to its practical utility, along the lines of the given profession.³¹

While Professor Bowne makes no plea for the classics, he does warn of the danger of a one-sided scientific training such as is likely to result from the above.

The above view of method is not unqualifiedly held, however. Henderson brings method over into the field of attitudes and standards and stresses the importance of reasoning,³² while Horne goes further toward a well-rounded discussion of various types of method, not omitting the reflective thinking of philosophy.³³

We find throughout these writers the modern emphasis upon life-centered learning with the child at the center, and the method adapted to the needs and capacities of each age level. A similar point of view is given by Bowne in treating the religious education of the child, as described in chapter six.

3. Conclusions.

Summing up we have the following points.

(1) Professor Bowne discusses the steps in scientific method in practically the same manner as present day writers.

29. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 270.

30. Howerth, Op. Cit., p. 162.

31. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 144; Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 264f.

32. Cf. Henderson, Op. Cit., p. 269f.

33. Cf. Horne, Op. Cit., p. 309f.

(2) There is a modern trend which stresses scientific method disproportionately to other types of method, especially the more reflective method of philosophy.

(3) In common with a minority view Professor Bowne recognizes scientific method as good in its place but includes other methods as vitally necessary in the educational process.

(4) Professor Bowne would warn against the modern trend which seeks utility in all learning, in so far as it results in an over-balanced scientific training.

(5) Professor Bowne reflects the up-to-date emphasis upon the adapting of method to age and capacity.

(6) Professor Bowne makes a contribution to the discussion of method in his clarifying of the more common structural fallacies.

Thinking involves method to some extent and has in one instance been identified with it. We discuss it next.

Thinking.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

Under section two of chapter five we gave an exposition of Professor Bowne's theory of thought. In the light of that we shall briefly summarize those phases of the discussion which are here pertinent.

Thinking is an active process whereby the mind works over the raw material received by the senses into the forms of intelligence. It is more than the passiveness of mere impressibility. It is also more than sensations or the mechanical order of association. It is rather a surplusage over these, an interpreting and relating activity. In this thinking process the mind works according to principles natural to itself and therefore not describable. It cannot be explained by the basic laws of experience but rather explains them.

The result of thinking is truth or knowledge. This thinking is reliable for building up within the mind an order of fact or reason which is common to all minds, which is therefore objective to, and independent

of, itself.

The thought life is rooted in our nature and begins without our reflective volition. When it becomes self-conscious and reflective it rises into freedom. Then it is carried on by judgments. These judgments require that there be a unified self back of them which is also abiding. It also requires that the objects of thought must not be isolated and unrelated, but must form a system or exist in systematic connection.

The mind rebuilds a world of things into a world of thought through a constructive perception. The reaction is an expression of the mind's nature under the circumstances. Psychology indicates that there are definite nervous changes accompanying perception but to identify these changes with subjective impression belittles this creative mental action.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Whether as thinking, reflection, or reasoning, this topic is not as widely or thoroughly treated as were the first two.

One of the most noticeable phases of its treatment are the attempts to picture the mental process. As a result of this desire Dewey identifies thinking with method and gives the same steps for both.³⁴

Chapman and Counts follow Dewey in this regard, accepting his views.³⁵

It is clear from our study of Bowne that he would look upon this as an attempt to picture the unpicturable and to ignore the intuitive element of the process. Henderson comes closer to Bowne's position by making his steps a little less definite and applying them to the judgment instead of the actual thinking process itself which involves the judgments. He

34. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 177.

35. Cf. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 105.

pictures first a critical attitude, followed next by an attitude of experimentation and original endeavor, to which experimental perception adds data, and finally, the logical resolution of the aggregate idea into a coherent decision.³⁶

A second tendency in the treatment of thinking is to tie it up with the immediate control or guidance of activity. Thus Dewey defines it as "...the accurate and deliberate instituting of connections between what is done and its consequences,"³⁷

while Chapman and Counts restrict it to "a conscious attempt to control activity."³⁸ Bode looks upon it as adaptive behavior.³⁹

As in the treatment of "method" this indicates a pragmatic, utilitarian attitude which tends to belittle "creative mental action." The self-conscious, intelligent self which is so important to Bowne becomes a somewhat mechanical, behaving organism. One of the above texts even goes so far as to make thinking the product of "a host of language habits."⁴⁰ The same book, however, views reflection as directive, adaptive, and auto-critical, thus implying a self-conscious agent after having apparently denied one. Bowne clearly objects to such apparent contradiction as being evidence of unsound thinking. He also says that, in regard to language, mental activity must precede, for

"When the classifying tendency of the mind is lacking, there can be no rational utterance, for there would be nothing to utter."⁴¹

3. Conclusion.

We conclude from the above that:

(1) Professor Bowne's treatment of thinking takes account of the creative activity of a personal self, and is therefore more idealistic

36. Cf. Henderson, Op. Cit., p. 249.

37. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 177.

38. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 99.

39. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 199.

40. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 94.

41. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 263.

than the words of these present day writers quoted.

(2) Present day writers frequently attempt to picture the thinking process, thus making thinking almost identical with good method.

(3) The present trend is to look upon thinking as a rather mechanical guide or control of activity.

(4) Thinking therefore tends to be valued as an instrument to be used in securing utilitarian ends rather than as a means of reaching eternal truth or knowledge.

Democracy.

This topic, in so far as it is not to overlap the discussion of "society", receives treatment as a particular kind of society. It is the ideal of the future rather than the practice of the present.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

Although Professor Bowne gives considerable attention to the ethics of society he does not spend much time in discussing its ideal implications. Such discussions, he holds, are very liable to lose sight of practical applications. He says in this regard that

"..many have been so impressed by the beauty and majesty of the ideal of society as an incarnation of the moral order of the world that they have overlooked its instrumental character altogether, and have erected it into the great end of human development. The individual is only the material for filling out the social form, which, in turn, has supreme value in itself. Against this view we must point out that, after all, the individual is the only concrete reality in the case, and that all social forms, of whatever kind, must be judged by their relation to the realizing of personal life." 42

However, we may judge of his goal for society. It is the development of good will and insight in such a way as to remove the need of society as a restraining or coercing power. In such a stage of moral and mental attainment society, as an aggregate of individuals, would meet all the demands of personal and social development. It would have wisdom enough to understand the conditions of life and the common good, and there

42. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 352.

43. Cf., Ibid., p. 249.

would be the will to co-operate in securing it. Thus external law and authority would become unnecessary.

His view is essentially that of the Christian conception of the kingdom of God upon earth. Seeking this kingdom is his one panacea for the woes of life and society. Its mark is justice, good-will, and mutual confidence, and these are necessary for peace and progress. He concludes that

"It is beyond question that the only sure and effective way of healing our social woes is to begin to love God with all our heart and our neighbors as ourselves." 44

Only in this way will it be possible to make righteousness and good will "stand fast and bear rule in the earth."

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

The ideal society receives considerable discussion under the title "democracy." It is the ruling conception in Dr. Dewey's text. By this term he means "conjoint communicated experience." The making of mutual interests basic both as a means of social control and for co-operation is 45 strongly stressed by both this writer and Professor Bode. The contrast here with Professor Bowne is between mutual and shared interests which are necessary for social relations of the right type, and, on the other hand, good will which naturally expresses itself in right relations. The former is outer motivation, the latter is inner. In this light Bowne's view would seem to be more basic without denying or shutting out the other idea. The one comes from the heart, the other from the activity.

The natural result of Dewey's view appears in his making social

44. Bowne, "Law of Successful Living," Zion's Herald, June 15, 1904, p.449.

45. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 100; Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 14.

46

efficiency a leading purpose of education, a result which we previously criticized by a use of Bowne's own words. With Professor Bode we come out at a somewhat different place. He regards the characteristic traits of democracy as the refusal to accept any standards as absolute or fixed and concern about future changes.⁴⁷ In this way the external guide of "mutual interests" results not only in no standard but goes further and decries the use of any standard which is not relative to the interests themselves. This is the pragmatic, experimental view.

Several other writers express themselves on this topic in words quite similar to those of Bowne. For example Chapman and Counts say:

"The worth of social life must be measured in terms of its contribution to the growth of human personality and to the development of the potentialities latent in original nature." 48

Howerth gives the goal as

"..the development of the highest personality in the citizens of the state." 49

Henderson also implies a like view in calling for a moral element in the curriculum and a liberal culture for all.⁵⁰

In one place democracy is referred to as a state of mind bent upon humanizing both the social order and the school curriculum.⁵¹ Bowne sees a trend in this direction in economic conditions where people are doing away with that cheapening of production which comes with the cheapening of humanity.⁵²

The above are the main points in the agreements and disagreements which center about this topic.

46. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 144.
47. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., pp. 68, 237.
48. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 275.
49. Howerth, Op. Cit., p. 232-233.
50. Cf. Henderson, Op. Cit., pp. 259, 269.
51. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., p. 11ff.
52. Cf. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 259.

3. Conclusions.

(1) There is a present day trend toward interpreting democracy as a society where mutual, shared interests are basic and controlling.

(2) Mutual interest is an external guide resulting in goals of "social efficiency," and tending to do away with fixed standards.

(3) Professor Bowne looks upon good will as basic in the best society, thus giving inner motivation for social relations.

(4) There is agreement between Professor Bowne and a number of present day writers in making the goal of society the development of the highest personality.

Environment.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

In a preceding chapter on educational views we touched upon Bowne's view of the environment. For the sake of clearness we shall repeat some of that material, though enlarging upon it.

In that place we found an insight into his estimate of the physical environment as educative. In so far as man tends to make his environment more than it makes him, according to this view, man may receive from it "some hygienic virtues and elementary decencies."⁵³ Beyond this the physical environment is valuable as the stuff which conditions our every day living and as the medium of expressing the purposes of persons. As the abiding elements in our common sense experience, the physical world has its laws and the mastering of them is important both for practical living and for the indications of reality or intelligence which are found to underlie them. The physical environment is subject to the remaking and perfecting which will only come as human beings carry it out.

The social environment is recognized as more important than the

53. Bowne, "Law of Successful Living," in Zion's Herald, June 15, 1904, p. 449.

physical. Thought itself is developed only in and through society. Social relations are the sole seat of the benevolent and malevolent impulses. The social stimulus is necessary to develop human beings. On the other hand we must guard against making society "the sufficient source of all individual experience."⁵⁴

Most important of all, however, is man's spiritual environment.

"The material world is not compounded of atoms and their forces, but is rather a product of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is continually supported, and from which it incessantly proceeds."⁵⁵

We live in a spiritual realm, ruled over by a Personal intelligence. The "World-ground" or God is working out his purposes in and through us, and as we recognize this and with our limited freedom lay ourselves open to the spiritual environment we take on the worth and dignity of persons.

2. Views of leading present-day writers in contrast.

The views of Professor Bowne, as indicated above, are beautifully reproduced in the work of Dr. Horne. He gives the environment of man as spiritual, -as centered in God -saying:

"Science, reached by the intellect of man, is the thought of God in the world; Art, reached by the emotions of man, is the feeling of God in the world; and volition, as expressed through the will of man, is the plan of God in the world."⁵⁶

This environment has been worked out in the experience of the race and is involved in the relation of man to his fellows, to their achievements,⁵⁷ and to his own personal ideals.

An opposing view is that of Dr. Dewey, who, in line with his pragmatic position, limits environment to the conditions involved in activity.

54. Bowne, Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 197.

55. Bowne, Metaphysics, p. 243.

56. Horne, Op. Cit., p. 271.

57. Cf., Ibid., p. 98f.

He writes:

"The environment consists of the sum total of conditions which are concerned in the execution of the activity characteristic of a living being.." and the "...social environment consists of all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up in the carrying on of the activities of any one of its members." 58

Thus the physical enters into our environment in so far as we react to it, as does also the social. Anything that does not enter into human activity is ruled out of the environment. There is no such thing as a spiritual environment which abides. Dewey further differs from Bowne in making the environment the force which settles the development and use of native equipment. 59 Here the environment makes man more than he makes it, though in the long run education is able to reorganize experience, thus adding to its meaning, and enabling individuals to better direct future experience. This is, of course, looked upon as a purely human process rather than as the divine purpose working itself out in and through man.

Howerth treats this subject in loose fashion, regarding environment as agencies without and ideas within. He also makes it a determining factor in education, even making it, in a sense, causal in heredity. 60

The other writers are silent on this topic.

3. Conclusions.

(1) Environment is viewed in two lights: as purely material and human, and as the Divine plan working out its purposes in man.

(2) As purely finite, the physical and social environment is a determining factor in education enabling human beings to improve it in the interest of its improving them in turn.

(3) Professor Bowne's view of the environment as spiritual is upheld in present day theory.

(4) The spiritual environment recognizes physical and social values, but transcends them by building them into the cosmic plan.

58. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 26.

59. Cf., Ibid., p. 87f.

60. Cf. Howerth, Op. Cit., pp. 175, 180.

We next turn to the topic which is perhaps most important from Professor Bowne's point of view.

Personality.

1. Professor Bowne's view.

In the previous discussion of Professor Bowne's philosophical views we found that the key-note of his system was personality. For our present purpose we shall re-summarize such of that material as bears
61
directly on this topic.

The fact that even now a very large part of the real issues and meanings of life are invisible and unpicturable in physical forms, and that the objects of space and time are largely symbolical in function, indicates a great invisible power behind the scenes of every day life. It appears that this power is using the space and time world to express and communicate its purposes. Space objects have no meaningful existence apart from intelligence. They are throughout dependent, instrumental, and phenomenal. They take on meaning as the "flowing expression and means of communication" of personal beings. This all leads to the conclusion that we have a world of persons with a Supreme Person at its head.

This Supreme Person, moreover, appears to be a free, self-conscious agent having a unified existence. This is necessary if the many persons are unpicturably dependent and yet are to have the "mutual otherness" of distinct persons. Only so would the relation of love and obedience be possible, or mutual understanding and sympathy. This is also a pre-condition of religious quality or relation.

61. Cf. Bowne, Personalism, chapter 6; also Chapter five, section five.

In this connection, religion, as a real fact of human experience, not only leads to a personal conception of existence, but must develop further in this direction. It must lead to a worship concept that satisfies the intellect. It must also lead to affirming a Supreme Reason, a supreme righteousness, a supreme goodness, and an adequate object of supreme inspiration for the human will.

In the light of the above, man as a personal being comes to have great significance in the universe, at least in terrestrial regions. The space world is largely a potentiality, waiting for realization by man himself. Thus, being in a personal world, we seek the final cause of nature in the personal and moral realm. Nature is an order of uniformity which is absolutely dependent, being established and maintained by an ever-living and ever-acting intelligence and will.

Man's experience as a person reveals a limited self-control and also a lack of self-sufficiency. This necessitates the maintaining of freedom for both the finite and the infinite spirit as its explanation. The freedom of the finite spirit results in the limited self-control. The freedom of the infinite spirit makes us lack full self-sufficiency. The setting up of nature as an order of uniformity, and the laws of thought, which are absolute uniformities of reason, is a pre-supposition of our freedom.

"The order of law is the one thing that founds our control of nature, and by means of it we continue to bring to pass many things which the system of law, left to itself, would never accomplish." 62

For example, the lack of what we call the law of gravity as something which is uniformly and consistently true would effectively remove man's

62. Ibid., p. 319.

freedom to build machinery that made use of the pull of gravity, if it did nothing worse.

Such things as the above are explainable in action rather than in speculation, in concrete experience more than in abstract theory. However, this leads to a warning against explaining things in terms of space forms. Such attempts lead to the substituting of the body for the personality. This in turn leads to materialism and the cerebral psychology of "behaviorism." Bowne calls this the "mythologies of cerebral psychology," and concludes that

"When the mental facts are seen in their true nature, the impossibility of assimilating them to any kind of physical fact is at once obvious."⁶³

The laws of reason, in like manner, do not bind us to a fixed impersonal order. On the other hand they cannot insure right thinking without the self-control of the free spirit.

As a result of, and growing out of the above view, we define personality as referring to the quality of freedom, dignity, and worth which attaches to human persons, who engage in purposeful activity, and who are dependent upon, and inspired by, a Supreme Reason. This Reason, in turn, as a personal agent, is working out through them His righteous and good purposes.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Personality, as a topic, while regarded as important, is not much discussed by present day writers in the field of educational philosophy. The dominating philosophical view of pragmatism, and its materialistic neighbor in the psychological field, behaviorism, which is also claiming to be a philosophy, seem to shun such topics as self-consciousness, personal

63. Ibid., p. 315.

influence, and the like. For example we find Dewey identifying personality as development with the attaining of a culture which leads to social efficiency. He says:

"Whenever distinctive quality is developed, distinction of personality results, and with it greater promise for a social service which goes beyond the supply in quantity of material commodities." 64

In a more behavioristic vein another view regards personality as that which

"..is revealed by the sum total of his specific responses to particular situations," or as "..an individual's total assets on the reaction side." 65

The holders of this view, Chapman and Counts, further stress the perfectly integrated and harmonized nature of reactions which mark the concept of personality.

A view more definitely in harmony with Bowne's views defines personality as

"..the spirit that unifies the attainments of a man; it is his attitude toward life, his point of view, his total character." 66

This writer also recognizes the freedom and worth of persons, especially in his attaching of large significance to the personal influence of the school teacher.

3. Conclusions.

(1) We may conclude that the topic of personality is receiving a minor emphasis among present day writers and in most cases is related to consistent social behavior.

(2) Professor Bowne's views are represented in present day writing.

(3) Professor Bowne's views would harmonize with present day views, for the most part, as far as they go, his probable criticism bearing

64. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 142.

65. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 123f.

66. Horne, Op. Cit., p. 186ff.

more on their lack and their implications, rather than on their errors.

(4) Professor Bowne's views add much that is wholesome and valuable: the dignity and worth of human persons, the purposive nature of human life, the significance of human persons in relation to the universe, the personal and purposive nature of the universe and its Creator, the rightful place and value of religion and its concepts, being examples.

Society.

In the discussion of the topic "democracy" we indicated that it referred to the ideal society. In so far as this present topic is distinct from that, it refers to the present state of society. As such we find it receiving more attention by Professor Bowne who writes upon the "ethics of society."

67

1. Professor Bowne's views.

Society is

"...a social organism which assumes to control and, if need be, to restrain and coerce the individual.." 68

for the common good. The common good is conditioned by moral principles and consists in the defence by society of the great fundamental rights and interests of property, family, contract, and the security of the individual. The necessity of this defence arises from the fact that men lack insight and are often ignorant and selfish. Society has therefore grown as the need for it has been felt, and the growth has been sporadic, in line with physical forces, as a rule, rather than moral and rational considerations. As a result we find caste distinctions of many kinds which are often the mark of war and conquest.

Present day man must also accept society as part of the constitution of things. We are to a large extent creatures of society, being born

67. Cf. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, chapter 10.

68. Ibid., p. 247.

into it, and having its influences bred into us. We are therefore rightly responsible to it. The distinctions drawn between the individual and society are likewise largely abstractions, the relations of the two being relative to social and individual development and discernible, at best, only by a close study of experience. Inasmuch as the prosperity of each is bound up in the well-being of the other, social equilibrium can only be assured through utter impartiality of social action. The rich must not oppress the poor nor the poor plunder the rich.

Even as excessive individualism is a bad extreme, so too is the complete subjection of the person, though this may be a necessity of embryonic societies under despotic or paternal governments. Social reform on a socialistic basis with law as the instrument of transformation is no better than a social reaction against individualism. The ills of society spring rather from selfishness and we need a new spirit in the individual and in society rather than new forms.

Progress in society comes with the moralizing and humanizing of conditions. Economically this means that humanity, and not material production, must be the aim. Socially it means that there must be equality of opportunity. Morally it means that the "good will" must prevail. Society's highest goal will then be progress in the direction of the realizing of personal life.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Among present day views the goal of society seems well expressed as
 69
 "a unified whole of component parts." This would be variously

interpreted. One writer would look upon it as meaning the breaking down of the many minor groups which make up society and which are due to selfishness or expressions of various kinds of superiority, with the setting up as a goal the strengthening of free intercourse and communication. This means holding in common "aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge."

Two other writers would interpret this goal in the light of a modern trend toward internationalism which they feel to be perceptible and which they discuss as the "great society." This trend is to be helped along through educating for citizenship. They add an element of idealism to their discussion of the best type of social approval. It consists in seeking approval

"..before an imaginary gallery peopled by the prophets, priests, and seers in whose ideal presence the individual has chosen to live," conduct being shaped by..."those great precepts, admonitions and ideals -the distillate of the wisdom and heroism of the ages." 72

Society is criticized as being rather discouraging to creative thinking and as wielding social approval and disapproval in a way that is not always to the highest good. Another writer, Bode, criticizes sociological determination as a means of working out the objectives of education.

The most common agreement comes in the several suggestions as to how the school must preserve the good of the past, enrich it in the present, and pass it on to a future society which will thereby be improved.

3. Conclusions.

(1) Professor Bowne and present day writers are in close agreement in their expressed views of society.

70. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 94, 115.

71. Cf. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 31ff.

72. Ibid., p. 129f.

73. Cf., Ibid., pp. 111, 129.

74. Cf. Bode, Op. Cit., pp. 124ff.

(2) Professor Bowne, having discussed the ethics of society, gives a more thorough treatment of the topic, though present day writers have given the topic more of an educational application.

(3) Professor Bowne's chief contribution lies in his emphasizing of a sane balance between individualism and socialism, in his ever present emphasis on practical life as a basis for understanding social problems, and in his placing human, personal values foremost.

Vocational education.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

Vocational education as an organized movement in the educational field is of such recent origin that it was not a major problem during Bowne's lifetime. For that reason, together with the fact that this is largely in the field of applied principles, Bowne has very little to contribute.

We have mentioned, in a previous chapter, that Bowne was convinced of the danger of over-specialization along the line of science training, and that he did not, in the same connection, attempt to present any claims for classical study.

In discussing the ethics of the individual, he has this to say:

"A person's vocation is the general form under which he serves both society and himself, and by which he vindicates a place for himself and a title to moral consideration in our workaday world. Rightly understood, the vocation is an institution of great and growing moral significance. In whatever way we approach the subject, we are led to condemn the drone, the trifler, the idle consumer in a world like ours. He has, indeed, been the object of much admiration, especially in countries with aristocratic institutions, but he is slowly coming to be an object of general contempt and condemnation." 75

Beyond this we find little in his works that has more than a vague, general application to this topic.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Vocational education has grown up, for the most part, as an attempt to prepare young people wisely for their vocations. The age of apprentice-

75. Bowne, Principles of Ethics, p. 210.

ship has given way to an age of machinery and mass production. This transition has made it necessary to provide specialized training, especially for those unable to finance the taking of the higher educational training. As a result various kinds of trade and vocational schools have sprung up which aim to give training for specific occupations. Most educational writers confine themselves to a discussion of ways of improving these schools. Such for example is the method of Chapman and Counts in their text.

There are those, however, who would prefer to reorganize the whole school system from the vocational viewpoint. A basic assumption, upon which they proceed, is that intelligence is best exercised within activity which puts nature to human use, and that individual culture is best secured through social conditions. In such a system culture is to justify itself vocationally, that is, contribute to the broadening of particular vocations rather than exist for its own sake or enjoyment. Thus vocational education becomes the type of true, purposive education. In the same way, traditional emphasis upon a liberal and cultural education for the few is ruled out.

76

This is the view of Professor Dewey, and it is approximated by Professor Bode who would broaden vocational training and make it the gateway to participation in all the major interests of the race and look upon culture as a way of life. The task would then be to give the pupil a social insight into the underlying principles of vocations and of life.

77

Such are the main views expressed upon this topic.

3. Conclusions.

(1) Professor Bowne agrees with the best thought of the present in holding that the individual has a vocational responsibility to society and

76. Cf. Dewey, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 376ff.

77. Cf. Bode, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 70, 264, 302-304.

should not be a consumer without also producing.

(2) There is a strong tendency to reorganize education in terms of a broad vocational training which minimizes classical study, as such.

(3) Professor Bowne would disagree with the movement in so far as it put an overbalanced emphasis upon the more manual types of occupations, or attempted to discredit all philosophical and classical study which did not have an immediate utilitarian value.

Interest.

This is a topic which has come into fuller prominence of late years, especially in relation to effort, and as such receives very little treatment by Professor Bowne.

1. Professor Bowne's views.

From the writings of Bowne's students we know that he both interested them and took interest in them. He seems to have greatly admired the ability to put forth real, concentrated effort, especially along lines of philosophical thought. Moreover he had little interest in students who did not put forth honest effort in the solution of their problems. He seems also to have had a "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude towards his students.

Once they decided to "take-it" however he was more than ready to help them. 78

Beyond drawing inferences such as are suggested in the above paragraph, Professor Bowne did not treat this topic directly.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

Briefly stated the doctrine of interest holds that learning takes place more quickly and with less effort when interest attaches to the content or activity being learned, and that such motivation dissolves the problem of discipline. Then as lesson content becomes artificial and unlikelike, it not only tends to require disagreeable effort but becomes bad content.

78. Cf. McConnell, Borden Parker Bowne, p. 38f.

Interest therefore often becomes a criteria of good, life-centered curriculum materials, and the requiring of effort a criteria of forced learning of unlife-centered curriculum materials.

As all educators will agree that learning has a valuable ally if interest attaches to the particular thing being learned, the difference of opinion centers upon the use of effort. The chief danger of interest is that it may be achieved through what is termed "sugar-coating."

Only three of the present day writers examined discuss this topic. The foremost in accepting the newer position is Dewey who maintains that interest is the essential motivation for learning and is therefore the criterion of subject matter of instruction. He claims that activity, if really purposive, will be interesting to the pupil, and he therefore feels that the curriculum should be reorganized in terms of purposeful activities.
79

"Interest means that one is identified with the objects which define the activity and which furnish the means and obstacles to its realization." 79

A second view refuses to make interest the leading criterion as child interests are not necessarily indicative of leading needs and are often changeable. He does, however, make it one of three criteria, the other two being the content value and the procedure value.
80

The third view recognizes the importance of interest and gives it as an immediate aim of instruction. Effort is often necessary though and may sometimes even lead to interest. Therefore interest is given a relative position along with effort and the sense of "ought."
81

79. Cf. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 152f; quotation p. 161.

80. Cf. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., pp. 376, 395, 410.

81. Cf. Horne, Op. Cit., pp. 193, 313.

The second and third of the above views would seem to be in line with traditional thought and therefore akin to the view with which Professor Bowne would have agreed. He would no doubt have taken issue with Dewey's point of view as it here appears since he placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability and value of good hard mental effort, recognizing at the same time that Dewey's view contains some real values.

3. Conclusions.

(1) The "doctrine of interest" in its relation to effort, as discussed by present educational writers, has increased in importance as an educational problem since Bowne's death and is too specialized in the field of education to have been discussed by him.

(2) Professor Bowne's apparent attitude toward interest and effort in learning is the traditional attitude of appreciating the former and not being afraid to use the latter.

(3) This traditional view is upheld in present day educational philosophy.

(4) The view which discounts effort and makes interest the leading criterion of subject matter is strongly held by one present day writer and refuted by two others.

Morals.

In discussing Professor Bowne's theory of ethics this topic was given careful treatment. We shall therefore briefly summarize the leading ideas presented in that place.

1. Professor Bowne's views. ⁸²

The fundamental moral ideas are good, duty, and virtue. The third named is assimilated by the first two as a rule. The first two, in themselves and considered separately, are unlawful abstractions. All three must be united so that we have goods of some kind to give rational meaning to duty, and then we must make virtue the free and loving performance of

82. Cf. chapter five, part four.

Cf. also Bowne, Principles of Ethics.

duty. In this way we unite the intentions or motives with the good actually accomplished, and keep both close to everyday life.

The standards of morality are three: first, moral obligation which arises as the free spirit imposes duty upon itself; second, the recognition of the duty and good desert of acting from good will, and the sin and ill desert of acting from evil will, a necessary standard wherever mutual influence is possible; and third, the accepting of the moral idea as a process of growth in the direction of human worth and dignity.

The directions of moral growth are also three: the inner sense, the outer code, and universal application. The first refers to the unfolding of the moral ideal and the strengthening of the sense of duty within the moral person. The second refers to the applying of the moral ideal to action through the formation of corresponding codes and the development of institutions. The third calls for an extension of the moral field to include the entire life of the individual, and all individuals.

The Christian religion is looked upon as a very definite aid to morals in the field of extra-ethical conceptions. Through its conceptions have been clarified, man has been given an inalienable sacredness, the moral law has been made the expression of a Holy Will within us, inspiration has been given to moral living, and the benevolent nature of God has been affirmed.

In applying the above views Professor Bowne seeks the field of ethics in the natural life saying

"..the fruitful work of ethics must lie not in the invention of codes, or in random casuistry and apriori speculation, but in a study and criticism of the great leading forms of life itself..social intercourse, the family, the state and the church.." 83

The spiritual is, in this light, seen as not being apart from the natural life, but is rather the natural rising to its ideal form through the free activity of the moral person. To attain this we must make the life that now is the expression of good will. By doing our duty to ourselves we attain inward worth and peace, by giving service to the common good we secure outward fortune and happiness. Morality's greatest need is to build up the impartial and unselfish will to do right, and to avoid abstractions. Next to this good will, the great need is the serious and thoughtful application of intellect to the problems of life and conduct, the breaking down of indifference to right doing. Social righteousness 84 lives only in the continual moral vigilance of the people.

In closing his discussion, Bowne warns us against the "respectable class" as being most dangerous in its too frequent indifference and smug self-respectability. He also warns against an abstract and impracticable idealism. Ethics divorced from practical wisdom and everyday life prevents 84 the attainment of its own ends.

2. Views of leading present day writers in contrast.

In present day theory three leading views are presented. Two of these views are ^{mutually} contradictory. Of these two the first is that of Professor Horne, who parallels the thought of Professor Bowne more thoroughly, if not more closely, in the discussion of this topic, than in any of the preceding ones. For him, morality is the volition of the individual in the presence of right and wrong, and the recognition of the rights of others in conduct. It grows out of the sense of the unity of human nature, and is enforced by the self-destructive results of evil and

84. Cf., Ibid., pp. 304-309.

the self-preserving results of good, results that are constitutional in life. It differs from religion in being man's relation to man, and is developed through the imitation of good copies. ⁸⁵

The contradictory view is held by Professor Dewey, who identifies the moral with the social quality of conduct, and calls effectively sharing in social life, moral living. According to this view morals cannot be limited to a list of definite acts, and to maintain capacity ⁸⁶ for education towards a social spirit becomes the essence of morals. We see by this that the contradiction is not so much in what is given, as in what is implied by the given and what is left out. The inference is that morality is entirely social and is to be judged by the effectiveness of the sharing involved. No authoritative basis is given for judging the wholesomeness of the activity itself beyond its own purposiveness. Not limiting morals to definite acts is in danger of two things which Professor Bowne warns against. The first is the practical realization that morals, as expressions of human relations, can only be practiced by individuals in definite acts, and the second is the setting up of an abstraction, such as Dewey does in speaking of "social spirit" or "social efficiency." Lack of an authoritative basis outside the activity tends to limit those standards which appear to inhere in the constitution of things, or which come from religion.

A third view of morals is that which accepts the practical ideas and fruits of Bowne's and Horne's system but fails to recognize the purposive element of a righteous and Divine Intelligence. Such a view is suggested by Chapman and Counts when they write:

85. Cf. Horne, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 140f., 180f.

86. Cf. Dewey, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 414-418.

"Indeed religion in its highest form has been aptly defined as morality touched with emotion, and, perhaps we might add, with meaning." 87

Two other writers touch upon this topic indirectly. One holds that the interests of society demand that the child be moralized, and suggests example and imitation as the most valuable means. 88 The other recognizes the need for training in moral ideals but looks upon it as the task of the home and the church. 89

3. Conclusions.

(1) Professor Bowne gives a very thorough treatment of the topic of morals with a practical application to life.

(2) Professor Bowne's view is held and implied by most of the writers surveyed, being very closely paralleled by one.

(3) The leading opposing view reduces morals to the effectiveness of social sharing and intercourse, and identifies moral training with good social training.

(4) Professor Bowne would accept the value of effective social sharing, and criticize the rest of this last view as verging upon theoretical abstraction, and as refusing to recognize authoritative standards of moral conduct as these exist in the constitution of life, have been worked out in experience in the form of codes and institutions, or have been added to by revealed religion. He would rejoice in Dewey's refusal to accept traditional standards blindly.

One further point, by way of bringing this discussion to a head, remains to be considered. This consists in a comparison of the leading definitions of education, and a placing of Professor Bowne in relation to them.

On this point we have the concise words of five of the leading present day writers. These are as follows.

87. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., p. 340.

88. Cf. Howerth, Op. Cit., pp. 333, 336.

89. Cf. Henderson, Op. Cit., pp. 476, 553, 564.

Dewey.

"It is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience." 90

Chapman and Counts.

"Education, as a social process, is .. an economical method of assisting an initially ill-adapted individual, during the short period of a single life, to cope with the ever-increasing complexities of the world." "To send out interested citizens who at their various levels are eager to continue their education in life's great continuation school." 91

Herne.

"Education is the eternal process of superior adjustment of the physically and mentally developed, free, conscious, human being to God, as manifested in the intellectual, emotional, and volitional environment of man." 92

Hewerth.

The aim of education should be "...the perfection of democracy...a social ideal involving and expressing the good of all, a social ideal that is an actual projection of the existing elements of social wellbeing as scientifically determined." 93

Henderson.

"We may conclude that the ultimate end of education is that of adjusting the young to the realities of life." 94.

Bowne.

Life will be a success if "we emerge from life's work as discipline crowned souls, at home anywhere in God's universe." 95

From the central stress of all of his writings upon the worth and dignity of human personality we may well conclude that he would regard education as the means of realization of the fullest well-rounded development of human personality possible.

90. Dewey, Op. Cit., p. 89.

91. Chapman and Counts, Op. Cit., pp. 11, 565.

92. Herne, Op. Cit., p. 285.

93. Hewerth, Op. Cit., p. 281.

94. Henderson, Op. Cit., pp. 533.

95. Cf. page 12 above.

4. The value of Bowne's view for educational philosophy

In the preceding pages we have related the views of Professor Bowne to those of the present. In doing that we have evaluated the results and drawn conclusions regarding the relative values of the various views presented. Out of this process there have grown several larger conclusions which will enable us to pass a more complete and concise judgment, first, as to whether or not Professor Bowne's views are applicable to present day educational philosophy, and second, as to whether he has any contribution to make to this field of study.

The larger and more general conclusions are six in number.

1. Professor Bowne is more systematic and complete in his treatment of the philosophical principles underlying life and education, though present day writers have made more definite application of their views to the educative process. This is due to the philosophical completeness of his writings, in which he builds a well-rounded system of philosophy, a task which educational theorists do not, as a rule, attempt.

2. Professor Bowne's views are in no place regarded as outworn or impracticable by present day writers taken as a whole, as indicated in their treatment of their ten leading topics. In other words, he does not defend theories or views which are generally conceded to be outworn or discarded.

