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JOHN CALVIN'S TEACHINGS ON HUMAN REASON  
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR  
THEORY OF REFORMED PROTESTANT CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

by

Leroy Nixon

Th.M. (Princeton Theological Seminary)

Ph.D. (New York University)

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AN ABSTRACT OF

Sponsoring Committee: Professor Lee A. Belford,  
Professor Louise Antz and Professor  
William W. Brickman

JOHN CALVIN'S TEACHINGS ON HUMAN REASON  
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR  
THEORY OF REFORMED PROTESTANT CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

- - - - -

A Problem in Philosophy of Religion  
Studied for Its Possible Implications for  
Theory of Religious Education

LEROY NIXON

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in the School of Education of  
New York University

1960

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This investigation starts from the assumption that the function of human reason in the practice of religion is a critical problem for theory of religious education. The investigation also assumes that an adequate study of an individual's teachings on human reason will yield some valid conclusions and implications for theory of religious education.

### The Problem

The purpose of the present study is to collect and analyze John Calvin's teachings on human reason in order to draw the implications of those teachings for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education today. The major burden of the investigation, however, evidently became the discovery of the basic questions about human reason which are raised in any philosophy of religion. There was then the problem of seeing Calvin's teachings on reason in a broad, historical perspective. Next Calvin's teachings were analyzed in terms of the categories. Some conclusions and implications were drawn.

### Methods of Investigation

Representative works in philosophy of religion were chosen in order to include typical Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant points of view; such typical Protestant positions as conservative, liberal, and neo-orthodox; and such philosophies as realism, idealism, pragmatism, naturalism, logical positivism, and vitalism. From these writings six main categories of human reason were derived; (1) reason and revelation, (2) the abilities of human reason, (3) the methods of human reason, (4) the relationship of human reason to the total personality, (5) the limits of human reason, and (6) the uses of human reason. In order to see Calvin's teachings historically, three main thought trends of his day were described as they were related to him: (1) decadent Aristotelianism, (2) Lutheran Augustinianism, and (3) Renais-

sance humanism. In collecting Calvin's teachings on human reason primary attention was given to the Institutes of the Christian Religion. The Commentaries and Sermons were also carefully examined.

### Findings

It was found: (1) that Calvin's doctrine of human reason is dominated by his theory of revelation, (2) that Calvin overemphasized the abilities of human reason, (3) that Calvin greatly overemphasized method in human reason, (4) that Calvin treated fully the relationship of human reason to the total personality, (5) that Calvin underemphasized the limits of human reason, and (6) that Calvin greatly underemphasized the uses of human reason.

From the historical background it was found: (1) that Calvin rejected the primacy of the intellect in Aristotle and the philosophical theology of Scholasticism, (2) that Calvin was obviously indebted to Lutheran Augustinianism, and (3) that Calvin was considerably indebted to Renaissance humanism, although the Renaissance left no mark upon Calvin's theory of reason as such.

The investigator did not draw his implications for Reformed Protestant Christian education from any of the above conclusions, but rather from features of Calvin's theory of human reason which broke through and split the philosophical categories. Implications were drawn: (1) that Reformed Protestant Christian education should be oriented toward the mysteries of the Christian faith, (2) that Reformed Protestant Christian education should orient itself toward regenerate human reason, (3) that Reformed Protestant Christian education should regard the form of transmission implied in the covenant theology as the normal method of communicating the Gospel, and (4) that efforts to improve the quality of Reformed Protestant Christian education should begin at the adult level.

The implications were corroborated by reference to a statement of policy adopted in 1959 by the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States and the Board of Education of the Reformed Church in America. The possible relevance of these implications to the Reformed-Church-related colleges was traced.

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## INTRODUCTION

The original purpose of this investigation was to collect and analyze John Calvin's teachings on human reason in order to draw the implications of those teachings for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education.

The function of human reason in the practice of religion is a critical problem for theory of religious education. If with William Clayton Bower we take the functional approach to Christian education and rest it upon the functional relationship of religion to human experience,<sup>1</sup> the activity of the mind continues to be an important part and sometimes the controlling part of human experience. If we allow the thesis of Gordon H. Clark that Christian theism as a world view is the basis of true Christian education,<sup>2</sup> the function of reason as the integrating faculty is obvious. If, like the late George Albert Coe, we say the "learning to be a Christian should be, essentially and primarily, an experience of free creativity,"<sup>3</sup> a high value is placed upon the creative function of human reason. If we stress, as did the late Harrison S. Elliott, that "everything that man knows about God has grown out of his experience in the world and out of his reflections upon the manifestations of God in nature and in human life,"<sup>4</sup> we still have to examine man's capacity to reflect. If with Frank E. Gaebelein we stress the Biblical and evangelical basis of Christian education,<sup>5</sup> we have to examine the role of

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1. Christ and Christian Education, p. 44.
  2. A Christian Philosophy of Education, p. 159.
  3. What is Christian Education? p. 33.
  4. Can Religious Education be Christian? p. 311.
  5. Christian Education in a Democracy.

human reason in interpreting the Bible. If with Elmer G. Homrighausen we stress decision and commitment in Christian personality,<sup>6</sup> commitment must be undergirded by reason. If with Randolph Crump Miller we become distressed that the religious education of children has apparently been in a state of turmoil and see certainty by adjusting religious education to a static theology,<sup>7</sup> the function of human reason is exclusively deductive. If with Shelton Smith we decide to shun methodology and social experimentation and to concentrate upon content,<sup>8</sup> reason becomes an instrument to absorb information. Whatever aspect of religious education we may choose to stress, the function of human reason in the practice of religion is a critical one for theory.

It soon became apparent that one major burden of the investigation was the derivation and validation of the categories of human reason as they exist in writings on the philosophy of religion. Originally a list of thirty representative philosophies of religion was examined. Representative Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant viewpoints were included. Such typical Protestant viewpoints as conservative, liberal, and neo-orthodox were included. Such various philosophical positions as realism, idealism, pragmatism, naturalism, logical positivism, and vitalism were included.

At first the attempt was made to derive the categories by inspection of tables of contents, chapter headings, paragraph headings, and indexes. It soon became apparent that this method was inadequate and resulted in serious gaps and omissions. It was necessary to collect every saying on

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6. Choose Ye This Day, p. 57.

7. The Clue to Christian Education.

8. Faith and Nurture.

human reason on index cards. Then the original list of works in philosophy of religion had to be expanded to cover phases of the categories which had been underemphasized in the tentative construction. Ten thousand references were compiled. The six main categories were checked in the early stages by Professor D. Campbell Wyckoff and Professor Louis Antz. Specifically Jewish aspects were validated by informal consensus at the dinner table at the Institute of Religious and Social Studies at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

The subcategories were derived over a period of time by a process of induction of internal relationships within the framework of each category.

Leroy Nixon

Section 1

The Categories of Human Reason  
as Found in Writings on Philosophy of Religion

Non-technical readers

may wish

to skip pages 1 to 100

and begin reading

at page 101.

SECTION 1

THE CATEGORIES OF HUMAN REASON  
AS FOUND IN WRITINGS ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Many of the meanings which have been assigned to human reason in the philosophy of religion have been anticipated in Plato's Republic.<sup>1</sup> Reason is defined as consistency by reference to the law of contradiction. "The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways."<sup>2</sup> As the stable principle of personality reason is set over against fluctuating desire.<sup>3</sup> Reason as a faculty intuitively apprehends the ideas of which objects of sense-data are imperfect copies.<sup>4</sup> Reason deals with reality and is thereby distinguished from opinion, which deals with phenomena.<sup>5</sup> Youth does not achieve reason as life integration.<sup>6</sup> Of the four faculties of the soul, reason is the highest. "Let there be four faculties of the soul-- reason answering to the highest, understanding to the second, faith (or

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1. Plato in the Parmenides and the Theaetetus critically re-examined and revised his theory of human reason as expounded in the Republic. It is assumed for the purpose of definition of human reason that the later critical works were historically less influential in establishing relationships between reason and religion than was the earlier, more popular Republic.
  2. Plato, The Republic, p. 152.
  3. Ibid., p. 157.
  4. Ibid., p. 207.
  5. Ibid., p. 206.
  6. Ibid., p. 229.

conviction) to the third, and perception of shadows to the last.<sup>7</sup> Reason alone is capable of dialectic, the art of correlating the various branches of knowledge.<sup>8</sup> Reason is set over against the passions and is the instrument of self-control.<sup>9</sup> Reason brings the highest possible degree of happiness when it controls desire.<sup>10</sup>

One could hardly overestimate the influence upon popular thought of Plato's notion of human reason as the intuitive or "divine" organ of the soul.<sup>11</sup> Even John Locke (1632-1704), whose empirical philosophy was opposed to Platonic "innate ideas," defined human reason as an "innate faculty" through which experience gives rise to "certain and indisputable knowledge."<sup>12</sup> As late as the eighteenth-century Enlightenment in England, reason was considered to be intuitive, infallible, and universal. Reason "was differentiated from logic in that its rules had never to be taught; they were known to all by a sort of intuition. Its dictates were certain, infallible, and universal, and were tacitly identified with the will of God."<sup>13</sup> Man was identified with nature through his reason. "In the Age of Reason . . . to act 'according to nature' meant to act according to reason."<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) considered human reason to be "intuitive and indisputable."<sup>15</sup> Joseph Addison (1672-1719) wrote of the sun, moon, stars, and planets,

- 
7. Ibid., p. 253.
  8. Ibid., p. 278.
  9. Ibid., p. 330.
  10. Ibid., p. 352.
  11. G. T. W. Patrick, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 242-43.
  12. Ernest Campbell Mossner, Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason, p. 42.
  13. Ibid., p. 14.
  14. Ibid., p. 23.
  15. Ibid., p. 74.

"In reason's ear they all rejoice,  
And utter forth a glorious voice,  
Forever singing as they shine,  
'The hand that made us is divine.'"<sup>16</sup>

Among the English deists it was not until 1731 that the anonymous author of Religion and Nature Considered denied the existence of natural reason as an innate faculty. He asserted, "This faculty called reason is nothing else but the result of sensation and reflection."<sup>17</sup>

Platonic "innate ideas" are basic to the typical systems of rationalism at the beginning of the period of modern philosophy: namely, those of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. René Descartes (1596-1650) limited reason to intuition and deduction, regarded mathematics as its ideal function, and believed reason capable of establishing its own authority.<sup>18</sup> Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) defined the human mind as a part of the infinite intelligence of God.<sup>19</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646-1716) criticized Locke's understanding of the mind as a tabula rasa by defining human reason as the creative agent in the knowing process.<sup>20</sup>

In the Platonic tradition, Georg W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) defined reason as the one principle of coherence, synopsis, or totality. Saying that "the true is the whole," he endeavored to take "all realms of experience into account in their systematic interrelations and in their totality."<sup>21</sup>

Perhaps it was with reference to this effort that H. Richard Niebuhr noted

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16. See his hymn, "The Spacious Firmament on High," stanza 3.

17. Quoted in Mossner, op. cit., p. 135.

18. Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student's History of Philosophy, pp. 240-48.

19. Joseph Ratner, editor, The Philosophy of Spinoza Selected from His Chief Works, p. 161.

20. Rogers, op. cit., p. 290.

21. Edgar S. Brightman, A Philosophy of Religion, p. 184.

that philosophers tend to exalt reason as the divine element in man.<sup>22</sup> Edgar S. Brightman describes the "religious apriorist" as one who says that reason consists of eternal principles of validity, whereas experience consists of data of sensation, morality, and religious life.<sup>23</sup> W. T. Stace says that this position assumes the intuition inherent in Plato's definition of reason as referring to the "higher" faculties of the intellect rather than the "lower" faculties of the senses.<sup>24</sup> More remarkable intuitionism in this regard is to be found in the writings of modern European existentialists. For example, Karl Jaspers defines reason as "the self-evident faculty"<sup>25</sup> and as the "imageless, unobjectifiable, self-impelling source of our self."<sup>26</sup>

The Platonic intuitive concept of human reason has been in continuous process of modification by the Aristotelian reduction. Aristotle in his early life as a student of Plato was interested in eternal types or "ideas." Later in life he became interested in pure science and investigation. The focus of his attention was shifted from how we know (epistemology) to how we think (logic). From his time on reasoning (method of human reason) has been classified as inductive (from particulars to generals) and deductive (from generals to particulars). Reason, whatever else it may be, must be honored fully as the capacity for logical inference.<sup>27</sup>

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22. H. R. Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 155.

23. Brightman, op. cit., p. 2.

24. Stace, Time and Eternity, p. 107.

25. Jaspers, Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time, p. 7.

26. Ibid., p. 37.

27. Nels F. S. Ferré, Faith and Reason, p. 20.

However, from this close identification of human reason with logical method there has resulted an increasing vagueness as to the nature of human reason as new dissatisfactions arose with reason as mere induction and deduction. When the English deists began to surrender their mystical concept of reason, they began to see human reason as a fallible instrument of discovery.<sup>28</sup> John Wild observed that, according to the animal-habit school, reason operates only intermittently as "a separate faculty which intervenes only at critical junctures to solve practical problems."<sup>29</sup> J. Donald Butler has noticed that for the neo-scholastics, despite the limitations of logical method, reason is a true vehicle of knowledge.<sup>30</sup> Emil Brunner tries to escape the limitations of Aristotelian logic by identifying reason not as a "thing in itself," but a relationship, the core of which is the perception of the Word of God.<sup>31</sup> Finally, Karl Jaspers submits two inclusive but vague definitions: (1) "Reason is the essence of philosophy,"<sup>32</sup> and, (2) "Reason is the will to unity."<sup>33</sup>

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) defined reason (Vernunft) as the power to use comprehensive principles in order to synthesize into unity the concepts provided by the intellect (Verstand).<sup>34</sup> In his Religion Within the Limits of Reason he saw reason as a characteristic of the best culture of his time.<sup>35</sup> Karl Jaspers has consistently observed Kant's distinction between reason and intellect and insists that, while reason depends upon intellect, reason goes

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28. Mossner, op. cit., p. 146.

29. Introduction to Realistic Philosophy, p. 69.

30. Four Philosophies and Their Practice in Education and Religion, p. 374.

31. Revelation and Reason, p. 55.

32. Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time, p. 7.

33. Ibid., p. 39.

34. Lewis White Beck, editor, Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, p. 11.

35. H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 91.

beyond intellect<sup>36</sup> and does not succumb to the restrictions of intellect.<sup>37</sup> Nels Ferré has failed to observe the distinction and gives a popular definition of reason as "our capacity for intellectual response to Reality."<sup>38</sup>

Paul Tillich distinguishes between "ecstatic" reason and technical reason as instruments of theology. He calls the organ by which the contents of faith are received ecstatic reason. Technical reason is the organ by which the contents of faith are formally arranged.<sup>39</sup> Technical reason is also to be distinguished from the more broad ontological reason, which in classical tradition from Parmenides to Hegel includes cognitive, aesthetic, practical, and technical reason. Ontological reason is the mental structure whereby the mind grasps and transforms reality.<sup>40</sup> Technical reason fails to grasp the goal of life and is concerned with arriving by logical inference at means of achieving goals given from outside itself.<sup>41</sup> Ontological reason includes subjective reason and objective reason. Subjective reason is the rational structure of the mind. Objective reason is the rational structure of reality.<sup>42</sup> Actual reason includes three elements: a static element, a dynamic element, and an existential distortion of both the static and dynamic elements.<sup>43</sup> The independence of autonomous reason is not wilfulness, but obedience to its own essential structure and avoidance of slavery to its own subjective conditioning.<sup>44</sup> Technical reason always aims to acquire controlling knowledge.<sup>45</sup>

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36. Op. cit., p. 38.

37. Ibid., p. 63.

38. Ferré, op. cit., p. 233.

39. Tillich, Systematic Theology, volume 1, p. 53.

40. Ibid., p. 72.

41. Ibid., p. 73.

42. Ibid., pp. 75-78.

43. Ibid., p. 78.

44. Ibid., p. 84.

45. Ibid., p. 97.

A minimum definition of human reason would be obtained by identifying it with inductive and deductive logical methods. A maximum definition of human reason would be obtained by relating it to Hegel's identification of reason with the whole of reality.<sup>46</sup>

### Reason and Revelation

There are four general types of relationship which may exist between reason and revelation. (1) Reason and revelation may achieve mutual harmony.<sup>47</sup> (2) Revelation may dominate reason.<sup>48</sup> (3) Reason may dominate revelation.<sup>49</sup> (4) Reason and revelation may clash and finally go their separate ways.<sup>50</sup>

### Reason and Revelation in Mutual Harmony

Plato (427?-387 B. C.) assumed that the allegorical and mystical language of revelation and the technical language of metaphysics were instruments for saying the same thing. He interpreted religion in terms of reason and became a great apologist for right religion.<sup>51</sup>

Justin Martyr (100?-165?), also known as "Justin the Philosopher," successfully synthesized reason and revelation.<sup>52</sup> According to one tradition, it was he who first wore the philosopher's gown in the pulpit of a Christian church as a symbol of the harmony between Greek wisdom and

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46. Working definitions of human reason will be stated as they are needed in expounding John Calvin's teachings on human reason.
  47. John 1:1. "The Logos was divine." (Moffatt's translation).
  48. Jeremiah 6:9. "Thus saith the Lord." (hundreds of times).
  49. 1 Thessalonians 5:21. "Never disdain prophetic revelations but test them all." (Moffatt's translation).
  50. 1 Corinthians 2:14. "The natural man receives not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."
  51. Wilbur Marshall Urban, Humanity and Deity, pp. 32-41.
  52. H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, p. 123.

Christian revelation.<sup>53</sup>

Clement of Alexandria (150?-200?) described Jesus Christ as the "Reason of God," and harmonized Christian ethics and Stoic ethics.<sup>54</sup> In The Instructor he said, "Everything that is contrary to right reason is sin."<sup>55</sup> He quoted extensively from pre-Christian philosophies to show that the Christian gospel is reasonable.

Origen (185?-254?), likewise, in his Stromata correlated the Christian revelation and the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Athanasius (293?-373) identified (1) essential humanity, (2) upright human reason, and (3) knowledge of the Reason of the Father.<sup>56</sup> Gregory of Naziansus (329?-389?) and Gregory of Nyssa (331?-396) are also in the tradition of the unity of faith and knowledge in the theology of the Incarnation.<sup>57</sup>

Peter Abelard (1079-1142), as a philosopher, appealed to the light of natural reason shared by Christian, Jew, and pagan. Living the religious life and philosophical contemplation of it are necessary to each other.<sup>58</sup> After Abelard the possibility of the harmony of faith and reason was shattered by rising authoritarianism. The thirteenth century is often referred to as the period of "the medieval synthesis."<sup>59</sup> However, it was not a synthesis of equals, since theology delimited the scope and function of reason.

The Cambridge Platonists (1650-1700) sought to promote tolerance by reconciling faith and reason. The basis of the philosophy of religion of

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53. L. Harold DeWolf, The Religious Revolt Against Reason, pp. 135-36.
  54. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 125.
  55. Quoted by DeWolf, op. cit., p. 136.
  56. St. Athanasius, The Incarnation of the Word of God, pp. 38-41.
  57. Lynn Harold Hough, Christian Humanism and the Modern World, p. 24.
  58. Urban, op. cit., p. 33.
  59. Stringfellow Barr, The Pilgrimage of Western Man, pp. 3-12.

Benjamin Whichcot was the identification of the rational and the spiritual.<sup>60</sup> In America, Roger Williams (1603?-1683) in later life advocated toleration and democracy upon the basis of rational religion. He sought to embody in political institutions "the claims of reason in society and of Christ in the gospel."<sup>61</sup>

In recent American Protestantism there have been two inclusive efforts to reconcile reason and revelation. L. Harold DeWolf, in his critique of existentialist neo-orthodoxy,<sup>62</sup> fully states the case for reason in religion. He stresses the method of "comprehensive coherence" as the most adequate rational instrument for discerning truth and shows that it does not oppose the principle of faith. Reason in Hegel's system need not necessarily lead to pantheism, as Kierkegaard assumed.<sup>63</sup> Yet there must be some bridge from God to man. Both God and man share in reality; the New Testament attributes the same kind of love to both God and man; God creates, man is creature; God redeems, man is redeemed. These relationships are the bridge over which reason passes.<sup>64</sup> Thus reason does not require pantheism in order to establish a point of contact with God.<sup>65</sup> Since even Kierkegaard has admitted that the gospel is not paradoxical to God, critical reason may surmount the paradox of the gospel.<sup>66</sup> Neither faith nor reason should be suppressed, but more faith and more reason should be combined in the same people.<sup>67</sup> Reason above faith produces barren logical positivism; faith above reason produces

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60. Mossner, op. cit., p. 21.

61. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 123.

62. The Religious Revolt Against Reason. He has broadly applied his philosophy of reason and revelation in The Theology of the Living Church, 1953.

63. The Religious Revolt Against Reason, pp. 98-99.

64. Ibid., pp. 126-27.

65. Ibid., p. 132.

66. Ibid., p. 137.

67. Ibid., p. 205.

uncritical dogmatism.<sup>68</sup> There is no conflict between reason as comprehensive coherence and revelation.<sup>69</sup>

Paul Tillich points out that revelation from beyond and the analysis of it made by reason are mutually dependent.<sup>70</sup> However, revelation is not to be identified with ontological reason, as is done in idealistic philosophy of religion.<sup>71</sup> Myth and cult as symbolic expressions of the depth of reason drive reason to the quest for revelation.<sup>72</sup> Technical reason often supports antirationalism, which also drives men toward the reintegration of reason in revelation.<sup>73</sup> Miracle does not contradict the rational structure of reality.<sup>76</sup> Scientific explanation and historical criticism protect revelation.<sup>77</sup> Revelation defined in terms of reason is "the manifestation of the mystery of being for the cognitive function of human reason."<sup>78</sup> The depth of reason implies the participation of reason in the history of revelation.<sup>79</sup> The terms of prophetic utterance express the depth of reason.<sup>80</sup> Paradox as an expression of the depth of reason appears contradictory because the concrete event to which it points cannot be expressed in terms of the structure of reason.<sup>81</sup>

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68. Ibid., p. 212.

69. Ibid., p. 202.

70. Tillich, op. cit., p. 64.

71. Ibid., p. 74.

72. Ibid., pp. 81-83.

73. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

74. Ibid., p. 112.

75. Ibid., pp. 113-14.

76. Ibid., p. 117.

77. Ibid., pp. 117-18.

78. Ibid., p. 129.

79. Ibid., pp. 140-41.

80. Ibid., p. 143.

81. Ibid., pp. 150-51.

Two British thinkers are worthy of mention at this point. The late William Temple has pointed out that there is no contrast between reason and authority.<sup>82</sup> Irrationalities in religion are perversions caused by an unbalanced interest in religion.<sup>83</sup> Frederick R. Tennant in his philosophical theology has offered a strong intellectual defense of theism from an empirical standpoint.<sup>84</sup>

#### Revelation Dominant

General revelation is knowledge of God which may be perceived by all persons by means of reason.<sup>85</sup> By definition, general revelation and reason are in harmony. Special revelation is knowledge and/or experience of God given through vital personal encounter.<sup>86</sup> Such revelation may determine the form, scope, methods, and uses of human reason.

St. Augustine (354-430) used and broke through the categories of Neo-Platonic philosophy.<sup>87</sup> He maintained that reason can know "Creation, Providence, the excellence of the virtues, the love of country, the fidelity of friendship, good works, and all things that pertain to good habits."<sup>88</sup> Yet revelation transforms reason by pointing to the purpose of the truths given by natural philosophy.<sup>89</sup> The Confessions is an account of how philosophical teachings are purified and enriched by means of a simple act

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82. Nature, Man, and God, p. 19n.

83. Ibid., p. 21.

84. Delton Lewis Scudder, Tennant's Philosophical Theology, Ph.D. thesis, Yale, 1939.

85. Compare Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason, pp. 36-37.

86. See Emil Brunner, The Divine-Human Encounter. Implications of this definition have been noted by Georgia Harkness, Foundations of Christian Knowledge, pp. 83-94.

87. George F. Thomas, in Edward D. Myers, Christianity and Reason, p. 54.

88. The City of God, book 18, chapter 41, quoted by Nathaniel Micklem, Reason and Revelation: A Question from Duns Scotus, p. 41.

89. Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, p. 20.

of faith. Faith starts from revelation and proceeds to reason.<sup>90</sup> Many of the profound psychological insights found in Augustine<sup>91</sup> were obscured by the efforts of Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) to expound the teachings of Augustine in strictly logical form.<sup>92</sup> By dialectical demonstration made up of faultlessly knitted syllogisms Anselm interpreted Augustine to his generation. Thus Augustine was made to point toward the "synthesis of Scholasticism."<sup>93</sup>

Rabbi Moses ben Maimon (Rambam or Maimonides) (1135-1204), in his Guide for the Perplexed, sought to reconcile the Hebrew Scriptures and the philosophy of Aristotle.<sup>94</sup> He went so far as to identify the intelligences of Aristotle with the angels of Scripture.<sup>95</sup> Superficially, Maimonides appears to have been a pure rationalist in that he loved to explain in a reasonable manner many ceremonial laws which others presented as grounded exclusively in supernaturalism.<sup>96</sup> In the Commentary he stated a theory of intellectual immortality.<sup>97</sup> Rambam stressed the unity of truth as an implication of monotheism.<sup>98</sup> He gave the Jewish theory of divine providence an Aristotelian slant in his controversy with Moslem predestinarians.<sup>99</sup> Nevertheless, he asserted that prophecy goes beyond the mental and moral faculties

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90. Ferré erroneously classified this attitude as a type of antirationalism. (Op. cit., pp. 244-46). Santayana (Reason in Religion, pp. 156-158). not without some poetry, perceived here a suprarationalism.
91. See introduction by Fulton J. Sheen in Modern Library edition of The Confessions of Saint Augustine.
92. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 23-25.
93. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, p. 310.
94. A. Cohen, The Teachings of Maimonides, pp. 16-17.
95. Ibid., p. 65.
96. Leon Roth, The Guide for the Perplexed, Moses Maimonides, p. 130.
97. Ibid., p. 117.
98. Ibid., p. 132.
99. Ibid., pp. 192-200.

and is the supreme source of human knowledge.<sup>100</sup> The verbal inspiration of the Torah was the foundation of his thought, and he maintained that all its parts were equally inspired, and that the eventual return of the Hebrews to Palestine was explicitly prophesied in Scripture.<sup>101</sup> However, he freely re-interpreted the Biblical texts.<sup>102</sup>

Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274) also sought to relate the philosophy of Aristotle to truth given by revelation. He called Aristotle "the philosopher."<sup>103</sup> and identified Aristotle's fundamental principles with the principles of natural reason.<sup>104</sup> He asserted that unaided reason can know that God is, what He is not, and through the analogy of being certain of His attributes.<sup>105</sup> Reason is trustworthy as far as it goes, he averred, but the sphere of authority extends beyond reason.<sup>106</sup> Moreover, he maintained that prepositional revelation is even more certain than propositions given by reason. Therefore theology is the most noble science.<sup>107</sup>

The "reasonableness" of the "Thomistic synthesis" is a debatable subject. G. K. Chesterton and Bernard Shaw are quoted by Fulton Sheen as having asserted that "the Catholic Church is the only real champion of reason."<sup>108</sup> Ferré, on the other hand, considers that since Thomism asserts that all necessary eternal truths are given by revelation, reason has been rendered superfluous.<sup>109</sup> Hocking has noted that the scholastics have main-

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100. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 132-45.

101. Ibid., pp. 152, 153, 225.

102. Roth, op. cit., p. 133.

103. George F. Thomas in Myers, op. cit., pp. 54-55.

104. Gilson, op. cit., p. 79.

105. Ferré, op. cit., pp. 243-44; Edwin A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy, pp. 109-10; Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics, pp. 26-27; Urban in Myers, op. cit., p. 71; Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 43.

106. F. R. Tennant, The Nature of Belief, p. 116.

107. George F. Thomas in Myers, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

108. Sheen, God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy, p. vii.

109. Op. cit., p. 244.

tained their system by means of "their genius for slippery distinctions." <sup>110</sup>

Urban has observed that history has demonstrated the instability of the Thomistic twofold truth. <sup>111</sup> John Wild has called attention to the need

for radical revision of the Thomistic synthesis, especially in cosmology and social philosophy. <sup>112</sup>

Martin Luther (1483-1546) placed reason and revelation in opposition to each other. <sup>113</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr considers John Calvin (1509-1564) as

standing between the Catholic and the Lutheran viewpoints on attitude toward reason. <sup>114</sup> It is a provisional hypothesis in this thesis that

Calvin's teachings on human reason were in certain important respects nearer to Aquinas than to Luther. In the Institutes of the Christian

Religion, book 1 is devoted to proof from reason. Calvin did grant some power to reason apart from faith. <sup>115</sup> Even the Geneva Catechism of 1545,

a brief summary of the Christian faith, included a statement on general revelation. <sup>116</sup> Calvin asserted that the heathen have some knowledge of

God. <sup>117</sup> Brunner claims that the Reformed concept of Holy Scriptures <sup>118</sup>

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110. William Ernest Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, pp. 60-62.