3. Professor Bowne's views are consistent throughout and are consistently upheld by one of the leading writers in the field of educational philosophy. They are in places further upheld by eclectic views as well as by the varying views of those writers who do not strictly adhere to any one interpretation of life.

95. Reference is here made to Professor Horne whose views coincide quite closely with those of Bowne. See pp. 84, 88, 96, 101, 111 above.

4. Professor Bowne is frequently in agreement with the leading opposing views in matters of practical insight which do not hinge upon or involve basic interpretations. This is evidenced, for example, in his steps in scientific method, which as method bear strong similarities with Dewey's steps, or again, when he discusses vocations and agrees with those who would vocationalize culture that those who consume goods should justify their existence by also producing goods.

5. Professor Bowne makes clear cut criticisms of many of the tendencies which are represented in present day thought and writing. This criticism is backed by sound reasoning and is applicable today.

6. Professor Bowne presents a number of contributions, and puts strong emphasis upon many views in such a way as to make his work of real value to the educational thought of today. Chief among his contributions are;

(1) A carefully worked out and consistently thought through interpretation of life which dignified the individual, his powers, and his purpose in living.

(2) A valuable treatise upon ethics which gives a constructive treatment of the morals of the individual, the family, and society.

(3) A clarifying of the structural fallacies most prevalent in philosophical thinking and writing, and a forcing of all issues back to actual living for their understanding and interpretation.

In the light of this intensive study we conclude that Professor Bowne's works furnish a substantial theory of life which could be made use of in building an educational philosophy, that his philosophy includes and clarifies theories which underlie educational practice, and that the application of his philosophy to the field of educational philosophy would bring forth beneficial results in educational practice.

96. See above; criticism of fallacies in thinking and writing (p. 36), of wrong methods in working out moral theory (p. 51f, 109); warning against dogmatic finalities (p. 41), the mechanical representation of mental activities (p. 50), the belittling of personal influence and of stressing method regardless of content (p. 61), and of securing an over-balanced scientific training (p. 62).

Chapter IX.

Summary and Conclusions

The problem of this thesis consisted in giving such an exposition and evaluation of the writings of Borden Parker Bowne as would enable the writer to compare them with current educational thinking and so draw conclusions as to the value of these views in the field of present day educational philosophy.

The primary source material examined consisted of Professor Bowne's writings, -seventeen books and numerous magazine articles, -a late and only biography, and six leading textbooks in the field of educational philosophy. Additional references were made to such secondary sources as referred in any way to his life and times or his philosophical view. The six textbooks mentioned above were selected through a wide and representative survey of the views of the professors teaching educational philosophy in the United States.

The method employed was threefold. First, a study of Professor Bowne's backgrounds was made to determine the influences, mainly philosophical, which molded his thinking. Second, his leading books were analyzed in order to secure a concise statement of his educational and philosophical views. Third, the leading topics discussed by present day thinkers in the educational philosophy realm were carefully selected, and the thinking of these men on these topics was compared with Professor Bowne's views. The evaluation here made was taken as a basis for drawing final conclusions as to the value of Professor Bowne's writings for this field.

Borden Parker Bowne was born in 1847 at Leonardville, New Jersey.

His father was a farmer-preacher, descended from New England Puritans, and the household was strongly religious. His mother had a strong strain of religious mysticism in her makeup. He early demonstrated his ability as a student, as well as his religious leanings, and after graduation from New York University and a period of foreign study he returned to America, accepting a professorship in Philosophy in Boston University, which he held from 1876 till his death in 1910. His chief works are: The Principles of Ethics, The Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Metaphysics, Theism, Personalism, and Kant and Spencer.

Bowne came under the influence of Lotze during his study in Germany, though his own position is more personalistic than Lotze's. As a personalist, he made a synthesis of the contributions to personalistic thought of Berkeley, Kant, and Lotze. With Kant, he regarded knowledge as mental activity. He also adopted from the Hegelian school, the doctrine that the real is rational, with the stress of Berkeley upon the active and perceiving nature of mind.

In the formulation of his philosophical system the self is made the primary datum of all thought. All speculation begins with the self and comes back to the active self for verification. In this sense all values, sensations, universals, and physical things become secondary and abstract. Self-consciousness is differentiated from self-experience though all self-consciousness rests upon an immediate experience of the self. As mentioned above, he regarded all knowledge as mental activity whereby the mind reconstructs a world of things into its own world of thought.

The principles or laws by means of which experience is built up

are the categories. Certain of these are basic to the mechanical sciences but in themselves are unable to give any internal connection to objects, and hence are phenomenal. These are space, time, motion, quantity, and the two doubtful ones of necessity and possibility. Those categories by which "the mind transforms fleeting impressions into an abiding and internally connected order of objects" are the metaphysical ones of being, quality, identity, causality, and purpose. The categories provide and explain the regularity of sequence among phenomenal objects, and in the metaphysical realm make causality the self-determination of a free spirit. Therefore we see that science is positivistic, related to the sense world, while thought goes beyond the sense world in seeking the internal connection of things, and finds it in purpose. Thus on the sense side, the objects of science are not metaphysically real and we have phenomenalistic immaterialism, while on the metaphysical side we have personalism eventuating in theism, for a Supreme Person is the ground both of the system of nature and of the society of persons.¹

As a teacher Bowne wielded wide influence, being a careful scholar, a clear and original thinker, and a forceful and pleasing speaker. He put a twofold emphasis upon the assimilation of new knowledge, and the development of originality. He further came into classroom contact with most of the graduate students of a large university over a long period of years. His students point out as his greatest achievement, his ability to focus attention upon the problems of deepest practical significance.

As an original and forceful thinker he is worthy of a high place

1. For a concise evaluation of his views Cf. Brightman, E. S., "Personalism and the Influence of Bowne," Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, pp. 164ff.

among American philosophers. He has contributed much to this field.

Among those who have given specific testimony to this fact are Professors E. S. Brightman, and A. C. Knudson, Dr. James Iverach of Aberdeen, Bishop Francis J. McConnell, W. E. Hocking, F. W. Flewelling, George A. Coe, George Herbert Palmer, Rudolf Eucken, J. Cook Wilson, and William James.

We have already mentioned the method of selecting the six leading textbooks in the field of educational philosophy. These six texts were carefully analyzed, and on the basis of relative amount of space allotted, the ten most important topics were chosen. In their relative order these were: the individual, method, thinking, democracy, environment, personality, society, vocational education, interest, and morals. On the basis of this standard the views of Professor Bowne were compared and contrasted with the views of these leading writers and conclusions were carefully drawn in completing the discussion of each topic. These were later synthesized to give the following six larger conclusions.

1. Professor Bowne is more systematic and complete in his treatment of the philosophical principles underlying life and education, though present day writers have made more definite application of their views to the educative process. This is due to the philosophical completeness of his writings, in which he builds a well-rounded system of philosophy, a task which educational theorists do not, as a rule, attempt.
2. Professor Bowne's views are in no place regarded as outworn or impracticable by present day writers taken as a whole, as indicated in their treatment of their ten leading topics. In other words, he does not defend theories or views which are generally conceded to be outworn or discarded.
3. Professor Bowne's views are consistent throughout and are consistently upheld by one of the leading writers in the field of educational philosophy. They are in places further upheld by eclectic views as well as by the varying views of those writers who do not strictly adhere to any one interpretation of life.
4. Professor Bowne is frequently in agreement with the leading opposing views in matters of practical insight which do not hinge upon or involve basic interpretations. This is evidenced, for example, in his steps in scientific method, which as method bear strong similarities with Dewey's

steps, or again, when he discusses vocations and agrees with those who would vocationalize culture that those who consume goods should justify their existence by also producing goods.

5. Professor Bowne makes clear cut criticisms of many of the tendencies which are represented in present day thought and writing. This criticism is backed by sound reasoning and is applicable today.

6. Professor Bowne presents a number of contributions, and puts strong emphasis upon many views in such a way as to make his work of real value to the educational thought of today. Chief among his contributions are: (1) A carefully worked out and consistently thought through interpretation of life which dignifies the individual, his powers, and his purpose in living. (2) A valuable treatise upon ethics which gives a constructive treatment of the morals of the individual, the family, and society. (3) A clarifying of the structural fallacies most prevalent in philosophical thinking and writing, and a forcing of all issues back to actual living for their understanding and interpretation.

In the light of this intensive study we conclude that Professor Bowne's works furnish a substantial theory of life which could be made use of in building an educational philosophy, that his philosophy includes and clarifies theories which underlie educational practice, and that the application of his philosophy to the field of educational philosophy would bring forth beneficial results in educational practice.

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APPENDIX NUMBER I.

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APPENDIX NUMBER II.

Bowne, Borden P., Theory of Thought and Knowledge, Harper & Bros., 1897.
(The following is a detailed outline of the arguments presented in this book.)

Preface.

The root thought of the work is that thought is an organic activity which unfolds from within, and can never be put together mechanically from without.

Two points of emphasis:

1. The volitional and practical nature of belief.
2. The almost universal illusion arising from the structural fallacies of uncritical thought:
 - a. Spontaneous thought taking its own operation as the double of reality.
 - b. The omnipresent imposture and deceit of language -abstract and verbal illusion; abstractions of logic mistaken for facts.

This volume is preparatory and must be completed in metaphysics.

Introduction.

I. Aim of philosophy.

Philosophy aims at a rational and systematic comprehension of reality; or, at a rational and systematic comprehension and interpretation of experience. An ideal imperfectly realized.

II. Classes of philosophic theories.

A. Epistemology, or the doctrine of knowledge. Fundamental division:

1. Conception of mind as active or passive in knowing. "Is knowing an active process determined by laws within thought itself, or is it only a mechanical reflection of objects in a passive consciousness?"
2. Historically, systems of Locke, Hume, and Kant are pre-eminently theories of knowing.

B. Metaphysics, or the doctrine of being. Distinction of theories:

1. Whether fundamental being is conceived as mechanical and unintelligent, or as purposive and intelligent. "Freedom or necessity?" "Purposive or mechanistic?"
2. Historically, systems of Spinoza and Leibnitz are fundamentally theories of being.

III. Divisions of philosophic study:

- A. Logic, or the theory of thought.
- B. Epistemology, or the theory of knowledge.
- C. Metaphysics, or the theory of being.

The first two will be discussed in this present volume.

Part I. Logic, or the Theory of Thought.

Chapter 1. The general nature of thought.

I. Definition of logic.

Logic as the science of thought has no fixed definition, depending on the limits of thought which are always somewhat arbitrary. We must aim at consistency, relevance, and significance.

- A. We limit our attention to our human thinking.
 - B. Life of consciousness neither true nor false, simply fact. It may also be the apprehension of truth.
 - 1. Mental life, as fact, belongs to psychology.
 - 2. Mental life, considered as apprehending truth, belongs to logic.
- II. Definition of thought.
- A. Thought is that form of mental activity whose aim is truth or knowledge.
 - B. Our study: the nature, laws, and implications of this activity.
 - C. Two meanings to thought:
 - 1. The mental activity.
 - 2. The contents grasped through that activity, -here including everything that can exist for us.
- III. Thought distinguished from sense and association.
- A. Sensations are always worked over by the mind into forms inherent in its own nature; it is a surplusage over the sensations; a mental interpretation of them. Thus thought may be defined as the process whereby the mind works over the raw material of the sensibility into forms of intelligence.
 - B. Association may be of two kinds.
 - 1. Chance falling together, accidental associations which are repeated indifferently. (Sensationalists)
 - 2. Rational connections, representing the fixed order of belonging together; subjecting associations to a rational ideal.
- IV. Objectivity of thought defined and illustrated.
- A. There are two kinds of thought.
 - 1. A mental event which ends in itself having no larger relationships.
 - 2. Apprehending or reporting a truth or reality beyond the mental event. Our thoughts, the mental events, claim to be valid for an order of fact or reason which is common to all minds. Thus they become partakers of the total system of reality, -this is the universality and objectivity of thought. Thus thinking posits a system for which our thought is valid, but which it does not make, -an order independent of itself.
 - a. Thought, the product, objectively valid.
Inquiry: the nature and extent of the validity of our thought for the independent object. (Epistemology)
 - b. Thought, the process, is no part of the object.
Inquiry: the nature and laws of the thought process considered as a form of mental activity. (Logic)
 - B. Thought life is rooted in our nature and begins without our reflective volition. When it becomes self-conscious and reflective it rises into freedom.
- V. Conclusion:
- "...within our experience there is a special order of mental activity with laws and aims of its own, which is to be distinguished from the mechanical order of association and from the passiveness of mere impressibility.

Chapter 2. General conditions of thought.

I. Consciousness nothing in itself.

- A. Consciousness arises only in connection with particular objects, its clearness or vagueness being that of apprehension.
- B. Thought, as apprehending truth, exists only in the form of judgment, which has three fundamental conditions.
 - 1. Psychological, subjective condition; the condition of any rational consciousness: the unity and identity of the thinking self.
 - 2. Logical, formal condition; the condition of our thoughts having any constant and consistent meaning: the law of identity and contradiction.
 - 3. Ontological, objective condition; the objective connection which thought aims to reproduce, and without which thought loses all reference to truth: the fact of connection among the objects of thought.

II. The unity of the mental subject.

- A. Judgment possible through a mental subject which can distinguish, compare, and unite separate states in the unity of one conscious act; without such a mental subject particular states remain external and judgment is non-existent.
- B. Objections considered.
 - 1. That judgment is not a congeries of component conceptions, but is rather a single, unitary conception.
Answer: Psychologically the conception of plurality is no doubt a single act; logically the one conception has a plurality of elements, and true thought must distinguish the unity of the conception into the plurality of its implications. Analysis as necessary as synthesis.
 "Over against the plurality of coexistent particular states the self must be one; over against the plurality of successive particular states the self must be both one and abiding."
Conclusion: that the unity and identity of the thinking self is an absolutely necessary condition of the simplest and most elementary judgment.
 - 2. That a simple passive consciousness is possible which is made up of particular units of feeling or impressions; these impressions, united by association, give judgment as a matter of course.
Answer: No objective reference; no inner consistency; also association means nothing except for an abiding self. There are two oversights which help the doctrine of association:
 - a. Getting particular impressions to recognize one another; done by mistaking one's own knowledge of what is to be done for a development of that knowledge by the impressions themselves.
 - b. Through juxtaposition of particular units of feeling to evolve a knowledge of their relations without invoking some superior principle. This is done through the ambiguity of the terms sensation and impression.
- C. Substitutes considered:
 - 1. That what is necessary is not the unity of self, but rather the unity of consciousness.
Answer: This is only another name for the same thing: this consciousness has states, distinguishes itself from them,

discriminates, compares, and unites them, and abides through them as self-identical.

2. That the only unity in the case is the self-distinguishing, self-identifying thought.

Answer: either we have nonsense (example: an inkstand having thoughts about chair, tree, house, etc.), or else an odd description of the self.

D. Denial of the fact of consciousness due to: (summary)

1. The unity denied is commonly restored in some figure of speech, or is assumed in the language employed.
2. The speculator performs the synthetic acts involved in the judgment itself, and mistakes this for their performance by the sensations.
3. He mistakes the external union of sensations by association for their logical union in a judgment.
4. Thus the arguments lead on to a denial of the self.

Conclusion: that thought exists only in relation to a conscious and abiding subject.

III. The law of identity and contradiction. Our conceptions must have fixed meanings and must be used consistently therewith.

A. Difficulties in this law. (A is A; A is not B)

1. A is often not A; and between B and non-B there are often many middles which are not excluded. This is because, in actual thinking, both affirmation and negation are often limited and relative, and the contradiction is only apparent.
2. The law of identity in its double aspect, and with its implication of the excluded middle, is the only one recognized by the traditional formal logic.

Answer: the formal principle of consistency is to be distinguished from the metaphysical category of identity. Problem: how to express a changing existence by changeless ideas. Consideration postponed.

- B. Conclusion: no valid thought is possible unless A equals A, and no knowledge is possible unless the changing things allow themselves to be grasped by fixed ideas.

IV. The ontological or objective condition of thought.

- A. The positive principle: the assumption of rational and systematic connection among the elements of that independent order which thought must assume if it is to be more than a meaningless mental event; that is, the objects of thought must not be isolated and unrelated but must form a system or exist in systematic connection.

B. Objections to this principle:

1. That it belongs to metaphysics rather than to logic.

Answer: logic should not be called the science of thought if it ignores the most vital feature of thought.

2. It is said that the law of connection is a law of existence rather than of thought.

Answer: it could never be known as a law of existence if it were not also a law of thought.

V. Conclusion of chapter:

The unity of the self, the law of identity, and the fact of objective connection are the fundamental conditions of thought.

Chapter 3. How does the mind get objects.

I. The active and constitutive nature of mind in sensation.

A. Sensations must be fixed and defined with reference to a permanent meaning before they can be anything for thought.

1. A sensation in itself, or apart from thought, is simply a peculiar affection of the sensibility.
2. Sensations are similar, not identical, and only intelligence which has identity and continuity can have a recurrence in experience. More than a registering intellect is needed, -a universalizing intellect.
3. Sensations are single, unrelated events, making association impossible except by a universalizing mind.
4. Implicit logical activity:
 - a. We must relate our sensations under the form of time.
 - b. We must raise the sensation from a particular event into an abiding logical meaning.
 - c. We must assimilate the later experience to the earlier by identifying the contents common to both.

Succession demands the fixity of the self, and of the idea.

B. Thought goes beyond the apprehension of sensations as having simple and identical qualitative contents in variously relating and interpreting them.

II. Perception as an active process by which the mind builds its objects for itself.

A. Two questions:

1. The existence and nature of the independent order.
2. The process by which it becomes an object for us.

B. Metaphorical solutions.

1. Naïve realism generally solves the problem by figures of speech: images thrown off by the object.
2. Other theories describe the object as impressing, or stamping, or photographing itself upon the mind.

C. Perception as due to interaction. Interaction between mind and objects through cause and effect. How can a passive object be the cause of its own perception?

D. Perception as mental construction.

1. There is no passing of anything between the agents, so that the perception is an expression of the agent's nature under the circumstances; mind reactions generated and not carried on or in.
2. Physiology indicated that there are definite nervous changes accompanying perception.
3. This creative mental action is belittled by:
 - a. Identifying the nervous change with the subjective impression.
 - b. Regarding the impression as already the impression of things.
4. Difficulty caused by double oversight:
 - a. We suppose that the existence of the object is in question, and becoming sure of it, feel that there is no further question. yet this throws no light on perception.
 - b. We fail to distinguish what is in the sense from what is in thought, thereby thinking sense puts the object bodily before us.

III. Idealism and perception.

Here there is no thought of interaction, rather that the object is a divine thought. This fails to explain how it becomes a human perception.

- A. Difficulties arising through turning thought into a kind of thing which can exist apart from thinking.
 - 1. We are said to share or participate in the divine thought, or to enter into it, but we are not told how.
 - 2. It is said that the eternal consciousness reproduced itself in the finite consciousness. At best we have only a logical identity. God's thought becomes ours only as we, by our own mental activity, build up that thought for ourselves, and thus share or participate in it.
- B. Conclusion:
A world of things can exist for us only as the mind reconstructs it as a world of thought.

Chapter 4. The categories. (immanent principles underlying experience)

- I. Time, the form under which we relate events.
 - A. Essential elements: antecedent and sequence.
 - B. Dimensions: past, present, and future.
 - C. Disputes as to the source of the idea:
 - 1. Events occur in succession, and hence are known in succession as a matter of course. The mind simply reads off the succession as given in experience. Being objectively real does not make them knowledge automatically.
 - 2. The idea of time is derived by abstraction from the experience of objective sensation revealed in memory. However, simple succession in experience is not experience of succession. Memory must be presupposed yet memory becomes memory only as time is presupposed. Thus the experience from which the idea of time is abstracted is one which contains it.
 - 3. Time is primarily a law of thought whereby the mind related events under the form of antecedence and sequence, and thus makes the temporal experience possible.
 - 4. Conclusion: time is primarily a law of mental synthesis whereby we relate events.
- II. Number.
 - A. Its bases: the succession of moments and events, the distinctness of objects.
 - B. Countable experience involves the establishment of a unit and a process of counting. Most units are relative and formal.
- III. Space, a mental principle.
 - A. Primarily a law of mental synthesis, whereby the mind relates its coexistent objects under the form of mutual externality.
 - B. Secondarily, space is the abstract form of external experience.
- IV. Motion, a mixed category, implying both space and time, yet not given in either or both. Definable only in terms of itself.
- V. Quantity. This refers to an order of likeness and difference within qualitative likeness, and the changes within qualitative constancy are quantitative.
 - A. Its dimensions are equal, greater, or less.
 - B. Quantity has no absolute unit, but is a ratio of one quantity to another.
 - 1. Continuous: extension, duration, and intensity.
 - 2. Discontinuous: numbers and discrete objects countable.

The above are categories of phenomena, the following are metaphysical categories.

- VI. Being. In its broadest sense this includes everything, thought and its objects alike; for all of these in some fashion exist.

A. Demand for:

1. Subjective demand in the manifest objectivity of things.
2. Logical necessity in that our objective experience is absolutely inarticulate and nothing for intelligence until it is fixed and defined with reference to an abiding and independent meaning.
3. Metaphysical demand seen when the objectivity of thought and the demand for ground and connection meet in the notion of being.

B. Three leading forms: thing, soul, and God.

C. Experienced being falls into two classes of minds and things.

VII. Quality and attribute.

Metaphysical being only known by its attributes. The relation of thing and quality underlies all of our spontaneous thinking about the outer world. (Grammatical form of nouns, adjectives.)

VIII. Identity.

A. As sameness of meaning, or equivalence of logical value.

Identity as to ideas, similarity as to things.

B. Metaphysical continuity of existence.

Without this category, experience would vanish into a groundless flux of perishing events.

IX. Causality.

A. Essential meaning: dynamic determination. Illustrated by:

1. The self-determination of a free agent.
2. The determination of the consequent by the antecedent.
3. The mutual determination of different things.

B. Questions as to (1) its source, (2) its validity, and (3) the form of its application.

1. Its source: the mind.

2. Its validity: to deny the reality of causal connection would cancel objective thought entirely.

3. The form of its application: uncertain, though often located between physical antecedent and consequent; it is possibly behind and beyond the physical. Unsolved;

a. Empirically we may have a rule of being or happening, which is a limitation and not a solution.

b. We have the causality of freedom which means self-determination--self moving into the future, a matter of experience.

Difficulties:

(1) We think causation only under the form of time, thus the cause becomes past tense and defeats a new beginning.

(2) Our reflective activity is largely directed by material and spatial relations, and our notion of causality takes on a corresponding character.

(3) Volitional causality gathers psychological limitations which are no necessary part and thus cannot well be applied to cosmic causality.

Conclusion: There is practical unanimity as to the necessity of the formal category, with much uncertainty as to the metaphysical form in which it is realized.

X. Necessity, a somewhat doubtful category.

A. The necessity of thought:

1. A factual condition of thought without which it could not go on.
2. It may express merely a logical relation, as of premise and conclusion, or of subject and predicate.
3. It may express a proposition which cannot be denied without contradiction or without violating some clear intuition.

B. Necessities of thought may involve necessities of things, thus

importing necessity into things themselves.

1. Logically the argument is from the necessity of an affirmation to the affirmation of a necessity: a fallacy.
2. By explanation, it appears in connection with our conception of the nature of things and in our thought of the laws of things: is not absolute but rather a fancy.

Conclusion: Necessity is hypothetical in its existence, and in its contents and direction, coming largely through psychological expectation.

XI. Possibility, also a doubtful category.

Its only real meaning is based upon the self-determination of a free agent; the only possible is the implications of the actual.

XII. Purpose, the elevation of causality to intelligent and volitional causality, with its implication of plan and purpose. This principle is needed to give a unity and completeness, and can never be found in any impersonal or mechanical conception.

A. Purpose is a category involved in the nature of free intelligence.

B. It is necessary only for the reflective systematization of experience.

1. Its necessity is reflectively rather than intuitively reached.
2. It is necessary to enable thought to maintain itself and to attain to systematic completeness.

Chapter 5. The Notion.

Conceiving, judging, inferring are only different phases of one indivisible process. Therefore the three factors of thought are the notion, the judgment, and the inference. (Notion, concept, idea.)

Logical aim: to form fixed conceptions which shall enable us to master and express experience.

I. The current doctrine of the notion.

A. Method of formation: (from particular to universal)

1. The mind begins with particular things, or events, immediately given in experience, thus preceding thought.
2. Particulars are compared to show common elements.
3. Common element is abstracted from particular cases, and thus appears the notion, or concept: the common element in many individuals.
4. Later, the concept is extended by generalization.

B. The antithesis between individual and universal.

Wherever the mind acts creatively the general conception precedes and determines the particulars.

C. The third possibility, realized in the case of developing intelligence the two grow together, and the internal, logical structure is the same.

D. Mistakes of traditional logic:

1. It has supposed that the individual may be articulately known apart from and before the universal.
2. It has supposed that the conception of the individual involves no proper logical work.

Mistaken because: the individual exists for thought only as it is defined and fixed in a logical scheme.

3. It has supposed that the concept has arisen simply by abstracting from individuals their elements of likeness and dropping their differences.

If all elements of difference were eliminated there would be nothing left.

II. The concept.

A. Essential nature: consists in its abiding thought content; this abiding significance is the central element.

1. In a complex concept the mind unites the elements into a complex whole whose parts belong together--especially true with external objects.
 2. Usually with subjective creations it analyzes the complex whole into its implications.
 3. Beginning with either a universal or a particular concept, the mind works from one to the other.
- B. Subject and predicate notions.
1. Subject notions, representing things which have a substantive existence, or any conception which serves as a subject for predicates; represented by common nouns.
Empirical view; exclusive attention to objects of sense perception; sums of qualities; with only external adherence.
 2. Predicate notions, having only an adjective existence, representing qualities or activities--adjectives and verbs.
- C. The concept as symbol; as a shorthand expression for the many; classification depends upon the nature of the mind's objects; concepts are symbolic and rarely completed or finished, economically valuable but open to errors.
- III. The notion as regarded by nominalism and realism.
- A. The objective or metaphysical nature of the notion.
1. Realism held that universals are realities of which individuals are only accidents.
 2. Nominalism looked upon classes as only subjective conceptions without objective correspondence--that universals have only a mental existence, and that individuals are the only proper realities.
- B. The subjective significance of the concept. This is denied by the empirical school who desire to reduce the activity of the mind to a minimum.
- IV. The relation of logic to thought or things.
- A. The problem:
1. Things can exist for the mind only through its thoughts concerning them. Therefore the mind has to do with thoughts.
 2. Thoughts have none of the properties which the mind attributes to things, and these are the great concern of thought. Therefore the mind has to do with things only.
- B. The answer: The concept has a double aspect:
1. For though it expresses a fixed meaning or a rule for dealing with objects,
 2. It applies to a set of objects. (connotation and denotation of concepts for example)
- V. Definition and classification.
- A. Different meanings of definitions.
1. The traditional conception is that it consists in giving the genus and differentia; presupposes a system of classification and places a thing but does not give meaning.
 2. Another conception is that it gives the essential nature of the thing; an ideal rarely realized.
 3. Most definitions are purely relative to our own ends or convenience; the ground for choice lies in the convenience of manipulation or elegance of exposition.

B. Important phases of classification.

1. In a general classification of the contents of thought we come down to notions; to the categories, or to those primal distinctions and classifications on which thought is based.
2. Classes are artificial or based upon natural and essential affinities.

After all, an arbitrary convenience.

- C. Ideal of thought: to gather our experience under concepts which shall be distinct and clear in themselves; yet our concepts vary all the way from constructive definitions to descriptions, and even to mere names.

Chapter 6. The Judgment.

I. Definition: a mental act in which an affirmation or negation is made with the conviction of its validity for the world of fact or the world of reason.

A. Two parts:

1. Conviction of validity.
2. Reference to an independent order.

B. Concepts both precede and follow on judgments.

1. Neither is anything by itself or in abstraction from each other.
2. Judgments are of all degrees of complexity, and occur under all the categories.

C. Two forms of aberration:

1. A large part of the current exposition of the judgment is constructed with reference to the needs of the syllogism; A is B taken to mean that A is subsumptive to B (contained in) which may not be true. (Example: oaks are trees.)
2. The judgment is defined as a declaration of the agreement, or disagreement, or two notions.
 - a. This is acceptable to many classes:
 - Empiristic: because it seems to reduce thought to such low terms that association can apparently explain it.
 - Idealism (certain types): because it says nothing of things and keeps the mind within the realm of ideas.
 - Conceptualist, logical formalist: because it carefully excludes all reference to matter-of-fact, and leaves the mind free to contemplate pure thought form.
 - b. This fails in that all judgments must have an existential reference in them to an order of some sort to which they are related as true or false.

II. Kinds of judgment: there is an element of arbitrariness, or at least of relativity, in the classification of judgments.

These judgments are of three kinds:

- A. Categorical, where predicate is unconditionally affirmed or denied. The other two may be put into an equivalent categorical form, but this does not adequately treat them.
- B. Conditional, for expressing conditional laws and forces of reality; express conditional connection; necessary to the expression of experience.
- C. Disjunctive necessary as we pass from intension to extension, where a notion at once falls into various divisions or disjunctions. (Notion man in extension breaks up into male and female, or men, women, children, etc.)

III. Conditions of applying the judgment.

- A. Implications of the actual working judgment:
 1. It must be possible to form general groups of elements.
Primal assumption: some things belong together in the order of fact or reason. These groups must become universals.
 2. The quantity of judgments has to be considered and in the fundamental judgment the quantity is universal.
- B. Traditional logic omits essential judgment of A is B, also the quantification of the predicate.

Chapter 7. Inference.

I. Definition and classification.

A. Definition.

1. The process of analyzing or combining judgments which are given or assumed; it implies imperfect knowledge, is finite.
2. Consists in drawing from one or more judgments, called premises, some others, called conclusions, which shall always be true if the premises are true.

B. Classification.

1. Immediate inferences; where conclusion is drawn from the analysis of a single judgment.
 - a. Where subject and predicate are interchanged: A is B becomes B is A. Has a negative value in stressing that though All A is B, it may not exhaust B.
 - b. Where; if any two quantities are equal, then equivalent operations performed on both will give equivalent results.
2. Mediate inferences; where a conclusion is drawn from the analysis of two or more judgments.
 - a. Two forms of deductive reasoning: (2 corresponding principles)
 - (1) In subsumptive reasoning we deal with class notions, or the relation of individuals to the universal.
It deals with the subordination of individuals to the universal.
 - (2) In substitutional reasoning we proceed by the substitution of equivalents.
 - b. The syllogism:
 - (1) A statement of the mark of law, positive or negative, of a class.
 - (2) A ranging of some individual or individuals under that class.
 - (3) The affirmation of the class mark or law of the subsumed individuals.
 - c. Objections to the syllogism:

That it begs the question, as the major premise already contains the conclusion.

Answer: It may be barren and lead to no new knowledge; knowledge of the universal does not involve a knowledge of all the individuals.
- C. Demonstrative inference is an ideal which is only rarely reached. Much valid reasoning may be done which does not admit of adequate formal statement.

Chapter 8. Proof.

I. Nature of proof or disproof.

- A. Definition: the bringing of the proposition into relation to something known, so that we may see the proposition to be a

necessary implication or incompatibility.

1. A kind of reversion of the process of inference.
2. Proof may be direct or indirect.
 - a. Direct: directly deduce the proposition as a consequence of other propositions.
 - b. Indirect: disprove its contradictory and then infer it.

B. Limitations of proof.

1. Proof is limited in presupposing some proposition back of itself as its own condition; needs given propositions.
2. Does not make a proposition true, but only enables us to see it. Truth is true, but we can only know it to be so upon proof.
3. Proof is limited by the nature of the knowing mind as it is only a stimulus to see.
4. The need of proof is a mark of limitation mentally: it is the device of a limited intelligence for extending its realm when direct insight fails.

II. Proof as probability.

A. Probability is the guide of life, its degree admitting of no exact determination because:

1. We know little about the factors at work.
2. The factors themselves often admit of no numerical statement.

B. The calculus of probabilities.

1. Ultimately the probability expresses a ratio of the favorable possibilities to the whole number.
2. This ratio may be found in many cases by mathematical analysis of the possibilities.
 - a. Such a study is independent of experience, but results for experience can only be determined by experience.
3. The probability reached determines only our expectation beforehand.
4. The probability is not the thing.
5. In a series of mutually exclusive events conceived as equally possible we have no reason for expecting one rather than any other.
6. The doctrine of probabilities in no way applies to first facts.

Conclusion: Demonstration is an ideal which is only rarely attained. For the most part, we must content ourselves with probability. The calculus of probabilities has only a limited application in experience.

Chapter 9. Deduction and induction.

I. The nature of deduction: It seeks to learn particulars from the universal; a knowledge of, beginning with a constructive definition, enabling us to define our objects from within. We may use deduction in so far as the categories of our thought apply to all contingent objects, --a little way.

II. The nature of induction.

- A. Induction seeks to gather universals from particulars where we name our objects and recognize them but are not able to penetrate into their hidden nature so as to say what is implied. To infer general principles from particular facts.
- B. The starting point is the world of particular facts.
 1. Inquiry cannot discover and establish relations but only specify them and render them more exact.

2. We assume; that real likeness exists among things, and that cosmic causality proceeds along traceable and many lines.
3. Cogency of the logic of induction: the fact that regularity or frequency of coincidence constitutes a problem and demands explanation.
- C. Three leading directions of the inductive problem.
 1. We have to learn from experience what marks belong together. Forming the notion.
 2. We may assume a subject and seek to determine its properties and law. Possible in rational science, not in the world of things.
 3. The search for causal connection. The real practical question does not concern itself with the idea of causation, but only with the uniformities of sequence.
- III. Induction and deduction in research.
 - A. Induction may help us to premises, but deduction must draw the conclusions.
 - B. The method of research:
 1. We observe the facts and form a provisional theory or hypothesis.
 2. We deduce the conclusions from the hypothesis.
 3. We compare the inferred facts with the observed ones.
 4. Agreement strengthens our faith and, extended, confirms it. Disagreement disproves the theory.
 - C. Hypotheses; their formation and verification one phase of induction.
 1. The primal duty of an hypothesis is to be intelligible.
 2. It must be deduced from the facts, and must in turn explain the facts.
 3. Hypotheses must admit of something like proof or disproof.
 4. An hypothesis must fit into others so as to be harmonious with our total system of knowledge.
 5. Two kinds of hypotheses:
 - a. Those simply offered as explanations of the facts.
 - b. Those which admit of deduction and put us in control of phenomena.
 - D. The meaning of law.
 1. The connections of reason are the only laws perfectly clear to us.
 2. The conjunctions of nature are mostly contingent:
 - a. Either, they are mere coincidences in our experience and express no order of reality. (change)
 - b. Or, they are laws founded in some opaque necessity in things. (necessity)
 - c. They are uniformities of phenomena which represent no necessity but the orderly forms of procedure on the part of some being back of them. (purpose)

The choice is not between chance and necessity, but between necessity and purpose.

Chapter 10. Explanation.

- I. Meaning of explanation. "The things and events of experience are such that the mind is unable to rest in them, but seeks to unite them in ways which shall satisfy its own nature by accounting for them." This is explanation.

- A. Only facts abide, while science as interpretation changes.
 - 1. Since theories of interpretation change, the problem is to find any theory that is final.
 - a. Basic assumption: that the normal processes of our thinking are valid for reality, so that what the mind infers from facts must also be a fact.

II. Types of theories of explanation.

- A. Explanation as classification. Facts are gathered into classes and referred to laws, then considered explained.
 - 1. This explanation gives no insight.
 - a. Its sole value is its logical convenience.
 - b. It rescues the facts from their isolation.
 - c. Facts remain as separate and distinct as ever, and also as mysterious as ever.
- B. Scientific explanation: connecting a fact with its antecedents as the result of a law or laws, the fact being an outcome of a law.
 - 1. The event or fact is understood, at least in its proximate origin.
 - 2. It is relatively independent of metaphysics, dealing with the world of experience.
 - a. The labyrinths of the metaphysical problem are escaped, and a definite field of practical inquiry marked out. An empirical method widely used and called scientific method.
 - b. Its connections are phenomenal only without insight into essential connections.
 - 3. It has deep-lying difficulties:
 - a. It reaches nothing final though crude thought is satisfied because:
 - (1) It is satisfied if the motions of explanation are made.
 - (2) It tacitly hypostasizes the system into "nature", "universe" or "cosmos" which is self-sufficient and self-administering.
 - b. The attempt to explain a whole by the interaction of its parts, or as the resultant of its parts, either fails or moves in a circle when it claims to reach anything final or anything more than a partial view.
- C. Metaphysical explanation: to infer from phenomena, not only their phenomenal antecedents, but also their ontological grounds.
 - 1. Physical metaphysics fails in explanation because it overlooks a hidden dynamism or sees it as unexplainable.
- D. Explanation by intelligence: that of purpose or final cause.
 - 1. Only ultimate ground is free intelligence.
 - 2. Intelligence as ultimate fact must be mysterious as something to be recognized and admitted rather than to be deduced and comprehended.
 - a. It is a mystery that makes other things clear. It makes possible the comprehension of everything but itself.
 - b. A mechanical scheme must find always potentially or actually present everything that will ever emerge, while intelligence assimilates the cosmic causation to itself.

The choice is between this and words that end in nothing. Our theories of explanation form a series, and we could not rest fully satisfied until the series and all its members are complete: an ideal not yet attained in any type of explanation.

Chapter 11. Some structural fallacies.

I. The problem of error.

- A. Any system which makes error necessary and cosmic destroys itself.
- B. The fact of error can only be explained in reason by the assumption of freedom.
 - 1. Our faculties are made for truth but they can be carelessly used.
 - a. There are laws of thought founded in the nature of rationality.
 - b. There must be ratification and self-control in accordance with those laws.
 - 2. The truths of reason and of physical science are quite independent of our volition.
 - a. We come to know them only through slow, painful and persistent research.

II. The structural or constitutional fallacies.

- A. The fallacy of the universal. Applied to concepts.
 - 1. It consists in mistaking class terms for things, and in identifying the processes of our classifying thought with the processes of reality.
 - a. The plurality and differences of the facts disappear in the unity and simplicity of the class term.
 - (1) We fancy that the facts themselves have been identified.
 - (2) We fancy that we have come upon the true essence of the facts or the original from which they proceed.
- B. The fallacy of abstraction. Applied to principles.
 - 1. Principles must undergo specification and even modification when applied to actual cases.
 - a. There must be careful inquiring into the form which they assume in application.
 - b. There must be careful inquiring into whether the conditions assumed in the theory are realized or realizable in practice.
- C. Fallacies of language.

Words, from their structure and associations, come to have a force of their own which is quite distinct from their logical connotation; they are identified with the thing.

 - 1. Using the word for the thing.
 - 2. Calling verbal consequences logical consequences.

"Back of all logic, and conditioning its use, is the mental and moral sanity of the individual and the community."
 - 3. Arguing from the metaphor involved in the word.
 - 4. Fancying that a new name means a new thing.

Part II. Theory of Knowledge.

Chapter 1. Philosophic scepticism.

I. The origin and nature of scepticism.

- A. Origin or genesis:
 - 1. Primal trust of the mind in knowledge is shaken as difficulties, inconsistencies, and contradictions develop.
 - a. These prove the fact of error and make doubt possible.
 - b. This doubt may spread over the entire intellectual life until the validity of all cognition is called in question.
 - (1) As a rule we believe and disbelieve alike on authority rather than reason.

2. Conditions of scepticism necessary for rational standing.
 - a. Not to be pure arbitrariness and ipse dixitism, it must be supported by reasons.
 - b. The attempt to give reasons presupposes valid laws of thinking and reasoning.
 - c. If more than individual whim, the skeptic must assume the community and identity of intelligence, so that truth for one ought to be truth for all.
 - d. The skeptic must assume the identity of the object in experience.
 - e. Something must be known or nothing can be inferred or doubted.

Therefore: absolute scepticism is a contradiction.

Rational scepticism can arise only from the discovery of insoluble contradictions within our thought system.

3. Historically, scepticism has commonly been an inference from a doctrine held as true. It has theoretical importance only in the case of general truth: those truths not limited to time or place, expressed in universal form.

B. Kinds of sceptical doubt.

1. The doubt of reason, of sensationalism.
 - a. It denies that reason has any laws of its own, or that it is anything more than a copy of experience made coherent by association.
 - b. Answer: Only an abstract possibility that our intelligence may be particular and individual, the question of fact remains open.
 - (1) All assume intelligence to have universal elements.
 - (2) Truth is relative to the human mind, not a mind.
 - (3) In making even a show of reason, the skeptic must assume the community and identity of intelligence.
2. The doubt concerning what seems to be objective knowledge.
 - a. The mind masks reality, and makes it inaccessible, limiting us to appearances or phenomena. Based on Kantian doctrine, and assumes:
 - (1) A world of coexistent persons, and also a common world of experience for them.
 - (2) Assumes the reality of things, and doubts only whether our knowledge can reach them.
 - (3) Assumes that the thing is external and unrelated to thought.
 - (4) It assumes that things are the first and undoubted fact and that thought has the function of copying them.

Conclusion: Scepticism rests upon a definite theory of knowing and being, and its theory of being admits of no establishment.

- b. The answer to or result of this scepticism.
 - (1) Based on the process of knowledge alone, scepticism must extend to persons as well as things: therefore it becomes a farce or is convicted of arbitrary inconsistency.
 - (2) The fact at best only proves a possibility, the question of fact remains open.
 - (3) A dogmatic denial of knowledge based upon the subjectivity of the laws of thought is not only illogical but self-destructive.

- (a) Illogical because it only makes doubt possible and does not compel it.
- (b) Self-destructive because when no law of thought is allowed to be valid for things, the things become unaffirmable and meaningless.
- (4) It is not even real or unreal, for reality and negation are categories, and hence without application; only a verbal phrase.
- (5) It introduces an unmanageable dualism into philosophy: thought and things.
- c. Only logical grounds for scepticism:
 - (1) That evidence is so conflicting that we are unable to reach any conclusion.
 - (2) Or that nothing can be known which is not either self-evident or demonstrated.

II. Conclusion: Scepticism is a confused compound of instinct and reflection, in which the elements are mutually incompatible, and in which we miss all clear comprehension of the cognitive problem, and all consciousness of logical obligation.

Chapter 2. Thought and thing.

I. The dualism of things and thought.

- A. From the human standpoint, an ineradicable dualism.
 - 1. Thought and thing are separate in human experience.
 - 2. The trustworthiness of reason presupposes that thought is a free activity based on rational insight.
 - a. Therefore knowledge has no objective validity unless the laws and categories of thought are also the laws and categories of being.
 - b. Knowledge is only possible by assuming, at least implicitly, that the laws of thought are valid for reality.
- B. Methods of solving the dualism:
 - 1. By uniting them in a transcendent third.
 - 2. To reduce one of the series to the other, or to an effect of the other.
 - a. Materialism, presenting thought as an effect of things.

There are several difficulties:

 - (1) Things are not to be taken in the phenomenal sense but as the indivisible things of metaphysical theory; atoms and molecules. This view must show:
 - (a) How things, conceived as impersonal and unthinking, can ever produce personal and thinking subjects.
 - (b) How things can produce minds all of the same rational pattern.
 - (c) How things can and must produce individual minds able to react upon their cosmic causes and correctly grasp them in thought.

These demands are met largely by ignoring them.
 - (2) Much of our apparent knowledge is relative, and the objective is often subjective. Outer relations are reduced to phenomena and become inner.

- (3) The problem of error, for error arises by the same necessity as truth and there is no standard.
- b. Idealism, explaining things in terms of thought. Here we are met with confusion.

II. Absolute idealism as the most elaborate attempt to overcome the dualism.

A. Origin and development.

1. Originated in Kantian philosophy who held:

- a. That all knowledge must be relative to our faculties.
- b. That things are external and antithetical to thought and in themselves unknowable.

Thus the independence of thought was mistaken for the independence of all thought, though

- (1) It does not follow that they are independent of all thought, nor

- (2) That they are incommensurate with our thought.

2. Fichte soon showed that such things are not only unknowable, but also unaffirmable; unreal.

- a. His wrong conclusion: that we may not affirm things independent of our thought.

His true conclusion: that we may not affirm things independent of all thought and unrelated to thought.

- b. Thus reality became thought, and thought became all-embracing.

3. Final step: to develop everything within thought itself as a necessary consequence of reason.

- a. Thus we know the world and understand its genesis and creation.

- b. Such was the genesis of the system of absolute idealism

B. The irrelevance of this system.

1. It derives all its plausibility from confounding the absolute and the human standpoint.

- a. Unless we allow the hypothesis of the human reason, this doctrine leads at once to pure individualism. Kant's transcendental ego becomes Fichte's universal ego.

2. It has a two-fold criticism:

- a. Of the alleged identification of thought and being, which changes a problem of knowledge to one of metaphysics.

We conclude:

- (1) That the identification of thought and being is a somewhat obscure doctrine in its best estate.

- (2) And that it is only indirectly of use in solving the problem of human knowledge.

- b. Of the development of pure thought into its concrete forms, that is, to the deduction of the world from thought.

- (1) However, pure being refuses to unfold or differentiate.

- (2) Also, the actual is found, not deduced; it is a fact of experience, not an implication of reason.

- (3) Within the objective order alone we find three factors which we cannot connect by any logical bond.

- (a) The necessary truths or categories of reason. These do not contain the concrete reality as a necessary implication.

- (b) Certain general laws of cosmic procedure. These cannot be deduced from the categories of reason.
 - (c) Neither the categories of reason nor the general laws contain any account of the detailed facts of existence.
- C. The failure of this system of absolute idealism.
 - 1. The objection that absolute reason may have more than human insight and thus be able to absolve contingent elements.
Two meaning of reason:
 - a. Reason may be extended to cover design, purpose, fitness, and character.
 - (1) Here existence may be rational, or an implication of the highest reason.
 - (2) Not self-realizing necessities of logic, but implying foresight and will for realization.
 - b. Reason may mean the system of necessary truth involved in the nature of the intellect.
 - (1) If the universe as existing were a logical implication of the pure reason, it and all its contents would be eternal.
 - (2) There would be no room for change, but all things would rigidly coexist.
 - (3) Finite minds with all their contents would be necessary and eternal.
Error and evil would likewise, as a part, be necessary and eternal.
 - (4) We would have to assume an element of unreason and evil in reason itself. The system thus collapses.
 - 2. The relation of our thought to cosmic being involves:
 - a. A dualism of thought and thing which is ineradicable.
Two orders of movements:
 - (1) Subjective: our conscious life.
 - (2) Objective: an order that exists for all and is not our product.
 - b. A parallelism: for if knowledge is possible, then this double order must be harmonious and parallel.
 - c. That the representation of the things series in the thought series is possible only through a highly complex activity within the latter.
 - 3. Conclusion: We must view thinking existence as fundamental. and all impersonal or physical existence as a manifestation or product of the same.
We must, with the absolute idealist, here hold that thought is all-producing and all-embracing.
- III. The necessity of a basal monism.
 - A. The necessary ideas of a basal monism:
 - 1. We must recognize the objective system as something independent of us.
 - 2. We must recognize the finite thinker as something which can in no way be identified with the objective system.
 - 3. We must go behind both to their common ground and bond of union in a monism of the infinite.

- a. Thought is the source of things, or the activity whereby things exist.
- b. Thought is the supreme condition of any real monism.
 - (1) It must be a complex activity of thinker and doer.
 - (2) Creation is the only solution of finite existence in which our thought can rest.
- B. Results of holding a basal monism:
 - 1. We escape the impossible identification of thought and thing.
 - 2. We reach a true monism which provides for but transcends the finite dualism.
 - 3. We provide for the element of freedom.
 - 4. We make some provision for the problem of human knowledge.

Chapter 3. Realism and idealism.

I. The nature of idealism.

A. Kinds of idealism.

- 1. That of sensational philosophy: things are only groups of sensations, real or possible.
 - 2. Berkeleyan idealism: views things as a system of presented ideas without any material substance.
 - 3. Phenomenalism: which reduces things to phenomena or appearances.
 - 4. The absolute idealism of the Hegelian school. (ch. 2)
- These have many and profound metaphysical and epistemological differences.

B. The common element in forms of idealism as against realism.

- 1. The claim that what we call material things and the whole system of material things exist only for, and in relation to, mind and consciousness.
- 2. Realism: the contention that things exist by themselves as material elements and bodies, or at least impersonal realities of some kind, outside of and apart from mind, and in antithesis to mind and consciousness.
 - a. The problem of idealism does not exist for spontaneous thought.
 - b. This results from the objectivity of thought when uncritically understood.

C. The impossibility of proof for realism.

- 1. Two possible views of perception.
 - a. The apprehension of something objectively existing.
 - (1) This makes it possible to think of the apparent object in somewhat idealistic fashion.
 - (2) Realists would escape this by appealing to the law of causation: we are coerced in experience, and objects coerce us, thus we are sure of objective reality.
 - (3) This does not answer the question respecting the nature and existence of the apparent object.
 - b. As a mental event.
 - (1) Objective presentations are a product of the percipient mind under appropriate stimulus.
 - (2) The antecedent of perception as nervous change in the brain cannot prove any connection between mental effect and the perceived object.
 - (3) Mental events, or perception, often has its stimulus without an object as in dreams, etc.

2. Basing the connection of mental state and externally existing object on "a law of our nature", perhaps founded on divine veracity.

a. There is general agreement that a good part of the apparent object is purely phenomenal and has subjective existence.

- (1) Many qualities are thought to inhere in the object which, nevertheless, exist only in and for our sensibility.
- (2) Thus the truly real comes to be placed beyond the reach of sense altogether. What realism is left is "trans-figured realism."

b. To fall back on a divine veracity will not work as that would make an apparent contradiction with critical thought.

Veracity can hardly be held responsible for anything beyond the truth and harmony of our nature as a whole.

D. Our conclusion: "We must, then, allow that idealism, in the sense of the phenomenal or subjective existence of the world of things, is possible, and admits of no decisive refutation."

1. A hasty conclusion because the alleged fact would be true, however real the world of things might be.

2. An absurd conclusion, for to deny this possibility leads to solipsism.

3. Short-sightedness of many traditional arguments for idealism.

a. That the individual mind can know only its own mental states.

- (1) This is distinctly false as to psychological form.
- (2) Objectivity is the universal form of perception, things are known as independent objects, yet they are held to be projected conceptions.

(a) Knowing can take place only through subjective conceptions which are products of the mind's own activity.

Answer: This does not preclude possibility of independent objectivity here reproduced.

(b) We are quite unable to tell how our minds can grasp realities external to ourselves.

Answer: This negative view decides nothing as to the positive fact.

(3) Argument supported by the philosophy of sensationalism.

(a) Here the mind is a passive impotency, or a mere cluster of experiences.

(b) A sum of impressions can never transcend the impressions. Leads to solipsism.

b. A two-fold conclusion here.

(1) That both traditional realism and traditional idealism have been hasty and superficial.

(2) That no tenable idealism can be founded on a theory of the knowing process alone.

(a) Either it must lapse into solipsism, or

(b) It must be arbitrary and inconsistent.

(c) A good idealism must therefore be based upon an analysis of the object known.

(3) The only idealism worthy of consideration:

(a) Study of objects show them to be meaningless apart from mind and consciousness.

(b) A world of ideas demands the conception of a mind as the condition of its being.

II. Idealism and realism in conflict.

A. Points of agreement.

1. To escape the absurdity of solipsism we admit at least the existence of other persons.
2. The world of apparent objects exists for others also, so that we live in a common world.
3. The world view of objects as nothing more than a similarity of impressions in finite minds, while it cannot be disproved, is practically impossible.
4. The world of things as a continuous existence of some kind independent of finite thought and consciousness, while it cannot be demonstrated, is the only view which does not involve insuperable difficulties.

B. The point of disagreement: the nature and whereabouts of this cosmic existence.

1. Realism views things as existing in a real space as true ontological realities.
2. Idealism views both them and the space in which they are supposed to be as existing only in and for a cosmic intelligence, and apart from which they are absurd and contradictory.
3. A difference of being independent of our thought and being independent of all thought.

C. Confusion of terms subject and object.

1. As appertaining to the subject or to the object.
 - a. A distinction primarily made by thought itself.
 - b. A distinction which lies within consciousness itself. Things we think about.
2. Psychological, referring to the antithesis of the thinker and his objects, be they persons or things.
3. Metaphysical, expressing the antithesis of conscious mind and impersonal thing.
4. Objective may be applied to all the elements of experience to which we give space relations, and subjective applied to the other elements to which we give only time relations.
 - a. Both are subjective in depending on thought for their existence.
 - b. Objective and subjective here mean the same as external and internal.
5. Objectivity may be identified with universality; "the common to all as truth;" and subjectivity may be identified with illusion; the "special to me."

D. The unclear conception of "extra-mental."

1. The origin of the concept by spontaneous thought:
 - a. Objects are not our own products or private property.
 - b. This conviction is expressed by saying that they exist "extra-mentally." (are subjective, phenomenal)
2. This identifies the subjective as phenomenal with the illusory
 - a. Yet we have the idea of universality in the phenomenal.
 - b. Thus we have the subjectivity (that it exists only for mind and not in itself) and the universality (that it exists for

all minds) of the world. "The illusory object is such because it is not there for all, and the real object is no illusion because it is there for all."

3. The "extra-mental" leads to a "transfigured" realism.
 - a. Extra-mental existence must mean that objects are under the category of causation, and when not perceived still exist in manifold interaction with one another.
 - (1) The real objects are thus found in a series of invisible and supersensible things.
 - (2) Thus our realism must be "transfigured."
 - (a) Its set of objects are entirely different than those of common-sense realism.
 - (b) The things of the latter become the phenomena of the former.
 - (c) In common is only the conviction that the apparent system is not arbitrary and groundless, or a private fiction.
 - b. Transfigured realism has reduced all apparent realities and properties to manifestations of hidden realities.

E. The relation of phenomena and noumena.

1. Several conclusions from the foregoing discussion.
 - a. The antithesis of phenomenal and noumenal leads to the idea of a hidden noumenal which is behind of and masked by the phenomenal.
 - b. The phenomenal should not be regarded as manifesting the noumenal unless it really does so.
 - c. Transfigured realism in seeking the real in the extra-mental only reaches a real of growing poverty.
2. A restatement of the problem necessary;
 - a. Phenomena and noumena must be replaced by phenomena and its causes.
 - b. Reality must be seen as double, as objective reality may mean;
 - (1) Phenomenal reality: the common to all in external experience; distinguished from individual illusion by the fact of its universality.
 - (2) Metaphysical reality, which consists in causality.

III. The phenomenality of space.

- A. Combining the previous conclusion that absolute reality must be viewed as a free intelligence, with all existence depending upon it, with the realistic view of space, we have three kinds of reality:
 1. Independent thinking existence.
 2. Dependent things.
 3. Space as something quite distinct from the others and as unique in its existence.
- B. Denial of the existence of ontological space.
 1. Space and being as separate realities collide with the demand of reason for unity in fundamental reality.
 2. Placing one within the other.
 - a. If space contains the reality, we collide with its unity for all in space must be subject to the laws of space, must be extended, has parts, is no unit.

- b. If reality contains ontological space we come near to having a negation.
 - 3. Therefore its existence cannot be maintained.
- C. Rational idealism's treatment of space.
 - 1. It denies the existence of ontological space, as separate from, and yet containing, all active reality.
 - 2. It affirms space as only the form of experience or the form of phenomena, and hence absurd and impossible when abstracted from consciousness as its fundamental condition.
 - a. It is no individual delusion as the world as universal may have a universal space-form.
 - b. It is subjective as it has no extra-mental existence.
 - 3. All that appears in space therefore has only subjective/phenomenal existence: existing only for and in consciousness.
- IV. The world as thought and act. Concluding statement: it only remains to infer that an all-embracing intelligence is the condition of cosmic being.
 - A. The world exists only in and for a supreme mind.
 - B. The world exists not only as a conception in the divine understanding, but also as a form of activity in the divine will.

Chapter 4. Apriorism and empiricism.

I. The nature of empiricism.

A. Differences between apriorism and empiricism.

- 1. Apriorism deals with form, or principles furnished by the mind, without which thought is chaotic. Often put forth as a doctrine of innate ideas.
- 2. Empiricism deals with matter, or the raw material given in the sensibility, without which thought is vacuous.
 - a. Empiricism has claimed to find in experience a sufficient account of all knowledge, whether of things or principles.
 - b. As a speculative theory of mind, never proceeds on properly inductive principles.
 - c. Led by Locke, this theory holds that the mind is purely passive and receptive. Two criticisms:
 - (1) That the categories of thought can never be found in a passive experience, and assuming the mind to be passive, experience must be cut down to sense impressions; rest illusion. (Hume)
 - (2) That our articulate experience is only possible because the ideas supposed to be abstracted from it are immanent in the mind as conditions of experience. (Kant)
 - d. Two difficult questions must be answered.
 - (1) If the mind is passive, how escape Hume's result? Experience apart from the constitutive action of mind is illusive fantasy.
 - (2) If by experience we mean anything rationally articulate, how answer the Kantian question: How is knowledge possible? Such experience is possible only as the mind imposes its own rational forms on the sense matter.

II. Relation of empiricism to experience and materialism.

A. The empiricist's conception of experience is ambiguous.

- 1. There is uncertainty as to the meaning of experience, and lack

- of clearness as to the meaning of our mental passivity.
2. Denial of mental nature as a determining factor in knowledge leads to denial of mind.
- B. Empiricism and materialism are incompatible.
1. Consistent empiricism must destroy materialism altogether. Materialism's world of things and laws are made impossible as objects of knowledge by empiricism.
 2. Consistent materialism overthrows empiricism.
 - a. Materialism, so far as it claims to be scientific, must build on the notion of fixed elements with fixed forces and fixed laws.
 - b. The mental manifestation, when it comes, is as much rooted in in the nature of matter as any physical manifestation.
 - c. Thus the empirical deductions and explanations by reference to experience (innate ideas) would vanish.
- III. The origin of experience and the warrant of knowledge.
- A. The origin of articulate experience and intellectual forms.
1. Apriorism: While the occasion of their manifestation is found in sense, the forms themselves are the expression of principles immanent in the mind.
 2. Empiricism: the sufficient origin of the higher mental forms is to be found in sensation.
- B. The ultimate warrant of knowledge and belief.
1. Apriorism: holds that experience is the warrant for believing many things, and that the mind has the warrant in its own insight for believing some other things.
 2. Empiricism: holds that experience is the only ground for believing anything.
 - a. Experience here sinks to impressions on the sensibility.
 - b. As the theory commonly identifies the impressions with sensation, it is called sensationalism.
 - c. As the principle of movement and synthesis is found in association, it is called associationalism.
 - (1) To pass from the impression as occurring to the sensation as anything articulate without an activity of fixation and generalization is impossible, however.
 - (a) There must be a logical activity above and upon sensation.
 - (b) Associationalism is absurd without the universals which it sets out to generate.
 - (2) Association working upon sensations cannot make anything new out of them except by appealing to some other principle.
- C. Oversights of empiricism.
1. The distinction between the particular sensation and the logical universal has been overlooked.
 2. There has been a perpetual and unsuspected shuffle between sensation as unqualified impression and sensation as various qualified by reference to both a subject and an object.
 3. There is an uncertainty as to the place of the outer world.
 - a. For Mill, the world is simply a function of sensation.
 - b. Spencerites, assume the world of things and laws as a matter of course.
 4. There is also an oversight of the objective intention of the judgment, and of the distinction between the conjunctions of association and the connections of reason.

5. The constructive part of the theory depends on assuming the ideas it rejects.
6. The same inconsistency appears in the account of sensations.
- D. The warrant of knowledge.

Knowledge exists in the form of the judgment and is expressed in propositions. But the judgment affirms some kind of connection between subject and predicate. Empiricism says we know this connection by experience.

1. Such plausibility as it has is due to ambiguity.
 - a. If it means that conjunction is the mark of rational connection it says nothing to the purpose.
 - b. If it means that conjunction is the true meaning of connection it falls a prey to Hume's destructive criticism and reason vanishes entirely.
 2. Such action is possible only to the rational mind, and not to the passive and receptive mind.
 3. Any further plausibility is due to the assumption of a fixed order.
 - a. This independent order has its uniformities of connection.
 - b. These reproduce themselves in uniformities of experience.
 - c. They in turn become uniformities of thought.
 4. Empiricism aims to generate the conviction of connection by recurrent association.
 - a. Assured beliefs often appear early in the experience of the individual.
 - b. This led to the substitution of racial experience for individual experience to secure more time. The real issue is the complete incommensurability between its data and its assumed products.
 - c. Thus apriorism became true for the individual and empiricism for the race, according to Spencer.
 5. Conclusions.
 - a. Articulate experience is impossible without a constitutive action of the mind whereby sense elements are given a rational form.
 - b. This activity must proceed according to principles immanent in intellect itself.
 - c. The source of these principles cannot be found in anything external to the mind.
 - d. They are not conscious possessions of the mind prior to all experience, but they reveal themselves in and through the experience which they alone make possible.
 - e. In this sense apriorism is established.
- IV. Knowledge of the contingent as finding no sufficient basis in either empiricism or apriorism.
- A. The contingent element of experience must be learned from experience itself.
 - B. Neither apriorism nor empiricism can tell whether the nature of things can be practically trusted, that the laws of nature will prove eternal.
 - C. We must look upon the cosmic uniformities as noted in purpose and maintained by freedom.

Chapter 5. Knowledge and belief.

I. Knowledge and belief distinguished.

A. Common point of agreement in convictions.

1. They are all held for true.
2. The objective reality and connection is thus the same in all these cases.
3. The subjective assurance is highly variable.
 - a. It ranges all the way from rational conviction to superstition and infatuation.
 - b. Declining order: knowledge, belief, faith, opinion, assumption, postulate, and finally whim, prejudice, and superstition.

B. These classes of belief and knowledge exist only subjectively.

1. Apart from our thought only the reality exists.
2. There is no perfectly sharp distinction between these classes.
 - a. The fundamental ones are knowledge and belief.
 - b. Faith sometimes added for the aesthetic and ethical character of its grounds and the religious nature of its object.

C. The definition of knowledge.

1. Knowledge defined as self-evident in the nature of reason, or immediately given in experience, or cogently inferred from the given.
 - a. Subjective form; certainty of the truth of its contents.
 - b. Tested by denying the alleged knowledge and seeing if the mind can entertain the denial.
2. Certainty of knowledge is inexpugnable in the case of truths of reason and the facts of immediate experience. Interpretations of facts not so clear.

D. The nature of rational belief.

1. It is a conviction based on reasons which lend some support, but do not compel it; may make it probable but do not prove it.
 - a. Objective when grounds may be objectively set forth.
 - b. Subjective when grounds are in our feelings and our system of mental interests, and must be sought in life itself.
 - (1) Due to sentiment and irrational connections these subjective beliefs are often belittled.
 - (a) Overlooks the fact that such beliefs vary from fancy to the great catholic sentiments of the race.
 - (b) The assumption that subjective grounds are no reasons for belief is quite as illogical as the opposite assumption.
 - (c) The objection overlooks the practical nature of belief as part of natural intellect.
 - (2) To doubt everything that can be doubted is speculative or false rather than practical.
 - (a) For belief is both speculative and practical.
 - (b) The mass of human beings, in the nature of the case, must live intellectually by hearsay.
 - (c) Individuals live not so much by reasoning as by instinctive imitation and submission to social authority.
 - (d) Men in general must live by authority though we believe the authority to be based on reason.
 - (e) A large element of assumption runs through our cognitive procedure.

(f) The actual method of life is to assume the truthfulness of our own nature and the nature of things, and not to doubt until we are compelled to.

(3) Underlying the method of doubting is the tacit assumption that belief is always the product of formal, logical processes.

II. Importance of great catholic beliefs and tendencies of humanity.

- A. Freedom must account for whims and error, but beyond this arise great universal beliefs.
- B. These beliefs are best viewed from the standpoint of their history and origin.
 - 1. Seen to be the power behind the universe working for us and in us.
 - 2. Thought thus moving along certain lines towards certain conclusions gives significant grounds for belief.
- C. They develop as the mind unconsciously adjusts itself to reality and reality to itself, thus securing the largest life. Thus the fundamental interests of the mind come to be recognized and secured.

III. Belief as related to will and action.

- A. A large part of belief becomes real only in life.
 - 1. When the mind can reach no decision it is the will rather than the understanding which declared the case closed.
 - 2. Practical necessity of doing something often precipitates or compels the conclusion.
 - 3. This relation of belief to action furnishes a test of real beliefs in distinction from mere assent.
- B. The meaning of rational belief.
 - 1. May mean harmony with the general laws of thought.
 - 2. It may have reference to purpose.
 - 3. It may refer to the quality of the purpose.
 - 4. Or it may mean something now definable as:
 - a. A world in which the categories of thought are valid.
 - b. Or a world which expresses a worthy purpose.
 - c. Or a world which is transparent to our intelligence.
- C. Pertinent questions in place of definition of rational belief. (beliefs which root in life.)
 - 1. What must we believe? The necessary truths of intelligence.
 - 2. What must we not believe? Whatever contradicts those truths.
 - 3. What may we believe? All of those practical principles which are necessary for the realization of our highest and fullest life.

Chapter 6. The formal and relative elements in thought.

I. Two kinds of thought:

- A. Thought as product claims to have objective validity, or to produce for us the independent fact.
- B. Thought as process is a subjective activity in which we reflect, distinguish, compare, and infer, but add nothing to the fact itself.

II. Two elements in thought:

- A. A certain rational content or insight: the objective and universal element.
- B. A variety of processes by which this insight is reached: formal only and it may be related to us.

APPENDIX NUMBER III.

Bowne, Borden P., *Metaphysics, a Study in First Principles*, Harper & Bros., 1882.

(The following is a detailed outline of the arguments presented in this book.)

Introduction.

I. The aim and field of metaphysics.

- A. Answers the question: What is reality?
- B. Aims at an outline conception of reality, within which all knowledge of particular things must fall, and by which such knowledge must be judged.
- C. Largely a study of the ontological meaning of the categories, either themselves or in their specifications.
- D. The need of this study has a double root.
 - 1. Theoretical: the categories are primarily principles of thought.
 - a. Reality becomes only a form of words when the categories are denied all objective validity.
 - b. Nevertheless a great deal is purely formal and relative in the use of the categories, without correspondence to objective fact.
 - c. After epistemology has established the formal principles, it remains for metaphysics to fix their ontological form and significance.
 - 2. Practical: because these fundamental notions are always loosely and often contradictorily conceived in popular thinking.
 - a. This leads to imperfect conceptions of the categories.
 - b. This in turn results in a reign of materialism, or a conflict of science and religion, or the like.
 - 3. Therefore of theoretical and practical importance.
 - a. Theoretically to escape a shallow dogmatism on the one hand, and a self-destructive subjectivism on the other.
 - b. Practically in order to lift popular thought from the sense plane, where it is perpetually tempted to run off into necessity, mechanism, and materialism.
- E. The question, What is reality? can only be answered by telling how we must think about reality.

II. Relation of metaphysics to experience.

- A. The facts of experience furnish the data of the problem, and our method is critical, not creative.
- B. Both physics and metaphysics carry us at once into a world of realities whose existence and nature can be assured only by thought
 - 1. We do not recognize the standard of sense-appearance as a measure of rational truth.
 - 2. The distinction between appearance and reality exists for spontaneous thought only in the form which makes appearance illusion.
 - a. Appearances or phenomena; the elements of experience which are given in sense-intuition.
 - b. Noumenal or reality: Elements of experience given only in thought.
 - 3. Both the phenomenal and noumenal are real therefore.
 - a. The nomena as having causality and substantiality.

- b. The phenomenal as no illusions of the individual, but as abiding elements in our common sense-experience.

III. The aim and task of metaphysics.

- A. The task is an attempt by a study of phenomenal reality to pass to a consistent and adequate conception of the causal reality.
- B. The aim is to tell how we shall think of being as it exists, or after it is made.

Part 1. Ontology.

Chapter 1. The Notion of Being.

I. The meaning of being in relation to reality.

- A. Different meanings of being.
 - 1. In logical use, being, reality, and existence, are affirmed of thoughts, feelings, laws, relations, as well as of things.
 - 2. In metaphysics we deal with the reality or being of things.
- B. Pure being a logical abstraction, impossible in reality.
 - 1. Fallacy of the class term or universal.
 - a. Logically everything is an accident of being.
 - b. This infers some element of real being, common to all objects, which may become the particular and specific thing: pure being.
 - 2. Logical manipulation the source of this fallacy.
 - a. Class terms, pure being among the rest, may be valid for reality, but they never can be ontological facts.
 - b. Logical manipulation is formal only, and does nothing to the things.
 - c. In concrete and complete thinking it is impossible to pass from complexity to simplicity, or from definiteness to indefiniteness, or the reverse, so long as we remain on the impersonal plane.

II. Only active being is ontological.

- A. Being is a simple idea and admits of no explanation.
 - 1. Yet it must have some mark to distinguish it from non-being.
 - 2. By discovering this mark we shall have being, at least in its essential characteristic.
- B. The distinctive mark of being.
 - 1. Much too simple to think of being as what we find given in experience, especially in sense-intuition.
 - 2. The distinctive mark is some power of action, therefore real things are distinguished from things having only conceptual existence by this power and fact of action.
 - 3. The phenomenal world manifests incessant change and motion, and we posit being as its explanation.
- C. Thus we demand of being that it shall contain in itself the ground and explanation of the apparent order.
 - 1. Therefore being must be viewed as essentially causal and active.
 - 2. Only the definite and only the active can be viewed as ontologically real.
- D. The difficulty of common sense with this conclusion lies in its failure to distinguish between phenomenal and ontological reality.
 - 1. Here all the contents of our sense-intuition are viewed and equally real, and as real in the same sense.