111. Urban, op. cit., p. 23.

112. Wild in Myers, op. cit., p. 24.

113. The extreme position of Luther on revelation will be explained and documented below.

114. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, volume 1, p. 285n.

115. L. Harold DeWolf, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

116. Brunner, op. cit., p. 60.

117. Ibid., pp. 262-63.

118. The word "Reformed" in this dissertation is used in the historical sense as denoting that branch of Protestant Christianity represented today by the Alliance of the Reformed Churches Throughout the World Holding the Presbyterian System, with headquarters at Geneva, Switzerland. James Hastings Nichols, in his Primer for Protestants, p. 53, identifies "six great families" of Protestantism, namely: Lutheran, Anglican, Presbyterian, Baptist, Methodist, and Congregationalist. The "Reformed" (or Presbyterian) tradition was molded largely by Ulrich Zwingli (1481-1531).

when properly understood excludes conflict with natural science.<sup>119</sup>  
Calvin's acknowledgment of revelation in nature is similar to the emphasis  
of Scholastic philosophers.<sup>120</sup> Brightman erred in asserting that Calvin  
repudiated general revelation.<sup>121</sup> However, the testimony of the Holy  
Spirit to the authority of Scriptural revelation is inwardly so certain  
that it does not require the support of reason, according to Calvin.<sup>122</sup>  
According to Brunner, God's word in Scripture measures reason.<sup>123</sup>  
Qualitatively the Christian revelation stands dialectically outside the  
sphere of reason.<sup>124</sup> Yet the Christian believer is "bound by a thousand  
cords to the general mental life of his era, controlled as that life is  
by reason."<sup>125</sup> So, there is much room for proof in the Christian reli-  
gion.<sup>126</sup> Revelation recognizes the claims of reason and culture.<sup>127</sup>  
Christian apologetics seeks to meet the truth of reason.<sup>128</sup> Faith does  
not ignore or suppress any legitimate concern of reason.<sup>129</sup> The Church  
must continually relate revelation and reason.<sup>130</sup> Revelation does not

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and John Calvin (1509-1564). In the sixteenth century this tradition was represented by the Reformed Churches in Switzerland, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, by the French Huguenots, and by the Presbyterian churches in Scotland and England. For a more full definition of "Reformed," see section in Nichols, op. cit., pp. 60-61, on "Presbyterians and Reformed." Typical "Reformed" churches in the United States today are the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, the Presbyterian Church, U. S., the Reformed Church in America, and the Christian Reformed Church.

119. Ibid., p. 280.  
120. J. V. Langmead Casserley, Graceful Reason, pp. 12-13.  
121. Brightman, op. cit., p. 420.  
122. Emil Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 27.  
123. Ibid., pp. 150-51.  
124. Ibid., p. 129.  
125. Ibid., p. 256.  
126. Revelation and Reason, p. x.  
127. Ibid., p. 7.  
128. Ibid., p. 13.  
129. Ibid., pp. 14-15.  
130. Ibid., p. 15.

extinguish reason, but claims it.<sup>131</sup> Theologians should not ignore the positive relationships between revelation and reason.<sup>132</sup> Every act of reason implies God as He is known to reason.<sup>133</sup> General revelation is the presupposition of particular revelation.<sup>134</sup> General revelation, the key to the nature of man, is perceived by reason and is the basis of man's responsibility before God.<sup>135</sup> There is no revelation without reason.<sup>136</sup> Jesus Christ, the principle of all rational knowledge, restores reason.<sup>137</sup> The inspiration of Holy Scripture does not rule out human research.<sup>138</sup> True faith is not a sacrificium intellectus.<sup>139</sup>

To Gilson some revealed truths are attainable by reason alone;<sup>140</sup> other revealed truths surpass the range of reason.<sup>141</sup> Averroes, he says, caused theologians to grow in distrust of reason as a servant of revelation.<sup>142</sup> For Maritain the merely rational notion of God is a warped notion, since God is more than reason.<sup>143</sup> Although philosophical and scientific reason should enjoy their own autonomy,<sup>144</sup> faith is a supernatural virtue infused into the intellect,<sup>145</sup> and faith stands above any human system, no matter how valid.<sup>146</sup> Urban has noted that the efforts of human reason

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131. Ibid., pp. 15-16.  
132. Ibid., p. 16.  
133. Ibid., p. 56.  
134. Ibid., p. 62.  
135. Ibid., pp. 63-65.  
136. Ibid., p. 68.  
137. Ibid., pp. 75-77.  
138. Ibid., p. 128.  
139. Ibid., p. 184.  
140. Op. cit., pp. 82-83.  
141. Ibid., pp. 83-84.  
142. Ibid., pp. 84-85.  
143. Op. cit., pp. 110-11.  
144. Ibid., p. 194.  
145. Ibid., p. 210.  
146. Ibid., p. 211.

to grasp religion are weak.<sup>147</sup> Though humanity and Deity are unthinkable apart from each other,<sup>148</sup> revelation comes as unique intrusion.<sup>149</sup> Reason needs revelation in order to function within the limits of reason.<sup>150</sup>

Richardson asserts that faith precedes reason and is a condition of rationality in the human sciences.<sup>151</sup> The Christian faith offers the possibility of constructing a philosophy.<sup>152</sup> "Christian rationalist" Casserley sees the function of natural theology as bringing "the philosophical man to a point where he is ready to listen to revelation."<sup>153</sup> Since natural theology and revelation are related as inference and verification,<sup>154</sup> reason and revelation are inseparable.<sup>155</sup> The God of Aristotle is the God of the Bible, he affirms.<sup>156</sup> Faith in God supports faith in reason.<sup>157</sup> Faith in reason reinforces faith in God.<sup>158</sup> Reason is more rational when influenced by grace.<sup>159</sup>

Nicolas Berdyaev, although he professes to follow the existentialism of Pascal and Kierkegaard,<sup>160</sup> operates within the framework of the limited rationalism provided by Russian Orthodoxy. The critique of revelation presupposes reason clarified by revelation.<sup>161</sup> Revelation without reason may lead to fanaticism and violence.<sup>162</sup> He points out that Augustine's

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147. Op. cit., p. 5.  
148. Ibid., pp. 49-50.  
149. Ibid., p. 67.  
150. Urban in Myers, op. cit., p. 77.  
151. Op. cit., p. 17.  
152. Ibid., p. 38.  
153. Op. cit., p. 11.  
154. Ibid., pp. 24-25.  
155. Ibid., pp. 25-26.  
156. Ibid., p. 26.  
157. Ibid., pp. 67-68.  
158. Ibid., p. 68.  
159. Ibid., pp. 162-63.  
160. Nicolas Berdyaev, Truth and Revelation, pp. 106-107.  
161. Ibid., p. 66.  
162. Ibid., p. 162.

thought on hell was kept within the limits of rational concepts.<sup>163</sup>

Of the American naturalistic humanists Wieman states the most satisfactory relationship between reason and revelation.<sup>164</sup> The creative source of human good operating in time and accessible to rational-empirical inquiry is apparent in the life of Christ.<sup>165</sup> The human mind cannot fathom the needs of others without the "creative event,"<sup>166</sup> which event reorganizes the mind,<sup>167</sup> giving to the mind a new structure.<sup>168</sup> The teachings of Jesus are the preeminently important part of revelation.<sup>169</sup> The creative event at the most important level always operates between persons.<sup>170</sup> This is the best in Christianity: "(1) revelation of God, (2) forgiveness of sin, and (3) salvation of man--all these by way of Jesus Christ."<sup>171</sup> George W. Richards maintains that the gospel is suprarational, rather than irrational.<sup>172</sup> John Oman distinguishes between reason which knows nature and open awareness which knows God.<sup>173</sup>

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163. Ibid., pp. 133-34.

164. This is despite the fact that his understanding of history is not so good at times. In Wieman and Meland, American Philosophies of Religion, p. 49, it is asserted that "Aquinas gave stability and systematic formulation to Christian thought following the Copernican revolution." This would appear to be a slight anachronism.

165. Henry N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 39.

166. Ibid., p. 45.

167. Ibid., p. 57.

168. Ibid., p. 68.

169. Ibid., p. 216.

170. Ibid., p. 266.

171. Ibid., p. 268.

172. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

173. Ibid., p. 88.

Reason Dominent

In general, philosophical idealists (with exceptions, e.g., Herman Harrell Horne), utilitarians, deists, Arminians, Jeffersonians, and cultural Christians tend to exalt reason above revelation in the practice of religion. In idealism reason includes faith,<sup>174</sup> and the idealist's revelation can be achieved by human reason.<sup>175</sup> However, even Brunner admits that Copernicus, Galileo, Giordano Bruno, Kepler, and Newton properly fought on the side of reason against authoritarian concepts of revelation.<sup>176</sup>

Aristotle's logic (Maimonides and Aquinas notwithstanding) suggested that scientific knowledge is sufficient for man and revelation is not necessary.<sup>177</sup> Abelard (1079-1142) denounced all authoritative compulsion in matters of belief and extolled systematic doubt as a method of discovering truth.<sup>178</sup> Hugo of St. Victor (1096?-1141) systematized theology in terms of the relationship of its propositions to reason.<sup>179</sup> Ibn-Rusht (Averroes, 1126-1198) through his translations of and commentaries on Aristotle brought forward reason as a critique of religion.

The Renaissance<sup>180</sup> mightily shifted the balance of emphasis in the relationship between reason and revelation.

After Calvin, Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609), a Dutch Reformed theologian, arose to offer an intellectual critique of Calvin's interpretation of the Christian revelation. Also Faustus Sozzini (1539-1604) arose to

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174. Brunner, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 55.

175. Brunner, Revelation and Reason, pp. 233-34.

176. Ibid., p. 277.

177. Micklem, op. cit., p. 8.

178. Burt, op. cit., p. 86.

179. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

180. Discussed below in section 2 as related to the immediate background of Calvin's teachings.

assert man's intellectual independence. Pietism unintentionally emphasized autonomous reason and was thus the bridge to the Enlightenment.<sup>181</sup>

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), in his Leviathan (1651), extended his "social contract" theory to cover the external form of any religious society.<sup>182</sup> René Descartes (1596-1650) sought to establish the ideal of mathematical certitude in metaphysical demonstrations, thus setting aside certain Thomistic distinctions which he regarded as mere subtleties. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (1670) said that ordinary knowledge is not one whit inferior to prophetic knowledge.<sup>183</sup> Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1645-1716) attempted to find common ground for Catholic and Protestant faiths in his Systema Theologicum (1686; published in 1819). John Locke (1632-1704), in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, aimed to undermine religious intolerance by inquiring into the capacity and limits of human reason,<sup>184</sup> which he considered to be the ultimate guide in religion.<sup>185</sup>

English deists sought a rational compromise between certain traditional and irrational elements in Christianity and philosophical atheism.<sup>186</sup> John Tillotson (1630-1694) reduced religion to reasonable, ethical propositions in his efforts to steer between atheism and Roman Catholic supernaturalism. Isaac Newton (1642-1727) thought of God largely in terms of "a Divine power" and did occasionally allow religious considerations to influence his scientific conclusions.<sup>187</sup> Matthew Tindal (1657-1733) turned from

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181. Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 114.

182. Burt, The English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill, pp. 127-234.

183. Ratner, op. cit., p. 37.

184. Burt, English Philosophers, pp. 237-402.

185. Ibid., p. 27.

186. Ibid., p. 32.

Roman Catholicism to rationalism and sought to divest religion of the miraculous element and set up morality as the primary claim of religion. In the subjective idealism of George Berkeley (1685-1753) reason includes revelation. "If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds."<sup>188</sup>

David Hume (1711-1776) expressed in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion a thorough-going skepticism as to the place of reason in religion.<sup>189</sup> Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) answered this skepticism by presupposing that conscious reason is the unifying center of experience.<sup>190</sup> All-inclusive reason operates beyond the world of phenomena into the world of noumena, where pure reason deals with the problems of God, freedom, and immortality.<sup>191</sup> "The concept of God and the conviction of His existence can be met with only in reason; they can come from reason alone, not from either inspiration or any tidings, however great their authority."<sup>192</sup>

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in his Philosophy of Religion subordinated revelation to reason, since revelation pertains to religion, which is the expression of only one "of the four fundamental forms or types of human experience: namely, the scientific, the moral, the aesthetic, and the religious."<sup>193</sup> Thus religion shelters no mysteries which reason cannot disclose.<sup>194</sup> There is "no transcendent truth distinct from the reason that

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188. Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, in Burt, English Philosophers, p. 547.  
189. Burt, op. cit., pp. 690-764.  
190. Butler, op. cit., p. 142.  
191. Rogers, op. cit., p. 382.  
192. Kant, What is Orientation in Thinking? in Beck, op. cit., p. 301.  
193. Urban, op. cit., p. 28.  
194. Tennant, op. cit., p. 116.

lies in things themselves."<sup>195</sup> Reason is a "comprehensive and adequate way of looking at things in their relationships and many-sidedness."<sup>196</sup> "Since God has His existence within experience, not outside of it, the more comprehensive the experience the more adequately is God revealed in it."<sup>197</sup>

Andrew Martin Fairbairn (1838-1912) interpreted Hegelian idealism to his contemporary Scottish theologians. It seemed to him that to disparage reason was unfair to religion.<sup>198</sup> Religion is a joint product of the mind within man and nature around him.<sup>199</sup> The claim that religion should not be investigated surrenders the integrity of reason.<sup>200</sup> Religion, in order to live, must eternally challenge reason.<sup>201</sup> The Person of Christ is a problem for reason.<sup>202</sup> No man or society can keep the mysteries of faith out of the hands of reason.<sup>203</sup>

William Ernest Hocking has noticed that reason is rightly suspect in religion,<sup>204</sup> religion is deeper than reason,<sup>205</sup> a vague territory in religion is Beyond-reason,<sup>206</sup> religion is a mode of feeling,<sup>207</sup> the intellect is not popular in religion,<sup>208</sup> ideas are secondary in religion,<sup>209</sup> the polemic method adds to distrust of intellect in religion,<sup>210</sup> the method of

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195. Rogers, op. cit., p. 408.

196. Ibid., p. 409.

197. Ibid., p. 421.

198. Fairbairn, The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, p. vi.

199. Ibid., p. vii.

200. Ibid., p. ix.

201. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

202. Ibid., p. 5.

203. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

204. Hocking, op. cit., p. v.

205. Ibid., p. v.

206. Ibid., p. iv.

207. Ibid., p. 33.

208. Ibid., pp. 37-38.

209. Ibid., pp. 38-39.

210. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

psychology of religion shows that the essence of religion is not intellect,<sup>211</sup> and the rationale of religion is weaker than its vital meaning.<sup>212</sup> Yet Hocking has never fully accepted the implications of the retirement of the intellect from religion.<sup>213</sup> He has aimed to find the foundations of religion, within or beyond reason,<sup>214</sup> to show that revelation implies idea in religion, within or beyond reason,<sup>214</sup> to show that revelation implies idea in religion,<sup>215</sup> and to see how mighty religion and mighty thought go together.<sup>216</sup>

Although Edgar Sheffield Brightman finds that religion and thought are complementary,<sup>217</sup> he sees Jeremiah's individualism<sup>218</sup> and Isaiah's representation of God's attitude as appeals to reason.<sup>219</sup> Since reason judges revelation, reason is the supreme criterion of truth in religion.<sup>220</sup> We do not find God by divesting ourselves of reason.<sup>221</sup> Science tends to undermine the literal authority of religious scriptures by recognizing only experience and reason as authorities.<sup>222</sup>

J. Donald Butler considers that the rational element is basic in religion,<sup>223</sup> that reason points to God,<sup>224</sup> and that Christ is known by reason and revelation.<sup>225</sup> He qualifies these idealistic premises with the notation that the ontological and cosmological arguments, as appeals to reason, cannot replace acts of faith.<sup>226</sup>

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211. Ibid., p. 42.  
212. Ibid., p. 48.  
213. Ibid., p. 54.  
214. Ibid., p. vii.  
215. Ibid., pp. 58-59.  
216. Ibid., p. 59.  
217. Brightman, op. cit., p. ix.  
218. Ibid., p. 59.  
219. Ibid., p. 60.  
220. Ibid., p. 173.  
221. Ibid., p. 257.  
222. Ibid., pp. 482-83.  
223. Butler, op. cit., pp. 250-52.  
224. Ibid., pp. 253-54.  
225. Ibid., p. 261.  
226. Ibid., p. 493.

Nels F. S. Ferré<sup>227</sup> includes faith under reason as interpretation of whole-response.<sup>228</sup> Coherence is the first standard of philosophy and theology.<sup>229</sup> Inclusiveness is the second standard.<sup>230</sup> Theology uses every method of learning.<sup>231</sup> Faith-judgment should be based upon whole-reason.<sup>232</sup> Truth of the most high is a synthesis of faith and reason.<sup>233</sup> We should trust reason and have a reasonable faith.<sup>234</sup> Faith is not beyond all experience and reason,<sup>235</sup> faith does not appear arbitrary to reason,<sup>236</sup> and reason can keep faith to its proper task.<sup>237</sup> Even rationalism, however, has its limits.<sup>238</sup>

#### Reason and Revelation Mutually Opposed

This part of the category is not concerned with merely occasional outbursts of irrationalism, as for example in the usually systematic, logically constructed thought of Augustine.<sup>239</sup> Irrational elements are important aspects in the efforts of the following persons to deal with religion. Tatian (second century) is named by Gilson as "the prototype of the Christian enemies of philosophy."<sup>240</sup> He berated, denounced, and ridiculed the Greek philosophers.

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227. Ferré, op. cit., in developing his theory of reason in religion quotes Sidney Hook, Reason, Social Myths, and Democracy; Arthur E. Murphy, The Uses of Reason; and A. N. Whitehead, The Functions of Reason.
228. Op. cit., p. 18.
229. Ibid., p. 122.
230. Ibid., p. 130.
231. Ibid., pp. 134-35.
232. Ibid., p. 183.
233. Ibid., p. 201.
234. Ibid., p. 217.
235. Ibid., pp. 226-27.
236. Ibid., p. 228.
237. Ibid., p. 232.
238. Ibid., pp. 236-38.
239. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 43.
240. Ibid., p. 40.

Montanism put mystic ecstasy above all reason.<sup>241</sup> Tertullian (160?-230) offered an irrational defense of revelation,<sup>242</sup> asserting that reason is valid when it favors the Gospel but not valid against the Gospel.<sup>243</sup> In his struggle against the gnostics he held that there is an irreconcilable antagonism between Christianity and philosophy,<sup>244</sup> and asserted, "We reject everything which rests upon human opinion."<sup>245</sup> Lucius Caelius Firmianus Lactantius (early fourth century) pleaded for the deus vivus over against the deus philosophorum.<sup>246</sup>

Peter Damiani (1007-1072) viciously attacked dialectics, grammar, and whatever involves any reliance upon the power of natural reason.<sup>247</sup> Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) bitterly opposed the rationalistic philosophy of Peter Abelard and had no use for the philosophers.<sup>248</sup> He said with the Psalmist, "I have more understanding than all my teachers."<sup>249</sup> Natural reason in religion is misleading; revelation alone shows us the way to God and salvation.<sup>250</sup> Etienne Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277 condemned 219 purely rationalistic propositions from thirteenth-century Averroism.<sup>251</sup>

For Duna Scotus (1265?-1308) faith was not speculative but an act of the will. Aristotle is the supreme authority for the philosopher, and

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241. Brightman, op. cit., p. 457.  
242. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 77.  
243. DeWold, op. cit., pp. 41-42.  
244. Gilson, op. cit., p. 8.  
245. Quoted in Ibid., p. 12.  
246. Urban, op. cit., p. 130.  
247. Gilson, op. cit., p. 13.  
248. Ibid., pp. 12-13.  
249. Psalms 119:99.  
250. Ferré, op. cit., pp. 242-43.  
251. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

Augustine is the supreme authority for the theologian.<sup>252</sup> Revelation and reason are each valid, even apart from each other.<sup>253</sup> Scotus contended for the "God of willing" rather than the "God of being."<sup>254</sup> In the nominalism of William of Ockham (1300?-1349) the real is always individual, and entities must not be multiplied unnecessarily. Tillich finds the irrational God of nominalism was a product of anxiety produced by social conflict in the disintegrating Middle Ages.<sup>255</sup> Of the Imitation of Christ, often ascribed to Thomas à Kempis (1280-1471), contains an antirational strain. "Surely, an humble husbandman that serveth God, is better than a proud philosopher who, neglecting himself, is occupied in studying the course of the heavens."<sup>256</sup> Even Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), faithful commentator on Thomas Aquinas, entertained grave doubts as to the power of natural reason to demonstrate the immortality of the soul and its consequent implications.<sup>257</sup>

Martin Luther (1483-1546) used reason in attacking the sale of indulgences, in questioning the use of relic as objects of religious veneration, in denying the supremacy of the bishop of Rome, and in historical criticism of the actions of certain church councils. Nevertheless, his explicit teachings on human reason mark him as one who entertained a low view of the powers of reason.<sup>258</sup> He repudiated reason apart from revelation.<sup>259</sup> Luther rejected three types of theology: (1) Scholastic-Aristotelianism of

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252. Micklem, op. cit., p. 41.

253. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 169.

254. Urban, op. cit., p. 130, also in Myers, op. cit., p. 67.

255. The Courage to Be, p. 61.

256. Page 13.

257. Gilson, op. cit., p. 85.

258. Richardson, op. cit., p. 22.

259. Ibid., pp. 24-25, supported by quotation from Luther's Table-Talk.

Thomas Aquinas, (2) theology of the Church Councils, and (3) theology of the Church Fathers.<sup>260</sup> Natural reason is of no value in religion in the unregenerate person, but reason in the regenerate person furthers and advances faith.<sup>261</sup> Reason must be killed, in order to accept salvation.<sup>262</sup> Philosophy has nothing to do with religion.<sup>263</sup> If reason could comprehend the ways of God, faith would not be needed.<sup>264</sup> Luther fought for the living God against the God of scholasticism.<sup>265</sup> Scripture truths are "the contrary of reason."<sup>266</sup>

Francis Bacon (1561-1626), in his Novum Organum (1620), sought to replace the deductive logic of Aristotle with the inductive method of interpreting nature. He deprecated any mixing of theology and reason.<sup>267</sup> He sharply distinguished between philosophy and theology, and refused to test theology by reason or empirical method.<sup>268</sup>

Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), a Jansenist Catholic, in rejecting the "God of the philosophers," was in reality protesting against the deism implied in Descartes's concept of nature. The Biblical idea of the living God shocks reason.<sup>269</sup> "The last proceeding of reason is to recognize that there is an infinity of things which are beyond it."<sup>270</sup> "Reason carries its own stumbling block within itself."<sup>271</sup> An object of faith cannot by its very nature

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260. Hugh Thomson Kerr, Jr., A Compend of Luther's Theology, pp. viii-ix.  
261. Ibid., pp. 4-5. Also DeWolf, op. cit., pp. 44-45.  
262. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 87-88.  
263. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 44.  
264. Brightman, op. cit., p. 311.  
265. Urban, op. cit., p. 130.  
266. Brunner, Philosophy, pp. 27-28.  
267. Rogers, op. cit., p. 218.  
268. Mossner, op. cit., p. 38.  
269. Kuhn in Myers, op. cit., pp. 146-47.  
270. Blaise Pascal, Pensées and The Provincial Letters, p. 93.  
271. Emile Cailliet, Pascal, Genius in the Light of Scripture, p. 112.

be an object of reason; and on the other hand, faith is not the appropriate instrument in the field of natural phenomena.<sup>272</sup> In passing, it is noted that the early Quakers and other Protestant independents rejected cultural human reason as erroneous and deceptive.<sup>273</sup>

Soren Aabye Kierkegaard (1812-1855) opposed Hegel's objective philosophy, maintaining that the relationship of the individual to God necessarily involves suffering. The ways of the spirit are beyond and above the categories of psychology.<sup>274</sup> Faith is irreconcilable with reason,<sup>275</sup> as is illustrated by the willingness of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac.<sup>276</sup> Faith begins where thinking leaves off.<sup>277</sup> The religious man cannot be understood by intellectual analysis.<sup>278</sup> Christianity is paradoxical,<sup>279</sup> and faith is not an intellectual position.<sup>280</sup> Reason must step aside to make way for the miracle of faith.<sup>281</sup> Inward religiousness is not subject to scientific research.<sup>282</sup> Divine revelation verifies itself subjectively in experience.<sup>283</sup> Claiming the authority of the New Testament,<sup>284</sup> rational certainty would kill faith,<sup>286</sup> reason cannot find God the Wholly Other,<sup>287</sup> and trust

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272. Ibid., p. 31.  
273. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 77.  
274. William Hubben, Four Prophets of Our Destiny, p. 10.  
275. H. J. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 3.  
276. Ibid., p. 5.  
277. Reidar Thomte, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion, p. 58.  
278. Ibid., p. 83.  
279. Ibid., p. 94.  
280. Ibid., p. 132.  
281. Ibid., p. 162.  
282. Ibid., p. 212.  
283. Ibid., pp. 216-17.  
284. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 38.  
285. Ibid., p. 71.  
286. Ibid., pp. 80-81.  
287. Ibid., p. 91.

in reason implies the denial of the paradoxical Christian Gospel.<sup>288</sup>

Brightman has reminded us of the extreme subjectivism involved in these assertions.<sup>289</sup> Reinhold Niebuhr, however, quotes Kierkegaard with approval numerous times, and calls him "the greatest of Christian psychologists."<sup>290</sup>

Karl Barth sets reason and faith in opposition to each other.<sup>291</sup> Man must cease to trust his reason.<sup>292</sup> God is outside the realm of intelligible value.<sup>293</sup> Thus faith is unintelligible to experience.<sup>294</sup> It is either revelation or reason.<sup>295</sup> The "theology of crisis" despairs of all reason<sup>296</sup> in a "religion of mere Deity."<sup>297</sup> Barth condemns philosophy and all its works.<sup>298</sup> Only non-rational knowledge of God is valid.<sup>299</sup> The ontology of Aristotle is identical with the idolatrous Baal.<sup>300</sup> Neither reason nor experience can be trusted as a basis for religious faith.<sup>301</sup>

#### The Abilities of Human Reason

In various philosophies of religion there are seven general assumptions which are made concerning the ability of human reason: (1) Reason can analyze. (2) Reason can synthesize. (3) Reason can know itself, set its own limits, and define its own uses. (4) Reason can guide human conduct. (5) Reason can serve faith. (6) Reason can know reality. (7) Reason can

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288. Ibid., pp. 102-03.

289. Brightman, op. cit., p. 110.

290. Reinhold Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 44.

291. Richardson, op. cit., p. 22.

292. Brightman, op. cit., p. 146.

293. Ibid., pp. 256-57.

294. Ibid., p. 417.

295. Ibid., p. 174.

296. Urban, op. cit., p. 8.

297. Ibid., p. 25.

298. Kuhn in Myers, op. cit., p. 148.

299. Ibid., p. 153.

300. Ibid., p. 154.

301. Brightman, op. cit., p. 6, in making this statement, says, "Continuing and elaborating the tradition of John Calvin, Karl Barth teaches, etc."

know God.

#### Reason Can Analyze

Aristotle argued that the proper end of a substance can be deduced by logical inference from its nature.<sup>302</sup> Descartes aimed to demonstrate self-evident propositions by reason.<sup>303</sup> He saw the intrinsic clearness of an idea as a test of its truth.<sup>304</sup> Free intelligence can discover and classify uniformities.<sup>305</sup> The intellect can seize movement.<sup>306</sup> Kant noticed that reason can abstract the concept of cause from its application.<sup>307</sup> Burt has observed that Protestant fundamentalism assumes that the Thomistic concept of causality is valid.<sup>308</sup>

#### Reason Can Synthesize

Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, sought to discover how synthetic judgments are possible, but he never doubted that they are possible.<sup>309</sup> Although reason cannot arrive at absolute certainty regarding many matters of importance, reason can arrive at a higher degree of probability.<sup>310</sup> Reason can not only describe; it can also explain.<sup>311</sup> Critical reason can surmount the paradox of the Gospel.<sup>312</sup>

#### Reason Can Know Itself

The intellect can know its own operation.<sup>313</sup> Reason can explain itself,

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302. Micklem, op. cit., p. 13.  
303. Richardson, op. cit., p. 35.  
304. Mossner, op. cit., p. 38.  
305. Hough, op. cit., p. 36.  
306. Sheen, op. cit., p. 124.  
307. Beck, op. cit., p. 159.  
308. Burt, Types, p. 165.  
309. Beck, op. cit., pp. 8-10.  
310. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 119.  
311. Ferré, op. cit., p. 173.  
312. DeWolf, op. cit., p. 137.  
313. Maritain, op. cit., p. 58; Sheen, op. cit., p. 84.

and cannot be explained in terms less than itself.<sup>314</sup> Many philosophies of religion are based upon the assumption that reason can set its own limits. In Catholic philosophy, reason can discover its own limits.<sup>315</sup> Hume, Kant, F. H. Bradley, and Hocking have acknowledged that reason knows its own limits.<sup>316</sup> De Wolf says that reason can determine its own limits and criticize itself.<sup>317</sup> Brunner admits that reason can set the bounds of what can be the object of thought.<sup>318</sup> Blackham has given this assumption a different slant by asserting that reason alone can limit reason.<sup>319</sup> Kant also discovered that pure reason can investigate its own use.<sup>320</sup> The human mind can correct its own mistakes.<sup>321</sup> Reason can be checked only by continuous self-criticism.<sup>322</sup>

#### Reason Can Guide Human Conduct

Socrates insisted that knowledge of that which is ethically right insures right conduct.<sup>323</sup> Duns Scotus argued that reason can deduce man's end from man's nature.<sup>324</sup> Even Luther admitted that reason is reliable in worldly affairs.<sup>325</sup> John Locke allowed that our limited knowledge is sufficient for living.<sup>326</sup> Kant found that the fact that human interest can be controlled implies that the will is determinable on principles of reason.<sup>327</sup>

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314. Ferré, op. cit., p. 198.  
315. Burt, Types, pp. 112-113.  
316. Hocking, op. cit., p. v.  
317. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 59.  
318. Brunner, Philosophy, p. 73.  
319. Blackham, op. cit., p. 150.  
320. Beck, op. cit., p. 129.  
321. Hough, op. cit., p. 39.  
322. Wild, op. cit., p. 100.  
323. Edmund W. Sinnott, Two Roads to Truth, p. 50.  
324. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 12-14.  
325. Kerr, op. cit., p. 3.  
326. Richardson, op. cit., pp. 45-46.  
327. Beck, op. cit., p. 73.

In his Critique of Practical Reason, he addressed himself to the question as to how reason can directly determine the will.<sup>328</sup> He discovered that the practical reason is capable of cognition beyond the world of sense for theory of conduct.<sup>329</sup> William James observed the power of abstract ideas in determining behavior.<sup>330</sup> Brunner, seeking to support man's responsibility for sin, says reason alone is capable of responsible action.<sup>331</sup> John Wild infers from the existence of reason as an immanent faculty<sup>332</sup> that reason can govern and even oppose desire<sup>333</sup> and in general moderate passion.<sup>334</sup> The human mind is capable of examination and decision.<sup>335</sup> Common reason undergirds group life.<sup>336</sup>

#### Reason Can Serve Faith

Duns Scotus believed that the truths of revelation had to be reduced to propositions in order to be communicated. Reason can understand the terms of all necessary truths of revelation.<sup>337</sup> The mind can receive truth from the appropriate supernatural agent.<sup>338</sup> Maimonides asserted that the gift of prophecy is available to all men<sup>339</sup> and reasons for the commandments can be discovered by research.<sup>340</sup> Thomas Aquinas employed philosophic reason to prove the immortality of the soul.<sup>341</sup> Francis Bacon claimed that reason

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328. Ibid., pp. 155-56.

329. Ibid., p. 211.

330. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 56.

331. Brunner, Philosophy, pp. 70-71.

332. Wild, op. cit., p. 86.

333. Ibid., p. 61.

334. Ibid., p. 154.

335. Hough, op. cit., p. 18.

336. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 137.

337. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 29-30.

338. Ibid., p. 61.

339. Cohen, op. cit., p. 129.

340. Ibid., pp. 168-69.

341. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 60-62.

through the scientific method can convict atheism, but it cannot inform religion.<sup>342</sup> According to Brunner, reason can say what is not revelation,<sup>343</sup> and the intellect can understand something about the revealing activity of the Holy Spirit.<sup>344</sup> Argument can remove impediments to faith.<sup>345</sup> Reason can deduce from revelation.<sup>346</sup> Reason can keep faith at its proper task.<sup>347</sup> Reason can help choose faiths that are intellectually respectable.<sup>348</sup>

#### Reason Can Know Reality

Aristotle went so far in assuming the objective competence of reason that the results of scientific reflection were considered to be final and not subject to future revision.<sup>349</sup> The Age of Reason saw absolute truth in reason.<sup>350</sup> Maritain shows that reason can know the universality of being, since Being and Reason are one.<sup>351</sup> Also, man's nature is capable of an endless increase of knowledge.<sup>352</sup> Temple's basic hypothesis was that Mind contains the explanation of the World-Process.<sup>353</sup> Since Mind knows itself as part of the world,<sup>354</sup> Mind discovers its own principles in the world of its environment.<sup>355</sup> J. Donald Butler calls the assumption that reason can know reality "the affirmation of knowledge."<sup>356</sup> John Dewey stressed the role of the history of ideas in arriving at reality by means of reason.<sup>357</sup>

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342. John Baillie, And the Life Everlasting, pp. 113-14.  
343. Brunner, Philosophy, p. 74.  
344. Brunner, Revelation, pp. 172-73.  
345. Casserley, op. cit., p. 159.  
346. Urban, op. cit., p. 158.  
347. Ferre, op. cit., p. 232.  
348. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 180.  
349. Burt, Types, pp. 199-200.  
350. Mossner, op. cit., p. 236.  
351. Maritain, op. cit., p. 87.  
352. Ibid., p. 36.  
353. Temple, op. cit., p. 132.  
354. Ibid., p. 139.  
355. Ibid., pp. 149-50.  
356. Butler, op. cit., p. 23.  
357. Ferre, op. cit., p. 18.

Reason Can Know God

Maimonides held that reason can prove the existence of God,<sup>358</sup> and the intellect becomes immortal by acquiring knowledge of God.<sup>359</sup> By reason we know that God is, but not what God is.<sup>360</sup> Logical reasoning is the primary factor in knowing God.<sup>361</sup> Thomas Aquinas assumed that reason can know the absolute truth concerning God's existence and certain of His attributes.<sup>362</sup> Duns Scotus qualified the theory of Aquinas to the extent of saying that natural reason can lead only to general knowledge about God, which is not sufficient for our needs.<sup>363</sup> Luther allowed that reason can lead to knowledge of the Creator but not to the essence of the Trinity.<sup>364</sup> Roman Catholicism, since the encyclical of Pope Leo XIII in 1879, recognizes five proofs from reason that God exists.<sup>365</sup> Modern Roman Catholicism teaches (1) reason can prove the existence of God,<sup>366</sup> (2) reason can know God,<sup>367</sup> (3) reason can prove there is only one God,<sup>368</sup> and (4) reason indicates six basic Christian principles.<sup>369</sup> Brunner observes that the truths of God, freedom, and immortality were able to stand upon the basis of reason alone during the Enlightenment.<sup>370</sup> Stace notices that in every case a rational theory of God comes only after the experience of God.<sup>371</sup>

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358. Cohen, op. cit., p. 33.

359. Ibid., pp. 25-26.

360. Ibid., p. 90.

361. Ibid., p. 254.

362. Burt, Types, pp. 109-10.

363. Micklem, op. cit., p. 34.

364. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

365. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 142; Urban, op. cit., pp. 158-59.

366. Baltimore Catechism, p. 1.

367. Ibid., p. 19; Sheen, op. cit., p. 4.

368. Catechism, p. 22.

369. Ibid., p. 396.

370. Brunner, Philosophy, p. 37.

371. Stace, op. cit., p. 23.



The Methods of Human Reason

The questions raised in any philosophy of religion with respect to the methods of human reason may be classified by reference to the types of inquiry in which they occur as related to (1) philosophical method (including philosophy of religion), (2) scientific method (including psychology of religion and sociology of religion), (3) theological method (including apologetics), and (4) historical method (including historical criticism of the documents of religion). With respect to the mood of the inquirer they may be classified as pertaining to (1) intuition, (2) logical consistency, (3) problem-solving, and (4) comprehensive coherence.

Philosophical Method

Philosophical inquiry need only specify correctly the most general truths.<sup>372</sup> Philosophy attempts a reasoned account of the whole truth.<sup>373</sup> The method of philosophical interpretation operates by (1) preliminary synopsis, (2) scientific analysis and synthesis, (3) synoptic hypotheses, (4) verification, and (5) reinterpretation.<sup>374</sup> Temple asserts that philosophy should interpret the lower in terms of the higher.<sup>375</sup> Nevertheless, philosophy starts from the detailed experience of men.<sup>376</sup> In scientific philosophy higher categories are admitted only as lower categories are proved to be inadequate.<sup>377</sup> Since Kant, philosophical method is neither deductive nor inductive but critical.<sup>378</sup> Metaphysics goes beyond empirical

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372. Wieman, op. cit., p. 198.

373. Brightman, op. cit., p. 21.

374. Ibid., pp. 116-22.

375. William Temple, The Nature of Personality, p. xxix.

376. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 45.

377. Ibid., p. 47.

378. Ibid., pp. 74-75.

investigation by use of analogy.<sup>379</sup> The degrees of speculative knowledge imply methods appropriate to each level of knowledge.<sup>380</sup>

The philosophy of religion, according to Pringle-Pattison, "investigates the nature of the religious consciousness and the value of its pronouncements."<sup>381</sup> The methods of philosophy of religion are common to all philosophy.<sup>382</sup>

#### Scientific Method

The permanent thing about science is its method.<sup>383</sup> Induction is its essence.<sup>384</sup> Every empirical science has the right to formulate its own categories.<sup>385</sup> The scientist uses imagination in arriving at the categories.<sup>386</sup> A. D. Ritchie, in The Scientific Method, shows that scientific discovery is an art.<sup>387</sup> Science develops categories and methods appropriate to the subject matter.<sup>388</sup> Mathematics and laboratory science are the ideal limits of scientific method.<sup>389</sup> Although religion and science employ different concepts of causation,<sup>390</sup> scientific method does not deny the applicability of philosophic and religious categories.<sup>391</sup> Science employs rigorous logic,<sup>392</sup> assumes the uniformity of nature,<sup>393</sup> is dedicated to the pursuit of truth,<sup>394</sup> and encourages a critical mind.<sup>395</sup> Science is an

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379. Richardson, op. cit., p. 49.  
380. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 9-10.  
381. Quoted in Urban, op. cit., p. 29.  
382. Brightman, op. cit., p. 22.  
383. Richardson, op. cit., p. 16.  
384. Ibid., p. 40.  
385. Ibid., p. 42.  
386. Ibid., p. 46.  
387. Quoted in Ibid., p. 47.  
388. Casserley, op. cit., p. 138.  
389. Ferré, op. cit., pp. 50-51.  
390. Harold Höffding, The Philosophy of Religion, pp. 26-27.  
391. Temple, op. cit., p. 52.  
392. Sinnott, op. cit., pp. 72-73.  
393. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

adventure in pushing back the frontiers of knowledge,<sup>396</sup> proceeds upon the basis of a faith,<sup>397</sup> and produces demonstrable results within its limited field.<sup>398</sup> The scientific spirit can develop the love of truth and habits of intellectual honesty.<sup>399</sup>

In the psychology of religion, divine action is admitted only after all other types of explanation have been exhausted.<sup>400</sup>

#### Theological Method

Traditionally theology has been deductive in method, as was all science in the Middle Ages.<sup>401</sup> Increasingly there is a tendency to regard theological method as the application of inductive scientific method to the sphere of theological existence.<sup>402</sup> The theologian, like any scientist, has the right to his own categories.<sup>403</sup> Theology stands or falls with the category of revelation.<sup>404</sup> Natural theology is based upon natural religion, which is continuous with the foundations of inductive science and philosophy.<sup>405</sup> Revealed theology is based upon authority which cannot be fully investigated by philosophical and scientific methods.<sup>405</sup> Stace denies the existence of the category of natural theology when he asserts that all theological reasoning takes place within the framework of revealed truth.<sup>406</sup> According to James, theology should be satisfied to claim reasonable probability for its

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394. Ibid., pp. 96-97.  
395. Ibid., pp. 99-100.  
396. Ibid., p. 101.  
397. Ibid., p. 179.  
398. Ibid., p. 207.  
399. Maritain, op. cit., p. 169.  
400. Temple, op. cit., pp. 50-51.  
401. Richardson, op. cit., p. 54.  
402. Ibid., p. 10.  
403. Ibid., p. 56.  
404. Ibid., p. 57.  
405. Tennant, op. cit., p. 95.  
406. Stace, op. cit., pp. 139-40.

results.<sup>407</sup>

Apologetics deals with the knowledge of God in light of general knowledge<sup>408</sup> and operates within the sphere of scientific methodology.<sup>409</sup> Reason is examined in order to establish the possibility of theological science.<sup>410</sup> Based upon reason,<sup>411</sup> apologetics is directed toward those who do not accept special revelation.<sup>412</sup>

#### Historical Method

History inquires into cause and meaning.<sup>413</sup> The scientific method of history includes the viewpoint of the observer.<sup>414</sup> Historical criticism helps in rightly understanding the Word of God.<sup>415</sup> Scientists tend to accept historical and literary criticism of the Bible.<sup>416, 416a</sup>

#### Intuition

Intuition and reason are sometimes described as separate ways of knowing. Stace sees them as instruments for apprehending separate orders of existence, the conceptual intellect apprehending the natural order and intuition apprehending the divine order.<sup>417</sup> Sinnott says that science is suited for analysis, while intuition deals with wholes.<sup>418</sup> Thus reason and spiritual insight are both valid ways to truth.<sup>419</sup> Intuition may complement reason by reaching truth synthetically.<sup>420</sup> Others see intuition as depend-

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407. James, op. cit., p. 326.

408. Richardson, op. cit., p. 7.

409. Ibid., p. 8.

410. Ibid., p. 9.

411. Herman Harrell Horne, The Philosophy of Christian Education, p. 157.

412. Richardson, op. cit., p. 21.

413. Brunner, Philosophy, pp. 117-18.

414. Richardson, op. cit., p. 11.

415. Brunner, Revelation, p. 292.

416. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 157.

416a. The above brief paragraph fairly reflects the almost complete absence of any theory of historical method in works in philosophy of religion. This lack of historical theory is a serious defect in the study of philosophy of religion.

417. Stace, op. cit., p. 105.

418. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 222.

419. Ibid., p. 211.

ent upon reason. Julian Huxley said that reason as intellectual analysis is a means to improve intuitive comprehension and appreciation.<sup>421</sup> Vergilius Ferm says that intuition depends upon reason, and intuitions are by-products of reason.<sup>422</sup>

Wieman defines intuition as creative integration.<sup>423</sup> We know God by intuition,<sup>424</sup> and one form of mystical experience is an instance of intuition.<sup>425</sup> The basic theoretical virtue, according to Wild, is apprehension or insight, "without which no further acts of understanding are possible."<sup>426</sup> Maritain speaks of basic intuitions related to the reasoning process. Thus he says that the basic intuition of Hegel was reality of history, and the central intuition of the Existentialist is the absolute Nothingness of the creature.<sup>427</sup> Reason apprehends principles intuitively.<sup>428</sup> In this sense Horne maintained that the intellect of Jesus was intuitive, not discursive.<sup>429</sup> The choice between reasonable alternatives involves intuitive devotion to values.<sup>430</sup> "Reason is like a labored calculation with pencil and paper, intuition like the same operation performed in an instant by an electronic calculator."<sup>431</sup> Thus Bergson said that intuition transcends intellect.<sup>432</sup>

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420. Ibid., p. 222.

421. Ibid., pp. 221-22.

422. Vergilius Ferm, What Can We Believe?, p. 15.

423. Wieman, op. cit., pp. 184-85.

424. Ibid., p. 186.

425. Ibid., pp. 186-87.

426. Wild, op. cit., p. 100.

427. Maritain, op. cit., p. 46.

428. Temple, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

429. Horne, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

430. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 182.

431. Ibid., p. 221.

432. Sheen, op. cit., p. 26.

### Logical Consistency

Reason is at least the capacity for logical inference.<sup>433</sup> Maimonides regarded logic and mathematics as prerequisites to thinking,<sup>434</sup> and used logic extensively in his Book of Precepts.<sup>435</sup> Furthermore, he maintained that logical reasoning is the primary factor in attaining true knowledge of God.<sup>436</sup> Formal logic was the instrument of Aquinas,<sup>437</sup> who assumed that by means of the concept we attain to the reality itself.<sup>438</sup> The Scholastic logic, however, became complex, like Ptolemaic astronomy, adding epicycle upon epicycle.<sup>439</sup> Brightman finds that Calvin's method was completely deductive and that Calvinistic supernaturalism is logically self-consistent.<sup>440</sup> Logical consistency is one of the most exacting intellectual ideals ever conceived.<sup>441</sup> We must recognize consistency as one standard of truth.<sup>442</sup>

In the Renaissance doubt became a philosophical instrument.<sup>443</sup> Par excellence in Descartes systematic doubt<sup>444</sup> was the first step in attaining clear and distinct ideas.<sup>445</sup> He finally extended mathematical method over philosophy, natural science, ethics, and religion.<sup>446</sup> However, we cannot know the world by deductive analysis.<sup>447</sup> Thinking is also the discovery of

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433. Supra, p. 4.  
434. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 24-25.  
435. Roth, op. cit., p. 28.  
436. Cohen, op. cit., p. 254.  
437. Brightman, op. cit., pp. 190-91.  
438. Sheen, op. cit., p. 117.  
439. Temple, op. cit., p. 85.  
440. Brightman, op. cit., pp. 221-22.  
441. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 187.  
442. Ferré, op. cit., p. 20.  
443. Tennant, op. cit., pp. 20-21.  
444. Temple, op. cit., p. 85.  
445. Ferré, op. cit., p. 17.  
446. Mossner, op. cit., p. 39.  
447. Casserley, op. cit., p. 143.

valid premises by experiment.<sup>448</sup> The principle of uniformity is presupposed in all inductive reasoning.<sup>449</sup> Reason requires continuous questioning and critical appropriation.<sup>450</sup>

#### Problem-Solving

Logically certain knowledge is rare.<sup>451</sup> Bishop Butler insisted that probability is the guide of life.<sup>452</sup> Effective thinking is largely alogical.<sup>453</sup> The operation of reason is piecemeal.<sup>454</sup> Practical reason works closely with habit.<sup>455</sup> Kant reminded us that reason operates by trial and error.<sup>456</sup> All human thinking is tentative.<sup>457</sup> Movement toward a conclusion is the nature of reason.<sup>458</sup>

#### Comprehensive Coherence

Since Hegel, increasing attention has been given to the structure of reason. According to Dewey, "the very process of inquiry creates the structure, which is the product of its search."<sup>459</sup> In general, for the newer naturalism the most basic reality accessible to the human mind is events and their quality and structure.<sup>460</sup> The mind is fitted to apprehend structures of possibility.<sup>461</sup> Through the Gestalt, mind senses the good and evil of events and possibilities.<sup>462</sup>

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448. Tennant, op. cit., pp. 36-37.  
449. Ibid., p. 41.  
450. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 52.  
451. Tennant, op. cit., pp. 35-36.  
452. Ibid., p. 36.  
453. Ibid., p. 37.  
454. Wild, op. cit., p. 378.  
455. Ibid., p. 70.  
456. Beck, op. cit., p. 98.  
457. Brightman, op. cit., p. 343.  
458. Sheen, op. cit., p. 130.  
459. Wieman, op. cit., p. 194.  
460. Ibid., p. 6.  
461. Ibid., p. 305.  
462. Ibid., p. 28.

Inclusive reason, according to Jaspers, criticizes its own criterion of the universally valid and seeks to explain what is alien to reason.<sup>463</sup> De Wolf distinguishes between reason as internal coherence within a system<sup>464</sup> and reason as unlimited comprehensive coherence.<sup>465</sup> Brightman maintains that, when applied to religion, coherence is a more rigorous way of knowing than consistency,<sup>466</sup> since coherence includes consistency,<sup>467</sup> Three stages in coherence are (1) gathering all the facts, (2) constructing some working hypothesis to interpret the facts, and (3) verification of the hypothesis.<sup>468</sup> When this process involves dealing with opposing hypotheses it becomes dialectical method.<sup>469</sup> A system must first of all be internally coherent in order to be true,<sup>470</sup> but the principle of coherence also requires external criticism.<sup>471</sup>

The Relationship of Human Reason to the Total Personality

"The proper study of mankind is man."<sup>472</sup> Alexander Pope sought to see reason in relationship to the total personality,<sup>473</sup> and man's relationship to the whole universe.<sup>474</sup> D. Maurice Allan, in The Realm of Personality, examines three views of man: (1) naturalistic, (2) humanistic, and (3) transcendental. Growing out of each of these views, respectively,

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463. Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

464. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 195.

465. Ibid., p. 197.

466. Brightman, op. cit., p. 190.

467. Ibid., p. 192.

468. Ibid., p. 193.

469. Ibid., pp. 251-52.

470. Ibid., p. 459.

471. Ibid., p. 460.

472. Alexander Pope, An Essay on Man, in Woods, Watt, and Anderson, The Literature of England, volume 1, p. 862.

473. Ibid., Epistle II.

474. Ibid., Epistles I, III, and IV.

he finds three interrelated dimensions of personality: (1) physical, (2) conscious, and (3) rational.<sup>475</sup> Howard L. Kingsley, in The Nature and Conditions of Learning, outlines seven forms of learning: (1) the development of motor skills, (2) the development of perception, (3) memorizing, (4) the development of understanding, (5) the development of problem-solving thinking, (6) the development of emotional activities, and (7) the development of attitudes and ideals.<sup>476</sup>

Usually in philosophies of religion human reason is related to behavior, emotion, insight and/or intuition, intellect, mystic experience, the physical body, sense-data, social dimensions, soul, spirit, will, and the whole self. Usually treated in much less detail are conscience, experience, image of God, imagination, language, memory, sin and grace, and subconscious life.

#### Behavior

Maimonides, who regarded prophetic inspiration as an extension and intensification of the normal functions of reason, noted that moral imperfections often caused the gift of prophecy to disappear.<sup>477</sup> He noted that self-indulgence works against moral development.<sup>478</sup> Moral conduct is a preparation for intellectual progress.<sup>479</sup> Both Lewis Beck<sup>480</sup> and John Wild<sup>481</sup> have noted the primacy of practical reason in the writings of Immanuel Kant. In the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals Kant

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475. D. Maurice Allan, The Realm of Personality, pp. 17-52.

476. Howard L. Kingsley, The Nature and Conditions of Learning, pp. 209-451.

477. A. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 137-38.

478. Ibid., p. 278.

479. Ibid., p. 279.

480. Op. cit., p. 12.

481. Op. cit., p. 48.

discovered that human reason attains its principle within the realm of moral knowledge.<sup>482</sup> He later discovered a neat correspondence between the categories of practical reason and the categories of pure reason.<sup>483</sup> Moral earnestness is necessary in order for a person to be able to discover the principles of reason. John Dewey has noted the effect of human behavior upon the structure of the mind. Thus he asserted that "any transformation of man's estate in the direction of greater good will transform the human mind itself with its evaluations and appreciative consciousness."<sup>484</sup> Even Tillich stresses the "learning by doing" in comments on the interdependence of grasping and shaping the world,<sup>485</sup> based upon the Gospel injunction to know the truth by doing the truth.<sup>486</sup> William James perceived a subjective element in all philosophy, due to the organic connection between a man's conduct and his thinking.<sup>487</sup> Herman Harrell Horne also stressed that truth to Jesus was primarily something to be done, and that intellectual illumination follows action as it proceeds "from deed to creed."<sup>488</sup>

Thomistic realists, on the other hand, reverse the above dependence of reason upon behavior and make behavior dependent upon reason. John Wild finds that the chief fault of utilitarianism is that it denies that reason is the natural faculty to guide man's behavior.<sup>489</sup> Intelligence can be used to induce the formation of new habits.<sup>490</sup> There is no virtuous living

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482. Beck, op. cit., p. 64.

483. Ibid., p. 211.

484. Henry N. Wieman, The Source of Human Good, p. 16.

485. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, p. 76.

486. John 3:21.

487. Op. cit., p. 433.

488. Op. cit., p. 47.

489. Op. cit., p. 51.

490. Ibid., p. 68.

apart from rational control.<sup>491</sup> Reason as the guide to action produces happiness.<sup>492</sup> Rational control is given by practical reason.<sup>493</sup> Temperance is the rational guidance of pleasant sensation; courage the rational guidance of pain and evil sensation.<sup>494</sup> All virtue is unwaveringly faithful to its rational ends.<sup>495</sup> Knowledge is the most essential phase of courage.<sup>496</sup> Temperance, although the product of reason, preserves reason by enabling us to resist those pleasures which might lure us away from our rational course.<sup>497</sup> Jacques Maritain likewise stresses the primacy of reason over feeling and action. Speculative knowledge is said to be independent of feeling or action.<sup>498</sup> Knowledge, by its very nature, does not tend toward power or action.<sup>499</sup> Brightman's personal idealism has certain affinities with the realistic dominance of reason, but he says that the primary purpose of reason is to make better persons.<sup>500</sup> Ferré, while far from the premises of realism, sees the danger that activism may run away from the task of reason.<sup>501</sup>

#### Emotion

Reason's dependence upon emotion was early seen by Plotinus, who observed in great detail how reason is handicapped by desire.<sup>502</sup> F. R.

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491. Ibid., p. 97.  
492. Ibid., p. 99.  
493. Ibid., p. 113.  
494. Ibid., p. 117.  
495. Ibid., p. 118.  
496. Ibid., p. 124.  
497. Ibid., p. 129.  
498. Maritain, op. cit., p. 13.  
499. Ibid., p. 16.  
500. Edgar Sheffield Brightman, op. cit., p. viii.  
501. Nels F. S. Ferré, op. cit., p. 13.  
502. Edwin A. Burt, Types of Religious Philosophy, pp. 63-64.

Tennant saw a serious limitation on human reason in the fact that an angry man will not listen to reason and so many of the people of the world are angry.<sup>503</sup> Maimonides had deduced from the use in ancient Hebrew psychology of the word "heart" to denote the seat of the intellect that all thinking is grounded in feeling.<sup>504</sup> Augustine had declared that Christ "transforms the emotions of men, not by substituting reason for emotion, but by attaching fear, desire, grief, and joy to their right object."<sup>505</sup> William James concluded from his study of the psychopathic temperament that "a certain type of emotionality is the sine qua non of moral perception."<sup>506</sup> He continuously emphasized that philosophical formulas are secondary.<sup>507</sup> Although both thought and feeling determine conduct, in religion theory is secondary.<sup>508</sup> Russian religious existentialism goes so far as to assert that there is no truth apart from will and feeling.<sup>509</sup> Edmund Sinnott sees religion as dealing with emotions at the core of personality and calls this one of "two roads to truth."<sup>510</sup>

Nels Ferré notes that truth-thinking requires passion, as well as intellect and will.<sup>511</sup> Henry N. Wieman, after observing that traditional supernaturalism rest upon feeling rather than thought,<sup>512</sup> asserts that the age of atomic energy calls for radical redirection of man's controlling

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503. Tennant, op. cit., p. 30.  
504. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 2-3.  
505. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 214.  
506. James, op. cit., p. 26.  
507. Ibid., p. 422.  
508. Ibid., p. 494.  
509. Nicholas Berdyaev, op. cit., p. 26.  
510. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 55.  
511. Ferré, op. cit., p. 205.  
512. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

devotion.<sup>513</sup> He goes on to observe that the structure knowable to the human mind is thin compared with that discriminated by feeling-reactions and that depth of mental structure can be attained only by integrating it with quality of feeling.<sup>514</sup> The late William Temple deduced from the fact that consciousness begins as emotion,<sup>515</sup> that emotion is present in all our conduct.<sup>516</sup> Tennant observed that emotion may be much more effective than logic in making thought alive.<sup>517</sup> Reason as the slave of passion in instrumentalism<sup>518</sup> and in the animal-habit theory is well known.<sup>519</sup>

Wilbur Urban observed that it is the task of theology to translate from emotion to reason.<sup>520</sup> Harold De Wolf asserts that we need "a passionate search for the truth in which emotional experience will provide its full share of the evidence."<sup>521</sup> However, although passion may aid objectivity,<sup>522</sup> this fact does not imply that the use of impartial reason results in loss of truth.<sup>523</sup> Schopenhauer had observed a basic emotional element in all reason, since there would be no reason apart from the fact of death and of a consequent fear of death.<sup>524</sup> William E. Hocking, after investigating the relative roles of feeling and reason in religion in his The Meaning of God in Human Experience, concludes that feeling precedes reason in religion.<sup>525</sup> Hocking says religion is to be judged by feeling rather than by argument,<sup>526</sup> since

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513. Wieman, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

514. Ibid., p. 66.

515. Temple, Nature, Man, and God, pp. 123-24.

516. Temple, The Nature of Personality, pp. 23-24.

517. Op. cit., p. 37.

518. John Wild, op. cit., p. 60.

519. Ibid., p. 69.

520. E. D. Myers, op. cit., p. 134.

521. Op. cit., p. 113.

522. Ibid., p. 109.

523. Ibid., p. 112.

524. Brightman, Philosophy of Religion, p. 40.

525. See Wieman and Meland, op. cit., pp. 109-10, for interesting deductions from Hocking's conclusions.

the desire for eternal life is the root of religion.<sup>527</sup>

Realists and idealists agree that especially the emotion of love affects the structure of reason. Jacques Maritain says that love based upon revelation illumines the intellect from within.<sup>528</sup> Harold D. Roelofs notes that love makes the mind more receptive than does intelligence.<sup>529</sup> H. B. Alexander burst into poetry as he described how love gives structure to reason.<sup>530</sup> William Temple found that love alone has absolute moral value and thus is the supreme goal of personality.<sup>531</sup> Some philosophers include human sexuality in the analysis of love. Augustine said that sexual passion is a manifestation of disordered rational life.<sup>532</sup> Wieman conjectures that "perhaps human sexuality is what renders men capable of undergoing great creative transformations."<sup>533</sup> He then cites the role of unrequited love in opening the way for the work of creative transformation.<sup>534</sup> "Moral standards should guide man into the ways of abundant love."<sup>535</sup> Suffering love provides the way to forgiveness; especially, Christian love enables people to participate in values remote from their own.<sup>536</sup> In the commandment to love God with the whole mind (Matthew 22:37) rational detachment is helped by emotion.<sup>537</sup> Theodore M. Green finds that the authority of the Bible, of the Church, and

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526. Hocking, op. cit., pp. 39-40.