- a. But here we find some objects undeniably inert and inactive.
- b. Therefore neither the notion nor fact of being has any necessary connection with causality.
- 2. Allowing matter itself to be a true substantial existence, and not merely a manifestation of some basal power;
 - a. We must admit that its nature is altogether different from what appears.
 - (1) Its reality is a multitude of non-appearing elements, and its inaction is only in seeming.
 - (2) These elements found materiality by their interactions.
 - (3) Hence materiality is but the phenomenal product of a dynamism beneath it where all is incessant activity.
 - (4) Thus the alleged experience of inactive being turns out to be only an experience of phenomena.
Equilibrium is balanced action.
- 3. Taking refuge in the law of inertia.
 - a. This law denies, not activity on the part of a material element, but only spontaneity with regard to its own space-relations.
Thus matter, as one, is confused for its elements which are many.
 - b. It claims that every material thing opposes a resistance to every change of its space-relations, but this does not affirm a mere passivity on the part of matter.
- E. The conclusion is the claim that substantial being, in distinction from phenomenal being, must be viewed as causal.
- III. The doctrine of inherence. It is objected that back of the power of being which we have given as its mark is being itself, and it must be dealt with also. Being and its mark, however, can be separated only in ideas of thought not in reality.
The claim is that the power inheres in the thing.
- A. The distinction of force and being is merely logical.
 - 1. Such distinction would bring division of labor with one part which simply exists and furnishes the being.
 - a. Thus we have the abandoned notion of pure being as a certain core of rigid reality.
 - b. The force or power would be self-supporting and it would make reality nothing but force.
 - 2. Such a distinction is due to the method of judgment which must have things as subject and attribute, thus making an unreal distinction between the thing and its attributes.
- B. The notion of power is, in every case, a pure abstraction, and, as such, incapable of inherence.
 - 1. Power in general is not a thing or an instrument, but only an abstraction from the activity of some agent.
 - 2. Reality is always an agent.
- C. Certain scruples emerge.
 - 1. Must not being exist before action rather than having to act in order to exist as in this theory?
Action is a dynamic consequence of being, and is coexistent with it.

2. The idea of being admits of no comparison. In so far as things are real they are on the same plane, and if to be is to act, it follows that the most active has the most being. This confounds the logical notion with real existence, as the mark which places things in a class may itself vary in intensity so that the conditions of membership are more or less perfectly fulfilled.

Chapter 2. The Nature of Things.

Having determined the nature of things as distinguished from non-existence we now study their nature as distinguished from one another, or as capable of their peculiar manifestations.

- I. The nature of things as distinguished from one another.
 - A. Things differ only in the form or kind of activity as concentered formulas of action. They have no common being, however.
 - B. Methods of determining the nature of things.
 1. Common sense tries to find the nature of things in their sense-qualities.
 - a. This, however, applies only to sense-objects, while the notion of nature applies to all being.
 - b. Also, sense-qualities never reveal what a thing is, but only how it effects us.
 - c. Things are also in manifold interaction with one another and this interaction also, is an expression of their nature.
 - d. Then too, the same thing is found to have different sense-qualities.
 2. In another view the thing retreats behind the qualities, as their support, and the qualities appear as states of the thing. The essence is their hidden and mysterious ground. Two views result from this theory:
 - a. That of being, in itself, is without quality of any sort. The idea of pure being again asserts itself.
 - b. That being has qualities, but what they are is entirely unknown. View of Herbart and agnostics. Views as to the meaning of quality:
 - (1) Usual meaning: Kinds or nature; this means only that all being must have some definite nature, or be of some definite kinds.
 - (2) Those kinds which are reached by reasoning and comparison, expressing a complex of relations.
 - (3) Those kinds discerned in intuition, adjectives and abstract nouns describing them. Here the nature of things revealed in intuition and not in reflection.
 - n c. However, neither adjectives nor abstract nouns are capable of expressing the true nature of things. Also qualities in this sense are changeless.
 - d. Therefore no simple quality or combination of qualities can ever represent the nature of a thing because of:
 - (1) The unchangeability of qualities.
 - (2) The necessary changeability of things.
- II. The nature of things can never be expressed by a quality, but only by a rule or law according to which the thing acts and changes.

The question arises How can a law be the nature of a thing?

- A. Thinking of it as a quality fails.
- B. This is the only conception which provides for change and action.
- C. The notion has a certain warrant in our own experience with the outer world, and the distinction of thing and law is in our thought.
 - 1. The fact is the unitary thing, and this thing acts in certain definite ways.
 - 2. From the fact of activity we form the notion of power.
 - 3. From the form and sequence of the activity we form a rule, which we call the law of its action.
 - 4. To know this law is to know the thing in itself, or in its inmost essence.

Chapter 3. Change and Identity.

Problem: Can change and identity be reconciled, and if so, how?

I. Defining change and identity:

A. The meanings of identity:

- 1. Logical identity is simply the sameness of definition.
- 2. Phenomenal identity is often the equivalence of appearance, and sometimes it means the continuity of equivalent appearance.
- 3. Metaphysical identity applies to the reality behind the appearance. Problem postponed.

B. The meaning of change.

- 1. Change in the abstract may denote any and every change, including the most lawless and chaotic sequences, continuous and discontinuous; simply a departure from the present order in any direction whatever.
- 2. According to science and philosophy: change implies causal continuity of being, and is identical with becoming. Each state of reality is founded in its predecessor, and, in turn, founds its successor; lawful.

II. Two conceptions of basal reality resulting from this problem.

A. The Eleatics defined the basal principle as being, which they viewed as unitary and changeless existence. com

B. Heraclitus defined the basal principle as being, which he regarded as a continuous process.

- 1. Nothing is fixed but law, which determines the order and character of the flow.
- 2. All being is comprised in an order of antecedence and sequence; and the antecedent must yield to its consequent, which, in turn, becomes antecedent, etc.

III. Attempts to reconcile change and identity.

A. Spontaneous and uncritical thinking solves the problem by a notion of a changeless thing with changing states or changing qualities.

- 1. We have a division of labor with a rigid core of duration.
- 2. A state of a thing is not something externally attached to the thing, but is really a state of the thing, and expresses what the thing is at the time. Any other conception gives us the doctrine of inherence.

B. The physicists: assume that things, in themselves, are changeless, but their relations change, and thus there arises for us a changing appearance, which, however, does not affect the underlying realities.

- C. Herbart had a notion of "accidental views" according to which the changes of things are only in appearance, and are due entirely to the changing position of the observer.
 - 1. This view denies all change in the substantial universe, and reduces the manifold changes of the system to occurrences in us.
 - 2. This view transfers rather than escapes the difficulty. Change is moving from the outer world to the inner.
- D. Apart from intelligence the world of substances must be brought into the cycle of change and resigned to the eternal flow.
 - 1. Hence as a matter of theory, we must have, at least, an abiding or permanent knower, to make the theory of change intelligible.
 - 2. We have immediate experience of such a knowing subject-the conscious self.
 - 3. Therefore the doctrine of the flow of being must be limited by the permanence, in some sense, of the mental subject.
 - 4. Logic reminds us that formal identity or the fixity of the idea is the absolute condition of any articulate thought whatever.
 - 5. Therefore the question of change and identity must be considered from the standpoint of intelligence, if we would reach any solution.

IV. The solution of the problem.

- A. The puzzle:
 - 1. The thing exists successively; the idea has no succession in it.
 - 2. Common-sense will not allow the idea to be real, and logic will not allow the thing to be real.
- B. We are thrown back upon the conception of an underlying intelligence which is at once the seat of the idea and the source of the realizing energy.
- C. Reality and identity acquire special meanings.
 - 1. Reality might mean the temporal manifestation of the productive energy, or it might mean the idea expressed thereby.
 - 2. Identity might mean the continuity of the realizing process, or the oneness of the underlying idea.
 - 3. This is our resulting view concerning the reality of all impersonal things.
 - a. That they have their existence through an energy not their own.
 - b. And that they have their identity solely through the intellect which constitutes them identical.
- D. Conscious intelligence the only solution.
 - 1. Something truly abiding must be found if we are to escape the eternal flow of becoming.
 - 2. In personality, or in the self-consciousness of spirit, we find only union of change and permanence, or of identity and diversity.
 - a. The soul knows itself to be the same, and distinguishes itself from its states as their permanent subject.
 - b. The soul forever changes, almost always in the direction of growth, gathering up its past and carrying it with it.
 - c. This fact constitutes the permanence and identity of self.
 - 3. Memory does not make, but reveals the fact that our being is continuous.
 - a. We are not conscious of a permanent substance, but of a permanent self.
 - b. This permanence is not revealed, but constituted by memory

and self-consciousness.

4. Intelligence cannot be understood through its own categories, but rather, conversely, the categories must be understood through our experience of intelligence itself.

Chapter 4. Causality.

I. Inductive and productive causality distinguished.

A. Inductive causality dealing with the order in which events occur.

1. Events occur under certain conditions.
2. We may call the total group of conditions the cause, or upon occasion, one of them.
3. By induction the one leading to or causing the event is located.
4. This is causality in the inductive sense, and the chief part of practical wisdom lies in a knowledge of this.
5. The inductive inquiry should be distinguished from and kept clear from the metaphysical agency by which events are brought about.

B. Productive efficiency or dynamic determination as causality.

Manifests itself in three ways for popular thought.

1. The interaction of things.
2. The determination of consequents by their antecedents.
3. In volitional self-determination.

II. Causality as manifesting itself in the interaction of things.

A. The origin of the idea of interaction.

1. Common sense never doubts that we are surrounded by a great multitude of mutually independent things.
2. These things appear to be comprised in an order of mutual change and concomitant variation.
3. This leads to the conviction that things also form a system, and that the place and functions of the individual are determined by its relations to the whole.
4. This systematic connection is brought about by interaction.

B. The logical presuppositions of interaction.

1. The general commensurability and adjustedness of things.
 - a. In order that any system whatever shall exist for thought, its members must admit of being brought into relations of likeness and difference under the various categories of thought, and of being united into a logical whole.
This implies:
 - (1) A complex system of logical relations among the members.
 - (2) The mutual logical dependence.
 - b. A real system, in order to be anything for us, must be a system of law, so that definite antecedents shall have the definite consequents; and this in turn demands an exact adjustment or correspondence of all the interacting members to all the rest.
2. This general commensurability and adjustedness of things, while a pre-condition of system, founds none. It determines the possibility of combination rather than its actuality.
 - a. In a conceptual system, two things are necessary:
 - (1) The commensurability of the contents of the conceptions themselves.

- (2) The unity of the thinking mind; the mind must comprise the many conceptions in the unity of one consciousness.
- b. In popular thought things form, not a conceptual system, but a real system apart from all mind.
- c. Problem; what is it in the real system which takes the place of the unitary thinker in the conceptual system, and makes the concrete system possible.
 - (1) If the real system were founded and maintained by a supreme thinker, we should have the necessary bond.
 - (2) Common sense holds, however, that the true systematic bond of things is the fact of interaction.
- C. The given facts of experience in interaction.
 - 1. We have no proper experience of interaction whatever. A specific volition may result in physical changes, but of the nature of the connection we know nothing.
 - 2. In the physical world we have experience only of mutual change or of antecedence and sequence.
 - 3. Interaction, then, is a thought problem rather than a datum of experience.
- D. The conceptions of interaction. Consideration with the aim of showing that this which we call interaction is not something which takes place between things as independent agents, but rather something which takes place in things as dependent on one fundamental reality.
 - 1. The view that a thing transfers its state or condition to the thing acted upon, and this transference is the act.
 - a. Meets the fatal objection that states, conditions, and attributes are nothing apart from a subject, and as such admits of no transference.
 - b. Is only a description, not an explanation.
 - 2. The above view adapted: "Only like can affect like."
 - a. Based upon the notion that in interaction something leaves the agent and passes into the patient.
 - b. Chief application to the interaction of soul and body:
 - (1) Leads to materialism or faith as one starts with body or soul first.
 - (2) Results in conclusion that body and soul could not effect each other.
 - c. The only truth in this doctrine is that things totally and essentially unrelated can never pass into relations of interaction, and, hence, that all true being must constitute a series, without any absolute oppositions.
 - 3. Another verbal explanation is found in the notion of a passing influence, which, by passing, affects the object. If influence means effect, the problem is merely renamed; if it means more we must answer:
 - a. What the thing is that passes;
 - b. In what this passing thing differs from the things between which it passes.
 - c. What the relation of the passing thing is to the thing from which it passes.
 - d. Where the acting thing gets the store of things which it omits.

e. How the passing thing could do any more than the original thing from which it proceeds.

Some make action at a distance the real puzzle in interaction, but it is not how to act across empty space, but how to act across individuality.

4. Among physicists, the view that forces play between things and produce effects. The force must be either a mere name for a form of activity, or it must be a thing. This either means nothing or worse difficulties.

5. Things are often said to have spheres of force about them; but this, too, is only a description of facts.

E. Interaction of independent things a contradiction.

1. By definition, the independent must contain the ground of all its determinations in itself.

2. By analysis it is plain that whatever is subject to a necessary interaction must have the grounds of its determinations in others as well as in itself.

3. These two conceptions will not combine.

F. Conclusion: we must transcend the realm of the relative and dependent, and affirm a fundamental reality which is absolute and independent, and in the unity of whose existence and possibility of what we call interaction finds its ultimate explanation.

1. We may regard the many individuals as ontologically distinct from the one and from one another, and as brought into interaction only through the mediation of the basal one which posits the whole and co-ordinates them according to the plan of the whole.

a. The interaction is only apparent, being the direct action of the one.

b. This view reduces to a universal occasionalism.

2. The conception that the many have no proper existence or thinghood in themselves, and are only modes or phenomena of the one, which alone truly is.

a. This view is the one to which reflection inclines for the physical world.

b. The former view is the one which must be held in the case of the finite spirit.

Further conclusion: the popular conception of interaction must be transformed into an immanent causality in a fundamental unitary being.

III. Causality in succession: the determining of consequents by their antecedents. (within things)

A. Two cautions:

1. We must distinguish between phenomenal and the metaphysical question.

2. We must distinguish between the conviction that causality is really in play, and the form in which we try to conceive it.

B. Difficulties to be faced.

1. Where the causality is within a series and not beyond it: the cause produces, and, in producing, becomes the effect.

a. The subject, here, is the subject of a not-yet-existing predicate; and the predicate is the predicate of a no-longer-existing subject.

- b. Thus no metaphysical predication whatever, causal or otherwise, is possible until we bring the entire metaphysical movement within the range of thought and view it as constituted by thought.
 - (1) All predication, then, must take place within the sphere of intellect, and with reference to intellect.
 - (2) The existence of things, then, has no meaning except with reference to intelligence.
 - 2. The first must have some essential relation to the later members of the series, otherwise we lose the notion of ground altogether.
 - a. With dependent things the solution is to view the series as the realization in temporal form of an idea which underlies the series.
 - b. With the fundamental reality: refer successive stages to the continuous self-determination of the absolute intelligence, according to an abiding plan.
 - c. Spontaneous thought: finds the solution of the problem in the notion of potentiality.
 - (1) A purely formal solution, gaining positive content only as we base it on free intelligence.
 - (2) This view does not escape the difficulties concerning metaphysical predication in a changing world.
 - C. Conclusion: that the causality which manifests itself in the form of antecedence and sequence eludes us so long as we regard it as an impersonal activity under the temporal form.
- IV. The manifestation of causality in volitional self-determination.
- A. The category of unity.
 - 1. Elements in the notion of real unity.
 - a. That which denies composition and divisibility.
 - b. No body which exists extended in space can be a unit. In order that a thing shall be a true unit it must allow no distinction of parts, and no activities which are activities of parts only.
 - 2. It now becomes clear that there can be unity on the impersonal plane. Here we end with what we assume in starting. Unity is formal.
 - B. The free and conscious self is the only real unity of which we have any knowledge. It is the only thing which can be a true unity, all other unities are formal, and have only a mental existence.
 - 1. Active intelligence cannot be understood through the metaphysical categories, but these categories must be understood as realized in active intelligence.
 - 2. This is here illustrated in the category of unity. Unity is realized through thought in action.
 - a. Here we find a unity which produces plurality without destroying self.
 - b. Living, active intelligence is the condition both of conceptual and of metaphysical unity.
 - C. Conclusion: volitional causality, that is, intelligence itself in act, is the only conception of metaphysical causality in which we can rest. "World-ground" -that basal causality by which the world is produced and maintained.

Chapter 5. The World-ground.

I. The infinite not substance but cause.

A. The infinite is to be viewed as a unitary and indivisible agent.

1. Representations of popular thinking:

- a. The infinite has been viewed almost as a kind of raw material, or as a kind of background of the finite.
- b. It has been said to produce, or emit, the finite from itself; or to pass from its own unity into the plurality of finite things.
- c. The finite is spoken of as parts or modifications of the infinite, or as emanations from the infinite, or as partaking of the infinite substance.
 - (1) The infinite, however, as an agent, is a unit, and not a sum or an aggregate.
 - (2) Therefore we cannot view the finite as a part of, or emanation from or as partaking of, the infinite substance, for all these expressions imply the divisibility of the infinite, and also its stuffy nature.
 - (3) All these views really deny the infinite and replace it by an aggregate. A double difficulty:
 - (a) The notion of division has no application to true being, but only to aggregates.
 - (b) If it had application, the result of dividing the infinite would be to cancel it, and replace it by the sum of the finite, -the pluralism of uncritical speculation.

2. Only creation can reconcile the reality of the finite as ontologically distinct with the unity of the infinite.

3. The idea of the finite as a mode of the infinite.

- a. Being is said to be one in essence, but various in mode; based on notion of pure being.
- b. The phrase is misleading, being allied with the imagination.
- c. The view that being is cause cancels these misconceptions.
 - (1) We must view being as an agent, and the modes as forms of activity.
 - (2) Things are but constant forms of activity on the part of the infinite, and their thinghood is purely phenomenal.

4. Conclusion: The infinite is not a passive substance, but the basal cause of the universe, is therefore one and indivisible, and forever equal to itself.

a. We may view the finite as a form of energizing on the part of the infinite.

b. Or we may view it as a substantial creation by the infinite.

B. Impersonal things are only phenomena.

1. The notion of the impersonal finite vanishes, upon analysis, into phenomenality.

- a. We found identity and causality only in the personal.
- b. In studying interaction, we found that the causality of the finite cannot properly extend beyond its own subjectivity, and the impersonal has no subjectivity.

2. Only selfhood serves to mark off the finite as substantial reality, and to give it any ontological otherness to the infinite.

C. The relation of the finite to the infinite.

1. The personal finite, the spirit, must be viewed as created, as caused to be.

a. Creation has a positive and negative meaning:

- (1) Positively, it means to posit in existence something which before was not.
- (2) Negatively, it denies that this something is made out of pre-existent material, or that the creator is less after the creative act than before.
- (3) We are shut up to this meaning by the contradiction of any other view.

b. We must guard from errors:

- (1) It is easy to fall into some species of pantheism without critical vigilance.
 - (a) We must see that quantity is a self-destructive category when applied to phenomena.
 - (b) We must distinguish between logical subordination and ontological implication.
- (2) The necessary dependence of the finite, through abstract thinking, leads to limited and relative existence, to partial and incomplete existence, to relatively phenomenal and non-existent.
 - (a) We must fall back on experience and interpret the categories by experience, instead of the reverse.
 - (b) Through experience, we discover that, while we cannot tell how the finite can be, it nevertheless is.

2. Two facts of experience necessary to interpret life.

- a. We have a certain selfhood and relative independence; we have thoughts and feelings and volitions. This fact constitutes us persons and gives meaning to personality.
- b. We cannot regard this life as self-sufficient and independent.
- c. We cannot interpret life without admitting these two facts and to deny them leads to difficulties.
 - (1) To say God is in all things makes him the author of human blundering and limitations, contradictions.
 - (2) His perfect unity is destroyed by making his finite thought so vastly different from infinite thought.

D. The relation of the infinite to the finite.

1. The infinite must be viewed as the primal source of all finite existence.

- a. For the finite has no ground of being in itself.
- b. The finite can be properly understood or comprehended only from the side of the infinite.

2. The finite may be viewed as the outcome or expression of a plan or purpose on the part of the infinite, or as a consequence of the infinite.

a. In the former case:

- (1) The basal purpose will contain the ground or reason for all the determinations of the system.
- (2) A knowledge of the system will depend upon a knowledge of the purpose for whose expression and realization the system exists.

3. Atheism and theism alike must regard the finite as dependent on the world-ground.

- a. Theism finds the order of dependence expressed in a plan.

- b. Atheism would found it in the nature of the infinite.
 - (1) The nature then becomes the determining principle of all finite existence.
 - (2) The system and its members will be in every respect what the nature may demand, and any knowledge must be of this nature.
 - 4. Thus if we deny the independence of the finite we must allow that the determining principle of the course of nature lies beyond all observation in the hidden plan or nature of the infinite.
 - a. Uniformity of nature is contingent, and for all we know, a complete reversal of all observed methods may occur at any moment.
 - b. An apriori knowledge of the system must be declared impossible.
 - c. There are many objections to these conclusions.
 - (1) That physical elements must be fixed quantities due to indestructibility of matter.
Answer: The indestructibility of matter, in the only sense in which it is proved, is compatible with the complete phenomenality of matter.
 - (2) That the necessity which rules in nature excludes a view which leaves things at such loose ends.
Answer: Necessity in nature can only mean that existing laws, facts, and events are expressions of necessity, but there is nothing here to assure us that necessity will always express itself in just these forms.
 - (3) The intellectualist urges that this view is a relapse into vulgar empiricism. Calls for a defining of our meaning.
Answer: Intellectualism, if universally valid, is purely formal and its first principles being formal determine no specific content, merely outlining a knowledge of possibility, and give no insight into the specific nature of reality.
 Also, first principles themselves must be founded in the nature of the infinite--what is true just as much as what is real.
 - 5. Conclusion: that there is one basal being in action as the source of the system and of all its laws, principles, and realities; this monism extending not only to things, but to principles also, The world-ground is a free and active intelligence.
- II. The emptiness of the atheistic attempt to refer the world, its order and products to mechanical necessity.
- A. Necessity, as formal category, contains nothing specific.
 - 1. It gets a concrete content only as we apply it to a given matter.
 - 2. Necessity itself is hypothetical and its contents are learned from experience.
 - 3. Logic shows that any explanation which does not root in purpose is equally empty. Explanation here consists simply in affirming or assuming a set of causes such and in such relations that they must produce the effect in question, to the exclusion of every other. The necessity which explains all is the necessity which contains all.
- III. The personality of the infinite; the divine personality and inner thought of God.

A. Much difficulty comes through confusion of ideas.

1. The limitations of the finite are applied to God and personality is confused with corporeality, or at least with form of some kind, combined with spatial limitation and separation.
Conclusion: God is not a person of any kind.
 - a. This conclusion is valid for personality conceived as implying corporeity, form and spatial separation.
 - b. The essential meaning of personality involves self-knowledge, self-consciousness, and self-control.
2. That God is not a person or individual has been further maintained, on the ground that then he would be one of a kind, would be comprised in a class, and so would lose his infinitude and absoluteness.
 - a. Ruling out the notion of form and spatial separation, which is here implicit, leaves only logical confusion.
 - b. The absolute is one of a kind and stands in relations posited by itself. (being kind, causal kind, knowing kind.)
3. Further maintained that we cannot view the infinite as personal because personality implies consciousness which in turn implies antithesis of subject and object, and the infinite as one and only has no object, hence cannot be conscious; consciousness here becomes a contradiction.
Answer: such antithesis is purely a logical or psychological form, and does not involve an ontological otherness.
4. Difficulties arise from transferring to the infinite the limitations of the finite and defining intelligence so as to make development a part of the definition where its essential meaning is the power to know.

B. Difficulties come through mistaken expectations and demands.

1. We must not attempt to construe the infinite spatially for God is in the world, not as spatial presence, but as that active subject by which all things exist.
2. We may not seek to construe the infinite mind, but must content ourselves with recognizing it. God is that with which all our inquiry must end; here is mystery.
3. Whatever conception we form in this field is of the nature of a limit rather than of a veritable apprehension.
4. Further positive word on this subject must come from the philosophy of religion.

Part 2. Cosmology

Chapter 1. Space.

It has been shown that space is primarily a mental principle according to which the mind projects and relates the objects of external experience. It becomes a real only as the space-law is immanent in the mental activity itself.

I. The nature of space objectively considered.

- A. It is something quite unique, independent of all things, and of all that we understand by substantial or causal reality.
- B. Or, it is a peculiar order of relations among things, which order, however, exists objectively and independently of the thinker.
- C. Or, Space is the form of objective experience, and is nothing in abstraction from that experience.

II. The popular view: space is not a thing, but the place of things, and as such is a necessary condition of their existence. Not a nothing, but a peculiar kind of existence, which can be described only in terms of itself. This view is full of difficulties and its apparent clearness comes from confounding the phenomenal and the ontological.

- A. The conception of space as an all-containing form is an inconsistent metaphor borrowed from our sense-experience.
 - 1. Forms must always be the forms of something and with not reality to produce and limit the form, and the form exists only in conception.
 - 2. The asserted reality of space cannot be maintained without conflicting with the space intuition itself.
 - a. If real it must be able in some way to assert itself as a determining factor in the system of things.
 - b. That which does nothing, determines nothing, neither acting nor being acted upon, most certainly is nothing. Why then maintain its existence?
 - c. As phenomenal, space has only mental existence, and our inquiry concerns a supposed ontological space.
- B. This doctrine leads to a hopeless dualism of first principles.
 - 1. If space be a reality apart from things, it is something uncreated and eternal for the common notion of an independent space is repugnant to creation.
 - 2. This view is contradicted by the necessary unity of the basal reality.
 - 3. We can view space only as some principle in being.

III. A second view: that space is a certain order of relations among realities. Things, when they exist, exist in certain relations, and the sum, or system, of these relations constitutes space. Things do not exist in space; but they exist in space-relations, and with space-properties. These relations are independent of the mind and objectively exist among things.

- 1. This view would give no unity in space.
 - a. Space relations of things are perpetually changing.
 - b. There would be no provision for the myriad ideal and possible space relations. These would be merely mental while real space would be variable.

2. Formal relations are incapable of real existence, but are necessarily subjective.
- IV. A third view: that space is a form of intuition, and not a mode of existence. Things in themselves are essentially non-spatial and space-predicates belong rather to phenomenal.
- A. The doctrine is commonly made to mean that our space-intuition is something arbitrary, and without any determining factor in the world of causality.
 1. The positions and relations of things in our subjective space are independent of our volition, and their spatial changes take place without any consent of ours.
 2. In affirming the subjectivity of space we have equally to admit something beyond ourselves which is a determining factor in our spatial experience.
 - a. This something may be God himself, who is reproducing in finite thought the order which exists in his infinite thought.
 - b. It may be regarded as a non-spatial system with which we are in interaction.
 - (1) These interactions produce, not a copy of anything objective, but only the subjective symbol or translation into the forms of sense-intuition of unpicturable realities beyond them.
 - (2) This view is not adequate and has in it an assumption of impersonal finite agents.
 - (3) This view makes space a delusion, and thus destroys all confidence in the mind.
 - B. We have an easy oversight of spontaneous thought concerning the relation of mind to reality; reality seems quite independent, and mind, therefore, non-essential.
 1. This becomes an uncritical prejudice when advanced as a speculative dogma.
 2. This independence of our mind is mistaken for an independence of all mind - a notion which destroys itself.
 3. We conclude that subjectivity, in the sense of dependence on mind, is universal; and that objectivity, in the sense of non-dependence on mind, is a fiction.
 - a. Sense-qualities are not unreal, but they rather have their reality only in and for mind.
 - b. In like manner the spatial order of things is not unreal, but rather it is real only for mind. It does not therefore become a delusion.
 - c. Apparent reality exists spatially; but proper ontological reality exists spacelessly and without spatial predicates.
 - C. Ways of looking at and explaining space.
 1. The apparent world is the seat and substance of practical experience though it has not ontological existence, and we must explain it by looking for its substantial cause and ground which must be non-spatial, and not by looking for a fictitious noumenal world.
 2. We are in a world of mind and in this world the space order has its place and value; after all we never try to give our thoughts space relations.

3. We may look at space as the form under which we intuit objects, provided we do not conceive the objects as something apart from the intuition and as warped by the intuition into forms foreign to their true nature.
 4. It is not to be expected that daily language should be modified to suit this view for daily life deals only with things in intuition, and space is a form of intuition. It is only when we pass into the ontological realm that we must drop our space-conceptions.
 5. The world as objective and therefore impossible as subjective does not hold as the relation of subject and object is absolutely unique and can only be experienced. It admits of no spatial representation.
 6. The identity of the object is not secured by its being in real space, but by its being a factor of the relational world.
- V. Determining the right view of space.
- A. In any case, space must be a principle of intuition.
 1. Its objectivity seems apparent because we have an immediate perception of its existence, while its subjectivity implies a deal of mental mechanism and mental activity of which we are totally unconscious.
 - a. Both arguments worthless because perception comes through being acted upon and only things can do this.
 - b. Hence our knowledge of space must be a mental interpretation of the action of things upon the mind.
 2. Our space intuition must therefore arise within and objective space is no factor in sense perception whatever.
 - B. Rejection of the first two views discussed.
 1. The realistic view is inconsistent, and upon analysis even unintelligible.
 - a. It hovers between making space something and nothing.
 - b. It conflicts with the unity of being and forces us to regard the infinite as composed of parts.
 - c. It implies the coexistence of two necessary and mutually independent principles.
 2. The attempt to regard space as a system of relations between things is an impossible compromise between the subjective and the objective view.
 - a. The objective view is not proven and is in itself unclear, inconsistent and impossible.
 - b. We reject it for the view that space is ultimately a principle of intuition, and secondarily, a mode of appearance. Space therefore is phenomenal.
 - C. The inquiry to determine whether the principle of space is such as necessarily to restrict it to three dimensions.
 1. The principle of space has not such universality as the laws of formal thought as it conditions only our intuition of objects.
 - a. However, though there is the possibility of a different principle, the space-intuition cannot be changed in its essential laws and nature.
 - b. It is important to premise that the planes of reference are perpendicular each to the other two.
 2. Arguments for more than three dimensions which consist entirely from illustrations drawn from analytic formulas.

- a. This method deduces a consequence from an assumption.
- b. It deals with numbers and their relations and these are logical and not spatial. Thus representing "a" by a line, "a squared" by a plane surface; "a to the third power" is a coincidence and does not imply that "a to the nth power" has "nth" spatial dimensions.
- 3. Another class of arguments confounds the dimensions of things in space with the dimensions of space itself. A curvature of space is substituted for a curvature in space.

Chapter 2. Time.

I. What is the nature of time?

- A. It is not an intuition such as space.
 - 1. We can imagine space without its objects but we cannot imagine time without doing so in terms of events.
 - 2. All our representations of time are images borrowed from space, and all alike contain contradictions of the time-idea.
 - 3. Time is rather a certain unpicturable order of events.
- B. Time is conceived as an existence unique, which exists apart from things, losing nothing by their absence and gaining nothing by their presence; it is independent, without any relation to being, and moves on in ceaseless and steady flow forever. This view is tenable:
 - 1. By making time independent of being is sin against the law of reason, which forbids all plurality of independent principles.
 - 2. The view which regards time as a real existence is hopelessly unclear and inconsistent in its assumptions and implications.

II. Inconsistency and contradictory nature of popular views.

- A. Unclearness of popular thought on this subject.
 - 1. Sometimes it is said to flow, and sometimes it is mentioned as the standing condition of all flow.
 - a. Taking time as the standing condition of all flow.
 - (1) If we regard time as a whole as existing, and thus embracing past, present, and future, then time as a whole stands, and the flow is put in things and not in time
 - (2) This notion of an empty time, with things flowing through it, is simply the image of empty space which has been mistaken for that of time.
 - b. Taking time as a ceaseless and steady flow.
 - (1) We are shut up to the affirmation that only the present exists.
 - (2) The present has no duration, is but the dividing line of past and future, and as these do not exist, time itself cannot exist.
 - (3) The notion of a standing time contradicts the time-idea; and the notion of a flowing time results in a mental vacuum.
 - 2. The relation of this independent time to the things and events said to be in it.
 - a. Things cannot exist in the past, or in the future; but in such a time the present is nothing; and hence they cannot exist at all.
 - b. In the relation of independent time to events, the movement of time is not supposed to be the movement of events, and the

movement of events, though in time, is not supposed to be due to the movement of time, but to the causes at work. The difficulty is in finding any connection between time and the events said to be in it.

(1) If time is said to condition events time must be dynamic and that is contradictory.

(2) If time be real and without causal influence, the whole series of events runs off instantaneously for the conditions of change are found in the interaction of things and when the dynamic conditions of change are fulfilled there is no reason why the change should delay.

c. Conceiving inactive time as either resting or flowing, it is quite impossible to assign any articulate relation in which it can stand to things or events.

It does not even measure anything for our units of time are taken from some change in things.

d. Affirming that our mental life itself bears witness to the reality of time, is merely confusing the phenomenal with the ontological.

B. It only remains that time be restricted to phenomenal existence, and that thought instead of being in time be regarded as the source and founder of temporal relations, which are the only time there is.

III. Attempts to reach timelessness by making the subjectivity of time credible.

A. A rhetorical device: long and short are relative terms and our estimate of duration is purely subjective, depending upon our state of mind.

Answer: The before-and-after of things is not a matter of feeling, the time-order remains unchanged.

B. That the apparent temporal sequence is merely the reflection of our own finiteness, which compels us to grasp successively what exists simultaneously.

Answer: This would hold if the world were a system of logical relations; a changeless system of things in changeless relations; time would be simply a movement in the finite mind, while for the infinite there would be an eternal now.

1. This view calls for the Eleatic notion of being, where action and change do not exist and are but the eternal consequences of being; here time would be but an unaccountable illusion in finite thought.

2. But we are committed to the Heraclitic view where things are active and changing and so it is impossible to reach the ideality of time by eliminating change from being.

3. It becomes necessary to show that change does not imply time as an actual existence, but that time is only the subjective appearance of change.

4. The objection that we confuse time with duration.

a. Linking time with change and making possible duration without time or sequence is untenable.

b. Duration can only mean continuous existence through time and without the notion of time duration loses all significance.

5. Time depends on change; time cannot relate to any independent

flow outside of things, but is related to the phases of change as sequences.