527. Ibid., pp. 49-50.

528. Op. cit., p. 64.

529. E. D. Myers, op. cit., p. 112.

530. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., pp. 205-06.

531. Personality, pp. 76-77.

532. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 212.

533. Op. cit., p. 236.

534. Ibid., p. 238.

535. Ibid., p. 239.

536. Ibid., p. 246.

537. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 109.

of Jesus Christ is rooted in the experience of Christian love.<sup>538</sup> J. Donald Butler observes that, in the Christian religion, reason is transfigured as love.<sup>539</sup>

Reason's independence from emotion was discovered by Pythagoras (6th century B. C.) who located the center of thought in the mind, with reason functioning entirely separately from emotion.<sup>540</sup> Maimonides emphasized that worship of God depends upon degrees of knowledge of Him.<sup>541</sup> He agreed with Aristotle that reason is the highest of the five faculties of the soul.<sup>542</sup> Transgressions of the Torah originate in sensitivity and appetite, not in reason.<sup>543</sup> We must know God in order to love Him.<sup>544</sup> Spinoza saw proof of the dominance of reason over emotion in the fact that understanding gradually transforms emotion.<sup>545</sup> Immanuel Kant, at a time when empiricist thinkers were exalting feeling at the expense of reason in morality, sought to establish reason as the exclusively legislative moral faculty.<sup>546</sup> William James saw the prominence of idea in conversion, which he defined as a shift in excitement about one set of ideas to another set of ideas as the habitual center of a person's energy.<sup>547</sup> John Wild concluded that practical reason is not a slave to desire<sup>548</sup> and that reason can modify passion.<sup>549</sup> The dominance of reason is demonstrated in Plato's observation that a man cannot

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538. E. D. Myers, op. cit., p. 15.

539. Op. cit., p. 497.

540. Cohen, op. cit., p. 3.

541. Ibid., p. 114.

542. Ibid., p. 242.

543. Ibid., pp. 265-66.

544. Leon Roth, op. cit., p. 121.

545. E. A. Burtt, Types, p. 189.

546. L. W. Beck, op. cit., p. 42.

547. Op. cit., p. 193.

548. Op. cit., p. 61.

549. Ibid., p. 154.

become genuinely angry about an injury done to him, if his reason tells him that he deserved the injury.<sup>550</sup> Maritain in studying inclination to action notices that feeling and will cooperate within the framework of reason.<sup>551</sup> Tillich in his definition of ontological reason includes emotion as one of the rational functions,<sup>552</sup> and shows that emotion in reason is not necessarily destructive.<sup>553</sup>

Emotion and reason are both necessary in religion, as Bishop Samuel Butler (1774-1839) maintained when he was on his way to worship.<sup>554</sup> William James contended that articulate reason is valid in religion only when supported by the feelings.<sup>555</sup> He went on to plead for a healthy balance of affection, intellect, and will in a person.<sup>556</sup> William Hocking says that idea and feeling are inseparable in religion.<sup>557</sup> Ducasse asserts that habitual action, which generates feeling, is as important as reason in religion.<sup>558</sup> Ferré observes that emotion, reason, and will accompany each other,<sup>559</sup> and that therefore reason cannot neglect emotion. Tillich includes both formal and emotional elements in reason.<sup>560</sup> In his analysis of courage he places it between reason and desire.<sup>561</sup> In the creative individual enthusiasm and rationality are combined.<sup>562</sup>

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550. Ibid., p. 490.

551. Op. cit., p. 23.

552. Systematic Theology, p. 77.

553. Ibid., p. 154.

554. E. C. Mossner, op. cit., p. 122.

555. Op. cit., pp. 73-74.

556. Ibid., p. 333.

557. Op. cit., pp. 63-64.

558. C. J. Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion, pp. 155-59.

559. Op. cit., pp. 7-8.

560. Systematic Theology, p. 89.

561. The Courage to Be, p. 3.

562. Ibid., p. 105.

Insight, Intuition, Mystic Experience

Distinction is the ability to observe difference between one quality or object and another quality or object. Discrimination is subtle and precise distinction. Discernment is sharply perceptive and critically compares and estimates. Insight discerns with the help of intuitive sympathy. Intuition instantly understands or comprehends a truth or rule of action. Intuition may be part of reason or it may operate parallel to reason. Mystic experience is the attainment of ultimate truth by means of intuition rather than reason. It may imply that final truth cannot be known by reason.

Maimonides observed a close connection between man's intuitive faculty and his intellect.<sup>563</sup> Hocking has made intuition dependent upon intellect, since intuition, although it may run ahead of intellect, must use concepts.<sup>564</sup> Urban notes that traditionally among Christian thinkers reason has occupied a higher position than insight in the hierarchy of modes of cognition.<sup>565</sup> Ferm defines intuition as "an ordinary process of mind, a process by which mental items already acquired by our senses are charged with feeling."<sup>566</sup> Thus intuition depends upon reason.

Many religious philosophers see intuition and reason as separate ways of knowing. Thus William James distinguished an intellectual element and an intuitive element in Luther's faith.<sup>567</sup> J. Donald Butler treats reason

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563. Cohen, op. cit., p. 248.

564. James Alfred Martin J., Empirical Philosophies of Religion, p. 11.

565. Op. cit., p. 219.

566. Op. cit., p. 14.

567. Op. cit., p. 241.

and intuition as comparable instruments of knowledge.<sup>568</sup>

It is quite commonly asserted that intuition as a way of knowing is much superior to reason. Even the rationalist Spinoza asserted that clear intuition of the universe as a whole precedes reason as the starting point in man's salvation.<sup>569</sup> Bergson saw intuition as superior in that it moves with life, whereas intellect often goes contrary to life.<sup>570</sup> Wieman stresses the role of common sense in life,<sup>571</sup> and defines intuitive awareness as "a gift of God's grace."<sup>572</sup> Brightman asserts the independence of intuition, in that it is not derived from reasoning.<sup>573</sup> According to Maritain, knowledge of God is "a natural fruit of the intuition of existence."<sup>574</sup>

Fulton Sheen confuses intuition with mystic experience when he asserts that intuitionists deny the need for reason in knowing God.<sup>575</sup> At this point Sheen puts himself in the tradition of a long line of irrational mystics. Plotinus felt fully God-possessed only after a long effort to put reason in abeyance.<sup>576</sup> Saint Teresa confessed that this state of complete union with the Divine in which reason and the senses are suspended cannot last for more than half an hour.<sup>577</sup> Hugo of St. Victor found that in the experience of all-embracing Love his intellect was illuminated.<sup>578</sup>

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568. Op. cit., pp. 23-25.  
569. Burt, Types, p. 184.  
570. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 44.  
571. The Source, p. 205.  
572. Ibid., p. 244.  
573. Op. cit., p. 125.  
574. Op. cit., p. 90.  
575. Op. cit., p. 26.  
576. Ducasse, op. cit., p. 283.  
577. Ibid., p. 284.  
578. Ibid., p. 285.

From this tradition Pratt concludes that mysticism is other than ordinary perception or reason,<sup>579</sup> and Leuba points out that reason ceases in mystical experience.<sup>580</sup>

Hocking says that mystical experience in its creativeness goes beyond the power of reason,<sup>581</sup> since it includes purity of heart as well as thought.<sup>582</sup> Tennant asserts that reason must be related to non-rational ingredients.<sup>583</sup> Wieman blames our superficial rationalism upon the ancient Greek scorn for unspecifiable richness of quality of thought,<sup>584</sup> and asserts that we must serve "what is deeper than truth."<sup>585</sup> Brightman excludes intellect from mystical experience by his definition: "By mysticism we mean an immediate consciousness of God, not believed to be mediated by the intellect or the will of the individual or of society, but attributed directly to God himself."<sup>586</sup> Stace claims that reason is below mystical consciousness in the order of living,<sup>587</sup> and complains that the philosopher is usually an unconscious mystic, tending to confuse mysticism and logical intellect.<sup>588</sup>

#### Intellect

Mind, the general term for mental functioning, includes consciousness, thought, perception, cognition, feeling, volition, and the subconscious. Intellect is commonly limited to that power of the mind that knows or reasons, as opposed to the power of feeling and will.

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579. Ibid., p. 291.  
580. Ibid., p. 306.  
581. Op. cit., p. xviii.  
582. Martin, op. cit., p. 13.  
583. Op. cit., p. 35.  
584. The Source, p. 174.  
585. Ibid., p. 175.  
586. Op. cit., p. 432.  
587. Op. cit., p. 110.  
588. Ibid., p. 133.

In the tradition of Aristotle reason and intellect are approximately identical. Thus Maimonides described intellect as the link between man and God.<sup>589</sup> Also he named intellect as one of the faculties of the soul and saw "acquired intellect" as the true essence of a man.<sup>590</sup> He further asserted that Divine Providence comes into an individual life in direct proportion to the development of the intellect.<sup>591</sup> At times Maimonides made the word "intellect" much more broad than reason, as he did when he said the intellectual virtues are wisdom and reason.<sup>592</sup> In this tradition Sheen says that "intellect" in modern speech is equivalent to "reason" in Scholasticism,<sup>593</sup> and that intellect ranges man with angels and God.<sup>594</sup> He then qualifies this remark with the assertion that reason is not quite identical with intellect in all respects.<sup>595</sup>

In modern existentialism reason is a much broader term than intellect. Reason, according to Karl Jaspers, is supported and permeated by the whole personality of a man. When reason declines into mere intellect, intolerable dissatisfaction results.<sup>596</sup>

#### The Physical Body and Sense Data

Maimonides defended the Hebrew dietary laws upon the basis of Aristotelian dualism between mind and body. The knowledge of God depends upon good physical condition,<sup>597</sup> since the human body as the source of shortcomings and sins may prevent the intellect from reaching God.<sup>598</sup> Nevertheless,

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589. Roth, op. cit., p. 80.  
590. Cohen, op. cit., p. 24.  
591. Ibid., p. 200.  
592. Ibid., p. 246.  
593. Op. cit., p. 63.  
594. Ibid., p. 83.  
595. Ibid., p. 128.  
596. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 68.  
597. Cohen, op. cit., p. 279.

active reason was considered to be independent of the body, which could limit such lower cognitive functions as sensation, memory, and imagination.<sup>599</sup> In neo-Scholasticism body and the rational soul unite to form the person.<sup>600</sup> Thus Maritain singles out Aristotle's definition, also used by Thomas Aquinas, of intellect as "the substantial form of the human body."<sup>601</sup> and notes that the intellectual virtues as forms survive the dissolution of the body.<sup>602</sup>

In modern philosophy the sharp distinction of Plato and Aristotle between mind and body tends to be rejected as unworkable.<sup>603</sup> Endocrinologists do emphasize the regulation of mental functions by bodily tissue; psychiatrists stress the role of one's state of mind in controlling bodily functions.<sup>604</sup> Yet this distinction tends to be blurred, as it was in ancient Hebrew psychology.<sup>605</sup> Ducasse asserts that, though mental states affect physical healing,<sup>606</sup> the role of the intellect is secondary in cure accomplished by prayer.<sup>607</sup> Mystical experience suggests that mind may exert broad control over the body;<sup>608</sup> this conclusion is supported by observation of how control of breath affects mental states.<sup>609</sup>

The mind-body problem in philosophy is brought to focus in the role of sense data. Maimonides emphasized the primacy of reason over sense data when

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598. Ibid., pp. 149 and 261.

599. Burt, Types, p. 200.

600. Butler, op. cit., p. 383.

601. Maritain, op. cit., p. 57.

602. Ibid., p. 62.

603. James, op. cit., p. 321; Baillie, op. cit., p. 103.

604. Baillie, op. cit., pp. 104-08.

605. Ibid., pp. 109-10.

606. Op. cit., pp. 275-76.

607. Ibid., p. 277.

608. Ibid., p. 279.

609. Ibid., p. 311.

he named logical deduction as the first of three independent sources of knowledge.<sup>610</sup> The Platonic tradition contrasted the "higher" faculties of the intellect with the "lower" faculties of the senses.<sup>611</sup> Kant made reason independent of sense data when he defined the role of reason as speculating "beyond any possible experience."<sup>612</sup> Likewise Kant observed that "the influences of sensibility" are not determinative for man's life.<sup>613</sup> Sheen admits that the knowledge possessed by the intellect is higher than sense perception.<sup>614</sup> John Wild uses temperance as an illustration of how sense is subordinated to reason in all virtue.<sup>615</sup> Idealism underscores the primacy of reason, on the ground that all experience is mental.<sup>616</sup> Ferré points out that rational verification goes beyond empirical sense data and that philosophy is not limited by sense data.<sup>617</sup>

On the other hand, in Aristotle sense experience always provides the necessary foundation for the activity of reason.<sup>618</sup> John Wild, by definition, broadens the faculty of sense to include both "the internal and the external senses,"<sup>619</sup> and then calls sense, reason, and will "the three most important faculties of human nature."<sup>620</sup> He goes on to describe in detail how sense cognition is the basis of reason.<sup>621</sup> Maritain observes that "men

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610. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 253-54.  
611. Stace, op. cit., pp. 107-08.  
612. Beck, op. cit., p. 11.  
613. Ibid., pp. 112-13.  
614. Op. cit., p. 115.  
615. Op. cit., p. 126.  
616. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., p. 105.  
617. Op. cit., pp. 120-21.  
618. Burt, Types, pp. 51-53.  
619. Op. cit., p. 403.  
620. Ibid., p. 412.  
621. Ibid., pp. 461-63.

live more often by senses than by reason."<sup>622</sup>

#### Social Dimensions

Reason cannot be understood apart from its cultural matrix. Maimonides went so far as to say that knowledge of God is attainable only in society.<sup>623</sup> Temple called personality "a principle of fellowship in a common purpose."<sup>624</sup> De Wolf, in dealing with the problem of national tragedy, observes that reason "demands inclusiveness beyond any one continent or any one generation."<sup>625</sup> Brightman notes that "the Greek appeal to reason was an appeal to what is universally human, the exclusive property of no race or nation."<sup>626</sup> Wieman asserts that the two primary conditions for the release of creative power are (1) the common good must be served above private good, and (2) human persons and social structures must be more transformable by way of creative interchange.<sup>627</sup>

On the other hand, culture has a tendency to weaken and limit reason. Brunner notices how rational culture tends to join with weakened forms of religion.<sup>628</sup> Wieman reminds us that creativity requires alternation between association and solitude.<sup>629</sup> Sinnott points out that certain forms of culture are obstacles to life based upon reason. He gives Roman Catholicism and communism as examples of authoritarian forms of culture working against building life philosophies upon the foundation of "our Great Tradition."<sup>630</sup>

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622. Op. cit., p. 137.  
623. Cohen, op. cit., p. 26.  
624. Personality, p. 61.  
625. Op. cit., p. 128.  
626. Op. cit., p. 58.  
627. The Source, p. 293.  
628. Philosophy, pp. 145-46.  
629. The Source, p. 232.  
630. Op. cit., p. 229.

Soul and Spirit

Soul and spirit are the vital force or principle by which the physical body is animated. They are the power by which a human being feels, thinks, wills, and decides. They are the essential part of a person's identity. "This distinction between soul and spirit is very vague and shifting," notes Ducasse.<sup>631</sup>

Socrates identified the soul with the real self.<sup>632</sup> Maimonides defined the soul as a unity capable of physical, vital, and pschical functions.<sup>633</sup> Sinnott equates soul with personality and defines it as "the persistent, internally experienced aspect of (the organism)."<sup>634</sup> In Plato reason is the rightful authority in the soul as a whole.<sup>635</sup> Maimonides saw the well-being of a soul in "correct thinking."<sup>636</sup> He saw "acquired intellect" as the "form of the soul"<sup>637</sup> and as the "immortal soul" which survives the dissolution of the body.<sup>638</sup> Temple says that in perfect Personality all impulses under the guidance of reason constitute a soul.<sup>639</sup> Baillie traces this emphasis upon intelligence as the surviving essence of man back to Hindu absorptionism.<sup>640</sup> Maritain makes intellect dependent upon soul.<sup>641</sup> Wild, although he names human rationality as the primary attribute of the soul,<sup>642</sup> derives reason from soul.<sup>643</sup>

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631. Op. cit., p. 71.  
632. Baillie, op. cit., p. 132.  
633. Cohen, op. cit., p. 241.  
634. Op. cit., p. 126.  
635. Burt, Types, p. 44.  
636. Roth, op. cit., p. 79.  
637. Cohen, op. cit., p. 233.  
638. Ibid., p. 247.  
639. Personality, p. 32.  
640. Op. cit., p. 215.  
641. Op. cit., p. 57.  
642. Op. cit., p. 395.  
643. Ibid., p. 401.

Martin Luther emphasized spirit as the controlling essence of the regenerate soul and asserted the usefulness of reason under the guidance of spirit.<sup>644</sup> He said that reason, the light of the soul, errs unless it is controlled by the spirit.<sup>645</sup> Paul Ramsay sees spirit as more basic in the relationship between spirit and reason.<sup>646</sup> Sinnott, while he saw his problem as the establishment of the authority of both reason and spirit,<sup>647</sup> says that spirit goes beyond and transcends the power of reason.<sup>648</sup>

### Will

Kant identified the will with practical reason. "It is practical reason itself so far as reason can determine choice."<sup>649</sup> Temple denied the need for any such concept as will, asserting that the notion of will arises from failure of the imagination to apprehend activity apart from an actor.<sup>650</sup>

In Roman civilization it was assumed that the will is supreme over reason.<sup>651</sup> Maimonides observed that the doctrine of reward and punishment rests upon the assumption that man has free will.<sup>652</sup> In the voluntarism of Duns Scotus reason is only the servant of the will in acts of choice.<sup>653</sup> Scotus further asserted the primacy of the will in salvation,<sup>654</sup> which he saw as coming from the arbitrary will of God.<sup>655</sup> In general the Protestant reformers followed Augustine in subordinating reason to will.<sup>656</sup> Kant made

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644. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 174.  
645. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 78-79.  
646. Ferre, op. cit., p. 234.  
647. Op. cit., p. 140.  
648. Ibid., p. 212.  
649. Beck, op. cit., pp. 32, 72, 98, and 214.  
650. Personality, pp. 23-26.  
651. Burt, English, p. xiii.  
652. Cohen, op. cit., p. 214.  
653. Wild, op. cit., p. 28.  
654. Urban, op. cit., p. 23.  
655. Micklem, op. cit., p. 70.  
656. Burt, Types, pp. 150-51.

reason the servant of will when he said that reason's proper function is to produce such a will as would be man's highest good.<sup>657</sup> Kierkegaard placed ethical will above disinterested intelligence.<sup>658</sup> Berdyaev observed that divine truth cannot be disclosed to abstract reason apart from will.<sup>659</sup> Brightman notes that reason is not independent of will,<sup>660</sup> since purpose is essential to rationality.<sup>661</sup> Ferré sees that reason requires self-surrender,<sup>662</sup> and that existential decision includes reasoning.<sup>663</sup>

The bondage of reason to the will is emphasized in the influence of a corrupt will over reason. Thus Augustine saw the human problem as centering in the will, since the mind cannot command itself.<sup>664</sup> Temple agreed with Augustine that our fundamental volitional attitude is the thing about us over which we have least control.<sup>665</sup> Thus he saw purpose as the highest and most distinctive mark of personality.<sup>666</sup> Religious conversionists in general assume that practical reason has been corrupted through the will.<sup>667</sup> Wild notices the harmful effect of an untrained will upon the intellect.<sup>668</sup>

In Thomism intellect is prior to will.<sup>669</sup> Descartes saw will as the source of error and sin when it goes beyond understanding.<sup>670</sup> Kant defined

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657. Beck, op. cit., p. 58.  
658. Blackham, op. cit., p. 6.  
659. Op. cit., p. 28.  
660. Op. cit., p. 364.  
661. Ibid., p. 382.  
662. Op. cit., p. 13.  
663. Ibid., p. 124.  
664. Temple, Personality, pp. 38-39.  
665. Ibid., pp. 40-41.  
666. Ibid., pp. 71-72.  
667. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 194.  
668. Op. cit., p. 490.  
669. Tillich, Courage, p. 7.  
670. Ducasse, op. cit., p. 366.

an "imperative" as "a command of reason to the will,"<sup>671</sup> thus assuming that reason can directly determine the will.<sup>672</sup> William James noted that in some persons will does follow the guidance of reason.<sup>673</sup> John Wild makes reason dominant as the "intrinsic, formal, or specifying cause of will."<sup>674</sup> He also notes that intellect as the supreme natural faculty enjoys "a certain natural priority" over will.<sup>675</sup> Maritain shows that human will is rooted in intellect.<sup>676</sup> Tillich sees reason as "the structure of freedom."<sup>677</sup> H. Richard Niebuhr also says that decision is dependent upon reason.<sup>678</sup>

Hammond says both intellect and will are aspects of the image of God in man.<sup>679</sup> Wild claims that rationality "is able to support the immaterial faculties of intellect and will."<sup>680</sup> De Wolf notes that neither reason nor will stand alone.<sup>681</sup> Maritain admits that pragmatic truth forms intellect and will.<sup>682</sup>

#### Wholeness

Medieval thought aimed at comprehensiveness.<sup>683</sup> Philosophic understanding was made coextensive with the whole of man's life and experience.<sup>684</sup> William James told his students to choose that philosophy which takes as its

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671. Beck, op. cit., p. 72.  
672. Ibid., p. 155.  
673. Op. cit., p. 165.  
674. Op. cit., p. 107.  
675. Ibid., p. 489.  
676. Op. cit., pp. 58-59.  
677. Systematic, p. 259.  
678. Op. cit., p. 249.  
679. Myers, op. cit., p. 94.  
680. Op. cit., p. 398.  
681. Op. cit., pp. 211-12.  
682. Op. cit., p. 41.  
683. Roth, op. cit., p. 14.  
684. Burt, English, pp. xii-xiii.

area of study man's whole nature.<sup>685</sup> H. H. Horne defined salvation as "wholeness of life, and the whole life in right relationship to God."<sup>686</sup> Ferre stresses the need for the cooperation of reason and religion in salvation.<sup>687</sup> Religion as "whole-reaction always includes reason."<sup>688</sup> Tennant shows how the whole man is involved in believing.<sup>689</sup> Wild sees reason as one of "four partial forms (physical, living, animal, and rational) united essentially into the single substance of man."<sup>690</sup> Urban sees "natural reason" in the history of philosophy as denoting man's whole nature functioning integrally.<sup>691</sup> Brightman defines reason as the principle of comprehensive coherence.<sup>692</sup>

The ancient Greeks assumed that there was nothing in life which essentially transcended the competence of reason.<sup>693</sup> Especially the Stoics believed that all of life could be reduced to and governed by reason.<sup>694</sup> Maimonides likewise asserted that we honor God through the intellect,<sup>695</sup> and that man's perfection lies in his reason.<sup>696</sup> Rationalism is that theory of knowledge in which reason is the most important instrument and which recognizes no authority beyond reason.<sup>697</sup> German rationalists agreed with the ancient Greeks that the relationship between reason and life is that man

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685. Ferm, op. cit., p. 17.  
686. Op. cit., p. 42.  
687. Op. cit., p. 234.  
688. Ibid., p. 9.  
689. Op. cit., p. 106.  
690. Op. cit., p. 398.  
691. Op. cit., p. 159.  
692. Op. cit., p. 353.  
693. Burt, English, p. xiii.  
694. Op. cit., p. 217.  
695. Cohen, op. cit., p. 308.  
696. Roth, op. cit., p. 72.  
697. Butler, op. cit., p. 24.

exists to know.<sup>698</sup> Kant asserted that reason is independent of nature.<sup>699</sup> Hegel identified human reason and divine reason.<sup>700</sup> William James pioneered in modern times a rationalistic optimism in which thinking regenerates.<sup>701</sup> Wild assumes without question that reason is the highest human faculty.<sup>702</sup> With neo-scholasticism, he accepts uncritically Aristotle's definition of man as a rational animal.<sup>703</sup> Maritain stresses the role of wisdom in creating order in life.<sup>704</sup> Lewis accepts Kant's presuppositions on the independence of reason from nature.<sup>705</sup> Temple took mind as the clue to nature.<sup>706</sup> Ferm deduces mind from nature, but takes mind as nature's highest gift.<sup>707</sup>

Not infrequently those who take reason as the clue to personality affirm the immortality and God-likeness of reason. In Plato the eternal world is the realm of reason.<sup>708</sup> In Aristotle only the rational faculty of the soul is the immortal one.<sup>709</sup> Maimonides saw intellectual perfection as the highest goal of man, leading to immortality.<sup>710</sup> In his Code he substituted the eternity of the rational soul for the physical resurrection.<sup>711</sup> Spinoza averred that the human mind, sharing the eternal, cannot be destroyed,<sup>712</sup> since its essence is eternal.<sup>713</sup> Thus Stace sees mind and

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698. Burt, English, pp. xiii-xiv.  
699. Beck, op. cit., p. 107.  
700. Baillie, op. cit., p. 219.  
701. James, op. cit., pp. 105-106.  
702. Op. cit., p. 143.  
703. Ibid., p. 383.  
704. Op. cit., p. 10.  
705. C. S. Lewis, Miracles, pp. 33-36.  
706. Nature, pp. 129-134.  
707. Op. cit., p. 13.  
708. Burt, Types, p. 48.  
709. Ibid., pp. 57-58.  
710. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 305-306.  
711. Roth, op. cit., p. 32.  
712. Burt, Types, pp. 191-192.  
713. Baillie, op. cit., p. 218.

personality as the general symbols most adequate to represent God.<sup>714</sup>

English philosophy in particular has tended to be dominated by the practical temper.<sup>715</sup> British empiricists hold that knowledge is always partial and tentative and that our minds are not equal to grasping the totality of the universe.<sup>716</sup> Thus Temple saw no conflict between reason and submission to God.<sup>717</sup> It is entirely appropriate that reason, with lesser elements of human nature, should bow before the transcendent majesty of God.<sup>718</sup> Tennant observes without embarrassment that reason derives many of its premises from authority.<sup>719</sup>

Many moderns are found in this empiricist school on the relationship of reason to the total personality. Wieman seeks to demonstrate a creative process which transforms the human mind.<sup>720</sup> Though he disagrees with Christian leaders who say the divine source transcends reason, he does agree that reality as expressed in the order of events does transcend reason.<sup>721</sup> The structures known to the mind are perverted when they are assigned value apart from the deeper levels of value.<sup>722</sup> Mythology operates at a deeper level than intellect.<sup>723</sup> Tragic art liberates the mind to undergo the transformations of creativity.<sup>724</sup> Faith is not primarily knowledge but

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714. Op. cit., p. 98.

715. Burt, English, p. xiv.

716. Ibid., p. xv.

717. Nature, p. 20.

718. Ibid., p. 23.

719. Op. cit., p. 59.

720. The Source, p. 17.

721. Ibid., p. 32.

722. Ibid., p. 67.

723. Ibid., p. 144.

724. Ibid., p. 156.

self-giving; the experiment of faith involves total commitment.<sup>725</sup> Thus Sanatyana assigned reason to the realm of essence, where human experience is translated into the level of rational appreciation.<sup>726</sup>

Reason does not exist in a vacuum; balanced reason takes place in the context of full and rich experience and aims at the whole truth.<sup>727</sup> Christ reorients the life of reason toward God in the redeemed man.<sup>728</sup> In neo-orthodoxy reason is subordinate to reality.<sup>729</sup> Thus Tillich asserts the need for a theologian's commitment, if he is to gain knowledge.<sup>730</sup> Reason is just as much in need of salvation as are the other sides of man's nature and reality in general.<sup>731</sup> Brunner finds that responsibility to God, not reason, is the key to man's nature.<sup>732</sup> No one apart from a changed life can perceive the act of God in Christ.<sup>733</sup> In preaching, the power which accompanies the word is as important as "soundness of doctrine."<sup>734</sup> Existentialist Berdyaev says not reason, but the whole man, apprehends truth, whether it be religious revelation or scientific truth,<sup>735</sup> and that truth is always the product of human effort.<sup>736</sup> Ferré points out that reason always operates within the realm of whole response.<sup>737</sup> He quotes with approval Calvin's observation that ignorance of self distorts all other knowledge.<sup>738</sup>

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725. Martin, op. cit., p. 101.  
726. Wieman and Meland, American, p. 183.  
727. De Wolf, op. cit., pp. 205-07.  
728. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 214.  
729. Butler, op. cit., p. 362.  
730. Systematic, pp. 23-24.  
731. Ibid., pp. 154-55.  
732. Revelation, p. 35.  
733. Ibid., p. 115.  
734. Ibid., p. 157.  
735. Op. cit., pp. 19-20.  
736. Ibid., p. 27.  
737. Op. cit., p. 14.  
738. Ibid., p. 73.

The Limits of Human Reason

John Locke is usually credited with having originally set the fashion of assigning reasonable limits to the use of reason.<sup>739</sup> Locke denied the metaphysical competence of reason and confined the activity of reason to seeking out practically significant relationships.<sup>740</sup> In his famous Essay Concerning Human Understanding he sought to undermine religious dogma and promote tolerance.<sup>741</sup> Kant was careful to assert that the limits of reason do not imply irrationalism,<sup>742</sup> since the fundamental principles of reason outside of practical pure reason can be sufficiently tested by ordinary "common sense."<sup>743</sup>

In realistic philosophy reason is limited by the dependence of knowledge upon being,<sup>744</sup> which transcends intellect.<sup>745</sup> Modern reason in particular is limited by its loss of grasp of being.<sup>746</sup> Closely related to this realistic limitation is Temple's assertion that reason depends upon capacity to appreciate in apprehension.<sup>747</sup> Tillich stresses the negative side of being, or the threat of non-being, as the "shock" which shakes the structure of reason.<sup>748</sup>

The limits of human reason may be listed with respect to areas of knowledge which reason alone cannot penetrate, as follows: (1) reason cannot know God, (2) reason cannot express mystical experience, (3) reason

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739. Hocking, op. cit., p. 48.  
740. Burt, English, p. xv.  
741. Ibid., p. xviii.  
742. Beck, op. cit., p. 2.  
743. Ibid., p. 198.  
744. Maritain, op. cit., p. 12.  
745. Ibid., p. 87.  
746. Ibid., p. 186.  
747. Temple, Nature, p. 109.  
748. Systematic, p. 113.

cannot know God's essence, (4) reason cannot fathom the mysteries of the Christian faith, (5) reason cannot know ultimate origins, (6) reason cannot discern the meaning of the universe, (7) reason cannot explain evil, (8) reason cannot bring happiness, and (9) reason cannot penetrate time and space. Limits with respect to method of inquiry occur (1) in the scientific method and (2) in the laws of probability in general. Reason is limited by the situation in which it arises by (1) emotions, (2) experience, (3) freedom, and (4) society. General limits arising out of the nature of reason are found with respect to faith, religion, natural theology, and the effects of sin upon personality.

#### Reason Cannot Know God

Although Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, and Luther allowed that reason can know God,<sup>749</sup> there is an important tradition in the philosophy of religion that reason cannot know God. Duns Scotus maintained that we cannot know God by our natural gifts alone,<sup>750</sup> since we cannot reason from sense-data to God.<sup>751</sup> Luther asserted that reason cannot defend the Word of God<sup>752</sup> or anticipate God's grace.<sup>753</sup> Kant implied that reason cannot know God, freedom, and immortality, but must postulate them.<sup>754</sup> Ritschl, following Duns Scotus, said that reason has no capacity to find God and that religious belief is rooted exclusively in the practical side of human nature.<sup>755</sup>

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749. Supra, p. 34.  
750. Micklem, op. cit., p. 25.  
751. Ibid., p. 28.  
752. Kerr, op. cit., p. 4.  
753. Ibid., pp. 32-33.  
754. Beck, op. cit., p. 13.  
755. Tennant, op. cit., p. 116.

Modern existentialists agree among themselves that reason cannot grasp the absolute.<sup>756</sup> Berdyaev goes so far as to claim that all intellectual proofs for the existence of God are bankrupt.<sup>757</sup> Ducasse takes up the cudgel and puts theistic and satanistic hypotheses on a par as evidence.<sup>758</sup> He then declares that the cosmological argument for the existence of God is a logical monstrosity,<sup>759</sup> that Aquinas repudiated the ontological argument,<sup>760</sup> that the argument from design even as reformulated by Kant is defective,<sup>761</sup> and that the moral argument for the existence of God is wishful thinking.<sup>762</sup> In short, he dismisses all reasoning to God as "only attorney's arguments."<sup>763</sup>

Stace claims that God is not grasped by conceptual intellect, but by intuition.<sup>764</sup> This results from the difference in structure between the human mind and the divine mind,<sup>765</sup> the structure of our minds being such as to make them incapable of grasping God.<sup>766</sup> The infinite God is nothing to the finite conceptual intellect.<sup>767</sup> All proofs for the existence of God make God finite.<sup>768</sup> God is known only by faith,<sup>769</sup> since the Ultimate is neither logical nor illogical, but alogical.<sup>770</sup> God as totaliter alter is

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756. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 47.

757. Op. cit., p. 113.

758. Op. cit., p. 205.

759. Ibid., pp. 334-35.

760. Ibid., p. 340.

761. Ibid., p. 342.

762. Ibid., p. 349.

763. Ibid., pp. 349-50.

764. Op. cit., p. 41.

765. Ibid., pp. 43-44.

766. Ibid., pp. 44-45.

767. Ibid., p. 49.

768. Ibid., pp. 150-51.

769. Ibid., p. 152.

770. Ibid., p. 153.

incomprehensible.<sup>771</sup> Six intuitions support the inability of the intellect to comprehend God: (1) God is a mystery beyond all human understanding; (2) God gives peace which surpasses understanding; (3) the blessedness given by God is infinitely beyond natural happiness; (4) God is infinite; (5) God is eternal; and (6) God is the Void.<sup>772</sup> Hegelian logic failed, because the Ultimate cannot be comprehended by reason.<sup>773</sup>

Reason Cannot Express Mystical Experience

Maimonides confessed that his fallible understanding fell short of the higher mysteries.<sup>774</sup> William James observed that reason cannot fully express mystical experience, which goes beyond discursive intellect.<sup>775</sup> He cited the mystical state of the yoga, which gives facts beyond the reach of intellect.<sup>776</sup> Berdyaev attributes the difficulty of expressing mystical experience in rational thought to the fact that it lies beyond the sphere in which the laws of logic operate.<sup>777</sup> Stace asserts that the conceptual intellect fails completely to grasp the innumerable.<sup>778</sup> Mystical experience cannot be conceptualized by discursive intellect.<sup>779</sup> Radical mysticism makes a philosophy of religion impossible, notes Brunner, by abolishing the philosophical side of religion.<sup>780</sup> Mysticism, the domain of the irrational, leads to opposition to the world, where the holy is identified with non-reason.<sup>781</sup>

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771. Ibid., pp. 154-55.  
772. Ibid., p. 157.  
773. Ibid., p. 166.  
774. Roth, op. cit., p. 70.  
775. Op. cit., p. 371.  
776. Ibid., p. 391.  
777. Op. cit., p. 78.  
778. Op. cit., p. 24.  
779. Ibid., p. 39.  
780. Philosophy, pp. 102-03.  
781. Ibid., pp. 134-37.

Reason Cannot Know God's Essence

Maimonides held that, though God is revealed in the created world, His essence is unknowable.<sup>782</sup> Since God has no attributes apart from His essence, no description of God in terms of positive attributes is possible.<sup>783</sup> Thus God is describable only in terms of negative attributes, such as incorporeality.<sup>784</sup> Human reason cannot know the character of God's knowledge.<sup>785</sup> Kant agreed with the Reformers that natural theology is of limited value.<sup>786</sup> Brunner maintains that reason cannot know either the oneness or the personality of God.<sup>787</sup> The fragmentary quality of our knowledge of God is a stumbling-block to reason.<sup>788</sup>

Reason Cannot Fathom the Mysteries of the Christian Faith

The Holy Trinity is the beginning of mystery in the Christian faith. The majority of Christians have accepted the confession concerning the Holy Trinity found in the Athanasian Creed: "The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost incomprehensible . . . also there are not three incomprehensibles . . . but . . . one incomprehensible."<sup>789</sup> Thus Duns Scotus alleged that the argument from effect to cause never leads to the Trinity.<sup>790</sup> Luther in preaching on the Trinity said that reason can never discover the essence of the Trinity.<sup>791</sup> The Baltimore Catechism speaks of such mysteries as the Holy Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Redemption as

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782. Roth, op. cit., pp. 49-50.

783. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

784. Ibid., pp. 89-97.

785. Ibid., pp. 102, 104, and 219.

786. Brunner, Philosophy, p. 66.

787. Ibid., pp. 73-74 and 81-82.

788. Ibid., pp. 95-96.

789. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, volume 2, pp. 66-67.

790. Micklem, op. cit., p. 27.

791. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 37-39.

being "beyond anything man can know by his unaided powers of reason."<sup>792</sup>

Brunner asserts that the triune God as the content of the Christian faith is incomprehensible to reason.<sup>793</sup>

The second greatest mystery would appear to be man's destiny. Duns Scotus quarreled with Avicenna's proposition that the destiny of man can be deduced from the nature of man.<sup>794</sup> He argued that natural reason gives no assurance of the resurrection of the body.<sup>795</sup> David Hume in his essay Of the Immortality of the Soul concluded: "By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove the Immortality of the Soul. . . . The gospel alone has brought life and immortality to light."<sup>797</sup> The Christian hope is not a humanistic deduction,<sup>798</sup> and logic alone cannot persuade anyone of the reality of eternal life.<sup>799</sup> Maritain admits that the demonstration of the immortality of the soul is difficult, while instinctive grasp of this truth is easy.<sup>800</sup> It is at the question of the destiny of the immortal soul that the limit of natural reason becomes most apparent.<sup>801</sup>

Luther singled out for extended treatment four mysteries. Reason cannot comprehend the Ascension.<sup>802</sup> Reason cannot discover the blessedness of the people of God.<sup>803</sup> Reason cannot understand hereditary sin.<sup>804</sup> Reason

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792. Page 6.

793. Philosophy, p. 23.

794. Micklethorp, op. cit., pp. 17-18.

795. Ibid., pp. 69-70.

796. Kerr, op. cit., p. 235.

797. Quoted by Baillie, op. cit., p. 69.

798. Ibid., p. 188.

799. Ibid., p. 233.

800. Op. cit., p. 60.

801. Ibid., pp. 61-63.

802. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

803. Ibid., pp. 236-37.

804. Ibid., p. 84.

cannot discover the justice of God.<sup>805</sup> Other mysteries beyond the power of reason frequently mentioned in philosophies of religion are angels,<sup>806</sup> the historical Christ,<sup>807</sup> the crucifixion,<sup>808</sup> and miracle in general.<sup>809</sup>

#### Reason Cannot Know Ultimate Origins

Maimonides in his Guide sought to harmonize the statements of Scripture with the philosophy of Aristotle. He understood the traditional doctrine of creation to mean ex nihilo, but Aristotle held that the universe was eternal and uncreated. Which view is right? Maimonides concluded that reason cannot decide. Therefore the only thing to do is to rely upon Scripture.<sup>810</sup> Ferré says we know no ultimate origins, since the problem of origins goes beyond the competency of the human mind.<sup>811</sup> Brunner maintains that philosophy cannot legitimately deal with the problem of creation, since creation marks the limit of reason.<sup>812</sup> Wieman holds that both final outcomes and original beginnings are beyond the scope of our thinking.<sup>813</sup>

#### Reason Cannot Discern the Meaning of the Universe

Our restricted powers, according to Maimonides, cannot comprehend the ultimate ends of the universe, nor can they take an isolated portion and trace out all the connections which make up the vast whole.<sup>814</sup> Kant held that human reason is a finite and pragmatic instrument relatively adequate to cope with life, but not metaphysically competent.<sup>815</sup> Reason cannot

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805. Ibid., p. 235.

806. Baltimore Catechism, p. 30.

807. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 112 and 161.

808. William James, op. cit., p. 356.

809. Brunner, Revelation, pp. 302-03, and Wieman and Meland, American, p. 169.

810. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

811. Op. cit., p. 171.

812. Philosophy, pp. 82-83.

813. The Source, p. 92.

814. Roth, op. cit., p. 72.

815. Casserley, op. cit., p. 66.

comprehend existence.<sup>816</sup> It must be supplemented in order to comprehend reality.<sup>817</sup>

#### Reason Cannot Explain Evil

Dante said, "Don't reason about (evil), but give a glance and pass beyond."<sup>818</sup> Reason cannot explain evil in experience.<sup>819</sup> The logical intellect cannot penetrate the character of evil.<sup>821</sup>

#### Reason Cannot Bring Happiness

Duns Scotus showed that Aristotle in his Ethics (1. 13) did not claim to know man's end by the light of natural reason and asserted that happiness is divinely given.<sup>822</sup> Scotus admitted that if a substance were fully known in its proper essence its final cause could then be deduced from its nature, but our knowledge of human nature is so vague that man's destiny cannot be logically deduced.<sup>823</sup> Kant observed that reason does not necessarily bring happiness.<sup>824</sup> The rationalism of Bishop Butler's day falsely supposed that reason could set up an a priori ethical code,<sup>825</sup> but reason alone is not sufficient to control conduct.<sup>826</sup> William James concluded from psychological case studies that reasoning intellect by itself cannot establish the meaning of life.<sup>827</sup> Ferré points out that depth experience cannot be grasped by

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816. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 88.  
817. Tennant, op. cit., p. 116.  
818. Quoted by William James, op. cit., p. 105.  
819. De Wolf, op. cit., pp. 92-93.  
820. Stace, op. cit., p. 150.  
821. Brunner, Philosophy, pp. 187-88.  
822. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 9-10.  
823. Ibid., pp. 19-20.  
824. Beck, op. cit., pp. 56-57 and 78.  
825. Mossner, op. cit., p. 105.  
826. Ibid., p. 123.  
827. Op. cit., p. 181.

reason.<sup>828</sup> Jaspers notes that truth arrived at by reason does not always produce good results.<sup>829</sup> Wild admits that more than intellect is required to achieve virtuous life.<sup>830</sup> Brunner criticizes the Enlightenment religion of self-sufficient human reason as having no redeeming power.<sup>831</sup> Thomte expounds the commonplace that intellectual apprehension of doctrine cannot make a person a Christian.<sup>832</sup> Wieman describes traditional Christianity as teaching that when despair leads man to trust the grace of God alone and not reason, it opens the way to life's fulfilment.<sup>833</sup>

#### Reason Cannot Penetrate Time and Space

Time has no meaning with reference to God, Maimonides insisted, since He is timeless and spaceless.<sup>834</sup> Luther observed that reason can discern time only according to its duration and cannot penetrate time obliquely, as God does.<sup>835</sup> Descartes was unable to analyze rational intellect in terms of extension and motion.<sup>836</sup> Reason requires time to control material means.<sup>837</sup> Tillich's analysis of reason leads to the discovery of finitude, but reason cannot answer the question implied in human finitude.<sup>838</sup> H. Richard Niebuhr limits reasoning to particular time and place,<sup>839</sup> but proclaims that speculative reason is not bound by time.<sup>840</sup>

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828. Op. cit., pp. 17-18.  
829. Op. cit., p. 51.  
830. Op. cit., p. 98.  
831. Revelation, p. 234.  
832. Op. cit., p. 171.  
833. The Source, p. 49.  
834. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 98-99.  
835. Kerr, op. cit., p. 238.  
836. Burt, Types, p. 178.  
837. Maritain, op. cit., pp. 203-04.  
838. Systematic, pp. 82 and 64.  
839. Op. cit., p. 237.  
840. Ibid., p. 246.

The Limits of the Scientific Method

Although the methods of human reason in philosophies of religion with reference to the types of inquiry in which they occur are (1) philosophical, (2) scientific, (3) theological, and (4) historical;<sup>841</sup> the limits of only one of these, that is, the scientific method, are singled out for detailed scrutiny in philosophies of religion.

Duns Scotus began to limit natural science with his assertion that the study of nature can never provide data sufficient to construct a metaphysics.<sup>842</sup> Francis Bacon, pioneer in the inductive method of interpreting nature, refused to test theology by empirical method, asserting that theology was outside the proper sphere for induction.<sup>843</sup> William Temple notes that the scientific method is of limited value in art and ethics,<sup>844</sup> that science in proportion as it becomes mathematical becomes indifferent to time,<sup>845</sup> and that science always deals in generalizations.<sup>846</sup>

Urban observes that the narrowing of human reason to scientific method leads to pseudo-rationalism,<sup>847</sup> that scientific reason cannot lead us to God,<sup>847</sup> and that even scientific appeal to facts rests upon evaluation.<sup>848</sup> Maritain calls attention to the well-defined field to which science refers,<sup>849</sup> asserts that the field of science is not the knowledge of being,<sup>849</sup> and observes that intellect patterned in habits of technology is not a normal

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841. Supra, pp. 35-38.  
842. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 18-19.  
843. Mossner, op. cit., p. 38.  
844. Nature, p. 53.  
845. Ibid., p. 87.  
846. Ibid., pp. 143-44.  
847. Op. cit., p. 37.  
848. Ibid., pp. 46-47.  
849. Op. cit., p. 6.

climate for faith.<sup>850</sup> Jaspers sees as limits that the reliability of the scientific attitude depends upon its methodological presuppositions,<sup>851</sup> that the extent of scientific knowledge is limited by its methodology,<sup>852</sup> that science cannot explain its own meaning,<sup>853</sup> and that the choice of subjects for scientific research cannot be derived from science.<sup>854</sup> De Wolf says the limits of the scientific method are that it cannot evaluate faith,<sup>855</sup> it is weakest in discovering worthwhile goals,<sup>856</sup> it cannot deal with value,<sup>857</sup> and it overvalues sense-data.<sup>858</sup>

Ferre lists thirteen limits of the scientific method: (1) scientific method is tentative,<sup>859</sup> (2) science is descriptive rather than normative,<sup>860</sup> (3) scientific method tends to deny freedom,<sup>861</sup> (4) scientific method cannot deal with motivation,<sup>862</sup> (5) its objectivity is a limitation,<sup>863</sup> (6) the ideal method of science results in oversimplification in the social sciences,<sup>864</sup> (7) science cannot explain purpose,<sup>865</sup> (8) scientific method cannot deal with the ultimate,<sup>866</sup> (9) scientific method tends to promote relativism,<sup>867</sup> (10) scientific method tends to stress analysis and criticism rather

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850. Ibid., pp. 210-11.  
851. Op. cit., p. 28.  
852. Ibid., p. 29.  
853. Ibid., p. 31.  
854. Ibid., p. 33.  
855. Op. cit., pp. 189-90.  
856. Ibid., p. 191.  
857. Ibid., pp. 192-93.  
858. Ibid., pp. 193-94.  
859. Op. cit., p. 55.  
860. Ibid., p. 61.  
861. Ibid., p. 65.  
862. Ibid., p. 70.  
863. Ibid., p. 72.  
864. Ibid., p. 74.  
865. Ibid., pp. 76-77.  
866. Ibid., p. 79.  
867. Ibid., p. 84.

than appreciation and creativity,<sup>868</sup> (11) science is pluralistic in that its branches are not unified,<sup>869</sup> (12) science tends to reduce content to fit method,<sup>870</sup> and (13) scientific method tends to split value from existence.<sup>871</sup> Sinnott admits that science cannot deal with spiritual truths,<sup>872</sup> it assumes the uniformity of nature,<sup>873</sup> it can analyze but hardly synthesize,<sup>874</sup> its final implications are not clear,<sup>875</sup> and its results are sure only within its limited field.<sup>876</sup> Sinnott qualifies all of this, however, by saying that the limits of science are not yet known.<sup>877</sup> Richardson notes that the ideals of natural science are inappropriate to human science,<sup>878</sup> that scientific method cannot lead to metaphysical truth,<sup>879</sup> that science cannot validate its own categories,<sup>879</sup> that the categories of science require skilful use of imagination in their construction,<sup>880</sup> and that science is based upon an act of faith.<sup>881</sup>

Important limits of the scientific method occur in other philosophies of religion but not with the precision in which they are found in the above-mentioned works.<sup>882</sup>

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868. Ibid., pp. 90-91.

869. Ibid., p. 92.

870. Ibid., p. 93.

871. Ibid., p. 94.

872. Op. cit., p. 76.

873. Ibid., pp. 77-78.

874. Ibid., p. 73.

875. Ibid., p. 139.

876. Ibid., p. 207.

877. Ibid., p. 204.

878. Op. cit., p. 12.

879. Ibid., p. 34.

880. Ibid., p. 46.

881. Ibid., p. 48.

882. See Brunner, Philosophy, p. 172; Burt, English, pp. xi-xii; Hough, op. cit., pp. 36 and 43; James, op. cit., pp. 193, 480, and 488; Myers, op. cit., p. 9; Tillich, Systematic, pp. 74 and 153; Wieman, The Source, pp. 31-32; and Wild, op. cit., p. 394.

Probability and Tentativeness

Maimonides pointed to the dulling of the intellect by overstrain<sup>883</sup> and the difference in intellectual capacities between one person and another<sup>884</sup> as evidence of the inexact boundaries of reason. Duns Scotus argued that, since God causes contingently, the knowledge of Him given by reason is only relative.<sup>885</sup> Luther observed that reason cannot say why a mathematical proposition is true, but can only observe that it is true by common consent.<sup>886</sup> Kant confined practical reason to a small realm of practical certainty in human ethics.<sup>887</sup>

William Temple remarked that the rules of inductive inference cannot give certainty,<sup>888</sup> that thinking is grounded in the process of adjustment,<sup>889</sup> that knowledge is not an absolute value,<sup>890</sup> that reason is not identical in all men,<sup>891</sup> and that true apprehension of reality comes only at the end of the mental process.<sup>892</sup> De Wolf concludes from his examination of "The Religious Revolt Against Reason" that reason demands commitment to the most probable truth.<sup>893</sup> Sinnott notes that reason in religion offers only probability, not certainty,<sup>894</sup> that reason is useless as a guide beyond a certain point,<sup>895</sup> that we know God only in part,<sup>896</sup> and that the finite mind cannot know what ultimate truth is.<sup>897</sup> Therefore reason and spiritual insight must

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883. Cohen, op. cit., p. 251.  
884. Ibid., p. 256.  
885. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 27-28.  
886. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 152-53.  
887. Beck, op. cit., p. 7.  
888. Nature, p. 90.  
889. Ibid., pp. 128-29.  
890. Ibid., p. 138.  
891. Ibid., p. 140.  
892. Ibid., pp. 147-48.  
893. Op. cit., p. 186.  
894. Op. cit., p. 40.  
895. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

must proclaim truth tentatively.<sup>898</sup>

Jaspers observes that truth is always bound in some way with untruth,<sup>899</sup> that reason requires continuous questioning and critical appropriation,<sup>900</sup> that reason depends upon putting itself into practice,<sup>901</sup> that reason is intangible,<sup>902</sup> and that reason does not work automatically.<sup>903</sup> Stace describes the nature of intellect as being involved in subject-object relationship,<sup>903</sup> tries to discover how our minds are finite,<sup>904</sup> and notes that no mind can be mathematically infinite.<sup>905</sup> Tillich asserts that reason is clear in essence but opaque in existence,<sup>906</sup> that finitude is essential to reason,<sup>907</sup> that heteronomy is part of reason,<sup>908</sup> and that the conflict between autonomy and heteronomy is the key to the history of philosophy.<sup>909</sup>

Brightman agrees with St. Paul<sup>910</sup> that no knowledge is certain.<sup>911</sup> Brunner maintains that reason is always relative, never pure.<sup>912</sup> Butler notes the limits of induction and deduction.<sup>913</sup> Casserley observes that our intellect cannot know any reality exhaustively.<sup>914</sup> Dusasse points out

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896. Ibid., p. 199.  
897. Ibid., p. 206.  
898. Ibid., p. 213.  
899. Op. cit., p. 51.  
900. Ibid., p. 52.  
901. Ibid., p. 65.  
902. Ibid., pp. 77-78.  
903. Op. cit., p. 40.  
904. Ibid., p. 46.  
905. Ibid., pp. 59-60.  
906. Systematic, p. 80.  
907. Ibid., p. 81.  
908. Ibid., p. 84.  
909. Ibid., pp. 85-86.  
910. I Corinthians 13:12b.  
911. Op. cit., p. 166.  
912. Philosophy, p. 99.  
913. Op. cit., p. 512.  
914. Op. cit., pp. 40-41.

that most people have limited capacity for abstract thought.<sup>915</sup> Henry Dodwell Jr. in 1742 published Christianity Not Founded on Argument, asserting that reason is an unavoidable imperfection of the intellectual operation.<sup>917</sup> Tennant observes that logic cannot certify the postulates of inductive reasoning.<sup>918</sup> George F. Thomas warns that Christian faith, while using philosophy, must be aware of the limits of every philosophy.<sup>919</sup> Wieman says that the human mind must submit to tests in order to discover the probability of error.<sup>920</sup> Wild, however, denies that reason is strictly amendable to quantitative measurement.<sup>921</sup>

Reason Limited by the Quality of the Emotions

The general relationship of emotion to reason has already been outlined.<sup>922</sup> Reason cannot elicit the passion of love.<sup>923</sup> Reason cannot predict what emotion an object will arouse.<sup>924</sup> Reason must be supplemented, Brightman alleges, by a satisfactory feeling-tone.<sup>925</sup> Reason must be motivated by love.<sup>926</sup> Lack of love leads to blindness and miscalculation.<sup>927</sup>

Thought is closely linked to desire<sup>928</sup> and is at first a servant of the organism.<sup>929</sup> Animal urges often defeat reason.<sup>930</sup> The passions must be

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915. Op. cit., p. 257.  
916. Mossner, op. cit., p. 142.  
917. Op. cit., p. 107.  
918. Op. cit., pp. 42-43.  
919. Myers, op. cit., p. 35.  
920. The Source, p. 211.  
921. Op. cit., pp. 4-5-06.  
922. Supra, pp. 45-50.  
923. William James, op. cit., pp. 147-48.  
924. Ibid., p. 147.  
925. Wieman and Meland, American, pp. 144-45.  
926. Jaspers, op. cit., pp. 44-45.  
927. Maritain, op. cit., p. 153.  
928. Temple, Nature, pp. 139-40.  
929. Ibid., p. 141.  
930. Sinnott, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

rationalized in order to employ theoretical reason.<sup>931</sup> Although reason is not competent to guide the will,<sup>932</sup> reason cannot release man from the necessity to decide.<sup>933</sup> The failure to decide works against reason.<sup>934</sup>

Reason Controlled by Experience

Maimonides, rationalist that he was, avowed that reason cannot know what is beyond nature.<sup>935</sup> Duns Scotus agreed that reason cannot go beyond natural knowledge derived from the senses.<sup>936</sup> Urban accuses Hume of having reduced reason to experimental reasoning<sup>937</sup> and of having abandoned the classical conception of natural reason.<sup>938</sup> Temple quoted Aristotle's Posterior Analytics to the effect that reason is conditioned by adjustment of the organism to environment,<sup>939</sup> and pointed out that mind is correlated with the world it apprehends.<sup>940</sup> Kant averred that pure reason cannot go beyond possible experience.<sup>941</sup> Bishop Butler asserted that God instructs man through experience rather than reason.<sup>942</sup>

Reason cannot be separated from our experience of reality.<sup>943</sup> Intellect cannot function without sense experience;<sup>944</sup> it needs the senses to see the particular.<sup>945</sup> Logical intellect operates only within the natural order.<sup>946</sup> Reason is conditioned by response to stimuli.<sup>947</sup> Reason without observation

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931. Wild, op. cit., p. 114.  
932. Beck, op. cit., pp. 57-58.  
933. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 233.  
934. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 75.  
935. Cohen, op. cit., p. 255.  
936. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 20-21.  
937. Urban, op. cit., p. 36.  
938. Ibid., p. 163.  
939. Nature, pp. 106-07.  
940. Ibid., p. 129.  
941. Beck, op. cit., p. 155.  
942. Mossner, op. cit., p. 96.  
943. Butler, op. cit., pp. 253-54  
944. Sheen, op. cit., p. 85.  
945. Ibid., p. 115.

can yield no knowledge of events.<sup>948</sup> The mind cannot develop except as the knowable and appreciable world develops.<sup>949</sup> The exercise of the intellect may be impeded by warped senses and imagination.<sup>950</sup>

Reason Depends Upon Freedom

Maimonides was agnostic on the problem of man's free will versus the foreknowledge of God.<sup>951</sup> Luther emphatically asserted that reason leads to the doctrine of Divine predestination.<sup>952</sup> Kant asserted both freedom and determinism. Practical reason requires the concept of freedom,<sup>953</sup> theoretical reason must assume the possibility of freedom,<sup>954</sup> and the concept of freedom is the regulative principle of reason.<sup>955</sup> Yet reason requires at least sufficient causality,<sup>956</sup> it cannot discern the possibility of freedom,<sup>957</sup> it is compelled to assume unconditional necessity,<sup>958</sup> the moral law defines a reason which determines the will through ideas,<sup>954</sup> reason cannot explain the possibility of free will,<sup>959</sup> and it cannot fully explain the nature of human responsibility.<sup>960</sup> Jaspers says the decisive fact about reason is that it arises from freedom;<sup>961</sup> furthermore, the power of self-preservation in reason is realized as freedom.<sup>962</sup> Whitehead in his Concept of Nature emphasizes that reason is inexplicable apart from effective purpose.<sup>963</sup>

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946. Stace, op. cit., pp. 148-49.  
947. Wieman and Meland, American, p. 13.  
948. Wieman, The Source, p. 187.  
949. Ibid., pp. 200-01.  
950. Wild, op. cit., p. 86.  
951. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 217-18,  
952. Kerr, op. cit., pp. 34-35.  
953. Beck, op. cit., p. 118.  
954. Ibid., p. 158.  
955. Ibid., pp. 158-59.  
956. Ibid., p. 13.  
957. Ibid., p. 115.  
958. Ibid., pp. 116-17.