- C. The idealist's view: that as the dynamic relations of the things are spaceless, yet demand that things should appear in space, so the dynamic relations of things are timeless, but demand that they shall appear under the form of time. Time does not enter into the reality, but only into the appearance, its position of far or near being due to the complexity of its conditionedness. The tendency is to resolve dynamic sequence into temporal sequence.
 - 1. There is, however, no enduring present, but one that changes is impossible so long as there is no change in reality. Hence change can never be made phenomenal only but is a fact of reality itself.
 - 2. Result so far: there is no independent time in which change occurs and by which change is measured, but change is nevertheless real, and time as the form of change is also real.
 - a. Absolute time, or time as an independent reality, is purely a product of our thinking. In this sense the world is not in time.
 - b. But change is real, and change cannot be conceived without succession. In this sense, the world-process is in time.
 - 3. Considered as temporal and extra-mental, the series falls asunder into past and future, leaving the present only as the plane of division between them.
 - a. The extra-mental time vanishes altogether.
 - b. Hence the doctrine of time must be construed not with reference to an extra-mental existence, but from the stand-point of self-conscious intelligence.

IV. Time must be construed with reference to self-consciousness.

- A. Time, as the form of our subjective experience, takes its origin from the stand-point of conscious intelligence, which constitutes its own present.

The mind relates its actual experience to itself, and this constitutes the only present there is.

 - 1. It is a relation in consciousness.
 - 2. The present can mean only the actual in experience.
 - 3. Experience, then, is not in the present, but the present is in experience.
- B. Objective or cosmic time can also be understood and defined only from the stand-point of conscious intelligence.
 - 1. Time is essentially a function of self-conscious intelligence.
 - 2. Its relation to the finite intellect, to the finite spirit as existing, and to the infinite and absolute being.
 - a. The finite intelligence, in so far as it is intelligence is timeless; that is, it has no real before-and-after in it, but it establishes temporal relations. Temporality is not in time, it is simply an aspect of our experience.
 - (1) From this point of view:
 - (a) Time is seen to be largely relative, the form of individual experience.
 - (b) Time would be relative to the individual except that the cosmic order marks the cosmic time, and furnishes the common timepiece by which our individual times are regulated.

- (2) We see that the present is relative.
 - (a) We cannot have experience in the present, but we constitute the present by the actual in experience.
 - (b) The range of experience varies with the range of our powers.
- (3) The present is no point in absolute time, but a relation in conscious experience.
 - (a) Every intellect transcends time as mental form, but the finite mind remains under the law of time as limitation.
 - (b) The complete transcendence of time in both senses is possible only to the absolute person.
- b. The absolute independence and changeless self-possession of the absolute are needed to constitute the changeless life.
 - (1) The will whereby the cosmic process is realized and carried on is essentially changing and progressive, and hence must be essentially temporal so it is said.
 - (2) Nothing will meet the case except the conception of the absolute person, which freely posits a changing world-order without being himself involved in the change.
- c. We have traced the change to the changeless, and have deduced change from the changeless which is contradiction. The problem is solved only by rising to the plane of free personality. Beyond this is mystery.

V. V. Summary of chapter.

- A. Time is primarily an order of relations in our experience.
- B. There is no ontological time separate from things and events, in which they exist or occur.
- C. There is no order of ontological change of which time is the form and to which time may be referred, without reference to intelligence.
- D. Both time and change must be referred to intelligence as their source.
- E. Neither time nor change can be carried into intelligence as such without making thought impossible.
- F. Neither time nor change can be construed with reference to any extra-mental fact, but only from the stand-point of self-conscious intelligence.
- G. Hence the temporal judgment becomes relative to the range and contents of self-consciousness.
- H. Not-temporality is not to be conceived as a temporal coexistence, but rather as the immediate possession of the objects by the conscious mind; it must be experienced.
- I. What this may mean may be gathered from reflection on what we call present experience. This is not temporal in the sense of having a real before and after in it. It is temporal in the sense of having temporal form. It is non-temporal in the sense that the conscious self grasps all its elements in an indivisible act, and thus makes consciousness possible.
- J. But still experience has the temporal form; and we may resume our temporal language with all confidence, only guarding ourselves against mistaking this form for an ontological fact, and also against overlooking the relativity in the temporal judgment due to our limitation.

Chapter 3. Matter, Force, and Motion.

I. Matter.

A. Interpreting sense experience by spatial and mechanical categories.

1. Some form of the atomic theory arises.
 - a. Bodies in space seem undeniably given.
 - b. Divisibility of body is also given as a fact of experience.
 - c. The thought of infinite division admits of no completion, something is always left.
2. The corpuscular philosophy, with its two factors of the atoms and the void, naturally emerges.
 - a. Solidity seems to be undeniably given in experience as a property of matter.
 - b. Actual bodies admit of expansion and contraction.
3. Occasionally a prime mover seemed to be necessary but this was found, not in causation, but in the atoms and their inherent forces.

B. Reasons for the atomic illusions.

1. Little corpuscular bodies lie so far below the range of experience that we can easily ignore the logical difficulties in the notion.
2. These little bodies are in space, and admit of various movements and combinations and thus we explain visible body by their composition--the category of the imagination.
3. Causation is provided for by the moving forces, and nothing more seems to be needed for successful and adequate speculation.

C1 Varieties of atomism. There is no agreement as to the correct view or conception of this theory, and in application it takes on different forms according to the character of the facts on which it is based. Different for physicist, astronomer, chemist, etc.

1. One view is a modification of the corpuscular theory in which atoms are enabled to play the part by the addition of moving forces, which in some mysterious way dwell in the atoms without being a consequence of them and yet are inseparable from them.
Criticism: a crude working of the categories of being and causation under spatial conditions, and a still cruder conception of inherence.
2. Atoms may be viewed as alike or unlike in essence, form size, and grouping, or in energy or in intensity of action; or as qualitatively unlike apart from all quantitative and geometrical relations.

Criticism: to determine the specific properties of the atoms will always belong to inductive science; to determine their general outline is the work of metaphysics. These explanations are but repetitions in the mass of what is given in the unit.

3. The chief qualities of bodies, which we may sum up under the term materiality, are products of the interactions of the elements, and not properties of the elements themselves.
 - a. For in determining the properties and form of bodies we are referred, not to similar properties and forms of the elements, but to their dynamic relations, whereby they found the properties and forms of bodies.
 - b. Solidity, by its very nature, must be a product and not an original and changeless attribute.

D. The chief reason which remains for the corpuscular theory is not its scientific value, but its picturability.

II. Force. This notion arises from the need of importing causality into the problem, and as the atoms are easily fancied to be the only things concerned, the force is distributed among them as its subjects.

A. Confusion in the notion of force.

1. In our discussion of being we saw that force, as commonly conceived as inhering in things, is purely an abstraction from certain forms of activity.
2. The common conception is that separate forces reside in the thing, and that the thing is the home or seat of the forces.
 - a. This view rests on the notion of pure being and on a hypothesis of force.
 - b. The result is an impossible dualism, in which the being does not explain the force, and yet the force is nothing apart from the being.
 - c. This results from mistaking the distinctions of language for metaphysical fact.
3. Another conception is the definition of force as the unknown cause of phenomena. This makes force a thing and dispenses with everything but force as cause.

B. An explanation of force.

1. From our general conception of the system, we must conceive of being, not as having inherent force, but as passing from one form of manifestation to another as its circumstances vary. A new activity does not spring from an inherent power coiled up within it, but from a power acquired in the moment of manifestation.
 - a. In like manner the different forces of things, as well as the different intensities of the same force, are acquired at the time of action, and represent only the forms of action which the nature of the system calls for in their special relations.
 - b. A thing is perpetually acquiring new forces and losing other, according as its relations change.
2. Our conclusion, is that force as used in the physical sciences is not to be regarded as a something resident in the atoms, but rather as an abstraction from the various forms of atomic activity, and the laws of force are only the formulas which express the conditions of these forms of activity, and sometimes the rate of their variation.
3. This supposes the atom to be ontologically real and the alternate view is to drop the language of causality altogether except in an inductive sense and confine ourselves to studying the laws of physical changes.

C. The laws of force variation--relation of the atoms and their forces to space.

1. Sense thought says that forces should vary with the distance.
 - a. Empty space does not seem to contain the least ground for the variation of force. Space does nothing so it cannot have a resistance which must be overcome.
 - b. Space position must therefore be viewed not as a cause but as an effect. Its own determining ground must be sought for in the idea, or nature, of the whole, which is the ultimate source of all law and order.

2. The fancy is entertained that empty space itself is a sufficient reason for force-variation.
 - a. This fancy is founded on the notion that force is something streaming out from the element as a kind of aura flowing from a centre.
 - b. However, nothing streams out from being, and force is only an abstraction from a thing's activity, and never a thing in itself.
3. In speaking of space as a ground of force-variation we denied that it can be such ground. But may it not make all action at a distance impossible?
 - a. It seems impossible that the atom can fill space with its influence and effect things at a distance in definite ways.
 - b. Nevertheless, the attempt to dispense with action at a distance must really deny all attractive and repulsive forces to the elements, and either appeal at once to a coordinating and moving force in matter which is not of matter, or it must reduce all material action to impact.
 - (1) The phenomenal of cohesion and affinity utterly defy any attempt to explain them as the results of impact.
 - (2) On the ordinary theory there is no contact whatever between elements and impact itself assumes action at a distance.
 - (3) Forces can only be attractive and repulsive when acting at a distance.
 - c. If we allow the general possibility of action at a distance there is no longer any reason for believing that a thing is in one place rather than in another.
 - (1) If action at a distance be allowed it is theoretically possible to claim that, for all we know, the real agents of the system are removed from it by the whole diameter of space.
 - (2) If we insist that a thing is wherever it acts, then we have to attribute a kind of omnipresence to every atom, as every atom is said to attract every other.
- D. The above difficulties infest the metaphysics of physics. Practically they do no harm as the important work of science consists in finding the laws of phenomena, but they are not scientific and final.

III. Motion.

- A. Various difficulties of the traditional doctrine of motion and its relation to matter.
 1. Motion is indefinable, except in terms of itself.
 2. The antithesis of absolute and relative motion. Absolute motion is declared impossible, and the universe, as a whole, is said to rest. Rest and motion, then, are alike relative and real only as relative.
 - a. Error of statement: by definition if things were in absolute rest, relative motion would be a delusion.
 - b. The fallacy of argument: It consists in assuming that the mental co-ordinates by which thought grasps the fact are necessary to the fact itself. Motion can only be grasped as relative to self or some standpoint, but this does not define the motion.

3. History has changed in its view and prejudice has often played a part in the changes.

B. Facts regarding motion.

1. Motion is neither natural nor unnatural, but a condition in which matter may or may not be; and in this sense matter may be said to be indifferent to motion.
2. Motion is but the spatial manifestation of a peculiar meta-physical state in the moving thing itself, and this state is what distinguishes the moving from the resting thing. This state is named velocity which in itself is not motion.
3. Motion and direction are or must be given as inseparable elements of the same internal state, and this state varies with the direction.
 - a. But possible directions are numberless and for each one there must be a special and peculiar inner state.
 - b. Thus we would have to declare that all directions, if not all positions, in absolute space have their representatives in the metaphysical states of matter.

C. The continuity of motion.

1. Continuity of motion is itself an ambiguous phrase, as it may refer to space or to velocity.
2. The continuity of motion is not a necessity of thought.
3. The continuity of velocity is not a rational necessity.
4. The continuity of velocity is a doctrine which holds only in a system which derives all motion from moving forces, which forces, again, act not only through space, but also through time.

D. The more specific laws of motion.

1. The law of inertia, according to which a body cannot start or stop itself.
 - a. This law cannot successfully be shown to be a necessity to thought.
 - b. The first part: a body at rest remains at rest.
 - (1) The proof consists in bidding us conceive a single element in void space, and as there is no reason why it should move in one direction rather than another, it remains at rest.
 - (2) The law of sufficient reason could be used to prove that the atom could not be in space or time for every point in space and time is like every other.
 - (3) The single atom in void space is a contradiction, because the atoms have their existence and properties only in the system of which they are parts or implication.
 - c. The second part: a body in motion remains in motion, the constant direction is no necessity of thought, as direction is given from within, and there is no absurdity in supposing that a thing should change its own direction.
2. That the amount of motion is proportional to the moving force, and is in the direction of its action.
 - a. The first part of this law is correct.
 - b. The second part contains implicitly the doctrine of the parallelogram of forces--not so self-evidently true.
Discussion postponed.
3. The equality of action and reaction. This is a law of action and it is an axiom of metaphysics that there can be no action without reaction.

- a. The action and reaction may be purely static, as when one thing rests on another. In this sense the law is a necessity of equilibrium.
- b. Action and reaction may be dynamic also and in this case the law is no self-evident necessity. The attraction of any one element does not imply the attraction of any other.

IV. Mechanics of the idealistic view.

- A. Theoretical mechanics is purely an abstract science, is independent of concrete facts, and to call its abstractions realities raises an inquiry into their true nature.
 - 1. In so far as mechanics deals with the objective order, it is only phenomenal, and a good part of it must be viewed as of the nature of a device for calculation.
 - 2. Phenomena have laws, largely spatial and temporal, which admit of geometrical and numerical expression. They are learned from experience. They are valuable only for the practical control of phenomena.
 - 3. True efficient causality lies in a realm into which science as such has neither the call nor the power to penetrate.

Chapter 4. Nature.

I. Nature introduced for study.

- A. The demand for system and totality has been met by forming the notion of nature or the cosmos or the universe.
 - 1. The aim being to pass from the discontinuous events and scattered existences of experience to a law-giving whole.
 - 2. Kant called this an idea of the reason, and it is this rather than a fact of experience. Kant held the idea to be regulative only, and not objectively valid.
 - 3. The end sought in the notion of nature is justified, and must in some way be reached.
- B. Two conceptions of nature implicit in popular speculation which are rarely distinguished.
 - 1. The view which identifies nature with physical nature. Here man and spirit stand in antithesis to nature.
 - 2. The view which identifies it with the system of law.

II. Nature as Matter and Force.

- A. Considered as the confusion of a metaphysical proposition with a principle of inductive method.
 - 1. Things and bodies about us are taken for substantial realities as a matter of course and tend to become the standard by which all reality must be measured.
 - a. Matter and force come to be the supremem and basal realities of objective experience.
 - b. Space and time furnish the scene.
 - c. Matter furnishes the existence.
 - d. Force, manifesting itself in motion, furnishes the causality.
 - 2. According to a popular and showy cosmic formula, cosmic processes consist of an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion.
- B. Rightly considered.
 - 1. The practical study of nature must mainly consist in looking for the laws of coexistence and sequence, and of combination

and concomitant variation among phenomena, and our valuable practical knowledge must very largely consist in a knowledge of these laws.

2. In a methodological sense we accept and emphasize the importance of the categories of space and time, matter and motion, for practical study and mastery of experience, but we cannot allow them to represent independent ontological facts.

III. Nature as mechanism.

Nature is a mechanism, and all natural phenomena are to be mechanically explained.

A. Different conceptions of mechanism.

1. Where nothing is assumed but matter and motion under the conditions of time and space. Force is a dynamic idea. This is exemplified in Greek atomism which sought to construe the system from atoms and the void alone.
2. Descartes view; that the essence of matter was extension, and the mechanical theory implied that all heterogeneity of quantity and quality in the material world can be explained as modifications of the one homogeneous property of extension and the one experienced fact of motion. Matter, if was held, can act only by impact. With this conception we are forced to affirm a prime mover in any case, and, if material phenomena refuse to be explained as the result of impact, we have to assume an extra-material power as the ever-present source of the energies of nature.
3. Importing causation we find, in a later view, that nature is a mechanism in the sense that all phenomena are produced by resident forces according to mechanical laws.
 - a. Without warrant the freest use of the notion of moving forces is made use of.
 - b. In this science we have the three factors of matter, force, and motion to determine their mutual relations. Qualitative differences are ignored.
 - c. Nothing but a redistribution of matter and motion.
4. There is also an ontological doctrine.

B. Conclusion: Nothing whatever can be explained by mechanism, atomic or otherwise, which is not assumed in principle in the mechanism.

C. Fallacies of these views.

1. Nothing can be done with atoms unless we regard them as dynamic.
2. All spatial changes among things must be viewed as translations into phenomenal form of dynamical relations in things.
 - a. The dependence of the spatial system on an unpicturable dynamic system must be borne in mind.
 - b. If we would make our mechanism adequate we must make it as complex as the facts themselves.

IV. Nature as the order of law.

Nature first implies the physical, then life, mind, society, and all human activity and progress, showing an order of uniformity, are called natural and the natural becomes coextensive with law.

A. The difficulty of uncritical thought.

1. Nature is metaphysically conceived as a cause or system of causes, rather than as merely an order of phenomena.
2. The rightful question: How are phenomena connected in an order

of discoverable law? The metaphysical question which cannot be answered here: What are the causes which produce them?

3. When we come to life, mind, and society, scientific method itself begins to lose its objectivity and sinks toward a relative validity.
4. This field of experienced law is the field of inductive science. Its practical importance cannot be overestimated, but its theoretical significance is easily understood. Crude thought turns it into ontology, but no metaphysical insight is to be found in this field.

B. The important truth in the conception of nature as the order of law.

1. The study of things postulates an order of law, and its aim is to connect things and events with one another in this order.
2. Such an order, though no metaphysical necessity, is a necessary postulate of human thought, and practical wisdom must centre here. This is the realm of law rather than the realm of mechanism.

C. Conclusion: Nature as an order of law has only phenomenal existence; and the explanations within the order have only phenomenal application. They have no causality in them, and they do not penetrate to the seat of power.

The definition of physical nature is, the sum-total of spatial phenomena and their laws. This nature is throughout effect, and contains no causation and no necessity in it.

V. Nature as continuous.

A. The law of continuity holds the conception that all phenomena are to be explained within the system itself, there must be no interferences or irruptions from without.

B. As it expresses itself in crude thinking.

1. By this principle one speculator deduces life from the lifeless, while another denies the possibility on the same ground.
2. Various meanings:
 - a. Sometimes it means simply a denial of creation and the supernatural.
 - b. Sometimes it means that nature never makes a leap.
 - c. Sometimes it means that all phenomena are but phrases of a common process, and from any fact whatever in the system we can pass to any other, however different, by simple modifications of this process.
 - d. In short, it may mean anything desirable.

C. What is it, then, in the case of nature which is continuous?

1. The continuity of nature is to be found in the continuous validity of the system of law and in the continuity of the thought of which nature is the flowing expression.
 - a. The necessary dependence of the finite on the fundamental reality reduces it to contingent existence, and leaves us unable to say how, or when, or in what order finite things shall begin, or how long they shall continue, or when, or in what order, they shall cease to be.
 - b. A metaphysical doctrine with so many riders can never be put forward as a first principle.
2. But natural causality is continuous for the cessation of all causality would be the vanishing of nature.

- a. As the causality which supports nature, it is continuous as a matter of fact.
- b. If we mean the causality of nature, considered as an impersonal agent or system of agents, there is no such thing.
- 3. What is needed is not a metaphysical doctrine about natural causality, but rather an inductive postulate of the continuity of natural law. The continuity of law, therefore, as a pure postulate, must be:
 - a. Referred to an abiding purpose in the cosmic intelligence.
 - b. Or accepted as an opaque fact.
- 4. The continuity of nature as phenomenon means the continuity of phenomenal laws.
 - a. This law produces nothing and really prescribes nothing.
 - b. This continuity in no way conflicts with the complete pliability of the system to free intelligence, which may bound it or be in interaction with it. A great multitude of forms and collocations of matter can be traced back to human volition guided by purpose.
 - c. The error or fancy that the actual system of law shuts everything up to a rigid fixity which can be modified only by irruption and violence, is set aside.
 - (1) The ultimatum of, either absolute continuity or no science, is merely a postulate.
 - (2) Absolute continuity may be a postulate of absolute science, but it is no postulate or the only science we have, and the only one worth having.
 - (3) Even if we suppose that it is freedom which acts through the law, the law remains, and the knowledge of it is as valuable as ever.

VI. Evolution.

A. As a cosmic formula.

- 1. In the scientific sense as a description of the genesis and history of the facts to which it is applied.
 - a. It means that the simplest and lowest forms of existence preceded the higher and more complex forms.
 - b. It is a statement of method and is silent about causation; and the method itself is compatible with any kind of causation.
- 2. As such a description, plus a theory of their causes.
 - a. This represents a battle of philosophies with the scientific and the metaphysical questions confused.
 - b. It is often of the mechanical and materialistic type, and almost invariably it has maintained a doctrine of necessity.
 - (1) Nature has been erected into a self-contained and self-sufficient system.
 - (2) Natural laws have been viewed as self-executing necessities.
 - c. There is absolutely no logical connection between natural causation, in the sense of material or physical or necessary causation, and the law of evolution, in the sense of gradual progress from the simple to the complex.
 - d. Materialistic evolution faces two questions:

(1) Does evolution necessarily mean qualitative progress?
If so, a necessarily progressive universe readily leads to reflection and lends itself to teleological interpretations.

(2) Does evolution mean only causal continuity; and is it equally compatible with either progress or regress?
If so, how is the actual progress to be explained?

B. Evolution as a biological doctrine.

1. When anthropomorphism is eliminated from the principle of selection, it reduces down to the survival of the fittest; Meaning that the able to survive, survive and the unable to survive do not survive.
2. The scientist insists that we must affirm natural selection as the principle of the metamorphoses in the organic world.
 - a. We are under obligation to accept no theory which can not prove itself.
 - b. This principle, when raised from a very subordinate position and made universal, becomes a barren formalism, leading to no insight, and largely a tautology.
 - c. The alternative of having recourse to design would be unscientific in the technical sense.
3. Design and teleology.
 - a. Design might throw light upon the existence of the whole, when one is looking for the ground of the arrangement of the parts, but it can never tell what the arrangement is
 - b. Science as such has no place for design; but reason, which is the source of science, has a place for design.
 - c. Teleology is unscientific in the technical and limited sense, but it is not unscientific in the sense of being false.
 - (1) There seems to be no good scientific explanation.
 - (2) Teleology claims that the net result of all arrivals and survivals in the organic world is such as to be unintelligible without the assumption that they root in purpose somewhere, whatever the method by which they have been reached.

VII. Nature as the System of the Finite.

A. The notion of nature is generally and often built on physical lines.

1. We tend to make man a physical product.
2. Or we make nature all inclusive to include both organic and inorganic, and the antitheses of experience--living and dead, spiritual and material, etc., -are only phenomenal.

B. This results from the desire for unity working under the limitations of sense metaphysics.

1. Eliminate the limitation of sense metaphysics and this mysterious nature becomes simply a name for the fundamental reality, and its properties remain a problem for investigation.
2. There is implicit in the doctrine the conception of an impersonal existence and of necessary causation.
3. However, epistemology convinces us that nature has neither existence nor meaning except for and through intelligence.

VII. Natural and supernatural.

A. The customary view of the natural.

1. A natural interpretation of all events is usually insisted upon, and this is held to exclude the supernatural as being mutually exclusive.
2. This results or rests on a double assumption:
 - a. Nature is supposed to be a metaphysical system with diverse resident forces by virtue of which it produces a great variety of effects which, as products of nature, are natural.
 - b. This nature is tacitly and often avowedly supposed not to root in, or be subordinate to, intelligence anywhere.
 - (1) If rooted in intelligence at all it is so only as to its general forms and laws, and not as to its details.
 - (2) A latent or explicit assumption that whatever can be referred to natural agency is thereby rescued from any purposeful interpretation.
 - (a) This does not follow as divine purpose may work through natural agency.
 - (b) If there be meaning in anything there is meaning in all things.
- B. The fallacy of the universal misleads us into thinking that the creative act produced only a system of things in general, and this system has wrought the rest on its own account.
 1. Creation implies and carries with it all that should ever arrive in the unfolding of the system.
 2. Mechanism can only unfold its own implications; it can make no departures so as to reach anything essentially new.
- C. Events in general must be said to be at once natural in the mode of their occurrence, and supernatural in their causation.

IX. Miracles.

- A. With the conception of divine immanence the question loses all essential importance.
 1. The only place or function for miracles would be as signs of a divine power and purpose which men immersed in sense could not find in the ordinary course of nature.
 2. They would root no more intimately in the divine will and purpose than any familiar event.
 3. Miracle in the sense of effects interpolated into the order of law without being a consequence of that order, would seem to be a fairly familiar fact of experience. (human volitions for example.)
- B. From our point of view the natural has its source and abiding cause in the fundamental reality, which is living will and intelligence.
 1. Miracle is only a question of the phenomenal relations of the event in question.
 2. A miracle is an event arriving apart from the accustomed order and defying reduction to rule.
 3. Our objective and logical ground rests on theistic faith.
 - a. An atheistic scheme allows psychological expectations, but they constitute no logical warrant.
 - b. An order of law becomes a rational thing and furnishes ground for rational assumption only on a theistic basis.

X. Nature as idea.

A thought world is the only knowable world; and a thought world is the only real world. And of this world intelligence is at once the origin and the abiding seat.

Part 3. Psychology.

Chapter 1. The soul.

The metaphysics of mind does not concern itself with the details of psychology (descriptive), but only with the basal ideas on which that psychology rests.

Experience owned; and the owning self which thinks and feels and wills we call the soul. (or mind, or spirit)

The question concerning the reality of the soul is commonly called the question of materialism or spiritualism.

Materialism may imply the crude theory of matter held by uncritical common-sense, and it may imply merely the unreality of mind; it may be defined by its doctrine of matter or by its doctrine of mind. For common sense it refers to every system which reduces mind to a sum of mental states and then views these states as the result of organization; it may be nihilism, idealism, pantheism, or agnosticism in its doctrine of existence.

I. Materialism as the denial of substantial reality of the soul and the organism as only a special material aggregate.

A. The positive argument appeals to the familiar fact that the condition and development of the organism have important bearing on the mental life.

1. The chief source of this view is ignorance of both physical and mental science.

2. There is complete unlikeness of physical and mental facts, and it is impossible to deduce one from the other as a necessary implication.

a. A physical explanation of thought and feeling must consist in a representation of them in terms of material movements and groupings.

b. Therefore thought would have to be a grouping of chemical elements.

c. But thought lies outside of the range of physical causation.

B. A new definition of matter is put forth, in terms of what matter does, thus making materiality and mentality opposite sides of the same substance.

1. This is a Monism in which the cause of mind is matter by definition, but what matter?

a. This matter is not the phenomenal bodies about us, it is ontological, the dynamic matter of scientific theory or of physical metaphysics.

b. It must be many, and the reality is a multitude of physical elements, each of which is endowed with sundry mystic or mental properties whereby, upon occasion, they become the sufficient explanation of our mental life.

(1) Though not deducing the mental from the physical, yet a certain unity seems to be secured by calling them endowments of the same thing.

(2) The doctrine is apt to result in turning the elements into little souls, in order to explain away the only souls of which we know anything, namely, our own.

(3) The doctrine is the extreme of pluralism, though called monism.

2. An unhappy dualism has emerged, that of neurosis and psychosis, in which we have:

- (1) A physical series; the changes of position, grouping and movement, which arise in connection with thought.
 - (2) A mental series: the changes of thought and feeling which attend the physical changes.
- a. The two series may be conceived as mutually independent, both depending upon a common subject. The physical series is the independent and universal fact; and psychosis must accommodate itself thereto.
- b. Another explanation: the physical series is self-contained and independent.
- (1) For the physical series is subject only to the laws of force and motion.
 - (2) Physical energy can never become anything else.
 - (3) Therefore we must hold that physical energy is never spent in producing those physical states which have thought as their inner face; these thoughts, as such, are powerless. Thus the physical continuity is saved.
 - (a) Thought is reduced to a powerless attendant on some phases of the physical series, or to a subjective aspect of certain physical activities.
 - (b) The thought-series appears as a gratuitous and magical addition to the thing-series, with no reason for appearing, let alone its when and where.
- c. Recurring to a. above, that matter has a mental as well as physical side:
- (1) To explain the form and peculiar character of any specific mental manifestation, we must allow that there is interaction between the two sides. Otherwise, thought would appear at unrelated places, etc.
 - (2) For proper and specific placement of thoughts, the inner and outer series must be in mutual determination.
 - (3) This, in turn, necessitates the further admission that the mental series is as real a form of energy as the physical series.
 - (4) And this realises the question as to which is really the ultimate fact: matter as moving, or matter as thinking and willing.
- d. We have here an ambiguity and unreal simplification: by mental series we may mean the thoughts and feeling which we call ours, or we may mean the mystical endowments, the subjective aspects, of the elements themselves.
- (1) This gives three elements: the physical order; the subjective aspects of the elements; and our own thoughts and feelings.
 - (2) The materialist solves the problem by saying that the mental series is an aspect, or phenomenon, or epi-phenomenon of the physical series.
 - (a) However, where there is no subject there are no aspects and no phenomenal.
 - (b) Hence a doctrine which would make thought phenomenal tacitly assumes the very mental subject it aims to deny.

- (3) Or he solves it by saying that the two series are identical, the same thing viewed in different ways. This is absurd as the thing-series is a set of moving elements; and the thought-series is a group of mental states

C. The relation of the physical aspect to the mental aspect of the elements themselves.

1. It does not seem to be a source of physical change to the materialist, for that is provided for by the laws of force and motion, and he must guard physical continuity.
2. To allow no dynamic relation between the inner and the outer makes it hard to see:
 - a. How the inner gets any hint how and when to manifest itself.
 - b. How it can manifest itself in any case, seeing that the physical order is closed against it.

D. The relation of the mental aspect of the elements to our thoughts and feelings.

1. The aspects as many, endowed with thought and feeling will give us a set of hypothetical souls to explain away the only soul we know about.
2. Allowing them to be true thought and feeling we must relate them to our thoughts and feelings.
 - a. To regard them as raw material is crude thinking.
 - b. As such they make a show of satisfying the demand for unity and continuity in the system, but it is a false show.

II. Monism, one substance or energy with two aspects, an objective and a subjective one, or a physical and a mental one.

A. The metaphysics of this view.

1. The theory is unclear as to what the two faces of the one are, whether aspects or objective attributes or phenomena.
2. Supposing them mutually independent attributes, several questions arise:
 - a. What becomes of the unity of the substance?
 - b. How is the parallelism of thought and thing which knowledge presupposes secured?
 - c. Seeing that knowledge is a mode of thinking and falls within the thought attribute, how can we admit a thing attribute at all, except as a phenomenon or mode of thought?
3. Supposing the faces to be only phenomenal, then the question arises, whence the thought which is the condition of all phenomena, and without which there could be no faces, or aspects, or unity of any sort?
 - a. If it is our thought which sees the one as double and gives it its attributes, then that thought turns out to be the precondition of the monistic system itself.
 - b. If it is not our thought, it is nevertheless thought; and then our system involves the one substance with the two aspects of thought and extension, and back of these another order of thought as the condition of the aspects and their bond of union.
4. The two attributes cannot be conceived as passive qualities like extension, but rather as forms of activity.
5. Conclusions:

- a. Active intelligence is the supreme condition of any real monism.
 - b. Accepting this metaphysics, thought is still not explained.
 - c. With our conviction of the phenomenality of matter and of all impersonal existence, and with the further conviction that active intelligence is the only reality, materialistic metaphysics from beginning to end is simply illusion and error.
- B. The psychology of materialistic monism.
- It has accepted or adopted the psychology of empiricism.
- 1. Particular sensitive states are produced in or by the nerves, and out of these the higher contents of consciousness are built by repetition and association, aided and abetted by heredity
 - 2. We have seen, however, that thought is impossible except through a unitary, abiding, and active self, that this self has never other than verbally denied, and that when denied it is always forthwith reaffirmed in some figure of speech, or assumed in the language employed.
- C. The epistemology of materialism.
- 1. It hardly has any, taking knowledge for granted.
 - 2. Its bearing is a logical outcome which makes all knowledge impossible.
- D. The place of the soul.
- 1. Materialism fails to see that it is not a sense object, but that it is the living subject in unchangeable antithesis to all other sense objects.
 - 2. Overlooking the necessarily antithetical nature of subject and object, the subject looks for himself among the objects and, confounded by the failure to find anything, overlooks and denies himself entirely.
 - 3. The knowing self is denied because it will not consent to become a phenomenon, although, in the nature of the case, it never can do so.
- III. Difficulties in accepting the affirmation of the soul as the active and abiding subject of the mental life.
- A. That the doctrine of the soul, though true for phenomena, is not true for noumena.
- 1. If the unity of the self in experience does not warrant us in concluding to its substantial unity, still less does it warrant us in concluding to its composition.
 - 2. We insist that in the face of all the facts we must think of the self as one and not many, as simple and not compound.
 - a. Objections must take the form of showing that the facts can be otherwise interpreted in articulate thought.
 - b. Objections are based on crude fancy that thought can grasp reality otherwise than by thinking of it, and on the further superstition of extra-mental reality. Thus arises the phenomenal or empirical ego, and the noumenal ego.
 - c. Reasons against the two egos.
 - (1) The nature of this empirical ego, and its relation to the transcendental ego, are left very unclear.
 - (2) Kant had the subject appear as the bearer of properties instead of the agent which, by its activity, founds properties. He uses the notion of a transmitted consciousness which is a gratuitous violation of appearances instead of their explanation.

- (3) A thing is to be viewed as real and substantial, not because it has a kernel of substance in itself, but because it is able to assert itself in activity.

3. That the self as object of knowledge must come under the conditions of knowledge, and by so doing, it must become a phenomenon. Our self-knowledge, therefore, only reveals the phenomenal self, and never the noumenal subject.

Answer: the application of the categories to the knowledge of self does not make it fictitious; the soul comes under the categories as the living principles of intelligence itself, revealed and understood in experience.

B. After all, has anything been gained or won in calling the soul real and abiding?

1. We gain first, negatively, by rescuing the soul from the position of a fiction or hallucination.
2. Second, positively, we satisfy the rational demand for a sufficient reason for the mental life, we supply the unity without which the thought life falls asunder, and we secure some ground for the conviction of responsibility on which society is based.
3. In thinking of the soul we must not look for a lump, nor for a category, nor for a picture, but for the agent which thinks and feels and wills, and knows itself in so doing.
4. Taking the soul as real and abiding or identical, we have the question, how?

Answer: The subject of consciousness is not the soul, considered as blank substance or blank subject, but the conscious soul; and the thing which is identical is neither consciousness in abstraction from consciousness, but the conscious soul.

5. But what of the soul when unconscious? What makes it before and after identical? If sameness can endure across unconsciousness, then consciousness does not constitute sameness.

a. This question assumes that things exist in a real time, but time is relative to self-consciousness; therefore we have simply a fault in the self-consciousness of one being judged by the self-consciousness of another being.

b. We might say that continuity of being might conceivably abide across periods of unconsciousness, but that only consciousness can raise continuity to identity. This continuity is what common sense means by identity.

In what does this continuity consist?

(1) Things have their essential existence for God.

(2) Their existence consists in the idea they express and in the activity in which the idea finds expression.

(3) Therefore the identity of the idea is the identity of the thing; and the continuity of the activity of expression is the continuity of the thing.

(4) Objections assume a real time, and that we have some real notion of identity other than what we experience.