Reason Conditioned by Society

No individual knows what the good of the human race is, since our human faculties cannot adequately observe or define society.<sup>964</sup> Reason alone cannot establish a better world.<sup>965</sup> Wieman's "creative event" produces a structure which could not be intended by the human mind before the structure emerges.<sup>966</sup> The subrational structure of culture cannot be intellectually formulated except superficially.<sup>967</sup> Reason cannot direct interactions at the cultural matrix.<sup>968</sup> Art, for example, is the expression of creative powers which no human mind can shape or master.<sup>969</sup> Only a small part of the vast complexity of events is knowable.<sup>970</sup> Our social structure is too deep and pervasive for intellectual formulation.<sup>971</sup> Although common reason undergirds group life,<sup>972</sup> reason is culturally conditioned,<sup>972a</sup> since reason is involved with culture in the movement of history.<sup>973</sup> Thus reasoning is historically and culturally relative.<sup>974</sup> This dependence of reason upon society, however, does not deny the objectivity of eternal reason.<sup>975</sup> Two radical perversions based upon the cultural conditioning of reason are Marxism<sup>976</sup> and Freudianism.<sup>977</sup>

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959. Ibid., p. 180.  
960. Ibid., p. 205.  
961. Op. cit., p. 50.  
962. Ibid., p. 92.  
963. Quoted by Ferré, op. cit., p. 78.  
964. Temple, Personality, p. 62.  
965. Sinnott, op. cit., p. 50.  
966. The Source, p. 75.  
967. Ibid., p. 147.  
968. Ibid., pp. 148-49.  
969. Ibid., p. 151.  
970. Ibid., p. 166.  
971. Ibid., p. 254.  
972. H. Richard Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 137.

The Limits of Natural Theology

Brunner's criticisms of natural theology do not destroy its value, but point to its limits, as follows: (1) The proofs for the existence of God are usually accepted or rejected upon the basis of non-rational factors. (2) These proofs were designed primarily to convince persons without faith and to strengthen those persons assailed by doubts. (3) These proofs, in common with all theological knowledge, are expressed in abstract conceptual terms and not in terms of the living God of faith. (4) Although the cosmological and teleological proofs are found in Plato and Aristotle, the development of these proofs has been influenced by the needs of Christian apologetics.<sup>978</sup> Maimonides had asserted that theology as a science can do no more than negate false views.<sup>979</sup> Thomas Aquinas confided excessively in reason in his natural theology.<sup>980</sup> Burttt has noted that the changed meaning of scientific categories cast doubt upon the validity of natural theology.<sup>981</sup>

Brunner notes that philosophy of religion contradicts every actual religion,<sup>982</sup> and that there is no such thing as the essence of religion.<sup>983</sup> Stace, using Kantian logic, asserts that reason cannot prove or disprove religion,<sup>984</sup> and notes a circular quality in all religious reasoning.<sup>985</sup>

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- 972a. Ibid., p. 145.  
973. Ibid., p. 146.  
974. Ibid., p. 236.  
975. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 18.  
976. Ibid., p. 18; Maritain, op. cit., pp. 200-01; and Tillich, Courage, p. 98.  
977. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 24.  
978. Myers, op. cit., pp. 39-41.  
979. Roth, op. cit., p. 63.  
980. Myers, op. cit., p. 46.  
981. Types, p. 168.  
982. Philosophy, pp. 103-04.  
983. Ibid., p. 105.  
984. Op. cit., p. 136.  
985. Ibid., pp. 140-41.

Of course, for those who place reason and revelation in conflict,<sup>986</sup> there is no place for natural theology. Thus Kierkegaard used Abraham's readiness to sacrifice Isaac<sup>987</sup> as an illustration of how faith contradicts reason<sup>988</sup> and of how faith and reason are irreconcilable.<sup>989</sup> Thus also Brunner's ambiguous attitude toward natural theology proceeds from his position that all assertions of faith are paradoxes.<sup>990</sup>

If reason, as De Wolf maintains, requires the dependence of reason upon faith,<sup>991</sup> natural theology will always appear in only a decidedly subordinate position. Modern Augustinians who hold that reason must be justified by faith<sup>992</sup> likewise radically limit the role of natural theology. Even Ferré, who stresses the continuity of functions between faith and reason, admits that reason is inadequate to the central problem of human motivation;<sup>993</sup> thus natural theology cannot influence the bent of a person's will.

#### Reason Marred by Sin

Duns Scotus asserted that reason has been perverted through the Fall and that therefore our knowledge necessarily remains imperfect.<sup>994</sup> Luther, in his commentary on Genesis, concluded that since the Fall reason is not sound and cannot comprehend the image of God.<sup>995</sup> Temple, though he questioned the historicity of the Fall, observed that we are fallen in that of ourselves we can do nothing but stay where we are.<sup>996</sup> Brunner notes that reason tends

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986. Supra, pp. 24-29.

987. Genesis 22:1-19.

988. Blackham, op. cit., p. 5.

989. Ibid., p. 3.

990. Philosophy, p. 96.

991. Ibid., p. 186.

992. Richardson, op. cit., p. 36.

993. Op. cit., p. 226.

994. Micklem, op. cit., p. 43.

995. Kerr, op. cit., p. 81.

996. Personality, p. 38.

to intensify man's inherent perversity.<sup>997</sup> Reason, the mirror of God, is spoilt and split.<sup>998</sup> Mysticism overlooks the sin of the creature.<sup>999</sup>

Burttt notes that extreme Augustinianism denied all competence to fallen human reason,<sup>1000</sup> and that Protestant fundamentalism with its emphasis upon consciousness of sin distrusts natural reason.<sup>1001</sup> Casserley says the extreme view of the Fall completely cuts off intellect from all ultimate reality and truth, whereas in the moderate view man's intellect is merely injured.<sup>1002</sup> De Wolf observes that doubt is caused by sin and cannot be cured by reason.<sup>1003</sup> Ferré has studied the manner in which self-seeking distorts reason,<sup>1004</sup> and concludes that reason is right only when it is free from the distortion of selfishness.<sup>1005</sup> Maritain asserts that the awakening of reason in sinful man is gradual.<sup>1006</sup>

George F. Thomas notes that theology is the work of finite and fallible human reason obscured and distorted by sin.<sup>1007</sup> Lewis M. Hammond admits that sinful reason must be enlightened in order to handle theology.<sup>1008</sup> Barth asserts that human reason is so totally depraved that it is completely opposed to the order of faith and grace, and therefore limited to the depraved order of nature.<sup>1009</sup> H. Richard Niebuhr says unredeemed reason does not perceive itself as under the rule of Christ,<sup>1010</sup> and quotes Augustine to the

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997. Philosophy, p. 81.  
998. Ibid., p. 97.  
999. Ibid., pp. 110-11.  
1000. Types, p. 144.  
1001. Ibid., p. 149.  
1002. Op. cit., p. xvii.  
1003. Op. cit., p. 84.  
1004. Op. cit., p. 234.  
1005. Ibid., p. 247.  
1006. Op. cit., p. 72.  
1007. Myers, op. cit., p. 55.  
1008. Ibid., p. 85.  
1009. Ibid., pp. 80-81.  
1010. Op. cit., p. 192.

effect that sin confuses the ordered pattern of man's rational and emotional nature.<sup>1011</sup>

### The Uses of Human Reason

In philosophies of religion the uses of human reason are usually not outlined or discussed in any systematic form. References to the uses of reason are here collected and classified according to the fields of endeavor in which they occur.

### Apologetics

Boyle in The Christian Virtuoso (1690) saw science as providing apologetics for religion in the arguments from design and final cause.<sup>1012</sup> William James noted that reason finds arguments for convictions established upon some other basis.<sup>1013</sup> Brunner admits that reason is necessary for intelligible communication,<sup>1014</sup> and that Christ is communicated through teaching.<sup>1015</sup> Burttt describes reason as the primary court of appeal in apologetics directed toward non-Christians.<sup>1016</sup> Casserley avows that reason seeks to banish doubts in order to establish certainty.<sup>1017</sup> De Wolf maintains that the internal meaning of a system of belief concerning existence cannot be supported independently of all rational grounds,<sup>1018</sup> that faith must be commended by work or example as an appeal to reason,<sup>1019</sup> that in the history of religion all advance is based upon reason,<sup>1020</sup> and that Christian-

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1011. Ibid., p. 211.  
1012. Mossner, op. cit., p. 34.  
1013. Op. cit., p. 426.  
1014. Revelation, pp. 16-17.  
1015. Ibid., p. 151.  
1016. Types, pp. 88-89.  
1017. Op. cit., pp. 104-05.  
1018. Op. cit., pp. 142-44.  
1019. Ibid., pp. 148-49.  
1020. Ibid., p. 151.

ity needs the services of reason in order to restate theological doctrines in language meaningful to this age.<sup>1021</sup>

Maritain sees the role of reason in apologetics as the overcoming of atheism.<sup>1022</sup> According to Richardson, the Christian and the humanist must show how knowledge outside natural science is possible,<sup>1023</sup> and apologetics seeks to show that faith does not contradict general knowledge.<sup>1024</sup> Sinnott avers that we must discover a common basis of enlightened belief.<sup>1025</sup> Stace notes that reason interprets to the intellect the discoveries of faith by means of symbolic propositions.<sup>1026</sup> Thomas declares that, despite Barth, apologetics is needed for the Church's mission to those outside the Church.<sup>1027</sup> Urban interprets Hegel as having shown that philosophy culminates in an apologetic for Christian theism.<sup>1028</sup>

#### Critique of Revelation

Knowledge tests apocalypse, noted Baillie.<sup>1029</sup> Berdayaev has refined this observation in his statement that reason judges not revelation but man's reception and understanding of revelation.<sup>1030</sup> He adds that reason is needed to correct the human elements in revelation,<sup>1031</sup> revelation is purified by criticism,<sup>1032</sup> and Biblical criticism liberates and cleanses Christian

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1021. Ibid., p. 154.  
1022. Op. cit., p. 100.  
1023. Op. cit., p. 15.  
1024. Ibid., p. 19.  
1025. Op. cit., p. 21.  
1026. Op. cit., p. 152.  
1027. Myers, op. cit., p. 50.  
1028. Op. cit., p. 40.  
1029. Op. cit., p. 243.  
1030. Op. cit., p. 8.  
1031. Ibid., p. 50.  
1032. Ibid., p. 59.

faith.<sup>1033</sup> Brightman reminds us that Socrates and Plato urged the testing of religious traditions by reason,<sup>1034</sup> that religious believers use reason to criticize religious aberrations,<sup>1035</sup> that the Church used rational judgment to meet the Gnostics and the Montanists,<sup>1036</sup> and that reason is the Supreme Court in matters of desire.<sup>1037</sup>

Brunner has eulogized a long list of martyrs on the side of reason in its legitimate controversy with faith.<sup>1038</sup> He notes that historical criticism of the Biblical revelation (1) destroys the cosmology in the book of Genesis, but not the vital truths contained in the concepts of creation, original revelation, the Fall, and the Covenant;<sup>1039</sup> (2) has not essentially changed the Biblical picture of the history of Israel;<sup>1040</sup> and favors the Synoptics over John as historical records.<sup>1041</sup> Burttt observes that the contradictions in the writings of the early Church fathers necessitated the use of rational analysis.<sup>1042</sup> J. Donald Butler points out that philosophy uses religious experience as one source of data for interpretation,<sup>1043</sup> that philosophy helps to refine religious belief,<sup>1044</sup> and that idealism finds value in the refinement of religion by reason.<sup>1045</sup>

De Wolf asserts that reason is needed to distinguish between true and false revelations<sup>1046</sup> and to assimilate discoveries made by Biblical schol-

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1033. Ibid., p. 89.  
1034. Op. cit., p. 451.  
1035. Ibid., p. 453.  
1036. Ibid., p. 457.  
1037. Ibid., p. 470.  
1038. Revelation, p. 277.  
1039. Ibid., pp. 286-87.  
1040. Ibid., pp. 287-88.  
1041. Ibid., p. 288.  
1042. Types, pp. 87-88.  
1043. Op. cit., pp. 7-8.  
1044. Ibid., p. 8.  
1045. Ibid., p. 251.  
1046. Op. cit., p. 146.

ars,<sup>1047</sup> and that reason offers a court of non-violent appeal.<sup>1048</sup> Ducasse observes with satisfaction that philosophical scrutiny tends to remove stupidity and error in religion,<sup>1049</sup> but complains that the purgation of religion by science deals only with the accidentals of religion.<sup>1050</sup> Ferré concludes that faith and reason challenge and check each other.<sup>1051</sup> Noting emotional elements in revelation, Ferm declares that reason must appraise emotions,<sup>1052</sup> that intelligence is man's only safeguard against foolhardy beliefs,<sup>1053</sup> and that reason is a reliable guide with respect to emotions in religion.<sup>1054</sup> William James observed how intellect delivers the saint from devotion to paltry ideals.<sup>1055</sup> C. S. Lewis affirms that rational thought sets valid limits to possible beliefs.<sup>1056</sup>

Sinnott reduces the essence of the Bible according to the liberal to one sentence. "There would be left the magnificent story of Creation, the development of a lofty conception of God, the sublime poetry of the Psalms, the deep spiritual and social messages of the Prophets, and especially the regenerative power of the teachings of Jesus for the lives of men," he says. He then declares that this essence is acceptable to reason.<sup>1057</sup> He then notices that reason opposes second-hand faith<sup>1058</sup> and leads to reduction of

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1047. Ibid., pp. 156-57.  
1048. Ibid., p. 158.  
1049. Op. cit., p. 419.  
1050. Ibid., p. 420.  
1051. Op. cit., pp. 228-29.  
1052. Op. cit., p. 16.  
1053. Ibid., p. 56.  
1054. Ibid., p. 63.  
1055. Op. cit., p. 362.  
1056. Op. cit., p. 26.  
1057. Op. cit., p. 166.  
1058. Ibid., p. 183.

a wide range of overbeliefs.<sup>1059</sup> Tennant observes that the faculty of reason, provided one leaves the word "reason" conveniently vague, is the only instrument for testing whether beliefs are true or false.<sup>1060</sup> However, he also stresses that the intellectual element is one of several factors which make belief possible.<sup>1061</sup> Temple said reason must set religion in the context of man's general knowledge.<sup>1062</sup> Thomte notes the role of reason in clearing the ground for the transition to a higher type of religion.<sup>1063</sup> Tillich calls attention to the cognitive function of ontological reason in developing the concept of revelation.<sup>1064</sup> He also shows how scientific explanation, historical criticism, and rational criticism in general prepare for the reception of and protect revelation.<sup>1065</sup> Wieman notes that knowledge is needed to guide faith in the service of creative good.<sup>1066</sup>

#### Distinguishing Reality

Butler interprets Dewey's assertion that reason in man is a disclosure of a characteristic of Nature.<sup>1067</sup> Fairbairn saw reason as the faculty which sees and feels the mysteries of nature.<sup>1068</sup> Jaspers says reason is always timely, because it brings to light what is eternally true.<sup>1069</sup> Maritain criticizes the irrationalism of much modern existentialism by asserting that true existentialism is a work of reason.<sup>1070</sup> Tennant notes

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1059. Ibid., p. 219.  
1060. Op. cit., p. 25.  
1061. Ibid., p. 106.  
1062. Nature, p. 11.  
1063. Op. cit., p. 153.  
1064. Systematic, p. 94.  
1065. Ibid., pp. 117-18 and 140.  
1066. The Source, p. 48.  
1067. Op. cit., p. 435.  
1068. Op. cit., p. 8.  
1069. Op. cit., pp. 80-81.  
1070. Op. cit., p. 87.

that Kant's ideas of reason yield no knowledge, but do unify knowledge.<sup>1071</sup> Wieman claims that the proper use of reason is to distinguish any concrete reality from another.<sup>1072</sup> Wild deduces from the evolutionary philosophy of Aristotle that reason enables man to identify himself with being and thus understand the universe.<sup>1073</sup>

#### Finding Truth

Maimonides asserted that the function of the intellect is to discriminate between the true and the false.<sup>1074</sup> Brunner admits the autonomy of reason in the world and says it is our duty to seek to gain all the knowledge we can by using our reason.<sup>1075</sup> Butler quotes Mary Whiton Calkins to the effect that reason must bring us to some all-inclusive whole.<sup>1076</sup> Ferré distinguishes between religion as whole-response and reason as interpretation.<sup>1077</sup> Lynn Harold Hough ascribes to the critical humanist the declaration that the mind is an instrument for finding truth.<sup>1078</sup> Jaspers finds hope amid the uncertainties of life in reason, which makes it possible to experience selfhood and meaning, within limits.<sup>1079</sup> Maritain quotes Aquinas to the effect that the object of intellect is to grasp the essence of objects.<sup>1080</sup> Temple observed that reason is used not primarily to distinguish between certainty and probability, but to distinguish between degrees of probability.<sup>1081</sup> Through these degrees the mind discovers value as beauty,

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1071. Op. cit., p. 74.  
1072. The Source, p. 33.  
1073. Op. cit., p. 138.  
1074. Cohen, op. cit., p. 249.  
1075. Revelation, p. 177.  
1076. Op. cit., p. 174.  
1077. Op. cit., p. 247.  
1078. Op. cit., pp. 38-39.  
1079. Op. cit., pp. 83-84.  
1080. Op. cit., pp. 54-55.  
1081. Nature, p. 84.

truth, or goodness.<sup>1082</sup>

Knowledge of God

Maimonides held that intellect is the connecting link between God and man,<sup>1083</sup> and that the imitation of God follows upon intellectual perfection.<sup>1084</sup> Brightman asserts that experience, revelation, and faith as three typical ways of knowing God imply the use of reason,<sup>1085</sup> and shows how Job tried to understand his belief in God.<sup>1086</sup> Brunner admits that God is not present except through ideas, and that it is only when a person is taught rightly about God that his heart is rightly turned toward Him.<sup>1087</sup> Butler says philosophy contributes to religion by studying the human thought and experience which receive the impact of the Divine.<sup>1088</sup> Hammond asserts that God is the proper object of the intellect.<sup>1089</sup>

In Aristotle reason seeks the excellence which is characteristic of God.<sup>1090</sup> Roman Catholic philosophy asserts that reason points out the truth that there is a God.<sup>1091</sup> Maritain quotes Aquinas to the effect that the human intellect naturally tends to rise to the knowledge of God,<sup>1092</sup> and to the effect that reason is one of three ways to Christ, the other two being Holy Scripture and preaching.<sup>1093</sup> Sheen sees intellect as the link between the world and God.<sup>1094</sup> Urban qualifies reason's testimony to God with the

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1082. Ibid., p. 164.  
1083. Cohen, op. cit., p. 246.  
1084. Ibid., p. 306.  
1085. Op. cit., pp. 182-83.  
1086. Ibid., p. 196.  
1087. Revelation, pp. 151-52.  
1088. Op. cit., p. 8.  
1089. Myers, op. cit., p. 96.  
1090. Burtt, Types, p. 56.  
1091. Baltimore, p. 396.  
1092. Op. cit., p. 13.  
1093. Ibid., pp. 208-09.  
1094. Op. cit., p. 3.

admission that reason tells us that what is said of God is sometimes symbolical or allegorical.<sup>1095</sup> Rufus Jones asserted that reason organizes experience and leads to awareness of God.<sup>1096</sup> Wild in discussing reason as an instrument of grace avows that Divine grace never bypasses reason.<sup>1097</sup>

#### Moral Philosophy

Spinoza alleged that reason inevitably leads to the influence of the good over mind.<sup>1098</sup> John Locke affirmed that our limited knowledge is sufficient for living,<sup>1099</sup> that the role of reason is to clarify the supreme good by critical analysis,<sup>1100</sup> and that reason forms moral values based upon experience.<sup>1101</sup> Kant held that reason legislates the law of nature and the moral law and merges them into a single philosophical system.<sup>1102</sup> Thus reason determines the will upon a priori grounds,<sup>1103</sup> and reason, not empirical examples, is the basis of morality.<sup>1104</sup> The categorical imperative, determined by reason, controls the will.<sup>1105</sup> Reason relates the maxims of the will to the universal laws.<sup>1106</sup> Through interest reason determines the will.<sup>1107</sup> The practical use of reason determines the will.<sup>1108</sup> Pure practical reason strikes down self-conceit,<sup>1109</sup> and causes feeling for the

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1095. Op. cit., pp. 220-21.  
1096. Wieman and Meland, American, p. 126.  
1097. Op. cit., p. 257.  
1098. James, op. cit., p. 125.  
1099. Richardson, op. cit., p. 45.  
1100. Burtt, English, p. xv.  
1101. Mossner, op. cit., p. 42.  
1102. Beck, op. cit., p. 15.  
1103. Ibid., p. 68.  
1104. Ibid., pp. 68-69.  
1105. Ibid., p. 85.  
1106. Ibid., p. 92.  
1107. Ibid., p. 114n.  
1108. Ibid., pp. 128-29.  
1109. Ibid., p. 181.

moral law.<sup>1110</sup> Practical reason presents the moral law, convicts of sin, and creates moral feeling.<sup>1111</sup> The first task of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason is to differentiate the principles of the doctrine of happiness from the principles of the doctrine of morality.<sup>1112</sup> Practical reason demands the subordination of happiness to duty.<sup>1113</sup> Pure practical reason reveals the intelligible world through the concept of freedom.<sup>1114</sup> Reason demands that happiness should be proportional to morality.<sup>1115</sup>

Roman Catholic philosophy holds that the law of God is made known through human reason and divine revelation.<sup>1116</sup> Maritain asserts that knowledge fosters inner unity,<sup>1117</sup> and that the primary role of moral philosophy is to elucidate principles discovered non-rationally.<sup>1118</sup> Reason tames the irrational; the supra-rational vivifies reason.<sup>1119</sup> John Wild defined the aim of morality as the use of reason to order and control all aspirations so as to direct them to their highest natural objects.<sup>1120</sup> Although reason specifies the ends and means of virtuous action,<sup>1121</sup> more than intellect is required in order to achieve the virtuous life.<sup>1122</sup> Right reason is essential to virtue, and reason as guide to action produces happiness.<sup>1123</sup> Prudence and conscience are associated with equity and moral

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1110. Ibid., pp. 181-82.  
1111. Ibid., p. 187.  
1112. Ibid., p. 198.  
1113. Ibid., p. 199.  
1114. Ibid., p. 200.  
1115. Ibid., p. 215.  
1116. Baltimore, p. 148.  
1117. Op. cit., p. 3.  
1118. Ibid., pp. 28-29.  
1119. Ibid., p. 194.  
1120. Op. cit., p. 51.  
1121. Ibid., p. 97.  
1122. Ibid., p. 98.  
1123. Ibid., p. 99.

judgment.<sup>1124</sup> Imagination, intellect, and reason in achieving the golden mean cooperate in courage.<sup>1125</sup> Practical reason in temperance subordinates sense-data and controls pleasures.<sup>1126</sup> In generosity reason moderates external appetite.<sup>1127</sup> Practical reason bestows the judgment of honor;<sup>1128</sup> greatness of soul is a rational mean.<sup>1129</sup> Reason is the source of freedom, self-sufficiency, the good life, and human greatness.<sup>1130</sup> Practical reason has its role in friendship and sympathy.<sup>1131</sup> Practical reason commands action.<sup>1132</sup>

### Science

Maimonides distinguished science from philosophy by saying that philosophy aims at the world as a whole, whereas science aims to clear up small areas.<sup>1133</sup> Duns Scotus agreed with Aquinas that all natural knowledge is based upon sense-data and complained that the notion of being as the primary object of reason was imported from Moslem theology via Avicenna.<sup>1134</sup>

Brunner allows that psychology of religion and sociology of religion do explain some phenomena in Christianity.<sup>1135</sup> Reason fits objects into their classes.<sup>1136</sup> Experimental and dialectical methods are required in order to deal with the dimension of movement or life.<sup>1137</sup> The scientific method is useful to discover repetitive aspects of experience.<sup>1138</sup> Quantitative

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1124. Ibid., p. 105.  
1125. Ibid., pp. 119-20.  
1126. Ibid., pp. 125-27.  
1127. Ibid., p. 134.  
1128. Ibid., p. 136.  
1129. Ibid., p. 138.  
1130. Ibid., pp. 138-39.  
1131. Ibid., pp. 145-51.  
1132. Ibid., p. 485.  
1133. Roth, op. cit., p. 14.  
1134. Micklem, op. cit., pp. 21-22.  
1135. Revelation, p. 259.  
1136. Butler, op. cit., pp. 143-44.  
1137. Ibid., p. 512.  
1138. De Wolf, op. cit., p. 190.

science is useful for prediction and control.<sup>1139</sup> Scientific explanation of nonmaterial dimensions of personality is the vital task of man, asserts Ducasse.<sup>1140</sup> Ferré declares that whereas philosophy deals with the whole of reality, the field and function of science are pluralistic.<sup>1141</sup> Science describes; philosophy relates.<sup>1142</sup> The basic function of reason is to interpret what is given.<sup>1143</sup> Jaspers maintains that the methodology of science can lead to the discovery of the limits of non-scientific knowledge,<sup>1144</sup> and that scientific method is necessary in order to arrive at truth in philosophy.<sup>1145</sup> Maritain, though admitting the dependence of intellect upon sense-data, stresses the transformation of sense experience wrought by intellect.<sup>1146</sup>

Sinnott sees science as the most dramatic consequence of the use of reason.<sup>1147</sup> Science is dedicated to the pursuit of truth<sup>1148</sup> and cuts through irrationalities.<sup>1149</sup> Science fire the imagination, shatter complacency, and pull man out of ruts.<sup>1150</sup> However, the exploration of such problems as telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psychokinesis requires methods of philosophy and metaphysics.<sup>1151</sup> Temple avowed that the aim of scientific knowledge is to reach fixed principles.<sup>1152</sup> Tennant calls attention to the essential function of doubt in scientific reason.<sup>1153</sup> Tillich

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1139. Ibid., pp. 191-92.  
1140. Op. cit., p. 422.  
1141. Op. cit., p. 106.  
1142. Ibid., pp. 107-08.  
1143. Ibid., p. 183.  
1144. Op. cit., p. 30.  
1145. Ibid., p. 31.  
1146. Op. cit., pp. 8-9.  
1147. Op. cit., p. 72.  
1148. Ibid., pp. 96-97.  
1149. Ibid., p. 134.  
1150. Ibid., p. 191.  
1151. Ibid., pp. 129-30.  
1152. Personality, pp. 117-18.

reminds us that theology also uses technical reason.<sup>1154</sup> Whitehead in The Function of Reason asserted that the principle function is to direct and test future observation.<sup>1155</sup> Wieman pleads that science must be directed to searching out the conditions demanded by the source of human good.<sup>1156</sup>

#### Social Structure

Maimonides believed that it is the function of reason to reveal world-order.<sup>1157</sup> Philosophy helps religious persons to understand the thought forms of people.<sup>1158</sup> Reason provides a common language among the peoples of the world, and the crisis of our age is a crisis of abuse of reason.<sup>1159</sup> The intellect seeks truth objectively valid for all men.<sup>1160</sup> Jaspers observes that reason makes boundless communication possible,<sup>1161</sup> that reason provides common ground for the movement of the Westerner and the tranquility of the Asiatic,<sup>1162</sup> that reason makes life a venture,<sup>1163</sup> that reason explains history,<sup>1164</sup> that reason makes for stability,<sup>1165</sup> and that reason is basically optimistic.<sup>1166</sup> He further notes that the surrender of reason prepares men for political slavery.<sup>1167</sup>

Maritain pleads that we need rational foundations of human dignity,<sup>1168</sup> and that reason demands that we have faith in man.<sup>1169</sup> N. Richard Niebuhr observes that reason discovers rules for human social life,<sup>1170</sup> that human

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1153. Op. cit., pp. 20-21.  
1154. Systematic, p. 74.  
1155. Wieman and Meland, American, pp. 229-30.  
1156. The Source, p. 31.  
1157. Roth, op. cit., p. 131.  
1158. Butler, op. cit., pp. 8-9.  
1159. Ferre, op. cit., p. ix.  
1160. James, op. cit., p. 423.  
1161. Op. cit., pp. 42-43.  
1162. Ibid., pp. 48-49.  
1163. Ibid., p. 63.  
1164. Ibid., p. 63.  
1165. Ibid., p. 80.  
1166. Ibid., pp. 81-82.

reason has devised the right to private property,<sup>1171</sup> and that reason and culture determine the content of action.<sup>1172</sup> Wieman notes that the interaction of mind and mind enhances human living,<sup>1173</sup> but advancing civilization puts a heavier burden upon knowledge.<sup>1174</sup> Wild sees reason as the source of group unity,<sup>1175</sup> observes the role of reason in group life,<sup>1176</sup> notes that group structure is primarily rational in character,<sup>1177</sup> and remarks that rational awareness is the means of overcoming psychic isolation in man.<sup>1178</sup>

### Theology

Maimonides recommended that the study of philosophy and theology should be begun early in life and pursued slowly and gradually, since the intellect only gradually becomes capable of mastering these studies.<sup>1179</sup> Brunner sees theology as an organ of examination and clarification,<sup>1180</sup> which as a discipline places reason at the service of the Word of God.<sup>1181</sup> Natural theology interprets general revelation.<sup>1182</sup> According to Hammond, theology discusses rationally a kind of knowledge that transcends reason.<sup>1183</sup> Philosophy and theology attain self-consciousness through

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1167. Ibid., pp. 75-76.  
1168. Op. cit., p. 93.  
1169. Ibid., p. 201.  
1170. Op. cit., p. 135.  
1171. Ibid., p. 136.  
1172. Ibid., p. 176.  
1173. The Source, p. 137.  
1174. Ibid., p. 218.  
1175. Op. cit., pp. 185-86.  
1176. Ibid., p. 194.  
1177. Ibid., pp. 198-99.  
1178. Ibid., p. 410.  
1179. Cohen, op. cit., p. 253.  
1180. Revelation, p. 155.  
1181. Ibid., p. 311.  
1182. Brunner, in Myers, op. cit., p. 40.

reason.<sup>1184</sup> Kuhn notes that theology needs non-Biblical concepts for its structure.<sup>1185</sup> Roelofs defines theology as a systematic, intelligible account of God, which in its statement is the work of reason and which claims to be knowledge.<sup>1186</sup> Temple observed that natural theology purges actual religion.<sup>1187</sup> Thomas sees the work of the theologian as penetrating to the essence of the Biblical revelation.<sup>1188</sup> Tillich says the final word about the nature of theology is that it must use theonomous reason in order to explain the Christian message.<sup>1189</sup>

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1183. Myers, op. cit., p. 80.  
1184. Jaspers, op. cit., p. 84.  
1185. Myers, op. cit., p. 160.  
1186. Ibid., pp. 99-100.  
1187. Nature, p. 28.  
1188. Myers, op. cit., p. 51.  
1189. Systematic, p. 155.

SECTION 2

THE IMMEDIATE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
OF CALVIN'S TEACHINGS

Good, Barr, and Scates in a chapter on historical method<sup>1</sup> suggests that the purpose of an educational historian may be either an exact and faithful record of unique past events or the derivation of fruitful generalizations through the survey of past events. The aim of this section is closely akin to the latter of these two purposes. No derivation of original data is contemplated here. The historical setting of John Calvin's discussion of human reason in relationship to religion is described from secondary sources. In the use of these secondary sources there is an implied evaluation by such tests as documentation of material unfamiliar to the investigator, frequency of reference to primary sources, use of specific detail, and consistency with other sources. The detailed method for evaluating and detecting errors in secondary sources outlined by William Brickman<sup>2</sup> has been followed.

The investigator admits with Toynbee that even in the broad survey of an era the human observer will inevitably be partial and subjective,<sup>3</sup> and that the historian's transcendence of self-centeredness is never more than partial and imperfect.<sup>4</sup> The objectivity of history, however, is aided by observing Cardiner's analysis of the assignment of motives in the writing

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1. Good, Carter V.; Barr, A. S., and Scates, Douglas E., The Methodology of Educational Research, pp. 239-85.
  2. Guide to Research in Educational History, pp. 108-16.
  3. Arnold Toynbee, An Historian's Approach to Religion, p. 3.
  4. Ibid., p. 9.

of history and the dangers of assigning motives to the actions of persons in the past in the form of cause and effect relationships.<sup>5</sup> Also with Muller we must admit the inevitable ambiguities, incongruities, and paradoxes of history. The immediate historical background of Calvin's teachings may be seen as three broad movements: (1) decadent Aristotelianism, (2) Lutheran Augustinianism, and (3) Renaissance humanism. These three movements left their marks upon Calvin in the formative years of his youth.

#### Decadent Aristotelianism

The first half of the sixteenth century can be understood as an era of crisis in human reason. On the one hand, confidence in the usefulness of discursive reason as an instrument to control nature was growing. On the other hand, confidence in the ability of human reason as the integrative faculty to guide and interpret man's life was waning. Both of these movements were set over against the background of Aristotelian philosophy.

The philosopher of discursive human reason par excellence in ancient Greece was Aristotle (384-322 B. C.). In his early life as a student of Plato he was interested in eternal types or "ideas." Later in life he became interested in pure science and investigation. Though he applied the scientific habit of mind in many directions and was a keen observer of nature, his chief contribution to the Middle Ages was his logic. From the sixth to the twelfth centuries Aristotle's logic was the only form of logic generally known in the West.

Boethius (c. 480-542 A.D.) translated Aristotle's Categories into Latin and wrote a commentary on it. Five independent works on logic produced by

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5. Patrick Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation, pp. 133-39.  
6. Herbert J. Muller, The Uses of the Past.

Boethius were Introduction ad Categorices Syllogismos, De Divisione, De Differentiis Topicis, De Syllogismis Categoricis, and De Syllogismis Hypo-  
theticis.<sup>7</sup> Aristotle's Categories as translated and interpreted by Boethius became the basis of "dialectic," which along with "grammar" and "rhetoric" formed the core curriculum known as the "Trivium" of the educational system of the early Middle Ages.

Berengarius of Tours (?-1088), who aroused increased enthusiasm for the study of logic and applied the principle of dialectical development to theology, attacked the doctrine of Transubstantiation upon the basis of Aristotelian logic.<sup>8</sup> He found this doctrine contrary to reason and not taught by Ambrose, Jerome, or Augustine. Thereupon he was excommunicated by Leo IX in 1050. He believed that dialectic is the instrument for discovering truth. Thus reason is the ultimate criterion in matters of faith. However, he supported his reasoning on Transubstantiation by quotations from the Bible and the Church Fathers.

Roscellinus (c. 1050-C. 1122) applied the logic of Aristotle to the doctrine of the Trinity.<sup>9</sup> Since Aristotle was a biologist, he was largely concerned with classification into genera and species. Whereas Plato had seen reality most perfectly in the eternal types of which actually observable things are more or less imperfect representations, Aristotle the scientist had framed his genera as convenient frameworks to include all known species. Although the Church found in Platonic realism a convenient way of asserting the importance of the Church universal, there was always in its

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7. A. P. McKinlay, Harvard Classical Studies.

8. Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma.

9. F. Picaret, Roscellin, philosophe et theologien.

use of Aristotelian logic an implicit tendency toward Nominalism, which came to wide public attention in the assertions of Rescellinus on the Trinity.

About the year 1130 the whole of Aristotle's Organon became known and studied in the West. Among the first to have access to a complete version of Aristotle's first major work in logic was Peter Abelard (1079-1142), who in his Dialectica commented on logical works of Aristotle, Porphyry, and Boethius. By defining the Scholastic method of reasoning more accurately and completely than any of his predecessors, Abelard prepared the way for Aristotle to become regarded as the authority in philosophy.

Otto of Freising (1114?-1158) included in his De duabus civitatibus events of his own life through the year 1146.<sup>10</sup> In this chronicle he mentioned that he had been to Paris to study "the subtleties of Aristotelian logic in the later and profounder Analytics as well as in the earlier treatises of the Organon."<sup>11</sup>

About 1170 the faculties of the schools of theology, law, medicine, and arts united to form the university of Paris. The study of the arts was regarded as preparatory for study in theology, law, or medicine. The curriculum in the arts was the traditional seven liberal arts with emphasis upon the philosophy of Aristotle. In the Trivium the highest place was given to dialectics, as a preparation for the study of theology. About 1211 Innocent III recognized the University of Paris as a legal corporation.

The revival of Aristotle in the twelfth century had been based upon inferior translations. The University of Cordova, founded by Calif Hakim II about 980, rapidly became an important center of Arabic learning. In the

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10. O. Holder-Egger, "Otto of Freising" in The New Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge, 1950, vol. 13, pp. 288-89.

11. Ernest Barker, "Aristotle" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1949, vol. 2, p. 354.

twelfth century it was especially noted for the study of Aristotle in Arabic. Since 800' in the city of Cordova there were students of Aristotle. After the Arabs conquered Syria in the seventh century they came into contact with the tradition of Aristotle as it survived in Syria. Two great Arabian commentators upon Aristotle were Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn-Roshd (Averroes).

Avicenna (979-1037) was noted in philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. His Canon of Medicine, partially based upon Aristotle, was translated into Latin in the twelfth century and was a standard textbook in the universities of Louvain and Montpellier until 1650. He also wrote long treatises upon Aristotle's Logic, Physics, and Metaphysics. Though he lived in the East and died in Hamadan, his writings were influential in Cordova.

Averroes (1126-1198) was born and died in Cordova. His comments in Arabic upon Aristotle were translated in the twelfth century into Latin and were admired by a group of Christians in Paris who became known as the Latin Averroists. In some instances the works of Averroes which crossed the Pyrennes into France were in the form of Latin translations of Hebrew translations of Arabic translations of Syriac translations of Aristotle's Greek. It is understandable that the thought of Aristotle was modified.

Aristotle was rescued from distortion as a result of the conquest of Constantinople by the West in the fourth Crusade in 1204. Three Dominicans, Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), Henry of Brabant, and William of Moerbeke, collaborated in translating much of Aristotle from the newly available Greek from 1260 to 1270.

Meanwhile, Aristotle was the subject of much controversy at the University of Paris. In 1215 Robert, the papal legate, forbade the reading of Aristotle's Metaphysics or any comments thereon in the University of Paris.

However, in 1231 Gregory IX caused an edition of the Metaphysics to be purged and recommended his expurgated edition for study in Paris. In 1243 the faculty of arts passed a resolution complying with the expressed wish of Gregory IX on the study of Aristotle.

William of Saint Amour, who about 1250 was teaching theology at the University of Paris, was a vigorous opponent of the Dominicans and Franciscans, who at that time were seeking to gain control of the university.<sup>12</sup> In 1254 Innocent IV intervened against the two orders on behalf of the independence of the university. When he died just fourteen days later, the Dominicans said that it was the judgment of Almighty God. In 1256 William wrote a tract in which he compared the monks to Pharisees. Thereby he won the favor of the populace of Paris.

The philosophy of Aristotle, after having been rather quietly taught in the University of Paris for nearly four centuries, again became a subject of violent controversy about the time that John Calvin attended the College de Montaigu (1524-1527). Calvin's most prominent teacher there was a Spaniard who idolized Aristotle.<sup>13</sup> Both Calvin and Loyola reacted vigorously against this new exaltation of Aristotle, but apparently for different reasons. Loyola fought against the Moslem doctrine of reason interwoven into the contents of the Averroist commentaries. Loyola's hatred of Averroes was so intense that he inserted in his Ratio, a manual of directions on methods of study, a note on the Arab philosopher that the professor of theology is to avoid even the mention of his name, and that "if anything good is to be cited from

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12. Histoire litteraire de la France, volume 19, pp. 197-200; volume 21, pp. 468-70.

13. Frank McClure Caughey, The Sources of the Thought and Teaching of John Calvin, p. 11.

(Averroes), let (the theological professor) mention it without praise and, if possible, show that he has taken it from some other source."<sup>14</sup>

Calvin reacted against this new enthusiasm for Aristotelianism as a means of expressing obliquely his dislike for certain features of Scholasticism. Luther had inherited a spirit of anti-Scholasticism from the Devotio Moderna, especially as expressed in Of the Imitation of Christ, usually ascribed to Thomas a Kempis.<sup>15</sup> Luther had heartily approved of the saying: "Surely, an humble husbandman that serveth God, is better than a proud philosopher who, neglecting himself, is occupied in studying the course of the heavens."<sup>16</sup> Indeed, Luther in an Advent sermon proclaimed that the dominance of Aristotle in theology is a sign that the last day is near at hand.<sup>17</sup> Calvin complained about the training for the priesthood in his Reply to Sadolet, "You yourself know that it was mere sophistry, and so twisted, involved, tortuous, and puzzling, that Scholastic theology might well be described as a species of secret magic. The denser the darkness in which anyone shrouded a subject, and the more he puzzled himself and others with nagging riddles, the greater his fame for acumen and learning."<sup>18</sup>

There are two stock phrases which occur dozens of times in Calvin's commentaries and sermons.<sup>19</sup> In the phrase "Philosophers say" the "P" is always capitalized. "The philosophers" is a standard medieval expression

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14. E. A. Fitzpatrick, St. Ignatius and the Ratio Studiorum, p. 168.
  15. Jameson Miller Jones, The Problem of Faith and Reason in the Thought of John Calvin, p. 36.
  16. Of the Imitation of Christ, p. 13.
  17. Hugh Thompson Kerr Jr., editor, A Compend of Luther's Theology, p. 247.
  18. J. K. S. Reid, editor, Calvin: Theological Treatises, p. 233.
  19. The investigator has translated and published three volumes of Calvin's sermons and published a Master of Theology thesis entitled John Calvin, Expository Preacher, and has used Calvin's commentaries as a tool in sermon preparation for ten years.

for Aristotle and his followers. It was used by Maimonides as early as 1175. When Maimonides thoroughly agreed he used the name "Aristotle;" when he disagreed he dubbed the Aristotelians with the epithet "the philosophers."<sup>20</sup> Calvin adopted this mannerism, occasionally even in the Institutes. In Calvin's other epithet "All the Sophists of the Sorbonne" the first "S" in "Sophists" is likewise always capitalized. Kidd has noted that during this period the Scholastics were commonly referred to as "sophists."<sup>21</sup>

The controversy over Aristotle came most sharply to focus around the head of Peter Ramus (1515-1572), "a practical reformer, a writer of textbooks, the founder of a new and influential point of view in subject matter and method, a popular and successful teacher, and an active correspondent and personal acquaintance of the educational leaders of his day in all countries."<sup>22</sup> Shortly after Francis I in 1530 founded the College of France with chairs in Greek and Latin as a protest against the Scholastic and dogmatic course at the University of Paris<sup>23</sup> and while the reaction against Scholasticism was still strong, Ramus revolted impetuously against Aristotle. In his Remonstrance au conseil privé he related, "When I came to Paris I fell into the subtleties of the sophists, and they taught me the liberal arts through questions and disputes, without ever showing me a single thing of profit or service."<sup>24</sup> Again he remarked, "The categories of Aristotle were like a ball that we give children to play with."<sup>25</sup> In

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20. A. Cohen, The Teachings of Maimonides, pp. 130-31.

21. B. J. Kidd, Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation, p. 525.

22. Frank Pierrepont Graves, Peter Ramus and the Educational Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, p. viii.

23. Ibid., p. 4.

24. Quoted in Ibid., p. 21.

25. Quoted in Ibid., p. 22.

1536 he submitted as his master's thesis "Everything that Aristotle has said is false," subhead 1 being that the writings attributed to Aristotle were spurious, and subhead 2 being that they contained only errors. At the final oral examination his thesis was assailed for a whole day, before Ramus was admitted to the degree with honors.<sup>26</sup> In 1543 he published his Animadversiones on Aristotle, which was full of the type of bitter invective characteristic of that era. The same year he published his Dialecticae Partitiones, a new textbook in terse and elegant language on the elementary principles of logic.<sup>27</sup> The later works of Ramus were directed more against the Scholastic interpretation of Aristotle than against Aristotle himself.<sup>28</sup>

In 1544 Guillaume de Montuelle, principal of the College of Beauvais, and rector that year of the University of Paris, caused Ramus to be summoned before the provost of Paris as an enemy of religion. This resulted in bringing the case of Ramus before the Parlement of Paris.<sup>29</sup> Pierre Galand, who had been rector of the university in 1543, in 1544 persuaded Pierre du Chastel, bishop of Mâcon, to complain to King Francis I, who referred the case to a commission of five members.<sup>30</sup> The three Aristotelians on the commission convicted Ramus of rashness, arrogance, impudence, lying, and scurrilous slander, and pronounced sentence upon him.<sup>31</sup> Francis I yielded to public clamor and confirmed the sentence upon Ramus.<sup>32</sup> He forbade Ramus to lecture upon dialectic or philosophy without the king's explicit permission. The decree was published in French and Latin in all parts of Paris,

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26. Ibid., p. 26.

27. Ibid., p. 30.

28. Ibid., p. 31.

29. Ibid., p. 32.

30. Ibid., p. 34.

31. Ibid., p. 35.

32. Ibid., p. 36.

dispatched throughout France, and sent to foreign towns and universities to vindicate the orthodoxy of the University of Paris. At the great celebration by the Aristotelians books were burned in front of the Collège de Cambrai.<sup>33</sup> That same year (1544) Ramus began teaching the classics and mathematics.<sup>34</sup> His vital and attractive instruction lured large numbers of students.<sup>35</sup>

#### Lutheran Augustinianism

Augustinianism is a broad term, although perhaps not so broad as Thomistic Scholasticism. Gilson, for example, in his analysis of fourteenth-century Scholasticism describes three movements: (1) Albertists and Neo-Platonists, (2) the second Augustinian school, and (3) the disintegration of Scholastic theology.<sup>36</sup> In the second Augustinian school he includes Henry of Ghent, and John Duna Scotus and his school. This analysis from a Roman Catholic point of view is important, because (a) it shows the virility of Augustinian theology in a century when Scholastic theology was declining, and (b) it shows a vital connecting link between Augustine in the fifth century and the Protestant Augustinians of the sixteenth century.

In the unfinished Summa Theologica of Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) some of the most pronounced features of the writings of Luther and Calvin are already apparent. Gilson summarizes a section of the writing of Henry which might well appear to have come from Luther or Calvin. According to Gilson, "Henry maintains that absolutely pure truth cannot be known by man without divine illumination; but he also thinks that, although man can receive this illumi-

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33. Ibid., p. 37.

34. Ibid., p. 38.

35. Ibid., p. 40.

36. Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, pp. 431-85.

nation in his present natural condition, God gives it when He pleases and to whom He pleases. In short it is a free gift of God."<sup>37</sup>

In the analysis of the relationship between intellect and will by John Duns Scotus (1265?-1308) and his predilection for the primacy of the will we find the basis for "the bondage of the will" in the thought of both Luther and Calvin. "When the will commands the intellect, it is clearly the will that causes intellection, even though that act taken in itself is an act of intellect."<sup>38</sup> "This affirmation of the primacy of nobility of the will over the intellect in man announces a more voluntarist than intellectualist conception of liberty."<sup>39</sup>

Luther beginning in the autumn of 1509 lectured at Erfurt on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. In 1889 in the library at Zwickau the books which Luther read as he prepared these lectures were discovered. Notes in Luther's own handwriting in the margins of these books show no departure from the Scholastic method. They do reveal, however, a growing fondness for the teachings of Augustine, according to MacKinnon.<sup>40</sup> Likewise in Luther's Lectures on the Epistles to the Romans (1515-16) the influence of Augustine is apparent, although couched in Scholastic method and terminology.<sup>41</sup> Luther, however, was no slavish follower of Augustine and was capable of pointing out defects in the writings of Augustine. Luther noticed that Augustine was defective in his knowledge of Hebrew. Luther believed that the common people of Germany should become well versed in Greek and Hebrew. In his Letter to the Mayors and Aldermen of All the Cities of Germany on

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37. Ibid., p. 448.

38. Ibid., p. 463.

39. Loc. cit.

40. James MacKinnon, "Martin Luther" in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1949 edition, vol. 14, p. 492.

41. Loc. cit.

Behalf of Christian Schools Luther uses some of Augustine's interpretations of the Psalms as horrible examples of mistakes in Old Testament exegesis that occur when one forgets his Hebrew. "How often is St. Augustine in error in the Psalms and in other expositions, as well as Hilary, and indeed all those who have undertaken to explain the Scriptures without an acquaintance with the original tongues? And if perchance they have taught correct doctrine, they have not been sure of the application to be made of particular passages."<sup>42</sup>

Muller has noted the close affinity between the thought of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, and traces it to a common interpretation of the letters of St. Paul. He says, "St. Paul asserted that God bestowed his saving grace without regard to merit, and St. Augustine, Luther, and Calvin systematized this arbitrary scheme of salvation. To the natural complaint about its apparent injustice, all answered that man has no right to set up his own standards or to assert his own merits; God's infinite goodness is sufficiently displayed by his willingness to save any men at all."<sup>43</sup> Muller's remarks are especially appropriate insofar as they pertain to The Letter of Paul to the Romans,<sup>44</sup> with respect to which Luther and Calvin have freely acknowledged dependence upon Augustine.

Luther and Calvin taught Augustine's doctrine of predestination, which was also official doctrine in the Roman Catholic Church until the Council of Trent.<sup>45</sup> Muller has neatly summarized this doctrine: "Augustine concluded

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42. See full text in Frederick Eby, Early Protestant Educators, p. 62.

43. Herbert J. Muller, op. cit., p. 83.

44. Form of title from The Holy Bible, Revised Standard Version, 1952.

45. James Hastings Nichols, Primer for Protestants, noting a few of the radical changes in Roman Catholic theology which were made at Trent, gives on pages 62-66 a brief outline of "The New Trent Religion."

that man cannot have any merit in himself; his salvation must be wholly dependent on the grace of God, which must be a free gift. In choosing to save some men God is rewarding His own good works, not theirs: 'God does not crown your merits as your merits but as His gifts.'<sup>46</sup> Also common to Augustine, Luther, and Calvin is the emphasis upon the primacy of the will. Muller notes about Augustine: "He offered acute observations on the nature of the will, as more primary than reason, and on the moral struggle to humble it before the divine will, as he had known this struggle in his own proud, rebellious youth. Yet he could never reconcile this idea of human responsibility with the idea of an Almighty who had foreordained evil."<sup>47</sup> Likewise common to the three is the doctrine of total depravity. Muller concludes with respect to Augustine: "The upshot of his ethical teaching was that man is totally depraved, that he must try to be good, that he can will good only if God chooses to grant him grace, and that he must shoulder the blame for all the evil in God's world."<sup>48</sup> Then Muller makes the final connection: "Augustine's predestinarianism . . . did not come fully into its own until the advent of Luther and Calvin."<sup>49</sup>

Walker correctly observes with respect to Augustine that "no man between Paul and Luther so emphasized justification by faith alone."<sup>50</sup> He notices that Socinianism "had almost no conception of what religion meant to Paul, Augustine, or Luther--a new, vital personal relationship between the believing soul and God through Christ."<sup>51</sup> Walker also tends to identify Luther as

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46. Muller, op. cit., pp. 170-71.

47. Ibid., p. 171.

48. Loc. cit.

49. Loc. cit.

50. Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church, p. 186.

51. Ibid., p. 453.

a rather thorough medievalist in his debt to Augustine. He concludes, "Sin and grace had been, since the time of Augustine, if not rather of Tertullian, the very heart problems of Latin theology. They were so of the Reformation."<sup>52</sup> Luther's distrust of human reason, however, is not to be traced back to Augustine. Walker assigns it to the later Scholastics, Occam, d'Ailli, and Biel.<sup>53</sup> He also notes that Luther's opposition to Aristotelianism and Scholasticism was accepted at the University of Wittenberg.<sup>54</sup> It was Luther's distrust of reason that led him to quarrel so violently with Zwingli, whose interpretation of the Lord's Supper seemed to Luther to be a sinful exaltation of reason above Scripture.<sup>55</sup>

Schaff in an appendix entitled "Luther's Views of the Church Fathers"<sup>56</sup> asserted that, of all the Church Fathers, Luther learned most from Augustine.

Schaff said, "For him he had the profoundest respect, and him he quotes more frequently than all others combined. He regards him as one of the four pillars of the church (the claims of Ambrose, Jerome, and Gregory, he disputed), as the best commentator, and the patron of theologians." Luther is quoted as having said of Augustine: "He pleased and pleases me better than all other doctors; he was worthy of all praise." Luther is said to have asserted in effect that Augustine did more than all the bishops and popes, who cannot hold a candle to him; and more than all the councils.

Latourette offers a neat summary of the attitude of Augustine on human reason.<sup>57</sup> "Augustine (and other leading Christians)," he says, "applied

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52. Ibid., p. 481.

53. Ibid., p. 338.

54. Ibid., p. 340.

55. Ibid., p. 364.

56. Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, volume 7, pp. 534-36.

57. Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of Christianity, p. 250.

reason to the data derived from faith. In rejecting the Greek use of reason they did not reject reason itself. They maintained that through reason men could attain to an understanding of some aspects of truth." Thus Luther reasoned strenuously about the Roman sale of indulgences. Latourette says Augustine and others "held that in the Gospel fresh and essential data had been given by God, of which reason must take account, . . . that it was through faith . . . which is a full commitment of themselves to God in Christ, that men gain the central insights into the meaning of life, . . . and that, having made this commitment and having gained these insights, they can apply reason to what has thus come to them."

Bainton explains that the doctrine of predestination commended itself to Luther upon the basis that it had been held by St. Augustine, especially since Luther belonged to an Augustinian order.<sup>58</sup> Leo X appointed a new general over the Augustinian monks in the hope of quieting Martin Luther. The new general instructed Luther to be fully prepared to defend the theology of St. Augustine concerning human depravity at the triennial gathering at Heidelberg of the Augustinian chapter, which Luther did with brilliance.<sup>59</sup> Luther at Leipzig discovered that the Council of Constance in condemning Hus had also condemned an accepted article of faith from St. Augustine: "The universal Holy Church is one, as the number of the elect is one."<sup>60</sup> Luther already in 1518 in a comment on A German Theology admitted that he regarded the works of St. Augustine as next in importance to the Bible.<sup>61</sup> Luther followed the Augustinian dualistic doctrine of eternal conflict

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58. Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand, A Life of Martin Luther, p. 58.

59. Ibid., p. 86.

60. Ibid., p. 115.

61. Ibid., p. 133.

between the City of God and the earthly city.<sup>62</sup> The notion from the late Scholastics that philosophy cannot reveal God seemed to Luther to be supported somewhat by Augustine's sharp distinction between the natural man and the redeemed man.<sup>63</sup> Luther emphatically rejected St. Augustine's qualms of conscience about the enjoyment of good music and regarded music as next to the Word of God in its power to heal a human soul.<sup>64</sup>

The dependence of Luther's doctrine of man upon Augustine may be clearly seen in the thesis by Donald Reitz.<sup>65</sup> He shows that Augustine taught that the will of man is perverted,<sup>66</sup> that original sin is a part of all of human nature,<sup>67</sup> and that human nature, in its very essence, is corrupt and prone to evil.<sup>68</sup> Reitz shows that Luther taught that original sin is the fall of the whole human nature, including intellect, will, and conscience,<sup>69</sup> and that will and reason are corrupted by sin.<sup>70</sup>

Calvin, like Luther, was highly dependent upon Augustine. Also Calvin thought very highly of Luther. Kerr quotes Calvin as having said of Luther, "Although he were to call me a devil, I should still not the less hold him in such honor that I must acknowledge him to be an illustrious servant of God."<sup>71</sup> Kerr adds that while the two Reformers never met, Calvin always treasured his friendship with Luther.<sup>72</sup> Like Luther, Calvin also quoted extensively from Augustine. In the Institutes of the Christian Religion

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62. Ibid., p. 218.