IV. Results of the discussion.

A. The mental life cannot be deduced from physical organization.

B. The mental life cannot be understood without admitting a real

something, the self or soul, which cannot be identified with the physical elements, and which is the abiding subject of thought and feeling.

- C. This self cannot be dispensed with by supposing matter to be one and duly furnishing it with mysterious subjective faces or aspects.
- D. The mental facts cannot be described in terms of their physical attendants or conditions.
- E. The mental life is not dependent on the organism in the sense of causal production by the organism; as an order of concomitant variation in the physical and mental series there is mutual dependence of each on the other.
- F. We can doubtless learn much of the conditions of mental activity; what takes place in the brain as the centre of the physical system is only a matter of hypothesis; what takes place there as the organ of thought is a subject very vague.
- G. There is no such thing as psychology without a soul; this does not rule out detailed work in psychology which does not go into metaphysics or the presuppositions. The fact of experience is exhausted in the discovery that the mental life has physical processes for its concomitant, and the wise man must aim to find the law of this concomitance.

Chapter 2. Soul and Body.

In the inductive sense interaction means simply the laws of mutual change or of concomitant variation among things. The inductive problem is to discover the law of these changes; to discover the laws of concomitant variation in physical and mental changes, or to find out what mental states go with what physical states and the reverse.

- I. Forms under which the interaction of soul and body is to be conceived, assuming the body to be substantially real.
 - A. By interaction in what case we could only mean that soul and body affect each other.
 - B. In construing the problem spatially the body is conceived as a physical aggregate, and the attempt is made to picture the soul as somewhere within this aggregate.
 - C. Some difficulties disappear on grasping the phenomenality of space.
 - 1. Here the invisible dynamic states of the elements are the forces which determine the resultant, and that these states may be in the soul as well as in the body is quite credible.
 - 2. The conservation of energy is not fully proved, and if proved does not forbid us to admit that our thoughts and volitions count in the control of the organism, if the facts point that way. Otherwise we would have to hold that the body starts, stops, and directs itself, speech and all, without control from thought.
 - D. Difficulties of interaction are due to spatial fancies, and to the fancy that interaction must be by impact.
 - E. No theory whatever can escape the sharp antithesis of the physical and the mental. The organism seems to be a kind of link between the inorganic physical and the mental.
 - 1. As physical it is allied to the world of matter.
 - 2. As living, it is allied to the world of mind.
- II. The body as organism.
 - A. Still assuming the reality of the physical elements, we have three factors in the problem:
 - 1. The elements which compose the organism.

2. The cause of their union into an organism.
 3. The subject of the mental life which is manifested in connection with the organism.
- B. Locating the seat of the organic law whereby physical elements build an organism which is different from the component elements.
1. We may seek to find it in the elements themselves.
 2. We may ascribe it to life, as something distinct from the elements, on the one hand, and from the soul, on the other.
 3. We may view the soul itself as the ground of form, having these stages:
 - a. The soul in interaction with the general physical system builds and maintains an organism within certain limits and under certain conditions set by its own nature and the general laws of the system.
 - b. This organized matter is already within the sphere of the soul's activity as well as under the general physical laws.
 - c. Hence the organism is partly a physical and partly a psychical function.
 - d. Conscious activity based upon and growing out of the organic activity is the final stage.
- III. Mechanism and vitalism (B, 1, above); the demand that the organism be viewed as a function of its component elements.
- A. In this view vitality is not needed to explain the existence and properties of the organism, but only the component elements with their inherent laws and complex interactions.
1. The forces of the elements are only abstractions from the activities of the elements, and the elements do whatever is done.
 - a. To explain gravitation, this theory assumes a peculiar endowment of the elements and calls it gravity.
 - b. To explain chemical action, it assumes another peculiar endowment of the atoms and calls it affinity.
 - c. So also to explain vital phenomena, it assumes again a peculiar endowment of the elements and calls it vitality.
 2. These forces are all alike necessary and are all alike but abstractions from the several forms of atomic interaction.
 3. This does not account for the fact that the forms and qualities of organisms are of the most diverse kinds, while the component elements are all of a kind. This necessitates the assuming of "subtle tendencies" which are, in some way, located in the germ.
 - a. This notion has been formulated in the doctrine of "physiological units," each of these has the power of reproducing the organism under appropriate conditions.
 - b. It attributes the tendencies to the germ, and forgets that, by hypothesis, the germ is a compound of elements.
 - c. The theory implies, then, that, under certain conditions the elements act with constant reference to the plan of the organism.
- B. The idea of vitalism is equally unclear.
1. Many holders of this view neglect to say whether vitality is a quality in the elements which conditions their agency, or whether it is a separate agent.
 - a. As the former we fail to escape the mechanical theory.

- b. AS a separate agent there are many problems;
 - (1) Is the agent one or many, separate agents in each organism or not?
 - (2) To say the agent is intelligent would confound it with God.
 - (3) To say it works differently in different conditions, we must bring it into a system of fixed interaction with the elements; still mechanical.
 - (4) To view the vital element as many adds additional difficulties; we would have discrete individual lives and must account for their source.
- 2. Difficulties arise in inquiring concerning the subject of the thought and sensibility which seem to be manifested in connection with the organism.
 - a. There seems to be an inner life of feeling of some sort in connection with all the higher animal forms which neither theory accounts for.
 - b. We cannot deduce complex organic molecules from simple inorganic ones, and such attempts are mere verbalism.
- 3. When mental manifestations appear, as in all the higher orders of animals, we must make a choice:
 - a. Either these manifestations are purely illusory, and the animals are senseless automata, or
 - b. We must declare that with each new animal a new factor is introduced into the system as the thinking and feeling subject of the animal's experience.
 - c. Thus the problem of life comes back again to the problem of the soul.
- IV. The infinite the source of both soul and body. (our own view)
 - A. Our own conception of the interaction of soul and body.
 - 1. The soul is posited by the infinite.
 - 2. The body is simply an order or system of phenomena connected with the soul which reproduces to some extent features of the general phenomenal order, and which also expresses an order of concomitance with the mental life.
 - a. It becomes a visible expression of the personality.
 - b. It becomes a means of personal communion.
 - c. It becomes a means for controlling to some extent the inner life.
 - 3. This concomitance is the only interaction there is, and its determining ground must be sought in the plan and agency of the infinite.
 - B. Two cautions:
 - 1. The inductive scientist in studying experienced laws and conditions must be reminded that these laws remain on the surface and contain no causal efficiency.
 - 2. The metaphysician who is persuaded that the infinite is the ever-present source of all things must not overlook the fact that a cosmic causality proceeds in certain ways, and that a knowledge of those ways is of great practical importance.
 - C. There seems to be necessary a correspondence between the mental and physical series, such that a given state in one should always attend a given state in the other.
 - 1. When we pass beyond the experienced concomitance we cannot affirm any absolute laws whatever.

2. Attempts to do so run to mythological molecular constructions.
- V. The origin of souls.
- A. Two views only are self-consistent: the creation of souls, or the reduction of mental phenomena to functions of organization. This second view is materialism so condemned.
 - B. Two ways of viewing the creation of souls:
 1. We may suppose that souls were all produced by some original creative act. This would lead to doctrines of pre-existence, transmigration, or metempsychosis.
 2. We may suppose that souls were individually produced in connection with the individual organism.
 - a. Other views of the origin of souls:
 - (1) Traducianism, that the soul of the child is said to be in some way derived from the parents. It is held here that there is a law, or a world-order, according to which souls are produced, yet without being created outright. Very vague, we must know what the agents are.
 - (2) If it be said that God has made the elements such that when combined in certain ways mental phenomena result, this is simply materialism.
 - (3) If it be said that when the elements are combined in certain ways a substantial soul results, this is to allow creation; but what creates?
 - b. Emanation, budding, fission, division, and composition of any kind are forbidden by the necessary unity of the soul.
 - c. We must fall back on the world-ground, or God, and we must say that where and when the divine plan, which is the law of cosmic activity, calls for it, there and then a soul begins its existence and development.
 - C. There are two difficulties that meet us here.
 1. We try to picture the operation in terms of space.
 - a. We tend to conceive the soul as brought from somewhere.
 - b. There is a fancy that the divine agent must appear among the phenomenal antecedents.
 - c. However, the divine immanence and the non-spatiality of the real, in distinction from the apparent, remove the difficulties.
 2. A second class of difficulties arise from theological and moral exigencies and the facts of heredity.
 - a. The theological exigencies are mainly connected with the doctrine of original sin and its transmitted guilt. Creation some have thought, could cut off the entail or corruption of blood.
 - b. The moral exigencies arise from the supposed difficulty in assuming that God should make morally imperfect souls.
 - c. The argument from heredity mostly mistakes a theory of the fact for the fact itself.
 - (1) The likenesses and unlikenesses among genealogically connected individuals are the fact; all else is theory.
 - (2) But the ultimate ground of the relation, whether of likeness or unlikeness, must be sought not in the finite series itself, but in the plan of the infinite power which produces individuals and determines their nature.

(3) As a theory in speculative biology, the doctrine of heredity generally contradicts itself.

VI. The future of souls.

- A. Speculation cannot say much that is positive.
- B. The fact of experience is:
 - 1. That in our present existence the mental life has intimate and complex concomitance with the physical.
 - 2. That with the removal of the body the phenomenal manifestation of the soul life ceases.
- C. The fact that consciousness varies with physical conditions is often used to prove that apart from the body the mental life would be impossible, and hence that for the conscious life, at least, death ends all.
 - 1. However, the relation, whatever it is, can only be viewed as factual and contingent.
 - 2. The actual body, then, is no analytically necessary factor of our inner life.
- D. Speculation destroys knowledge but makes room for belief.
 - 1. Criticism makes short work of the pretended disproofs of immortality, by showing that they are only weaknesses of the dogmatic imagination.
 - 2. It equally overturns the sense dogmatism which finds in the spatial and physical the supreme, if not the only, type of the real.
 - 3. It shows that the physical, even if temporally first in the finite order, can lay no claim to be the truly real of which all later factors must be viewed as only products.
 - 4. It removes the difficulties which arise from the attempt to construe the soul and the immortal life spatially.
 - 5. The decay and failure of the body do not analytically imply the destruction of the soul, as would be the case if the body were its causal ground.
 - 6. Speculation makes room for belief, but for positive faith we must fall back on the demands of our moral and religious nature, or on some word of revelation, or on both together.

Chapter 3. Of Mental Mechanism.

I. The notion of a mental mechanism.

- A. No mechanical representation of mental activities is possible.
- B. Difficulties in the notion of a mental mechanism.
 - 1. What is meant by being in consciousness?
 - a. It means what we experience when we are conscious of something.
 - b. The exact fact: we are conscious of certain things, and this consciousness is absolutely unique and can only be experienced.
 - c. This consciousness admits of no representation in space images.
 - (1) With the vanishing of space forms and relations from the mental states, the notion of a mental mechanism begins to grow obscure.
 - (2) Also when doubt is cast on the substantiality of the component factors and on their dynamic relations.
 - 2. As to the meaning of sensations.

- a. Because of the category of substance they tend to take on a substantive and even a substantial form.
- b. An indefinite amount of psychological language and theory implies their thinghood, but a little reflection dispels the illusion.
- c. It is not sensations that abide but only the constant meaning which they express, or of which they are the bearers.
- 3. As to the dynamic relations of the sensations.
 - a. Nonsense results when the sensations are conceived as particular and separate existences, endowed with special forces and united thereby into mental groups.
 - b. Where the sensations are regarded as affections of a mental subject we cannot work the doctrine without appealing to some higher principle.
 - (1) It would seem that as affections of a unitary subject they would necessarily be brought into interaction, and then it would be natural to consider them as endowed with inherent forces, whereby they modify or combine with one another.
 - (2) Herbart's theory attempts to establish this view.
 - (a) Sensation meaning logical contents would give the sensations only logical existence, and hence only logical relations. Dynamism is absurd when applied to logic, an inference being not a dynamic resultant, but a logical consequent.
 - (b) Sensation meaning the psychological activity involved leads to endowing these activities with forces of mutual attraction and repulsion, and this is unintelligible.
 - c. The English associationalists have agreed in viewing the sensations as the raw material of the mental life, in viewing the higher forms of mentality as resulting from the lower forms under the law of association.
 - (1) They waver between regarding the association of ideas as an ultimate fact, and viewing the relations of contiguity, similarity, etc., as forces of mental cohesion and movement.
 - (2) They would give such relations dynamic significance by simply using dynamic terms.
 - (3) What it is that is associated is unclear, though they usually mean particular states. These are nothing until elevated to the plane of the universal.
- C. The mechanical process is supposed to explain reproduction.
 - 1. Steps in the process:
 - a. We first substitute physical images for the facts.
 - b. We then hypostasize the images and endow them with forces.
 - c. Finally we regard the images as having veritable identity in time.
 - 2. Reasons for this illusion:
 - a. We look at memory as a sort of chamber filled up "with nascent-motor excitations with ideal attachments."
 - b. Reproduction consists in bringing back into consciousness matter which exists in some form outside of consciousness.

3. Criticisms of this view.

- a. What is the meaning of reproduction itself? What is produced, the original fact as mental event, or the logical contents of the fact?
 - (1) The original fact as particular mental event vanished with its date and cannot be recalled.
 - (2) The logical contents have no psychological and temporal existence; they are a product of thought and exist only in the ideal world of logic.
- b. In reality the reproduction of an idea would mean the production of another idea, psychologically considered, but with the same logical contents or value.
- c. Memory itself can be explained by nothing but itself. Anything other than memory proper must be brought under the general notion of habit, and such facts have no physical analogue.

4. Conclusions.

- a. Thoughts and mental states in general are not things, but mental acts or functions, existing only in and through the soul's act.
- b. When in a later experience any elements are given similar to those in an earlier experience, the earlier experience is often reproduced in its significance.
- c. Reproduction in no way brings back the old fact as mental event. The fact is exhausted in the power to rethink the past and to know it as past; a unique fact of the mental world.
- D. Cerebral reproduction sometimes given to explain reproduction. The only sense in which the brain may be called the organ of memory is that in which the brain is the organ of thought; this means only that thought and recollection are cerebrally conditioned.
- II. Conclusion concerning the notion of a mental mechanism.

- A. The synthetic or constructive psychology, with its implicit category of composition and mechanical combination, must be abandoned; and psychology must be largely descriptive and classificatory rather than explanatory in the causal sense.
- B. Two things should be borne in mind.
 - 1. The emptiness of most general terms until they are illustrated in concrete reality.
 - 2. The impossibility of understanding the mental life in terms of anything but itself.

Chapter 4. Freedom and Necessity.

I. The meaning of freedom.

A. For popular thought.

- 1. This conviction of freedom manifests itself chiefly in connection with moral responsibility and executive moral activity; the traditional argument for freedom consists in appealing to the sense of responsibility, and in pointing out that freedom is a manifest implication of this and other facts of our moral nature; common sense.
- 2. A necessary assumption.
 - a. In the physical world we are led to assume an all embracing uniformity of law.
 - b. If in studying the facts of life, of conduct, of society we find it necessary to assume, in connection with law, a factor of freedom, a power of choice and self-direction

within certain limits, we have equal right to assume it.

B. Freedom defined:

1. We have seen that faith in reason itself is involved in freedom, and that the denial of freedom must lead to the collapse of reason.
2. By freedom in our human life we mean the power of self-direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and to work for their realization. Not an abstract freedom existing by itself, but this power of self-direction in living men and women.
3. Such freedom is presupposed in every department of life.
 - a. Implicit in the assumption of responsibility.
 - b. The moral nature in both its mandatory and its retributive aspect is absurd without it.
 - c. It seems to be involved in the very thought of a personal and rational life.
 - d. The purest illustration we have of self-direction is in thinking itself.
4. Its speculative significance appears first in its bearing on the problem of error.
 - a. It is plain that unless our faculties are essentially truthful, there is an end to all trustworthy thinking.
 - b. It is equally plain that a large part of thought and belief is erroneous.
 - c. Freedom is the only solution to this antithesis which does not wreck reason itself.
 - d. In a scheme of necessity error becomes cosmic and necessary, and reason is overwhelmed in scepticism.

C. Significance of freedom for science and philosophy.

1. The question of freedom enters intimately into the structure of reason itself.
2. In the field of thought proper, every one, in spite of himself, assumes that reason is a self-controlling force. Freedom cannot be rationally disputed without assuming it.
3. Without assuming a free cause as the source of the outer world the mind is unable to satisfy its own rational nature or to bring any line of thought to an end.
4. We also need the conception of freedom as the source of the cosmos to make it amenable to the demands of our intelligence.

II. The metaphysics of necessity.

A. The doctrine is in unstable equilibrium between:

1. The groundless becoming of Hume's doctrine, in which events succeed one another without any inner ground or connection.
2. And a doctrine of freedom, in which the ground of connection and progress is to be found.

B. The doctrine of freedom is open to criticism because:

1. It is supposed that freedom asserts pure lawlessness.
Answer: it presupposes a basis of fixity or uniformity to give it any meaning. The abstract notion of freedom and the abstract notion of necessity are contradictory.
2. Human freedom has only a limited sphere; it does not provide the laws of the intellect, of the sensibilities, of external nature, or the possibility of its own action. Within its own sphere it is far from absolute.

- a. Science, it is said, assumes the uniformity of law, and thus excludes freedom; it assumes that under like circumstances there must be the same result, while freedom says there will be a different result.

Answer: the objection is purely abstract and verbal in character; it tacitly assumes that freedom means pure lawlessness, whereas our freedom presupposes that order of law is its condition.

- b. The heavy speculative objections of freedom are drawn from the supposed demands of the law of causation; freedom is here ascribed to the will, and the will is abstracted from feeling and intelligence; thus freedom is reduced to blind and lawless arbitrariness, and loses its value.

Answer: This fiction results from mistaking the abstractions of psychology for separate and mutually indifferent factors. If anything is free it is the knowing and feeling soul, not the will; such self-directing activity does not violate the law of causation as it makes the self the agent.

- c. We must guard against the two extremes of necessity and lawless caprice.

Conclusion.

1. It is impossible to construe the mind as the resultant of the interaction of any number of physical or impersonal elements. It is also impossible to construct thought by any mechanical juxtaposition or associational union of particular mental states.
2. Thought is to be viewed as an organic activity, unfolding organically from within and not mechanically put together from without. Knowledge can therefore never be a passive reflection of an existing order, still less can it be a passive reception of ready-made knowledge from without.
3. The various categories whereby realistic thought constructs reality proved to be simply the bare forms of intelligence, projected beyond intelligence, and thereby made meaningless.
 - a. Instead of testing our fundamental experience by the categories, we must rather find the meaning of the categories in experience.
 - b. Intelligence cannot be understood through the categories, but the categories must be understood through our living experience of intelligence itself.
4. The world of things can be defined and understood only as we give up the notion of an extra-mental reality altogether, and make the entire world a thought world; mind is the only ontological reality.
5. All explanation lies within the sphere of the products of thought, and must not be extended to thought itself; intelligence itself simply is.

APPENDIX NUMBER IV.

Bowne, Borden P., Principles of Ethics, American Book Company, 1892.

(The following is a detailed outline of the arguments presented in this book.)

Preface.

Life itself is the field of morals, and the realization of ideal life the aim; it is only a form of words until it is interpreted by the living spirit.

We must guard against both the scruples of ignorant conscientiousness and the lawlessness of the selfish will.

The lawyer, the economist, the historian, and the moralist must work together, and the sentimentalist must be left out.

Introduction.

I. Nature of the growth of morals.

- A. Like the mental life, the moral life did not begin by laying down general principles of conduct, but by forming codes of concrete duties.
- B. These codes are disturbed by individual life and by historical and geographical knowledge.
 - 1. Other peoples have different customs from ours.
 - 2. Reflection detects many arbitrary or inconsistent features in prevailing codes.
 - 3. Conscience is invoked to ratify oppression, superstition and nonsense.
 - 4. Experience shows that the right way is not always easily or immediately discerned.
- C. Such facts lead to the attempt to rationalize our moral experience by passing behind the instinctive form to the underlying principle.

II. Directions which ethical study may take.

- A. We may study the genesis and development of moral ideas and of practical codes.
 - 1. Such a study might reveal a certain order of succession in the appearance of moral conceptions, and their conditions.
 - 2. The worth and validity of moral ideas can not be determined by this method.
- B. We may study the psychological faculties concerned in the production of moral ideas, the nature of conscience, the relation of desire and will, and of reason and sensibility.
 - 1. These theories of moral faculties are of only negative value.
 - 2. They are purely psychological.
- C. We may study our moral ideas in themselves, and seek to unfold their postulates and implications; theory of ethics field.
- D. We may apply the theory thus reached, or assumed, to the construction of a concrete code of conduct. Ethics proper.
- E. We may consider the relation of man to the ideal of conduct, and the obstacles in human nature to the realizing of the moral ideal, and the ways and means of bringing men into harmony with the ideal.
 - 1. After unfolding the ideals of character and conduct we find men practically indifferent to them.

2. This leads to the study of moral and spiritual dynamics. This is usually the field of Christian doctrine and life.
3. Where the morality of an act is supposed, on the one side, to attach to the motive or intention of the doer, and to be independent of consequences altogether; the opposite view regards consequences regardless of intentions.
4. As regards the significance of freedom for ethics; as responsible agents ethics depends on freedom; as simply studying the dynamics of the desires and passions, and reducing conduct to a mechanical resultant of its antecedents, freedom has no significance.
5. The relation of ethics to metaphysics; speculation does not have the function of generating our moral judgments, but of adjusting them to our total intellectual system.
6. In daily life duty is largely conceived in connection with religion and ethical truth takes on a religious character.
7. We may inquire into the motive forces of life and describe them thus elaborating an alleged dynamics of the appetites, passions, and desires, and exhibiting conduct as a necessary result. If man be a proper automaton, we might as well speak of the conduct of the winds as of human conduct.

Chapter 1. Fundamental Moral Ideas and Their Order.

- I. The name and nature of the fundamental moral ideas.
 - A. The good, duty, and virtue are the fundamental moral ideas and they are alike necessary.
 1. The good ethics: makes the idea of good fundamental and builds its system on this foundation.
 - a. This resulted in various definitions of good.
 - b. All its forms agree in finding the reason and obligation of action in the end, conceived as a good, to which action is directed.
 - c. This system often becomes simply a system of calculating prudence and practical shrewdness.
 2. The duty ethics: making the notion of duty, or obligation, basal. There are certain principles of conduct which ought to rule our action, such as justice, good-will, etc.
 3. Virtue has been less prominent as the basis of a system, being assimilated by the others by making virtue the chief good or the sum of duty.
 - B. We must distinguish two standpoints in ethics, the inductive and the theoretical.
 1. The inductive standpoint:
 - a. It aims to discover the actual form of moral experience and describe it.
 - b. The first fact is the notion of right and duty, unconditioned imperatives.
 2. The theoretical standpoint.
 - a. It aims to adjust our moral ideas in a rational system.
 - b. It asks what the laws and duties are for, or to what they tend.
 - c. As unconditioned duties are not always in accord with visible prudence and self-interest, it attempts to connect them with some good as otherwise they lose all rational authority and sink to level of blind instincts.

3. These two standpoints must go together.
 - a. The duty ethics is manifestly distinct from the goods ethics only in those conventional cases where duty is agreed upon, and where only the disposition of the agent is in question.
 - b. In general, when the duty ethics ignores the goods ethics, it tends to formalism and etiquette.
- II. The two grand divisions of ethical philosophy; all other divisions are psychological rather than ethical.
 - A. The two divisions:
 1. The goods ethics which seeks to found the notion of duty in goods to be reached.
 2. The duty ethics which seeks to make duty an absolute self-sufficing imperative.
 3. These two great divisions mutually imply each other, if the full moral consciousness of mankind is to find expression.
 - B. The claims of the goods ethics.
 1. Moral action must be rational action and must therefore have some end beyond itself.
 2. The end to be rationally obligatory must be a good of some sort; there can be no obligation to indifferent action.
 - a. The deepest thing in the moral life cannot be a moral law, but some good or goods to which that law is instrumental.
 - b. A moral law which is purely formal must be set aside as having neither authority nor sacredness.
 - c. This does not tell us what, where, or whose this good is.
 - d. It does not imply that the good must be seen; it may be only believed in.
 3. The course of conduct is right or good if it tends to promote well-being.
 4. Meanwhile it is plain that the great bulk of duty refers to some form of productive activity; and here the only assignable rational ground of obligation lies in its relation to well-being.
 - C. The claims of the duty ethics.
 1. The distinction between judgments of wisdom, or folly, and properly moral judgments.
 - a. Action considered in its consequences as producing effects may be wise or unwise, prudent or imprudent, a success or a failure; it depends upon its relation to the system of law in which we live.
 - b. Action considered in its motive as expressing a disposition or character is moral or immoral; it depends upon its relation to a subjective ideal of right or wrong.
 2. Moral action as having two factors.
 - a. A certain content and outcome which may be objectively estimated without any reference to the person whatever.
 - b. A moral character which can only be subjectively estimated. Action must spring from a will to do right to be moral; otherwise immoral or non-moral.
- III. Irrelevancy of the question concerning the origin of moral ideas to our present aim.
 - A. The English moralists have generally confused the question of origin with that of validity. Their aim has been twofold.
 1. To reduce moral ideas to something else, which must fail.
 2. To show that they are primitive and irreducible.

- B. The supposed importance is due to English ethics having its source in a largely sensational psychology, which has sought to deduce our rational ideas and powers from sensations and the sensibility.
 - C. The law of evolution was supposed to apply to ethics but it fails to explain how that which is essentially and only brute can become anything else, or how the brute which has transcended itself still remains the identical brute.
 - 1. If unselfishness evolves from selfishness by transformation it is to be understood and estimated on its own account, and is not to be branded as base because of its antecedents.
 - 2. Both the identification and the evolution are purely verbal.
 - D. Convictions growing out of preceding discussion.
 - 1. The pretended deduction of moral ideas from non-moral data is purely verbal and fictitious.
 - 2. The pretended reduction of moral ideas to non-moral elements is likewise purely verbal and fictitious.
 - 3. The actual order of graded development in the mental life cannot be understood as modification of its earliest phases, but only as the successive manifestation of a law immanent in the whole development.
 - 4. No psychological theory concerning the origin and genesis of our ideas, moral or otherwise, can be used as a test of truth, or as a method of discovery.
 - a. All investigation presupposes a certain insight on the part of mind, no matter whether original or acquired; and that insight must be the final court of appeal.
 - b. Classification leaves the fact just what it was.
- IV. Complexity and discord of ethical literature explained.
- A. Due partly to the complexity of life itself.
 - B. Due to a double aim which has often been separated.
 - 1. The aim to secure outward happiness and fortune.
 - 2. The aim to attain to inward worth and peace.
 - C. This has led to a number of schools of ethics:
 - 1. The virtue and the happiness school: looking to the inner worth and peace of the agent, and, looking to pleasure of some kind as the only rational end of action, virtue being only a means to this end.
 - 2. The egoistic and benevolent schools: our own welfare or the good of others as the aim of action.
 - 3. Intuitionism where the mind has direct insight into moral principles, and the empirical school which supposes that the mind has no original insight, but learns by experience to distinguish right from wrong, consequences being the final test.
- V. The goods ethics and the duty ethics must be united.
- A. The argument of the duty ethics is satisfactory only when applied to the motives of the agent, and is of little use in forming a code.
 - B. Formal ethics in themselves are barren.
 - C. The two must be combined before we reach any complete moral system.
 - 1. Duty ethics taken alone is an unlawful abstraction resulting from considering the good will apart from its conditions and objects.
 - 2. The goods ethics taken alone is an equally unlawful abstraction resulting from considering conduct apart from the living subject.

3. The good will must aim at well-being, and well-being is realized in and through the good will.
 - D. Therefore the good, duty, and virtue are the fundamental moral ideas and are in this order.
 1. There must be goods of some sort to give duty any rational meaning.
 2. The free and loving performance of duty is what we mean by virtue.
 - E. Reconciling the law of duty and the law of happiness, bringing unity into life.
 1. Our constitution makes various goods possible.
 2. These are the various forms of well-being founded in the essential structure of our minds and in their external relations.
 3. When these goods are seen in their value and obligation and the free spirit devotes itself to their realization, we have moral activity.
 4. Therefore the moral is the natural, glorified and realized by rational freedom.
 5. Therefore one must not only be formally right, that is, true to his convictions of duty; he must also be materially right, that is, in harmony with reality and its laws.
- VI. Difficulties in traditional ethics.
- A. The idea that will and motive and not consequences are most important.
 1. Our leading moral judgments are judgments of will truly.
 2. However, not only must the will be right, but the affections and emotions should be harmonious therewith.
 - B. To conclude that since the moral elements of conduct lie in the intention, all else is non-moral or indifferent, and we have only to direct the intention to fulfil all righteousness, and may help ourselves to all extra-ethical satisfactions.
 - C. We have Kant's claim that no action is morally right which is not done from a sense of duty.
 1. No conduct is morally perfect which does not have a right moral form.
 2. Instinctive sympathy, unless directed by moral insight, is very apt to lose itself in immoral sentimentality.
 - D. That consequences cannot be the ground of the moral character of actions, for consequences are infinite and hence beyond any knowledge or calculation by us.
 1. But for the material rightness of conduct, there is no standard except consequences which does not reduce conduct to barren etiquette.
 2. The objections drawn from the infinitude of consequences is more verbal than real.

Chapter 2. The Good.

- I. Difficulty of determining the good.
 - A. The nature of practical ethics hard to determine.
 1. We often find strong convictions of duty which are not connected with any apprehension or expectation of goods to be reached.
 2. Duty often seems to be the chief enemy to our peace, rather than the way to happiness.
 3. Insight into our own nature is so slight that we are quite unable to deduce any significant law of conduct from self-analysis.

4. The future is so hidden that we have no such knowledge of the goods possible to humanity as would enable us to lay down with any certainty the law of life.
5. The desires of men are not a reliable guide to the good.
- B. The nature of goods in general, and the place and mode of their existence.

1. Nothing can be a good except in relation to the sensibility in its most general meaning. Without feeling there would be no reason for calling a thing good, bad, or indifferent.
 - a. To say that there is no evil but pain and no good but pleasure is a rather fictitious simplification.
 - b. All things take their color or quality from their objects and have nothing but a class name in common.
2. The doctrine of goods says nothing about the possibility of reducing all goods to a common measure and does not imply that the subjective value of things can be separated from the things themselves.

II. Various conceptions of the good.

A. Historical answers.

1. Hedonism, finding the good in pleasure. For a being capable only of momentary and isolated gratifications, such pleasures would be the only good.
2. Eudemonism, finding the good in happiness. If a man is capable of looking before and after, and needs to give some unitary aim to his practical life, we advance to this. Here the grounds of happiness have been sought without, and the significance of the personality within has been overlooked.
3. Cynicism is intelligible and praiseworthy as a revolt against a theory which would find the end of life in outward gratification

B. The nature and fault of hedonism.

1. Attractions of this view:
 - a. It rests upon the undoubted fact that pleasure is a good.
 - b. It seems to do away with the need of any moral insight or standard beyond experience itself.
 - c. By beginning with the lowest forms of sensibility, it gives a fine chance for developing the higher forms of moral feeling from the non-moral forms of animals.
 - d. Fatalistic ethics can use this view for a foundation: pleasure determines desire and desire determines will.
2. Limiting pleasure to the various affections of the passive sensibility we have a double doctrine:
 - a. That pleasure is the only rational aim of action; ethical.
 - b. That pleasure is the only possible aim of action; psychological and fatalistic hedonism.
3. Considering the latter view we seem to have a simple and adequate theory of conduct as an outcome of the mechanism of sensation and passive desire.
 - a. The pleasant leads to desire, the unpleasant to aversion.
 - b. Out of these desires and aversions, by the aid of reflex action, conduct arises as a resultant.
 - c. There is no call for a free self and ethics disappears as we have only a psychical mechanism.
 - d. The blunder here seems to lie in the doctrine of desire which has its roots in:
 - (1) A sensational psychology.
 - (2) In the general claim that in any case desire is necessarily

determined by affections of the passive sensibility.

e. Fallacy of the sensational psychology:

- (1) It makes the mind only a congeries of sensations welded by association.
- (2) On this theory pleasure is no possible object of desire whatever, being only a logical abstraction.
 - (a) Only actual and specific pleasures have been experienced; only their recurrence can be desired.
 - (b) As these are perpetually changing, life has no common end whatever.
- (3) Allowing that abstract pleasure is possible we have a double difficulty:
 - (a) The doctrine is practically barren for we pursue pleasure in these things, good or bad, and get no hint concerning the right direction in life.
 - (b) We are shut up to saying that, from the side of the agent, all action is alike.

f. Fallacy of the doctrine which would found desire and pleasure solely in the passive sensibility.

- (1) It overlooks the significance of self-consciousness for both pleasure and desire.
 - (a) Objects derive their value from their relation to self-feeling and self-esteem.
 - (b) Mature aims would bring ourselves into some kind of harmony with an ideal.
 - (c) This ideal is the implicit condition and regulative norm both of the desire and of the volition.
- (2) Passive pleasures form a natural part of our lives and in their place may be rightly sought, but no sufficient end of life can be found in them.

C. The nature and fault of eudemonism: happiness as the end and aim of conduct, happiness being taken in the sense of abiding well-being as distinct from isolated and momentary pleasures.

1. Eudemonism is a barren truism as it does not tell us in what happiness consists.
2. We may suppose that happiness consists or is revealed in:
 - a. Momentary pleasures.
 - b. The non-moral satisfactions of experience and especially in those of external success and comfort.
 - c. In the above plus some specific moral satisfaction arising from the reaction of the personality upon itself.
 - (1) This view often puts true happiness solely in the moral nature and ignores all other forms of happiness; virtue is the chief and only good, and happiness is left out of view as being no object of moral action.
 - (2) This puts us under the two laws of conscience and of happiness, ethics being concerned only with the former.
 - (3) It becomes impossible to survey and determine their respective jurisdiction.

III. A formal definition of the good.

- A. The ideal good is conscious life in the full development of all its normal possibilities; and the actual good is greater or less as this ideal is more or less approximated; human good is the realization of normal human possibilities.

1. The attainment of this good, for man, involves the perfection of individual life and of social relations.
2. The good is perfectly realizable only in and through the co-working of the community.
- B. It is impossible to separate the good will from the natural goods of our constitution.
 1. For the ideal humanity we must exorcise not only evil wills but ignorance, superstition, disease, and the like.
 2. A certain tinge of asceticism may be desirable in all cases where moral insight and self-control have not been largely developed.
 "Wealth, leisure, learning, music, taste, beauty, serve to dwarf the soul when there is not moral force enough to assimilate them."
- C. The centre of gravity of the good lies within the person himself; and within the person the central element of the good is the righteous will.
 1. The will needs a field for development and realization, and this field consists in the potentialities of our nature.
 2. These potentialities in turn depend for their realization in any high degree upon the existence of a developed social order and also upon the co-working of the physical world itself.
 - a. Ideal life is impossible, except in an ideal environment.
 - b. Our general conception of the good implies that duty has all fields for its own: whatever ministers to the enlargement and enriching of life.

Chapter 3. Need of a Subjective Standard.

- I. Need of an ideal by which to interpret our terms.
 - A. To seek happiness and good is impossible until we define our terms.
 1. To make the actual happiness of the actual man the justifying ground of actions would lead to everyone doing as he pleases.
 2. Therefore the rational pursuit of pleasure or happiness must always be so bound up with the observance of law as to be quite irksome.
 - B. This matter has been complicated by false psychology.
 1. The goods ethics has often been built upon a selfish psychology which held that action can proceed only from a desire for personal happiness.
 - a. This leads to flouting the universal ethical demand for unselfish actions which is impossible because of the sharp contradiction of both conscience and consciousness.
 - b. Or it must make a show of deducing such action from the elements of purely selfish desire and this is hopeless except to confusion.
 - c. This alliance of goods ethics with selfish psychology is purely accidental.
 2. The question has been complicated and confused by the need of sensationalist ethics of escaping the admission of native moral insight on the part of the mind.
 - a. The determination of right and wrong is by a calculation of anticipated consequences on the basis of experience.
 - b. This is another accidental alliance. The goods ethics claims that material rightness is determined by relation to

well-being, and that our duty is to find and follow this material rightness. This is compatible with the intuitive perception of the validity of certain formal principles.

II. Judgments determined by anticipation of consequences or by some inner standard.

A. The calculating ethics, utilitarianism.

1. Pleasure is the only end of action, and the objects which produce it are revealed in experience.
2. We are to live by external authority rather than by reason.
3. If consequences are estimated by the individual we have a pure individualism which cancels ethics.
 - a. Differences in judgment are only differences of taste and opinion.
 - b. Claiming that the moral nature also must be taken into account in determining what happiness is leads to further difficulties.
 - (1) It brings in a specific moral nature thus disturbing the purity of the calculating ethics.
 - (2) The pains and pleasure of conscience presuppose a moral judgment concerning right and wrong, and can never be the ground of the distinction.
 - (3) The moral nature is brought in only as a psychological fact, and as an authoritative standard.
 - c. In such a scheme we miss an essential element of the moral character, namely, the love of goodness for itself and not for its advantages.
4. If pleasure give the aim and law of life, it follows that the unpleasurable may always be avoided unless it be supported by the prospect of a greater pleasure to be reached or a greater pain to be avoided.

B. The calculating ethics as taking into account the consequences for all concerned.

1. The selfish psychology of desire makes it necessary for individual and general well-being coincide.
 - a. At best this would only give us a wise selfishness.
 - b. Such coincidence cannot be made out.
2. To give us the selfish theory of desire and set up general well-being as an end, leaves the obligation to seek it very vague and obscure.
 - a. By hypothesis there is no intuitive perception of duty in this case.
 - b. No selfishness, enlightened or otherwise could engage us to work for future and unrelated generations.
3. To make the aim of action to secure the greatest amount of happiness for all concerned, will not help matters.
 - a. For the individual it looks very like an intuition and is barren besides.
 - b. In treating the matter quantitatively my happiness is as necessary as any other persons; also, what shall assure us that different men's pleasures are equal?

C. The calculating ethics must decide whether it aims to find a rational ground for moral principles already discovered and possessed, or to deduce them from experience.

1. Finding a rational ground for moral principles already discovered and possessed. To show a measure of utility for the virtues, we

assume the virtues, show some utility, and take the rest on trust.

a. The purity of the calculating ethics is somewhat bedimmed in advance, for the virtues are either referred to a moral nature, or are assumed out of hand.

b. For subjective utility we have no measure but the very feelings from whose uncertainty the calculating ethics promised to deliver us.

2. Attempting to deduce the virtues and duties:

a. If we try each case on its own merits, we cannot know all the consequences so no case is ever closed.

b. If we are trying to prove general laws the individual is subordinated to the universal which looks like abandonment of calculation and surrender of the selfish psychology.

III. Necessity of assuming some ideal to escape the above puzzles.

A. If happiness be the sole aim of life we must assume:

1. That happiness itself has a law, and that this law is the same for all concerned.

2. We assume a fixed constitution of things and a normal nature of man; and the standard of appeal is not the actual happiness of the actual man, but the normal happiness of the normal man.

3. We further assume some measure of insight into this normal happiness which shall serve as a standard of discrimination between allowable and unallowable happiness by presenting some kind of ideal in harmony with which alone happiness may be realized.

B. The conception of the common good and the obligation to seek it are equally beyond calculation.

1. The true ethical aim is to realize the common good which is determined in accordance with an inborn ideal of human worth and dignity.

2. This is not an abandonment of the goods ethics because while happiness must have a law, the law must lead to happiness.

Chapter 4. Subjective Ethics.

The law founded in the nature and insight of the moral subject himself, or the law which the moral subject imposes in himself.

I. The idea of moral obligation, or the subjective factor as related to the law of duty.

A. This inner law is not the authoritative conscience.

1. Conscience is discredited by the different codes of different peoples.

2. Many manifest absurdities have claimed the authority of conscience thus discrediting it.

B. In connection with all moral life is the fact of recognition of a difference between right and wrong, and a conviction of obligation to the right and from the wrong.

1. This idea of a right and of its inalienable obligation lies at the foundation of all moral progress.

2. It is impossible to define and deduce this idea of moral obligation.

3. Moral goodness does not consist in conforming to human laws or opinions, or even to divine law, except as they are believed to conform to righteousness.

4. The idea arises within the mind itself as the free spirit imposes duty upon itself.
 - a. This idea of moral obligation is a necessary function of a free intelligence in any world where conduct is possible.
 - b. It comes through realizing that one is entrusted with his own interests and those of others.
 - (1) It is unintelligible except to him who has had the experience of it.
 - (2) It (the idea of obligation) does not tell us infallibly what is obligatory, but by its existence it makes the moral form of action possible.
 - C. Conclusion: The formal ideas of duty and obligation supply a moral form for conduct, but no contents. Without additional moral insight we should be thrown back upon eudemonistic calculation for any concrete code.
- II. The duty and good desert of acting from good will, and the sin and ill desert of acting from an evil will is the deepest law concerning the interaction of moral beings.
- A. The positive side is the law of love which stands in its own right.
 1. It depends upon the conception of the objective good and the possibility of reaching it (mutual influence).
 2. This law of good will is the only universal one.
 - a. All concrete duties take their form from the specific nature of the being and the particular circumstances of his existence.
 - b. As the deepest law for the interaction of moral beings it is the law which binds all moral orders together.
 3. The law of justice is derivative, being the negative side of good will and demanding that a person be undisturbed in the enjoyment of his rights.
 - B. Making the good will the deepest law of moral interaction does not give us a complete practical guide.
 1. We have no hint of the necessary limitations in practice. This is a problem for practical experience.
 2. The law of good will throws no light upon the methods of realizing it--we must form a code.
 3. While the duty of good will is absolute as a disposition, the forms and measures of its manifestation are not revealed in the disposition itself; they must be largely gathered from life, determined in accordance with social relations.
 4. The law of good will itself is conditioned by some ideal of humanity.
 - C. We have then, in human morality, even supposing it perfect, a double element.
 1. A universal factor which we must view as valid for all moral beings, lying in the affirmation of the duty and good desert of the good will, and of the evil and bad desert of the evil will.
 2. A factor relative to humanity itself having reference to human perfection.
 - a. The uncertainty of our ideal of perfection, and relative clearness of the law of the good will have led some writers to hold that social life is the only field of ethics; social law of morals then is all.

- b. For social ethics, good will is the spring and the common good the aim, but the ethics of the person is not exhausted therein.
- c. Many a course of action is condemned not as harming others but as degrading the humanity of the agent.
- D. The moral ideal is a growth and exists in any given circumstances chiefly in a perception of the direction in which human worth and dignity lie.
 - 1. With the enlargement of knowledge and the unfolding of life comes enlargement of the ideal.
 - 2. For the authority of this ideal there is no warrant but the soul itself, and this is independent of the environment or statute-book.
 - a. They fail to tell how they arose in the environment.
 - b. They confound the concrete code for outward conduct with the soul's estimate of its own inward life.
 - c. Some find this authority in the law of the type but this is good for spontaneous thought rather than universal application.
 - 3. The ideal as such lies beyond actual attainment.
 - a. Merit and demerit, duty and obligation are measured by ability only, but the ideal transcends it.
 - b. The ideal makes no allowances, but simply holds up a standard.
 - c. The ideal itself grows, and always keeps in advance.
 - 4. The moral judgment goes deeper than the act and the volition.
 - a. The ideal has two elements, a conception of what man ought to be and one of what he ought to do.
 - b. The ideal concerns itself with the scheme of the virtues.
 - c. The ideal concerns life itself and we judge it not only by its intermittent manifestations but by its abiding principle.
- E. The moral outfit of the race from the subjective side:
 - 1. The law of good will and its implications.
 - 2. The ill desert of the evil will.
 - 3. A human ideal more or less clearly perceived and the obligation of which is more or less strongly felt.
 - 4. The growing of this ideal and its obligation with the unfolding of humanity and the enlargement of knowledge.

Chapter 5. Development in Morals.

I. Factors in moral development.

A. Basic facts of moral history:

- 1. We have development in the sense of the gradual moralization of life and conduct.
- 2. Our life in all its departments begins as a potentiality rather than an actuality.

B. Leading factors in the development:

- 1. We have a body of instincts, appetites, and passions which lie back of all volition as expressions of our nature itself.
- 2. In man this automatic form of life needs to be supplemented by the rational and moral activity of the free spirit.
 - a. He here becomes free and conscious of his aims.
 - b. He assumes control of himself and sets himself to complete the development which begins automatically.
 - c. Here the constitutional becomes moral; and the natural rises to the plane of the spiritual.

3. There is the evil, selfish will, which misuses its freedom and seeks to exploit others.
 - a. The embryonic and imperfect conditions of our moral life result necessarily from the relation of the moral to the natural.
 - b. The evil will is the necessary outcome of our nature when uncontrolled by right reason.
4. The moral life of mankind is essentially immature.
 - a. It is under the necessity of effecting its transition from the animal and automatic to the moral and free.
 - b. The will to do right is always possible at any level, thus making moral character possible.

II. The general directions of moral development.

- A. In general there are three:
 1. The unfolding of the moral ideal and the strengthening of the sense of duty.
 - a. This form of development is within the moral person.
 - b. Men in general need a higher ideal and a stronger sense of duty.
 2. The application of principles possessed to action or to the formation of a corresponding code and the development of institutions.
 - a. This form implies an extension of practical wisdom so that moral principles are embodied in more and more fitting forms.
 - b. Men need more wisdom in the application of moral principles to practical life.
 3. The extension of the moral field which involves:
 - a. The gradual extension of the law of duty over the entire life of the individual and of society.
 - b. Also the inclusion of at least all human beings within the sphere of moral relations.
- B. The development of the ideal, a highly complex matter.
 1. Its most important factor is the will to do right.
 2. It is bound up with our general conception of the meaning and destiny of life, being correspondingly either high or low. Jesus of Nazareth is most important for this.
- C. Applying moral principles to life or to the formation of a code.
 1. Moral development arises from the specification of moral principles into codes.
 - a. Moral life began spontaneously and later reflection found a partially developed system of duties already existing.
 - b. These spontaneous forms need rectification and extension.
 2. This moral development is manifestly necessary.
 - a. Activity must have a moral form and be in accord with the nature of things.
 - b. Social development has largely gone on without reference to moral ideas and therefore fails to realize its need of a code of conduct.
 3. This development of a code must be inspired by good will, and guided by experience of consequences.
 - a. Having no sufficient insight, conflict with, or indifference to the common good indicates wrong track.

- b. The individual must have a sphere in which he is responsible for himself, self-dependence.
- c. Good will needs some quantitative measures in manifestation. (How grateful shall one be? for example.)
- 4. The moral nature primarily commands no concrete action, but gives only the spirit from which action should spring.
 - a. The corresponding action is learned from experience.
 - b. Certain fundamental forms of conduct are quickly discerned and are likely to be confused with the principle itself.
 - c. Thus a conventional conscience is reached and the form of conduct is exalted above its living spirit.
- 5. Our codes of conduct are subject to change when found detrimental to the good will.
 - a. Thus codes grow as society grows.
 - b. The individual is often more immature in social ethics than in his individual ethics.
 - c. The objective expressions of the moral spirit, when socially recognized are turned into statutes or laws.
 - (1) The legal field lies within the moral field but is far from being co-extensive with it.
 - (2) The law confines itself to deeds and does not attempt to control the inner life.
 - (3) Law is based upon moral ideas and gives them their exactness and authority.
 - (4) Men may be moralized by impartial legislation in the interest of humanity.
- 6. Moral customs and laws of society must be looked upon as attempts to specify the living principle of good will so as best to secure its ends. A double error is possible:
 - a. We may content ourselves with a lifeless observance of the forms.
 - b. These forms never exhaust expressions of duty, but are only general outlines.
- D. The extension of the moral sphere.
 - 1. In the individual life there is need of making the whole life an expression of good will and right reason, though men have little apprehension of this fact.
 - 2. In the social sphere there is very slow development away from sectionalism, sectarianism, prejudices.
 - 3. Reasons for this lack:
 - a. Living sympathy and deep sense of obligation, as men are constituted, are conditioned by the recognition of a common nature or of some common interest.
 - b. Man has not yet developed sufficiently far in harmony with his world and its inhabitants.
 - 4. This moral extension is conditioned by two leading factors:
 - a. Peaceful intercourse bringing peoples together.
 - b. The Christian comprehension of all men as children of a common Father.
- III. The universality of moral ideas.
 - A. The validity of moral principles in no way depends on their being universally recognized.
 - B. As there is no harmony in the actual codes of men we must seek agreement in the principles of action.

1. The feeling of obligation, the idea of a right and a wrong with corresponding duties is universal.
2. There is a very general agreement in the formal principles of action, and largely in the virtues also.
 - a. Differences which exist in the formal principles of conduct concern chiefly the extent of their application.
 - b. The most marked variations concern the things which are compatible with personal morality: natural impulses with their excesses.
3. The specific contents of the moral ideal are not fixed, but the direction in which the ideal lies is generally discernible.

Chapter 6. Moral Responsibility, Merit and Demerit.

I. Judgments which apply to the moral agent.

A. The work of moral activity;

1. It determines what should be done.
2. It refers the deed to the doer, as something for which he is responsible, and in which he acquires merit or demerit.
3. In all of this the notion of freedom is implicit.

B. The assumption of freedom as the law and condition of the moral world.

1. Psychology and metaphysics must decide as to the fact of freedom; ethics has only to take it as implicit in the moral consciousness.
2. The notions of responsibility, merit and demerit have given the utmost embarrassment to all fatalistic schemes of ethics.
 - a. Formally to deny freedom affronts the moral consciousness of mankind.
 - b. Denial of freedom must in logic result in denying all proper responsibility and merit or demerit.

II. The abstract conditions of responsibility with their difficulties.

A. The amount of responsibility varies with the amount of freedom and knowledge, so far as the deed in question is concerned.

1. The factors which determine responsibility admit of no objective standard.
2. We must therefore insist upon the fact of responsibility without being able to establish a definite measure.
3. In penology, this ethical uncertainty leads to making the public safety the aim in punitive action, rather than the vindication of the moral law.

B. There is even greater difficulty in fixing the measure of merit and demerit.

1. Though unsure about the absolute scale of merit and demerit, we are fairly sure of the relative one.
2. Definitions of merit and demerit as more than moral approval and disapproval.
 - a. Merit is the desert of moral approval and the right to be treated accordingly.
 - b. Demerit is the desert of moral disapproval and its appropriate treatment.
3. Considered in the field of self-regarding action.
 - a. The virtuous choice is the one in which we choose the higher goods of life, and the higher life itself, because of their essential and intrinsic worth.

- (1) It presupposes that the good in question is attainable.
- (2) This reward is bound up in the conception of virtue itself, not being something external and adventitious.
- b. The choice which ethics rejects is one which seeks to serve the higher in the interest of lower aims. (Example: taking the motions of religion for the sake of social standing) Here one also gives himself over to low and unworthy living, refusing to serve the highest.
 - (1) Such a one comes into conflict with the laws of his own being.
 - (2) He falls into suffering and self-condemnation and the condemnation of all moral persons.
- 4. In the field of social action:
 - a. The good will is the benevolent will aiming at the common good and being impartial between self and others; it merits approval and esteem of all moral persons.
 - b. The evil will has as its desert and reward the failure, misery and outcast condition due its anti-social acts.
- C. Merit and demerit from the theological side.
 - 1. It is contended that the finite can have no merit whatever, being in itself nothing before God.
 - 2. A theological doctrine concerning the depravity and sin of the natural man who abounds only in demerit.
 - a. This doctrine rests upon confounding material and formal rightness.
 - b. Incomplete or pathological conditions are states of disease and not of demerit.
 - c. Our life, on the whole, shows a tendency, and must be judged thereby; there is no perfect formal goodness or evil among men.
 - d. Progress in goodness is the utmost we can expect, and such progress constitutes the virtuous life.
 - 3. The idea that one should be moved to action by anything but the purest love of goodness results from confounding abstract theory with the actual life of man.
 - a. Reasons for the point of view:
 - (1) The moral ideal is not reached until the pure love of good becomes the sufficient motive of action.
 - (2) If the moral life had nothing to do with the natural life, being in possession of its own aims and principles from the start, it would be worthless when mixed with lower motives, at least in proportion.
 - b. Inapplicability of this point of view:
 - (1) The moral life is only the ideal form of the natural.
 - (2) The moral life is slowly developed out of the natural.
 - (3) The goal of the development is not extraneous reward but ideal life itself.
 - c. Obedience under tutelage and from non-moral motives may yet lead to conduct in accordance with our true good, thus being good as far as it goes.
- III. The question of demerit, as being where we pass beyond disapproval and inflict penalty, as in criminal law.
 - A. Theoretical statement of the problem.

1. The demerit of action varies with the amount of knowledge, the strength and balance of our natural propensities, the measure of self-control, etc.
 2. However, we are unable to measure these.
 - a. We can only assume a rough identity as the condition of all mutual understanding, and make such allowance for differences as the facts seem to call for.
 - b. In general, when the differences are such as to cancel self-control, the problem of disease replaces that of demerit.
 3. To measure by consequences we must take foreseen and intended consequences or we confound error and crime.
 4. The race has always assumed that the demerit of a deed varies with the amount of its departure from the recognized standard of duty and humanity.
- B. Two facts deserve mention as especially affecting our judgment of demerit.
1. We are not abstract moral beings existing in self-chosen ethical relations, but are parents and children, husbands and wives, neighbors and citizens.
 2. The sense of obligation is very largely dependent on sympathy, and that sympathy depends on proximity and the ability to put ourselves in another's place.
 - a. We are comparatively indifferent to wrongs done to those with whom we stand in no relations of sympathy.
 - b. However, ethics demands that we enlarge the sympathy to fit the moral relation, instead of restricting the relation to the sympathy.
 - c. Society is obliged to look to the objective facts and consequences as well as to the mental state of the agent.
- C. Action varies in demerit, according as it springs from an evil will or from a weak will, or a diseased will.
1. We have a theological and rigoristic school denying all merit to humanity and reducing everything to sin.
 2. The other extreme is another school denying all demerit, sinking at times into an odious criminal worship.
 3. A third school ignores the metaphysics of responsibility and treats the problem "positively and objectively" on the basis of physiology, sociology, etc.
- These are one-sided notions due to the embryonic and immature morality of the actual human being.

Chapter 7. Ethics and Religion.

I. The setting of the problem.

- A. In real life ethics is commonly allied with religion.
1. There is a difference of claims:
 - a. It is claimed that ethics is a self-sufficient science.
 - b. It is urged that ethics depends on something beyond itself.
 2. It is the one human mind which founds ethical systems and religious systems so there are inter-relations.
 - a. Wherever there is any degree of development, the moral nature is a leading factor in determining religious conceptions.
 - b. In actual life, ethics and religion strongly influence each other, and man is the subject and source of both.

3. Irrelevant questions:

- a. The historical fact that degrading religious conceptions have often degraded both moral conceptions and moral practice.
- b. As to whether Christianity has contributed anything to moral science.

B. The question: Is ethics a self-sufficient science based solely on our moral insight, or must it appeal to extra-ethical conceptions, speculative or religious, as well?

- 1. Epistemology shows that no valid theory of knowledge or science can be formed without resorting to theistic conceptions.
 - a. This fact escapes notice in practice because instinct guarantees knowledge apparently beyond any possibility of question.
 - b. The automatism implied in atheistic theory would be fatal to ethics.
- 2. Nevertheless the claim is made that duties arise from the concrete relations of actual existence and are independent of any theistic reference.
 - a. However ethics contains general moral principles which stand alone, such as duty of justice, good will, etc.
 - (1) The need of an external sanction in order to secure external obedience, has been mistaken for the source of the moral obligation itself.
 - (2) Failure to see the importance of an external sanction for developing morals has led to the contention that purely moral considerations alone are allpowerful with men.
 - b. Ethics contain ideal conceptions which condition their application.
 - (1) Here the dependence of ethics on something beyond our formal intuitions appears.
 - (2) Apart from some high ideal of the worth of man, there will be no high effort for his improvement, and no inviolable sacredness in his rights.
 - (3) The meaning and destiny of human life are bound up with our general conception of the universe.
 - (a) The continuity of life is needed here to give meaning to life.
 - (b) Man seeks for some supreme practical ideal and inspiration without which ethics loses its meaning.
 - (4) Being under the formal moral law and also the law of happiness we must make two assumptions:
 - (a) That the common good and the individual good are at bottom one so that the service of the common good leads to the highest and best individual good.
 - (b) We must assume that the highest and best is also the safest and wisest.

II. The true significance of Christianity for ethics.

A. Its help to ethics lies largely in the field of extra-ethical conceptions which condition the application of morals, and even more in that of moral and spiritual inspiration.

- 1. Our conceptions of God, life, and death have been greatly clarified by Christianity.
 - a. Thereby a vast extension has been given to moral principles.
 - b. The sense of obligation has been re-enforced.

2. It affirms an origin and destiny for man which give him an inalienable sacredness.
 3. The moral law is not merely a psychological fact in us, but also an expression of a Holy Will which can be neither defied or mocked.
 4. It sets up a transcendent personal ideal which is at once the master-light of all our moral seeing, and our chief spiritual inspiration.
 5. We are told of a God whose name and nature are love, in whom we live and move and have our being, and who is carrying all things on to an outcome of infinite goodness.
- B. This is a new setting of old principles which makes them practically new.
1. Our moral nature has not been transformed, but the conditions of its best unfolding have been furnished.
 2. Love and loyalty to a person take the place of reverence for an abstract law.
 3. Christianity is contrastable with other systems on three points: the nature of man, the nature of the common good, and the inspiration of duty.
 4. While the great inspirations of life come from the Christian world-view, the concrete forms of duty must be found mainly in the life that now is.

Chapter 8. Ethics of the Individual.

I. The individual's duties to self.

A. Objections to this division of ethics.

1. It is claimed that the two classes of duties to self and duties to others are not mutually exclusive, each involving the other to a degree. Answer: valid in many cases but not universally.
2. That self-regarding duties are natural and take care of themselves, and only altruistic action is moral.
 - a. At best this is true of only the most elementary physical duties.
 - b. There is need of rational guidance and self-control along the whole line of conduct.
 - c. The moral person is the unit of values in the moral system.
 - d. Affirming the inviolable sacredness of the moral person duties to self must take the first rank in ethics.
 - (1) Each individual is a bearer of the ideal of humanity.
 - (2) Whatever one does must be conditioned by what is done to his essential humanity.

B. These duties consist in regarding in both its positive and its negative bearings the ideal of humanity in one's life, in developing and realizing the same, and in the due unfolding of all our powers so as to render ourselves as adequate as possible to demands upon us.

1. Failure in these duties may consist in:
 - a. A flouting and rejection of the ideal.
 - b. An indolent acquiescence in admitted imperfection.
 - c. In a general thoughtlessness leading to complete pauperism of soul, and constituting us mere cosmic rubbish.
2. The reference of these duties is as much social as individual.

- a. For example a person's vocation is the general form under which he serves both society and himself and shows himself a necessary part of society.
 - b. The chief and best part of our own moral development arises only in and through our social activities.
- 3. The interests of self and of others are not always the same so we need adjustment and compromise.
 - a. We must go by the conventions of society largely.
 - (1) They fix the rough outlines of duty and expectation.
 - (2) They are never to be viewed as so accurate as not to need constant supervision of the free moral spirit.
 - b. Here is a great field for moral originality.
 - c. In applying our principles to conduct as a whole we find great uncertainty as to the ethical frontier.
- II. The doctrine of personal rights: those which are founded in the nature of the moral person and are independent of positive enactment.
 - A. Our nature demands certain things as the condition of our existence and development.
 - 1. Our rights are those doings and omissions on the part of others which the general conditions of our existence make necessary in a community of moral persons.
 - a. Such rights do not obtain between persons and things.
 - b. Rights exist only between moral beings who are capable of recognizing mutual duties.
 - 2. The recognition of rights is only an application of the law of good will to the general circumstances of our existence.
 - 3. Rights have been denied outright except as expressions of power.
 - a. Such natural rights are no rights.
 - b. Such a state of nature is manifestly incompatible with the existence of society.
 - 4. Some have sought to find the source of right in positive law.
 - a. Here, apart from society, rights are only a question of power.
 - b. Within society they are what society enforces or permits.
 - 5. Rights and duties are opposite sides of the relation existing between moral beings in any world where mutual influence is possible, even apart from social authority.
 - B. The first and primal duty in a moral community is that of mutual good will and the implied recognition of the sacredness and inviolability of the moral personality.
 - 1. Ethics insists only upon freedom as a right of the moral, not of the immoral, person.
 - 2. Those of inferior development and powers must have impartial diminution of freedom, in the interests of all, for reasons universally valid.
 - a. It may never be absolute, subjecting a person in all respects to the will of another.
 - b. It can not be allowed to last beyond the reason on which it rests.
 - C. Rights to property.
 - 1. Some measure of property is necessary to human existence.
 - 2. Property is necessary as a means of self-realization, in the sense of recognized ownership.
 - 3. Property is a necessary institution if we are to have any civilization.

4. The community has a right to prescribe the universal conditions of property-holding as demanded by the common good.
5. Property in ideas, inventions, literary productions, etc., is of very recent recognition and its rights are hard to determine.
- D. We have a right to truth as truthfulness is an absolute duty.
 1. A right to the truth presupposes the existence of a normal moral order.
 2. There is a general conviction that the duty of truth-telling lies within the realm where others have a right to the truth; outside this realm the truth is within one's own power.
 - a. Yet inexactness of statement, exaggeration, unreality in speech are sure to react upon the mental habit of the person, himself, and upon the estimate in which his statements are held by others.
 - b. In dealing with children and animals truthfulness is the only safe method.
- E. Freedom of contract is one of the most important factors of the right to freedom.
 1. Society prevents the fulfilment of all contracts which are prejudicial to the existing social order, or which may tend to evil.
 2. Society has nothing to do with contracts or agreements between individuals, except as they may affect public interests.
 3. Society compels the fulfilment of such agreements as may be necessary to public interests.
 4. Conditions which make an agreement or promise binding:
 - a. The agreement must propose no violation of the moral law.
 - b. The contracting parties must be of sufficient mental development to understand what they are doing.
 - c. There must be no deception on either side as to the scope and meaning of the contract.
 - d. A contract is not morally binding when one of the parties is seriously mistaken about the difficulty of the work proposed, or when in consequence of changed circumstances the difficulty increases in an unexpected manner.
- F. The rights to life, property, freedom, reputation, and those arising from contract are the elementary rights in the community.

Chapter 9. The Ethics of the Family.

- I. The long period of human infancy, physical and mental, makes the family a necessity of human development.
 - A. If not a form of universal morality, it is a very significant form of human morality.
 - B. At the foundation of the family is the institution of marriage.
- II. The nature of marriage.
 - A. In some aspects it is a contract, yet its contents can not be determined by the arbitrary volition of the parties.
 - B. Involved in this state are:
 1. An idealization of the physical relation of the sexes.
 2. A recognition of the deepest needs of humanity.
 3. An instrument of unequalled importance for the moral development of the race.

- C. Conditions as demanded by the ideal of marriage.
 - 1. The union must be permanent; this is supposing marriage to be based on affection and not simply on passion.
 - 2. The consecration and surrender must be mutual. Complete surrender of only the wife becomes a degradation.
 - 3. The set of feelings which cluster around the marriage relation must not be brought into conflict with those which cluster around any other natural and normal relation.
- D. Moral validity of a marriage depends only on the free choice and action of the couple concerned, and no other power whatever can be viewed as its source.
 - 1. No law can make a forced marriage morally valid, or make a voluntary marriage morally invalid.
 - 2. The married couple need the recognition and assistance of society however, and society in turn has a right to demand a specific announcement of the relation it is expected to recognize.
 - 3. Marriage ceremonies have a double function:
 - a. A religious desire to relate the union to the divine order of things.
 - b. A need of informing society of the fact that a marriage has taken place.
 - 4. The moral well-being of all is the true aim and the only sacred thing.
- E. The dissolution of marriage; only normally through death.
 - 1. Moral interests would seem to be best conserved:
 - a. By forbidding absolute divorce except for adultery.
 - b. For cases where gross fraud and deception have been practiced.
 - c. For cases where one party has repudiated the relation by groundless and long-continued desertion.
 - d. By allowing the right to remarry only to the innocent partner, unless we wish to encourage crime.
 - 2. Only a brute would dream of making sickness, insanity, the various ills that flesh is heir to, and the manifold imperfections of character which in one form or another all possess, a ground for divorce. These belong to the burden of life which both promised to bear together.
- F. The ideal of marriage calls for or implies community of property.
 - 1. Marriage laws have been modified to give separate property rights.
 - a. This provides for some untoward circumstances.
 - b. It serves to prevent marriage for money to an extent.
 - c. It saves wives from the niggardliness of some husbands.
 - 2. This separation of property control is not ideal but probably the best arrangement for the present stage of human unfolding.
- G. There is a natural division of labor resulting from the practical necessities of life, not assumed differences.
 - 1. Husband and wife stand on an equal plane of honor and rights.
 - 2. All matters are settled between rational persons on rational grounds, mutual concession and compromise; a head of the family is an abstract utterance.
- H. The mutual duties of parents and children cannot be deduced from their physical relations.
 - 1. Children, like their parents themselves, have a moral task to perform and a moral ideal to realize.

2. The rights of the children, at least in early life, are much more evident than the rights of the parents.
 - a. Children must be fed and cared for.
 - b. They must have such education, physical, mental, and industrial as shall fit them to enter upon the struggle for existence under favorable conditions.
3. Of highest importance is the duty of parents to regard the growing independence of the children.
4. Children have duties towards their parents also.
- I. The limits of the family must be transcended, and men must meet on the open field of the world, not as relatives but as men.

Chapter 10. The Ethics of Society.

I. The nature of society.

- A. It is a social organism which assumes to control, and, if need be, to restrain the individual, and coerce him, for the common good.
- B. There are great fundamental rights and interests which precede government, and which society therefore may defend but does not found.
 1. This defence is necessary because men lack insight, are ignorant and selfish, often led by passion.
 2. The function of this defence is:
 - a. To guard the individual in his natural rights.
 - b. To secure the impartial and passionless administration of justice.
 - c. To restrain lawlessness and violence.
 - d. To conserve the public good.
 3. Society therefore arises necessarily from the form and nature of our existence.
 4. The social order is no arbitrary imposition of violence, its warrant and foundation being:
 - a. The fixed nature of things.
 - b. The moral law and the natural rights of the person.
 - c. The constitution of the objective world.
 5. Society is a subordination of all, ruler and ruled alike, to the highest common good.
- C. Society has often, historically, been based on simple might.
 1. Yet all social forms, of whatever kind, must be judged by their realizing of personal life.
 2. At the same time, as instrumental necessities, society may have all the authority of life and the moral nature itself.
 - a. The prosperity of each is bound up in the welfare of the other.
 - b. We must maintain utter impartiality of social action.
 - c. Selfish actions being in conflict, the second choice of every one, no matter how selfish, is justice and impartiality.
 3. The internal order of society unfolds only as experience reveals the necessity.
 - a. The actual social order has been the outcome of a great multitude of historical influences, many of them of a poor sort.
 - b. The dividing line between the independence of the individual and his subordination to society must be solved relative to the measure of social and individual development; it is always hypothetical, and in life.

D. Discussion of the individual as versus society has been obscured by several causes.

1. An excessive individualism.
 - a. This is partly a reaction against the complete subjection of the person which is a necessity of embryonic societies, and goes with despotic or paternal governments.
 - b. It is partly an echo of the ideas of the social contract perceptible in a great deal of our political philosophy.
 - (1) With the idea of reserved rights some would restrict society to the performance of police duty.
 - (2) If the state provide any education it must not go beyond the merest rudiments.
 - (3) Whatever conflicts with the common weal, supposed natural rights, constitutions, words and verbal exegesis of verbal formulas, must, however, be set aside.
2. A set of abstractions mistaken for realities, these causing confusion especially in the field of economics.
 - a. The moral foundation and meaning of the social structure have been largely overlooked, and a single aspect of life has been taken for the whole.
 - b. The production of material wealth has been set up as the aim and man is sacrificed to production.
 - c. Realizing that a cheapening of humanity is unlawful morally is a fact that is slowly moralizing and humanizing the conditions of production.
3. Social reform through reforming the individual is thought too slow so reforms are demanded on a socialistic basis with law as the great instrument of transformation.
 - a. As a general difficulty, this method pursues a laudable end by unwise or destructive methods.
 - b. A few necessary suggestions:
 - (1) The inequalities and evils found in society are by no means all due to society itself.
 - (a) There is an inequality of power and faculty in the constitution of man.
 - (b) Equality, except in the sense of one law for all and impartiality, is an idle dream.
 - (2) A large part of the evil is to be traced to idleness, ignorance, and vice.
 - c. In a study of the inequalities of fortune we should need to inquire whether they spring from injustice, and especially from an unjust social order.
 - d. We must also inquire whether there be any legal or economic remedy.
4. Suggestions for improving conditions.
 - a. As the ills of society spring from selfishness rather than individualism, we need a new spirit in society rather than a new order necessarily.
 - b. Prudence, thrift, industry, and the ascendancy of the man over the animal will aid.
 - c. We must cultivate the sense of justice and a regard for the rights of others; cultivate respect for essential humanity.
 - d. Legislate to protect public interests from private rapacity.
 - e. Establish a lower limit to competition.

- f. Society must administer just laws and care for the poor and sick who are not otherwise cared for.
- g. Society cannot afford to relieve the healthy individual from the necessity of working out his own salvation.
- 5. Society cannot legislate for religion, the best results being reached by leaving men free to think for themselves in matters of religion so long as they refrain from lawless and harmful conduct.
 - a. The bulk of legislation involves no moral principle, but only a practical judgment of expediency.
 - b. There is therefore always a neutral field between the individual and society where the sense of obligation will be a variable quantity.
 - c. The laws should be as wise and righteous as possible.

II. The punitive action of society.

A. Two points of view are to be distinguished:

- 1. The standpoint of abstract desert as we may conceive it to exist for God in his dealings with men.
 - a. It is not plain that we are constituted the guardians of the moral law to the extent of meting out its penalties.
 - b. The fundamental idea of punishment is retribution on the part of the punisher and expiation on the part of the punished.
- 2. The standpoint of our human relations.
 - a. We are entirely unable to judge how much evil a given crime demands for its expiation.
 - b. We are unable to estimate the proper responsibility of any one.
 - c. The only misdeeds we are called upon to punish are those which have a social bearing.
 - d. No theory of punishment is manageable which does not rest on the ill desert of the evil will.
 - (1) Public security alone is no just ground for punishment.
 - (2) It is not permitted to punish one for his improvement.
 - e. Whatever is necessary to guard society against the criminal, and to make the criminal industry unprofitable, society may justly do.

B. In the punishment of crime.

- 1. The form and measure of punishment must always have in human hands a somewhat arbitrary character.
- 2. Regard should be had to the character and circumstances of the criminal, so far as it does not interfere with the aim of the law. Extremes should be avoided.
- 3. Most of the crimes in society are against individuals, but society assumes the right to punish.
 - a. The individuals right to forgive is recognized except where infringement of social rights is involved.
 - b. Society has generally assumed the right to inflict punishment leaving to the individual only the right of self-defence. Such punishment has the advantage of power, impersonality, and passionless justice.

III. The political rights of individuals.

- A. The people are the source of power, and governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.
- B. The ideal is equality of political rights, and in default of reasonable and just limitation this should be the rule.

1. Minors are universally recognized as having no political rights because of immature knowledge and judgment.
2. Only those should be allowed to participate whose character is in harmony with the fundamental social aims.
3. A low grade of intelligence justly excludes from political rights.
4. The proposition to give special political rights to property has not justified itself in practice.
5. Minority, imbecility, and criminality justly exclude from political rights therefore.
6. To maintain the political disqualification of women it will have to be shown:
 - a. Either that women are not moral persons at all.
 - b. Or that they are mentally and morally so weak as to be a menace to society if entrusted with any voice in the government.
7. The legal distinctions between men and men have vanished; those between men and women must vanish also.

IV. Society as a moral institution.

- A. Things which in themselves are immoral can never be permitted or licensed by society.
 1. Society itself is imperfect, but it may and must enforce its authority even in its imperfection.
 2. The common good as conditioned by moral principles must be the aim of social action.
 3. Ethics must emphasize the moral spirit and ideas which should underlie social development, but it cannot dictate its forms.

V. Regarding national ethics.

- A. A nation's first obligation is to itself and its own subjects.
- B. If a nation be conscious of having a great work to perform in the progress of humanity, it is forbidden to do or allow anything which will hinder that work.
- C. The rights of humanity are above all rights of nationality.
- D. Wars of self-defence against barbarous peoples, or to secure the rights of humanity are allowable.

VI. Regarding the church.

- A. The church as an institution is subject to the same law as all other institutions.
- B. Its value is measured by its ministry to humanity.
- C. The church is ideally the head of institutions for the moral life.

Conclusion.

- I. That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was natural, and afterwards that which was spiritual.
 - A. The spiritual is not something apart from the natural.
 - B. The spiritual is the natural rising to its ideal form through the free activity of the moral person.
 1. The natural is understood through the spiritual.
 2. The spiritual gets contents from the natural.
- II. As a consequence, the field of ethics is life itself, and, immediately, the life that now is.

- A. Our task is to make this the expression of good will.
- B. We have a double guide:
 - 1. Internally, a growing moral ideal.
 - 2. Externally, a growing insight into the tendencies of conduct.
- III. Life has two poles: outward fortune and happiness and inward worth and peace.
- IV. The moral life finds its chief field in the service of the common good.
- V. The greatest need in ethics is the impartial and unselfish will to do right.
- VI. The great need in ethical theory is to renounce abstractions, as virtue, pleasure, happiness, and come into contact with reality.
- VII. The great need of ethical practice, next to the good will, is the serious and thoughtful application of intellect to the problems of life and conduct.
- VIII. The living will to do right must be ever present in the individual and society, forever reaffirming itself and adjusting itself to new conditions.
- IX. In a very important sense the respectable class is the dangerous class in the community.
- X. In the application of principles to life there will long be a neutral frontier on the borders of the moral life, where consequences and tendencies have not so clearly declared themselves as to exclude differences of opinion among men of good will.
- XI. In reducing principles to practice we must be on our guard against an abstract and impracticable idealism.

APPENDIX NUMBER V.

Bowne, Borden P., Personalism, Chapters 5,6, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908.

(The following is a detailed outline of the arguments presented in these two chapters, which arguments constitute a concise and final statement of Bowne's philosophical position at the time of his death.)

Chapter 5. The Failure of Impersonalism.

I. Impersonalism may be reached in two ways:

- A. The sense bound mind sees many extra-mental things about and these tend to become the basal fact of existence; in this way naturalism arises.
- B. The other form arises through the fallacy of the abstract, where uncritical minds attempt to explain the explanation; a species of idealistic impersonalism.

II. The consideration of naturalism.

A. Naturalism may have two meanings:

1. As a principle of scientific method it is about identical with science itself. Such wise naturalism is most beneficial.
2. As a philosophic doctrine it is a kind of extension or refinement of common-sense realism.
 - a. Things that we can see and handle seem to be the undeniable realities; things invisible are doubtful.
 - b. As by easy generalization these may be gathered under the one head, matter, and their activities ascribed to one cause, force, these come to be regarded as the supreme and basal realities of our objective experience.
 - c. As matter and force are in space and time, these four become the fundamental factors of reality.
 - (1) Space and time furnish the scene; matter furnishes the existence; force, manifesting itself in motion, furnishes the causality.
 - (2) These five factors constitute nature, and from them nature is to be construed and comprehended.

B. The consistent and coherent nature of this system.

1. This view is allied in its beginnings with common-sense realism and never gets entirely away from it.
 - a. Though making changes towards transfigured realism, it retains the conception of an impersonal order of things.
 - b. Even accepting phenomenism it attempts to explain the world by impersonal and mechanical principles.
 - c. It fails to realize that transfigured realism and phenomenism are veritable Trojan horses.
2. The view has a double abstraction:
 - a. The objects of experience which are given only in experience and which analysis shows are conceivable only as functions of intelligence, are abstracted from all relation to intellect as the veritable fact in itself which is later to explain intellect.
 - b. Even in experience itself only one aspect is fixed on, that of extension and motion, and this is supposed to be the real.

- (1) The world of qualities is ignored and only the quantitative aspect is retained.
 - (2) There is no such world except among the abstractions of physicists.
 - (3) Qualitative distinctions and relations are contributed by the spectator, and they are the chief part of the real problem.
 - (4) This way of thinking shuts us up to transfigured realism and all its fictitious problems.
 - (a) The world we experience becomes more and more subjective.
 - (b) The real world becomes less and less accessible and less and less worth knowing.
3. This system, on its own realistic ground, is throughout ambiguous. It oscillates confusedly between explanation by classification and explanation by causality.
- a. Explanation by classification always remains on the surface, merely finding the explanation of things in some one point in which they agree.
 - b. Explanation by causality, also giving account of the specific peculiarities or differentia of concrete things.
 - (1) Infinitely small objects are pictured and given causality or forces.
 - (a) With bare lumps we can explain only heaps.
 - (b) Unless we assume a mover without, we must posit moving forces within.
 - (c) Unless these forces within are under some structural law, they will explain only amorphous masses again.
 - (2) Assuming the existence of such forces we have a double order of facts, one of spatial change and one of metaphysical nature. (change among things and change in things.)
 - (a) The change among things depends on the change in things.
 - (b) All substantial changes among things must be viewed as translations into phenomenal form of dynamic relations in things.
 - (c) The spatial system can be understood only through the dynamic system.
 - (d) We must carry the arrangement into the existence in the form of "subtle tendencies" and "mysterious potentialities." These are elusive terms and only confuse further.
 - c. Can life and mind and morals and society be explained on a naturalistic basis?
 - (1) The space and time world of phenomena explains nothing, being rather the problem itself.
 - (2) The real account must be sought in the world of power, and this world eludes us unless we raise power to include intelligence and purpose.
 - d. The superficiality of naturalistic philosophy.
 - (1) Classification has passed for identification.
 - (2) Phenomena have been mistaken for causality, in their activity, their sequence being unduly stressed.

4. The puzzle arising from overlooking the distinction between concrete and exhaustive thinking and symbolic or shorthand thinking.
 - a. We have the fallacy of the universal which rests upon mistaking the logical process for an ontological one.
 - b. By passing from complexity to simplicity, from heterogeneity to homogeneity, the speculator reaches simple, almost contentless terms such as matter and force.
 - (1) Though really the last terms of logical abstraction, they are supposed to be the first terms of real existence. Being very simple, vague, and indefinite in themselves, they raise no question.
 - (2) The class term applies to every member of the class, but it implies none of them.
 - (3) The concrete facts remain as complex and multiform as ever.
 - c. The law of the sufficient reason compels us to find in the premises full and adequate preparation for the conclusion; and if the conclusion be complex, then there must be corresponding complexity in the premises.
5. Evolution as a description of the phenomenal order and evolution as a doctrine of causation have never been sufficiently distinguished.
 - a. No variations of quantity contain any explanation of qualitative change, unless we assume a qualitative system in connection with the quantity.
 - (1) Defying logic we try to explain everything by antecedents, and so by the aid of the fallacy of the universal as we go backward we succeed in reaching to our satisfaction some indefinite, incoherent homogeneity.
 - (2) If we assume an order of law on the impersonal plane we have determined everything for all future time, so that nothing new may hereafter be introduced without some irruption from without.
 - (3) Working forward this law makes it clear that no developing thing can be understood or defined by what it momentarily is, but only by all that which it is to become.
6. Confusion of the question of the transformation of species in naturalistic discussion.
 - a. Tracing forms back to a common converging origin.
 - (1) This is a question for science and is unimportant.
 - (2) Its supposed importance is due to:
 - (a) The assumption of a self-running nature which does a great many unintended things on its own account.
 - (b) The fancy that such genetic connection would mean identity of nature in the successive members of the series.
 - b. Determining what the individual things are and what the power is that determines them.
 - (1) The doctrine of descent as existing in name only.
 - (a) A species is nothing but a group of individuals which more or less closely resemble one another.
 - (b) The fact would be a power producing individuals

in such a way that they could be variously classified, possibly on an ascending scale and in adaptation of to higher and fuller life.

- (c) This is but a doctrine of the transformation of species.
- (2) This doctrine vanishes in complete and barren tautology as soon as we take it concretely and exhaustively, instead of symbolically.

C. Conclusion regarding naturalism as a philosophy.

- 1. The doctrine is convicted and judged by its doctrine of causality.
- 2. It is condemned to a hopeless tautology and endless regress.
- 3. It is impossible to verify as actual any of its leading conceptions. They must remain, at best, mere conceptual forms.

III. The failure of impersonalism as idealism.

A. The reinstatement of the problem:

- 1. Approaching the problem from the side of knowledge, will and causality in existence are overlooked, and the conclusion is that things are only ideas.
- 2. Since the mind is an object of knowledge the conclusion is that it is only an idea or group of ideas.
- 3. Then, by elimination of the personal implication, the conclusion is that mind itself is a function of impersonal ideas.

B. How the view arises:

- 1. Epistemological interest makes us unwilling to admit anything which cannot be conceptually grasped.
- 2. Accordingly it seeks to make ideas all-embracing.
- 3. Yet the impersonal idea is a pure fiction as all actual ideas are owned, or belong to some one.
 - a. This idealism assumes categories as being conceived in themselves, and that they are in a measure the preconditions of concrete existence.
 - b. In the concrete the terms, or categories, have no meaning except as it is abstracted from our own personal experience.
 - c. Concerning the place and ground of combination and movement of these categories:
 - (1) To exist in space or time turns them into things.
 - (2) To exist in consciousness is contrary to the hypothesis.
 - (3) Thus they retreat into some kind of metaphysical nth dimension, where we cannot follow them because they mean nothing.

C. The ground of grouping and movement of these ideas.

- 1. Conceiving their relations to be purely logical.
 - a. The intellect as merely a set of logical relations is incapable of explaining the order of experience, for logic is non-temporal.
 - b. If the universe as existing were a logical implication of ideas, it and all its contents would be as eternal as the ideas.
 - c. Finite minds as implications of eternal ideas would be equally eternal.
 - d. Evil and error as part of the minds contents would have to be necessary and eternal also.

2. Only a living, active, and personal intelligence can escape this fatalism and suicidal outcome of the impersonal reason.
- D. The claim that thought must comprise everything is itself unclear in its meaning.
1. In our human thinking there is a world of objects which we do not make but find and this dualism can never be eliminated from our thinking.
 2. This world of objects is retained within the thought sphere by being made the product and expression of intelligence, and as such it is open to apprehension and comprehension by intelligence.
 3. Hence there is an element in self-knowledge beyond what the conceptions of the understanding can furnish; this is found in our living self-consciousness.
 - a. Living cannot be realized without the conception of things, but the conception is formal and empty without the living.
 - b. Intelligence must accept itself as a datum, as the self-recognition of itself by itself.
 - (1) The recognition would be impossible without the content, and the content would be nothing without the recognition.
 - (2) In this fact the antithesis of thought and being finds recognition and conciliation.
- E. Recalling our doctrine of transcendental empiricism.
1. The meaning and possibility of these terms must finally be found in experience itself, and not in any abstract philosophizing. Abstraction brings difficulties.
 2. These difficulties can be removed only as the problem is raised to the personal plane, and we take the terms in the meaning they have in living experience.
 - a. Thus identity is entirely intelligible as the self-identification of intelligence in experience.
 - b. Likewise unity is entirely intelligible as the unity of the self in the plurality of its activities.
 3. The notion of the self can easily be taken in such a way as to be worthless.
 - a. The self taken abstractly is indeed worthless.
 - b. It is the living self in the midst of its experiences, possessing, directing, controlling both itself and them.
 4. We again conclude impersonalism is a failure both in the low form of materialistic mechanism and the abstract form of idealistic notions.
- IV. The objection that personalism itself is open to equal objection.
- A. The attempt to solve the problem by picturing ends by confounding the person with the physical organism and such personality is impossible.
 - B. The more significant objections arise from an abstract treatment of the subject and an attempt to construe personality as the outcome of impersonal principles.
 1. The indications of living experience are the only source of knowledge in this matter however.
 2. When we have lived and described the personal life we have done all that is possible in sane and sober speculation.
 - C. Human existence with its limitations and temporal form lends itself to the thought that personality develops out of the impersonal.

1. The Impersonal would have to have a coefficient of personality as the condition of the development.
2. Our existence, however, depends upon the living will and purpose of the Creator.
- D. The objections to affirming a Supreme Person are largely verbal.
 1. Many directed against a literal anthropomorphism.
 - a. The essential meaning of personality is selfhood, self-consciousness, self-control, and the power to know.
 - b. These elements have no corporeal significance or limitations.
 - (1) Complete and perfect personality can be found only in the infinite and Absolute Being.
 - (2) Only in Him can we find that complete and perfect selfhood and self-possession which are necessary to the fullness of personality.

Chapter 6. The Personal World.

- I. The large proportion of our human life which is even now invisible and impalpable.
 - A. We ourselves are invisible as living selves.
 - B. The most familiar events of everyday life have their key and meaning only in the invisible. (a kiss in anatomical terms.)
 - C. Literature exists solely in the invisible and non-spatial world of ideas and consciousness; the same with history.
 - D. These things may use spatial phenomena as a means of expression, but in themselves they are strictly unpicturable.
This world exists in consciousness rather than in space.
 1. The reality of the human world is not denied but simply relocated in terms of itself, in the incommensurable terms of life and feeling, love and hate, etc.
 2. The space world is not unreal but rather it is not a self-sufficient something by itself, but is rather a means of expression of the underlying personal life which is the deepest and only substantial fact.
 3. We see that life now actually goes on in the invisible, and space has only a symbolical function with respect to this hidden life.
 - a. The space world is largely a potentiality, waiting for realization by man himself.
 - b. Such a view leads on toward the view that there is a great invisible power behind the space and time world as a whole which is using it for expressing and communicating its purpose.
- II. The necessary inference of a Supreme Person and purpose.
 - A. It becomes plain that man is a very significant factor in cosmic ongoings, at least in terrestrial regions.
 - B. A world of persons with a Supreme Person at the head is the conception to which we come by critical reflection.
 1. Space objects have no substantial existence by themselves and apart from intelligence, but are only the flowing expression and means of communication of personal beings.
 2. The world of space objects is throughout dependent, instrumental and phenomenal.

- C. Metaphysics shows that we cannot explain the existence and community of the many without affirming a fundamental reality which is truly one, and which produces and coordinates the many.
1. Quantitative ideas involving multiplication or division are incompatible with the true unity of the one.
 - a. The fundamental reality is an agent to which the notion of divisibility has no application.
 - b. This agent must be regarded as self-conscious intelligence.
 - c. Quantitative conceptions are the attempt of the uncritical imagination to express an unpicturable problem of the reason in the picture forms of the spatial fancy.
 2. The unpicturable many must be conceived as unpicturably depending on the unpicturable one,
 - a. Pantheism results by emphasizing the dependence of the finite spirit, or by taking that dependence in an abstract and absolute sense.
 - b. Considering life critically we come upon two facts:
 - (1) Experienced limited self-control.
 - (2) Experienced lack of self-sufficiency.
 - c. In experience we find these two ideas united in the individual.
 - d. The pantheistic view has insuperable difficulties.
 - (1) The problem of knowledge is insoluble except as we maintain the freedom of both the finite and the infinite spirit.
 - (2) To make our thoughts and feelings God's, makes our errors, folly and sin, divine, and reason and conscience as having authority vanish.
 - (3) The divine unity itself disappears, there being a confusion of finite outlook with infinite outlook and knowledge.
 - e. This mutual otherness of the finite and infinite is equally demanded by the moral and religious relation.
 - (1) Only so can the relation of love and obedience be.
 - (2) It is necessary for the union of mutual understanding and sympathy which love and religion seek.
 - f. The metaphysical relation of dependence in itself has no religious quality and does not imply a religious relation, though it is a pre-condition of it.
- D. The intellectual status of religion.
1. The sensational philosophy held that religion, as a late growth, is to be understood through its psychological antecedents as a product of evolution.
 - a. We have come to see that no development is possible without assuming some immanent law underlying the unfolding.
 - b. Also that the true nature of a developing thing can be learned only by studying the full unfolding of the finished product.
 2. To know what religion is we must consider it in its great historical manifestations, rather than in the dim imaginings of undeveloped men.
 3. Therefore religion has come to be recognized as a great human fact, deep rooted in humanity itself, and having profound significance for this life, either for good or evil.

- a. Religion may be a great source of progress, of illumination, of inspiration, both for the individual and for the people.
- b. Christian thought recognizes God as good, even to other peoples who know Him not, working out in them His purposes also.
- c. Non-Christian religious systems are seen to have had their place in God's providential plan for men.
- 4. Therefore religion also is a fact of human experience, and must receive its recognition and interpretation as belonging to reality. This fact preeminently leads to a personal conception of existence.
- E. The direction the normal development of religion must take.
 - 1. There are certain conditions that must be met by any religion that is to command the assent of developed humanity.
 - a. The object worshiped must be something which satisfies the intellect.
 - b. Religious development must take the direction of affirming not only a supreme reason but also a supreme righteousness.
 - c. It must also be supreme goodness: the positive conception of ethical love.
 - d. The final religion must be one that has a worthy thought of man, and provides a task for him which will furnish the will with an adequate object and a supreme inspiration.
 - 2. Where non-Christian religions have fallen short:
 - a. They have failed to be such as will bring man to his highest estate.
 - b. They have not been able to think consistently, and in a way as to carry conviction, of the destiny of man.
 - 3. We are positivists in respect to science, and theologians as respects causation.
- III. The practical bearing and application of personalism in dealing with our concrete problems.
 - A. Experience is first and basal in all living and thinking, and all theorizing must go out from experience as its basis, and must return to it for verification.
 - 1. With this understanding, science of the saner and deeper type is in no way disturbed by our phenomenalistic teaching.
 - a. Metaphysics, while of use in understanding life, does not really in any way make or modify it.
 - b. Science as a dogmatic system is the only thing forbidden by our general view.
 - 2. The practical trustworthiness of life can be learned only from experience and verified only in experience. Nothing can be speculatively justified, or discredited.
 - a. The fearsome conclusions drawn by the skeptic are due to the attempt to reason after reason has been discredited.
 - b. The great body of our fundamental beliefs are not deductions but rather formulations of life, wrought out in action rather than in speculation.
 - c. In this way life and experience themselves are installed as the great source of practical belief.
 - d. Science must always be classificatory and descriptive, and can never deal with the true causes and reasons of things.

e. Two errors on the mental side:

(1) By identifying the physical figure with the mental fact, it becomes easy to mistake an exegesis of the metaphor for a dealing with the fact.

(2) We tend to think of things under space forms and to substitute the body for the personality.

3. Not to form abstract theories but to formulate and understand this personal life of ours is the first and last duty of philosophy.

B. For us, nature is only an order of uniformity, established and maintained by an ever-living and ever-acting Intelligence and Will.

1. This uniformity is the absolute pre-supposition of our having any freedom or rational life whatever.

2. All machines of human invention owe their value to the order of law, but that order alone would never have produced any of them.

3. The laws of thought, which are absolute uniformities of reason, do not insure right thinking without the self-control of the free spirit.

4. In combination, the order of law merely prescribes the outcome or resultant of the component factors.

5. The integrity of the mental order does not consist in a self-inclosed continuity of mental states, but in the identity of the mental laws which determine the combination and succession of mental states, however produced. The same holds for the cosmic order.

6. In the strict sense of the word, nothing whatever can be explained by the antecedent state of the system.

7. If we are in a personal world, the final cause of nature must be sought in the personal and moral realm.

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Comparative Content of Educational Philosophy Text Books

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TO serious thinking men and women life must be given a consistent interpretation, in which the nature and interests of mankind find real significance and meaning, before they can adequately know the joy of purposive living. To this end the race always has had and always will have its philosophers. Nor is it surprising that society's most highly organized agency of reproduction, formal education, should receive the attention of these philosophers.

The Philosophy of Education, as such, has received enough attention to make it feasible to enquire: What is the Philosophy of Education? In seeking an answer to this question we find various replies. To Dr. Dewey, philosophy "is the theory of education in its most general phases" and the "Philosophy of Education is . . . only an explicit formulation of the problems of the formation of right mental and moral habitudes in respect to the difficulties of contemporary social life." This makes it the matter of solving social conflicts. To Professor Bode it is a matter of adjustment of the different values, such as the interests of childhood, vocational needs, and the cultivation of "purely intellectual interests," while Dr. Horne would link education up to the nature of reality and ask, "What are the implications of education?" Other authors have largely shaded into one or another of these views, though often allowing generously for their own particular interest or prejudice.

In the matter of text books there seems to be about ten or fifteen, covering the last twenty-five years, which deal primarily with this field, though there are a great many more which shade off into the principles and theory of education.

In the light of the foregoing, this paper is a brief summary

of an investigation having as its purpose, "*to determine the principal texts being used, the philosophical approach to the subject most prevalent, and the comparative content of the most prominent texts.*" This investigation was undertaken as a piece of graduate research for the Master's degree by the writer, who is a student in the Biblical Seminary in New York and in New York University.

In order to determine the text books most in use in teaching Educational Philosophy and the viewpoints from which this subject is now being taught, it was necessary to ascertain which colleges and universities in the United States were giving courses under the title of "The Philosophy of Education." The World's Almanac for 1926 lists approximately four hundred and twenty-five colleges and universities of recognized scholastic standing in this country. Upon close examination of the catalogues of three hundred and eighty-eight, or about ninety-one percent of these schools, it was found that fifty-four of them offered courses in this one subject. To these schools a brief questionnaire was sent and answers received from forty, which is a return of seventy-four percent. These answers came from twenty-six universities, twelve colleges, and two other schools unidentified, these institutions being located in twenty-three states very evenly distributed throughout the United States. In each case the answer was from the professor teaching the course.

The first point of the questionnaire dealt with the textbooks being used. Each professor was to list the three texts most used in their order of value. In tabulating the results, all textbooks receiving a first choice were given three points, those receiving a second choice were given two points, and those receiving a third choice were given one point. Listing all those which received at least two choices, the following results were obtained:—

<i>Rank</i>	<i>Points</i>	<i>Author</i>	<i>Text</i>
1.	52	Kilpatrick	Source Book in the Philosophy of Education. (Also Syllabus)
2.	48	Dewey	Democracy and Education.
3.	27	Chapman-Counts	Principles of Education.
4.	15	Horne	Philosophy of Education.
5.	6	Bode	Modern Educational Theories.
6.	4	Henderson	Principles of Education.
7.	4	Howerth	Theory of Education.

e, "to determine the ical approach to the ative content of the ion was undertaken Master's degree by al Seminary in New

lost in use in teach- xpoints from which necessary to ascer- United States were hilosophy of Educa- lists approximately and universities of untry. Upon close undred and eighty- ese schools, it was ses in this one sub- naire was sent and return of seventy- twenty-six univer- chools unidentified, y-three states very d States. In each eaching the course. ealt with the text- list the three texts ulating the results, given three points, en two points, and one point. Listing ices, the following

Text
in the Philosophy on. (Also Syllabus) und Education. Education.
f Education. ational Theories. Education. ducation.

Other books which received single mention were: Kilpatrick, "Foundations of Method"; ;Coursault, "Principles of Educa- tion"; Randall, "Making of the Modern Mind"; Partridge, "Genetic Philosophy of Education"; Spearman, "Abilities of Man"; Shields, "Philosophy of Education"; Patrick, "Intro- duction to Philosophy"; Jones, "Essentials of Education"; Charters, "The Teaching of Ideals."

The second point of the questionnaire dealt with the philo- sophical viewpoint from which this subject was approached and handled. The results are:—

Number	Viewpoint
12.....	Idealism
10.....	Pragmatism
5.....	Eclecticism
3.....	Behaviorism
9.....	Eclectic mixtures distributed as follows:
2.....	Idealism, pragmatism
2.....	Pragmatism, behaviorism
1.....	Personality, pragmatism
1.....	Personalism, instrumentalism
1.....	Idealism, pragmatism, behaviorism
1.....	Positivism, pragmatism, behaviorism
1.....	Idealism, <i>realism</i> , behaviorism
1.....	Historical approach

It is quite interesting to notice that many who were Idealists used a pragmatic textbook, and also to notice the number who worked with apparently self-contradictory viewpoints.

Carrying the study further, the four leading textbooks in the above list were analyzed to determine the twenty leading topics in each text. The topics in each case were the author's own, and the rank was based on space occupied, carried down to quarter pages. This required much difficult judgment but is fairly accurate. These four lists of topics were then syn- thesized, and the final list of ten topics is:—

Rank	Topic	Texts (number having this topic)
1.	Individual	4
2.	Method	3
3.	Thinking	3
4.	Democracy	2
5.	Environment	2
6.	Personality	2
7.	Society	2
8.	Interest	3
9.	Vocational education	2
10.	Morals	2

These ten topics were then used as the basis for further analysis to determine how they were treated. It was found that Dr. Kilpatrick's Source Book drew largely from Dr. Dewey, quoting him to the extent of fifteen percent of its quotations and nineteen percent of its pages. It further being a source book of conflicting views and not representative of one man's view except in organization, it was omitted from this phase of the study, and the next six of the original list were used.

Upon summarizing and re-summarizing there was finally brought out the range and completeness of treatment, in terms of sub-topics of each main head as it is approached by six different men. Under this treatment the following was evolved by synthesis:—

1. Individual:
 - Relation to reality or cosmic significance.
 - Relation to society.
 - Relation to environment; heredity; will or effort.
 - Historical perspective.
 - Individual differences.
 - Adjustment: self realization; re-making environment; habit formation.
2. Method:
 - Defined as experimental, pragmatic, scientific.
 - Defined as purposive activity, receptivity, reflection.
 - Realized through study habits; application of principles.
 - Relation of knowledge and activity.
 - Adaptation to age level.
 - Humanizing of method.
3. Thinking:
 - As identical with method.
 - As interaction of language habits.
 - As directive, adaptive, auto-critical; relating action to consequences.
 - As conceptual re-adjustment.
 - Its neurological basis.
 - Its value in relation to resultant knowledge.
4. Democracy:
 - Associated living and conjoint experience.
 - Based upon mutual recognition of aptitudes and interests.
 - Relation to development of highest personality of citizens.
 - Relation to objective civic education.
 - Relation to curriculum.
 - As meaning academic freedom; equal opportunity in education.

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5. Environment:

As sum total of conditions concerned in human activity.
As effecting agencies without, ideas within.
As three-fold: intellectual, emotional, volitional.
As spiritual: thought, feeling, plan of God in the world.
Relation to heredity.
Relation to school:
The school like life.
The school to simplify, order, purify, and balance
environment.
Possibility of being re-made for a better future.

6. Personality:

As denoting a socially efficient being.
As denoting perfect integration and harmony of con-
duct and self.
As denoting unification of total character.

7. Society:

As many divided individual groups.
Relation to future, and education:
As the ideal democratic state.
As unified whole of component parts.
As internationalism, world citizenship.
Relation to Sociology.
Relation to schools:
Society preserved, guarded, bettered.
Level raised through selected individual types.

8. Vocational education:

As type of true purposive education.
As fairly separate: an integrated body of particular
activities,—one's economic specialty.
As responsibility of particular industries.
Relation of trade schools and formal system for pro-
fessional training.
Harmonization of culture and vocational education.

9. Interest:

Relation to effort.
Relation to subject-matter and method as criteria of
activities.
As identical with purposeful activity.
As outcome of motor adjustment.
As essential in education.
As an immediate aim of education.

10. Morals:

As social quality of conduct.
As unemotional religion.
Relation to school teaching.
As a responsibility of family and church.

11. Aim in education:

Adjustment of youth to the realities of life.

To assist an initially ill-adapted individual to make proper adjustment.

Adjustment of a fully developed individual to God as revealed through his spiritual environment.

To make a reconstruction or re-organization of experience which:

Adds meaning to life.

Increases ability to direct course of subsequent experience.

To impart a desire for further education.

The perfection of democracy.

12. Author's aims in writing text:

To expound implications of ideal democracy stressing experimental and pragmatic method.

To ground students in sound principles of educational philosophy.

To unify contemporary conflicting claims from the viewpoint of Idealism.

To give perspective in educational thinking.

To ground the theory of education in organic, psychic, and social evolution.

To proclaim educational theory from the viewpoint of evolution.

One can hardly complete a study such as this present one without forming certain judgments and conclusions in regard to how a textbook in the Philosophy of Education should be written. In conclusion, therefore, we will outline the field and briefly show how these conclusions should guide one in writing such a text. The outline* used divides the field into six sections: (1) What is a Philosophy of Education? (2) What is the goal of education? (3) With what does the educational process start? (4) What are the means of education? (5) How shall we measure our educational progress? (6) Summary and conclusions: The meaning of Education?

I. What is a Philosophy of Education?

The textbooks studied in this thesis are seen to hold the following philosophic viewpoints:

Kilpatrick	Eclectic, though mainly Pragmatic.
Dewey	Social and Pragmatic.
Chapman-Counts	Eclectic, mainly Social.
Horne	Idealistic.
Bode	Pragmatic, broadly Behavioristic.
Howerth	Naturalistic and Socialistic.
Henderson	Naturalistic and Pragmatic.

* For these six divisions we are indebted to class work with Dr. Horne.

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This, together with the fact that the questionnaire results gave three main viewpoints, would lead to the conclusion that a textbook should treat the Pragmatic, Idealistic, and Eclectic viewpoints. Coming down to more specific treatment, education should be viewed in its relation to the Biological, Psysiological, Sociological, and Psychological concepts of growth and development. The function should be to see the educational process whole, and education as a part of the whole process. The text should endeavor to develop a critical, evaluating attitude in its readers. This would require that the textbook be a careful and impartial evaluation of opposing tendencies, treating all views sympathetically, and further, that it be a synthesis of the best which leaves out all propaganda in behalf of particular views. The writer should not deal merely with the principles of education but he should always aim to get back to the first principles, and answer the questions: "Does this education mean anything significant for human happiness, progress, and destiny? What? Does education imply anything as to the final truth of man and his world? In brief, what is the meaning of education?" In answering these questions, in the impartial way outlined above, we will be answering our first question.

II. What is the goal of education?

Ethics, defined as "the basic principles of right action," should assist in giving the goal of education. This goal being reached through proper adjustment of the individual to his physical and social environment, and to a lesser degree perhaps, the adjustment of the environment to the individual and social group. In so far as God, freedom, and immortality are implied in education, and if it can be shown that from the practice of these conceptions there spring attitudes, feelings, and powers that may never be derived simply from a glorification of humanity, then, to that extent, adjustment should also consider these seriously. This section would further include a discussion of what are the chief values of life, as for example, health, beauty, and a vocation. The foregoing study indicates that the ideal society and a real Democracy are one in being the main aim of education, and that the individual aim is self-realization through adjustment. The social and individual aims would be worked out and their relationships to each other shown.

III. With what does the educational process start?

The educational process starts with the original nature of the educand. In this section the text should apply the best of Psychology to the main problem. Individual differences, capacity, inheritance, environment, and will or effort should all be fully discussed and related to each other. The usual mistake of favoring inheritance against environment or the opposite, or of accepting both and ignoring will should carefully be guarded against. Each of these three factors should be given fair treatment. The concept of personality should also be related to the whole. The individual's dependence upon society would, as a topic of discussion, round out this section.

IV. What are the means of education?

Under this section would come the discussions of social control, education as the function of society, method, curriculum, the teacher, and kindred subjects. Method should be treated as both philosophical and scientific,—purposeful receiving, appreciating and meditating, as well as purposeful activity. In the discussion of interest, effort should receive adequate attention. The place and function of vocation education should also be discussed. As section three above was grounded in psychology, so this section should be grounded in sociology.

V. How shall we measure our educational progress?

Under this section should come an evaluation of the testing movement. The philosophical implications of scales, together with their good points and bad points, should be pointed out. The past and the present should be compared and contrasted. There should be evaluation of the actual in terms of the ideal.

VI. Summary and conclusions: The meaning of education.

Under this section the many threads of the text would be woven together to spell out an answer to the questions of the opening section. The complete and finished definition of education would embody the results of the first five sections.

Such, in brief, is the conclusion of this study. This outline is admittedly incomplete. It, however, suggests the complete whole, and while the discussion under each section largely deals only with points which the thesis shows should be stressed, it does leave room for the complete development which an adequate text would embody.