63. Ibid., p. 219.

64. Ibid., p. 341.

65. Unpublished Ph. D. thesis by Donald B. Reitz, Implications of the Doctrine of Man for Christian Education, School of Education, New York University,

66. Ibid., p. 19.

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67. Ibid., p. 25.

68. Ibid., p. 26.

69. Ibid., p. 40.

70. Ibid., p. 44.

71. Hugh Thomson Kerr Jr., editor, A Compend of Luther's Theology, p. v.

72. Loc. cit.

Calvin quoted Augustine 228 times. After Augustine, Calvin's favorite author was Pope Gregory I (the Great), who reigned from 590 to 604, and whom Calvin quoted 39 times in the Institutes.<sup>73</sup> By way of further comparison, in the Institutes Calvin quoted, for example, Chrysostom 27 times, Bernard of Clairveaux 22 times, Aristotle 5 times, and Thomas Aquinas only once.<sup>74</sup>

As late as 1555 Calvin still thought of himself as a Lutheran. Between February 26, 1554, and March 20, 1555, on weekday mornings Calvin preached 159 sermons on the book of Job.<sup>75</sup> In these sermons Calvin's mannerism of saying "we Lutherans" occasionally appears.<sup>76</sup> Yet no direct quotations from Luther are apparent in the Institutes. This may be due to the fact that the Institutes was originally written in Latin and only works which existed in Latin or Greek were quoted directly, except for the Hebrew of the Old Testament. It is also possible that the design of Calvin to convince Francis I and other Roman Catholic monarchs that the Protestants had a good, solidly orthodox theology and were not heretics made it inexpedient to mention the name of Luther in the text. If this were the case, however, one would also have expected that Calvin would have dropped the name of Aristotle, which he

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73. In Calvin's admiration for Gregory I there is suggested a possible dependence of the Geneva Psalter-tunes by Louis Bourgeois and Maître Pierre upon the form of chant commonly ascribed to Gregory I. The likenesses are very striking.
74. The investigator has collated indexes to the Institutes in Latin, Dutch, English, and French, and in 1950 published an adaptation of an index for the American translation by John Allen of the Institutes.
75. In T. H. L. Parker, The Oracles of God, see on pages 160-62 the chronological chart of Calvin's preaching and on 163-65 the chart of sermons in manuscript form stored in the Bibliothèque Publique, Geneva.
76. The investigator has read most of these sermons in Opera Calvini, Corpus Reformatorum, volumes 33-35, and has translated and published 20 of them.

left in the text five times. However, Calvin was careful to be a strict neutral in his handling of the delicate questions about Aristotle. Twice he quoted him with approval; twice with disapproval; and once in a noncommittal fashion. Calvin could not have quoted Luther with any such studied neutrality. That Calvin may have read Luther for inspiration may be inferred from a comparison of Luther's Treatise on Christian Liberty<sup>77</sup> and Calvin's chapter in the Institutes "On Christian Liberty."<sup>78</sup>

#### Renaissance Humanism

Will Durant dates the Italian Renaissance from the birth of Petrarch (1304) to the death of Titian (1576).<sup>79</sup> He selects as the most fascinating character of that period Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519).<sup>80</sup> The life-span of da Vinci certainly represented an age of discoveries. In the 1450's there came the Gutenberg Bible printed in Latin. In 1453 with the Fall of Constantinople some Greek scholars took refuge in Italy. In 1492 Columbus sailed to the West Indies. In 1493 Pope Alexander VI issued a bull granting to Spain all territories discovered west of a line drawn down the Atlantic, all east of it to Portugal. In 1497 the Cabots discovered Labrador and Newfoundland. In 1500 Amerigo Vespucci explored the coastline of South America. In 1513 Balboa discovered the Pacific. In 1516 Erasmus published a Greek New Testament. The discovery of the modern physical world and of the ancient world of the Bible was well along the way. The features of the Renaissance which most deeply affected Calvin were the revival of antique

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77. Martin Luther, Three Treatises, pp. 251-90.

78. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion (translation by Henry Beveridge), volume 2, pp. 130-42.

79. Will Durant, The Renaissance.

80. Ibid., p. 199.

learning which came through the printing of the Latin classics, the discovery that in Greek and Latin culture man had been much more free than he was in the late Middle Ages, and new methods of Biblical research.

The Renaissance was marked by a new zest for all that was human and beautiful,<sup>81</sup> combined with a spirit of revolt against authority.<sup>82</sup> It is important to note that though there was much intellectual activity and ferment, new contributions to philosophy were rare in this period. Muller has bluntly remarked, "After medieval philosophy reached the end of its development, about 1350, there was no important philosophy in all Europe until the rise of the moderns with Descartes, after 1600; yet this long slump coincided with the Renaissance, a period abounding in intellectual activity."<sup>83</sup> Muller's contention is supported by the general shape of histories of philosophy. Rogers<sup>84</sup> gives 207 pages to the period from 600 B.C. to 1300 A.D., averages 11 pages per century. He then gives 7 pages to the period from 1300 to 1600, average 2 1/3 pages per century.<sup>85</sup> Next he gives 269 pages to the period from 1600 to 1932, average 80 pages per century. In Will Durant's popular The Story of Philosophy this gap in philosophy at the Renaissance is still more striking. After giving 100 pages to Plato and Aristotle,<sup>86</sup> he gives a total of 10 pages (including 2 pages of charts) to the period from Aristotle to the Renaissance,<sup>87</sup> and then one whole page to the period from the death of Roger Bacon (1294) to the birth of Francis Bacon (1561).<sup>88</sup>

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81. Arthur Kenyon Rogers, A Student's History of Philosophy, p. 209.

82. Ibid., p. 210.

83. Herbert J. Muller, op. cit., p. 66.

84. Rogers, op. cit., pp. 1-207.

85. Ibid., pp. 208-14.

86. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy, pp. 7-106.

87. Ibid., pp. 107-16.

88. Ibid., pp. 116-17.

Whereas the Protestant Reformation tended to be essentially un-Greek, the secular ideals of ancient Greece were the mainspring of the Renaissance.<sup>89</sup> In the Renaissance the rediscovery of the Greek spirit led to extremes of sensuality and vice.<sup>90</sup> Thus when Rodrigo Borgia (1431-1503), great patron of Renaissance art, became a candidate for the office of Pope the fact that he publicly acknowledged four children by Vanozza dei Cattanei, the favorite of his many mistresses, was no obstacle to his acceding to office. It was believed only that he should have a more suitable mistress for the purpose. He forsook Vanozza, took unto himself the beautiful Guilia Farnese, and in 1492 became Pope Alexander VI. Much of the glorification of the Vatican was the expression of the pagan, worldly side of the Renaissance.<sup>91</sup> Muller, however, notes that the above scandalous abuses which are commonly attributed to the worldliness of the Renaissance were logical developments of conditions solidly rooted in the life of the Middle Ages.<sup>92</sup> Calvin's doctrine of the depravity of man was a reasonable interpretation of these developments.

On the positive side, the rediscovery of the ancient Greeks led to the rebirth of hope for a good life on this earth.<sup>93</sup> The humanists became conscious of the worth of the natural man. They gave much freer play to his creative powers than in the Middle Ages. They idolized the human body and the human spirit. They rediscovered the individual personality. However, much of the learning of the Renaissance was pedantic or merely literary.

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89. Muller, op. cit., p. 142.

90. Ibid., p. 175.

91. Ibid., p. 240.

92. Ibid., p. 261.

93. Ibid., p. 266.

Bookworms cut themselves off from social actualities in a spirit of academic aloofness. With the exception of printing, they were little interested in the actual explorations and inventions that were enlarging and transforming the world. For the most part they were indifferent to science, except when they looked down with haughty disdain upon such a bourgeois practical art. In their service of princes rather than the common people their aristocratic bias was more a matter of temperament and custom than the expression of any deep principle. Muller notes, "They had no clear or firm philosophy. Thought did not become systematic again until Descartes."<sup>94</sup>

Petrarch (1304-1374) was attracted by the writings of Virgil, Cicero, and Horace.<sup>95</sup> All three of these were quoted by Calvin in the Institutes. Calvin even to his last days appears to have been especially fond of Cicero. Yet it was primarily with reference to these Latin authors that men of the Renaissance learned to enjoy the use of their critical faculties. They came to scorn Scholasticism. They revived the architecture of Greece and Rome and disdainfully labeled the architecture of the Middle Ages with the uncomplimentary epithet "Gothic." They sought satisfaction in human achievement and believed in man's power to understand the world and to master it. The Scholastics had taught the orderliness of the natural world and had believed that man and his environment constitute a universe, not a multiverse. Humanism, while in part the product of the Christian faith, was both an aid to an enemy of that faith.<sup>96</sup>

Most of the humanists were at least nominal members of the Roman Catholic Church. Yet their humanism often led to arrogance which had no sense of sin

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94. Ibid., p. 267.

95. Latourette, op. cit., p. 604.

96. Ibid., p. 605.

or of creatureliness and which felt no need for the forgiving grace of God. For them heaven and hell did not exist. This present life, they proudly asserted, is the one that counts. They indulged in much scoffing at Christianity.<sup>97</sup> The earlier humanists were largely negative in their attitude toward the Church and its faith. They scorned Scholastic philosophy and theology, and held monasticism in contempt. Typical of the early part of the fifteenth century is Laurentius Valla (1405-1457), who used his critical skill to reveal the spurious character of the Donation of Constantine and who inferred from what he discovered that the Papacy was a huge, pious fraud. He also delighted in showing that the Apostles' Creed was not framed, as popular legends asserted, by the Twelve Apostles. In advocating the study of Scripture in the original Greek and Hebrew texts he undermined confidence in the reliability of the Latin Vulgate as the authoritative version.<sup>98</sup> Calvin accepted the humanistic conclusions of Valla, including the notion of gradual authorship of the Apostles' Creed.<sup>99</sup>

The Papacy was captured by the Renaissance and secularistic humanism. Nicholas V (reigned 1447-1455), Callistes III (r. 1455-1458), Pius II (r. 1458-1464), Paul II (r. 1464-1471), Sixtus IV (r. 1471-1484), Innocent VIII (r. 1484-1492), and Alexander VI (r. 1492-1503) are commonly listed as Renaissance Popes. Nicholas V is commonly credited with having founded the Vatican Library. He also adopted the plans for the new St. Peter's Cathedral. Pius III tried to unite all of Europe against the Turks.<sup>100</sup> Paul II

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97. Ibid., p. 606.

98. Ibid., p. 659.

99. Part of Calvin's critical apparatus for studying the Apostles' Creed may be seen in his exposition of the article "He descended into hell." See Institutes, volume 1, pp. 441-43.

100. Iatourette, op. cit., p. 636.

more properly represents a brief anti-humanist reaction. Sixtus IV, noted for political activity tried to build a strong Italian state around the Papacy. He built the Sistine chapel.<sup>101</sup> Innocent VIII sold church offices to the highest bidder, except that Giovanni de' Medici was given an abbacy before he was eight years old and two more abbacies before he was twelve years old.<sup>102</sup> Alexander VI, who probably knew more about human conception than any other Pope, strongly supported the doctrine of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary against many opponents. Latourette concludes that the Renaissance Popes were probably not as depraved as some of the Popes who reigned between 900 and 1050.<sup>103</sup>

Few of the early Renaissance humanists made any very positive contributions to religious life. Many were negative in their attitudes toward the Church and the Christian faith. However, there were even in Italy some earnestly Christian humanists. Two of these were Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) and Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494).<sup>104</sup> Two outstanding Christian humanists of the North were Jaques Lefèvre d'Étaples and Erasmus, both of whom died in 1536, the year Calvin first published the Institutes.

Le Fèvre (also known as Jacobus Faber, Fabri, or Fabry and surnamed Stapulensis) in 1492 was studying Plato and Aristotle in Italy. At the College of Cardinal Lemoine he taught F. W. Vatable and William Farel, two associates of Calvin. In 1507 he entered the Benedictine Abbey of St. Germain des Prés, near Paris. His work Mary Magdalene (1517) caused violent contro-

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101. Ibid., p. 637.

102. Ibid., p. 638.

103. Ibid., p. 639.

104. Ibid., p. 660.

versy. The Sorbonne put said work on Index Librorum Prohibitorum in 1521. Le Fèvre left the monastery and took refuge at Meaux. He published his French translation of the New Testament from the Latin Vulgate in 1523. Francis I, who was rapidly becoming for a time patron of French humanists, protected Le Fèvre from persecution for a few years. In 1530 he published his French Bible. Margaret, Queen of Navarre, advised him to flee from impending persecution. In 1531 he took refuge at Nèrac, where he was visited by Calvin in 1533.

Erasmus of Rotterdam was born about 1466. His father and mother died of the plague when he was a small boy, and he was sent to school in Deventer. Part of his education was under the auspices of the Brethren of the Common Life. His guardian and friends tried to persuade him to be a monk. He was ordained as a priest, but was not too happy as such. Besides study at the University of Paris his education continued in Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, England, and Germany. He was skilful in Latin composition. His books were popular. As a Christian he did not care for Scholasticism. He wanted people freed from supersitition by using their minds. He used the rational approach to the problems of the day. He believed that the proper use of reason could improve both Church and society. His edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516 was accompanied by a new translation into Latin. He did much to turn the tide of humanism into the channels of real religion.<sup>105</sup> He contributed substantially to humanitas in religion by editing either alone or with others the works of Athanasius, Basil, Chrysostom, Cyprian, Jerome, Augustine and other Greek and Latin Fathers.<sup>106</sup> Calvin quoted all of these except Athan-

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105. Ibid., p. 662.

106. Arthur Cushman McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, volume 2, p. 391.

asius in the Institutes, very probably from the editions of Erasmus:

McNeill says that the principal manner in which Calvin, Zwingli, and Oecolampadius diverged from the Christian humanists from whom they learned much was that the Reformers emphasized "the majesty and holiness of God, the sinfulness of man, and the gulf between God in his holiness and man in his sinful state."<sup>107</sup> Calvin as a young student enjoyed the companionship of such moderate humanists as Francois Daniel, Nicholas Duchemin, and Melchior Wolmar. At the same time he was capable of holding in profound respect the conservative, pious, and stalwart Pierre de l'Etoile, the great French teacher of jurisprudence at Orleans. Calvin rejected radical humanism in the personality of Andrea Alciati, whom he regarded as coarse, pompous, and vain. In Calvin's first appearance in print in 1531 he vigorously defended the competence and expertness of de l'Etoile against the charges of Alciati.<sup>108</sup> Young Calvin apparently wished to see humanism contained within the bounds of decent responsibility. Calvin's Commentary on Lucius Anneas Seneca's Two Books on Clemency (1532) is usually mentioned as Calvin's principal humanistic attainment.<sup>109</sup> especially in view of its clear and polished Latin.

There is another work by Calvin which ought to be classified as a humanistic work. This is his treatise On Relics. When Calvin was a small boy, his mother took him to the festival in honor of St. Ann at Uricampus. There he was required to kiss an object which was supposedly a mummified part of the body of St. Ann, mother of the Virgin Mary.<sup>110</sup> John Calvin's mother, who died soon thereafter, in accordance with the prevalent religious supersti-

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107. John T. McNeill, The History and Character of Calvinism, p. 76.

108. Ibid., pp. 102-103.

109. Ibid., p. 104.

110. Caughey, op. cit., p. 9.

tions, and in her uncritical piety, believed this hoax. The boy John always wondered about it. In his travels he noted carefully every time he was shown an object alleged to be a finger of St. Peter. He persuaded some of his young friends to do likewise. Then at the proper time Calvin wrote his Admonition Showing the Advantages which Christendom Might Derive from an Inventory of Relics, in which he wittily exposed the then current epidemic of "idolomania."<sup>110a</sup> This work is a humorous catalog of bodies and relics of saints said to exist in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and other countries. It lists parts of the body of Christ, vials of blood of Christ, objects pertaining to the boyhood of Jesus, relics of the Last Supper, fragments of the cross, the nails, the soldier's spear, the crown of thorns, the seamless robe of Christ, the napkin at the resurrection, bones of the Virgin Mary, various parts of the bodies of the Apostles, and numerous other objects. The whole work proceeds in the true style of some of the debunking logic of Renaissance humanism.

Calvin before he was 14 years of age was exposed to probably the best Latin style of the Renaissance when his father transferred him in 1523 to the Collège de la Marche. Mathurin Cordier's Colloquies, whether or not they ever became as popular as those of Erasmus, were models which were reflected in the style of the Institutes. Calvin acknowledged that he had been singularly blessed to have had such an outstanding teacher and dedicated his Commentary on I Thessalonians to Cordier.<sup>111</sup>

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110a. John Calvin, Tracts and Treatises, volume 1, pp. 289-341.

111. Quirinus Breen, John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism, p. 15.

Breen says that during the 1520's Luther was generally regarded in Paris as a humanist.<sup>112</sup> In 1523 the University of Paris declared most of the works of Melanchthon contraband. On May 13, 1523, the library of Louis de Berquin was confiscated and inspected by the faculty of the Sorbonne. It was found to contain Luther's writing on the Babylonian Captivity and certain of Luther's expositions of Scripture.<sup>113</sup> In 1524 Josse Clichtowe wrote a refutation of Luther's On Christian Liberty, showing that said work of Luther had been important enough in France to require refutation. Again in 1527 the new library of Louis de Berquin was sacked by the theology professors of the Sorbonne. De Berquin had written notes in the margins of the works of Luther which he had collected in four years. Francis I, sympathetic to the humanist cause, set de Berquin free a second time.<sup>114</sup> However, on April 26, 1529, de Berquin was sentenced to death, "because he was a Lutheran."<sup>115</sup>

In 1531 Calvin was attending the Royal Lecturers, humanist college in Paris established by Francis I to combat reactionary tendencies in the Sorbonne.

Calvin's exile from Geneva to Strasbourg from 1538 to 1541 and his association with Johann Sturm of academy fame shows how Calvin did his best work when he enjoyed the quiet sympathy of humanist scholars. A comparison of the five major editions and many sub-editions of the Institutes clearly shows the superiority of the French edition of 1541, completed when

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112. Ibid., p. viii.

113. Ibid., p. 32.

114. Ibid., p. 27.

115. Ibid., p. 39.

Calvin was enjoying that goal of every Renaissance humanist, namely, some quiet leisure for study.<sup>116</sup>

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116. The investigator spent one semester with Professor George A. Barrois, of Princeton Theological Seminary, comparing editions of the Institutes in Latin and French.

INSERT A

A BRIEF SURVEY OF

CALVIN'S TEACHINGS ON HUMAN REASON

Reason and Revelation

Of the four general types of relationship which may exist between reason and revelation<sup>1</sup> Calvin's teachings clearly place him in the "Revelation Dominant" category.<sup>2</sup> He says that in the very arrangement of subject matter in the Holy Scripture is to be seen a superiority over the writings of the philosophers.

As philosophers have certain definitions of rectitude and honesty, from which they derive particular duties and the whole train of virtues; so in this respect Scripture is not without order, but presents a most beautiful arrangement, one too which is every way much more certain than that of the philosophers.<sup>3</sup>

Calvin has noted a certain type of arrogance in the manner in which many of the philosophers commend the virtues, which arrogance he saw as the opposite of true Christian humility.

Those who have not so renounced themselves have followed virtue at least for the sake of praise. The philosophers who have contended most strongly that virtue is to be desired on her own account, were so inflated with arrogance as to make it apparent that they sought virtue for no other reason than as a ground for indulging in pride.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Supra, p. 7.
  2. Supra, pp. 11-18.
  3. John Calvin, The Institutes of the Christian Religion, volume 2, page 2. In this insert this major work by Calvin will be abbreviated as "Inst." Volume and page numbers will refer to the Beveridge translation. The investigator's comparison of editions in Latin and French with the Norton, Beveridge, and Allen translations in English has indicated that the text of the Beveridge translation is sufficiently accurate for the purpose of this brief survey.
  4. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 8.

The authority of Scripture rests upon the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is above reason.

In vain were the authority of Scripture fortified by argument, or supported by the consent of the Church, or confirmed by any other helps, if unaccompanied by an assurance higher and stronger than human judgment can give. Till this better foundation has been laid, the authority of Scripture remains in suspense.<sup>5</sup>

Scripture has power to authenticate itself by the manner in which it affects us when we read it.

Here there was good ground for the Apostle's declaration, that the faith of the Corinthians was founded not on "the wisdom of men," but on "the power of God" (1 Cor. ii.5),--his speech and preaching among them having been, "not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power" (I Cor. ii.5). For the truth is vindicated in position to every doubt, when, unsupported by foreign aid, it has its sole sufficiency in itself. How peculiarly this property belongs to Scripture appears from this, that no human writings, however skilfully composed, are at all capable of affecting us in a similar way. Read Demosthenes or Cicero, read Plato, Aristotle, or any other of that class: you will, I admit, feel wonderfully allured, pleased, moved, enchanted; but turn from them to the reading of the sacred volume, and whether you will or not, it will so affect you, so pierce your heart, so work its way into your very marrow, that, in comparison of the impression so produced, that of orators and philosophers will almost disappear; making it manifest that in the sacred volume there is a truth divine, a something which makes it immeasurably superior to all the gifts and graces attainable by man.<sup>6</sup>

The Gospels deal with mysteries beyond the capacity of human reason.

Three evangelists give a narrative in a mean and humble style. The proud often eye this simplicity with disdain, because they attend not to the principal heads of doctrine; for from these they might easily infer that these evangelists treat of heavenly mysteries beyond the capacity of man.<sup>7</sup>

The doctrine contained in the Gospels has been given by the Holy Spirit.<sup>8</sup>

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5. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 74-75.

6. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 75.

7. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 81.

8. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 81-82.

### The Abilities of Human Reason

After the Holy Spirit has authenticated Scripture, reason can help and strengthen faith.

On the other hand, when recognizing (the) exemption (of Scripture) from the common rule, we receive it reverently, and according to its dignity, those proofs which were not so strong as to produce and rivet a full conviction in our minds, become most appropriate helps. For it is wonderful how much we are confirmed in our belief, when we more attentively consider how admirably the system of divine wisdom contained in it is arranged--how beautifully it harmonises in all its parts--and how rich it is in all the other qualities which give an air of majesty to composition. Our hearts are still more firmly assured when we reflect that our admiration is excited more by the dignity of the matter than by the graces of style. For it was not without an admirable arrangement of Providence, that the sublime mysteries of the kingdom of heaven have for the greater part been delivered with a contemptible meanness of words. Had they been adorned with a more splendid eloquence, the wicked might have cavilled, and alleged that this constituted all their force. But now, when an unpolished simplicity, almost bordering on rudeness, makes a deeper impression than the loftiest flights of oratory, what does it indicate if not that the Holy Scriptures are too mighty in the power of truth to need the rhetorician's art?

Reason, a natural gift, could not be totally destroyed by the Fall of man.

Nor although there is still some residue of intelligence and judgment as well as will, we cannot call a mind sound and entire which is both weak and immersed in darkness. As to the will, its depravity is but too well known. Therefore, since reason, by which man discerns between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be entirely destroyed; but being partly weakened and partly corrupted, a shapeless ruin is all that remains. In this sense it is said (John i. 5), that "the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not;" these words clearly expressing both points--viz. that in the perverted and degenerate nature of man there are still some sparks which show that he is a rational animal, and differs from the brutes, inasmuch as he is endowed with intelligence, and yet, that this light is so smothered by clouds of darkness, that it cannot shine forth to any good effect. In like manner, the will, because inseparable from the nature of man, did not perish, but was so enslaved by depraved lusts as to be incapable of one righteous desire. The definition now given is complete, but there are several points which require to be explained. Therefore, proceeding agreeably to that primary distinction (Book I, c. xv, sec. 7 and 8), by which we divided the soul into intellect and will, we will not inquire into the power of the intellect.<sup>10</sup>

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9. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 75.

10. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 233.

Natural reason in the natural man aspires to truth to some extent; but it always stops short of its goal.

To charge the intellect with perpetual blindness so as to leave it no intelligence of any description whatever, is repugnant not only to the Word of God, but to common experience. We see that there has been implanted in the human mind a certain desire of investigating truth, to which it never would aspire unless some relish for truth antecedently existed. There is therefore, now, in the human mind, discernment to this extent, that it is naturally influenced by the love of truth, the neglect of which in the lower animals is a proof of their gross and irrational nature. Still it is true that this love of truth fails before it reaches the goal, forthwith falling away into vanity.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, natural reason can make a little progress even in spiritual matters.

Still, however, man's efforts are not always so utterly fruitless as not to lead to some result, especially when his attention is directed to inferior objects. Nay, even with regard to superior objects, though he is more careless in investigating them he makes some little progress. Here, however, his ability is more limited, and he is never made more sensible of his weakness than when he attempts to soar above the sphere of the present life.<sup>12</sup>

In politics, economics, mechanical arts, and liberal arts reason is competent.

(In) matters of policy and economy, all mechanical arts and liberal studies . . . the view to be taken is this: Since man is by nature a social animal, he is disposed, from natural instinct, to cherish and preserve society; and accordingly we see that the minds of all men have impressions of civil order and honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands how human societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to comprehend the principles of those laws. Hence the universal agreement in regard to such subjects, both among nations and individuals, the seeds of them being implanted in the breast of all without a teacher or lawgiver. The truth of this fact is not affected by wars and dissensions . . . Quarrels . . . do not destroy the primary idea of justice. . . . All this is ample proof that, in regard to the constitution of the present life, no man is devoid of the light of reason.<sup>13</sup>

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11. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 234.

12. Loc. cit.

13. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 234-35.

All persons have at least some ability in both the liberal and the manual arts.

Next come manual and liberal arts, in learning which as all have some degree of aptitude, the full force of human acuteness is displayed. But though all are not equally able to learn all the arts, we have sufficient evidence of a common capacity in the fact, that there is scarcely an individual who does not display intelligence in some particular art. And this capacity extends not merely to the learning of the art, but to the devising of something new, or the improving of what had been previously learned.<sup>14</sup>

Thus we see that the human mind, even though fallen, retains admirable gifts of God, which must not be despised.<sup>15</sup> God even confers excellent gifts upon pagans, for the common benefit of mankind.<sup>16</sup> In order to keep our pride in check, however, we must remember that these abilities of natural reason are possessed only through the mercy of Almighty God.<sup>17</sup>

#### The Methods of Human Reason

Human reason does not work in a vacuum. There must be content with which to work. Calvin sought to outline the content by preparing catechisms. Schaff has shown that this was the almost universal method in religion in Calvin's day.<sup>18</sup> Beyond that Calvin was perpetually warning against superficial exercises in logic, which appeared to him to be only so much playing with words. Finally, he urged his hearers to observe the methods used by the Holy Spirit of God in setting up the Holy Scriptures.<sup>19</sup>

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14. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 235.

15. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 236.

16. Loc. cit.

17. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 237.

18. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, volume 3.

19. Inst., vol. 2, p. 2.

The Relationship of Human Reason to the Total Personality

The soul consists of two parts: intellect and will, Calvin held.

Philosophers, being unacquainted with the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of revolt, erroneously confound two states of man which are very different from each other. Let us therefore hold, for the purpose of the present work, that the soul consists of two parts, the intellect and the will . . . the office of the intellect being to distinguish between objects, according as they seem deserving of being approved or disapproved; and the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad (Plato in Phaedro). We dwell not on the subtlety of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of itself; but that the moving power is choice, which he also terms the appetive intellect. Not to lose ourselves in superfluous questions, let it be enough to know that the intellect is to us, as it were, the guide and ruler of the soul; that the will always follows its beck, and waits for its decision, in matters of desire. For which reason Aristotle truly taught, that in the appetite there is a pursuit and rejection corresponding in some degree to affirmation and negation in the intellect (Aristot. Ethic. lib. vi. c. 2). Moreover, it will be seen in another place . . . how surely the intellect governs the will. Here we only wish to observe, that the soul does not possess any faculty which may not be duly referred to one or other of these members.<sup>20</sup>

Philosophers in general maintain the primacy of reason over will and sense-data.

Philosophers generally maintain that reason dwells in the mind like a lamp, throwing light on all its counsels, and, like a queen, governing the will that it is so pervaded with divine light as to be able to consult for the best, and so endued with vigour as to be able perfectly to command; that, on the contrary, sense is dull and short-sighted, always creeping on the ground, groveling among inferior objects, and never rising to true vision; that the appetite, when it obeys reason, and does not allow itself to be subjugated by sense, is borne to the study of virtue, holds a straight course, and becomes transformed into will; but that when enslaved by sense, it is corrupted and depraved so as to degenerate into lust.<sup>21</sup>

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20. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 168.

21. Ibid., vol. 2. p. 224.

Calvin observed, apparently with some satisfaction, that philosophers were compelled to admit all kinds of practical difficulties in the way of establishing the primacy of reason. Calvin charged that many ancient theologians, who should have known better, feared to deny the primacy of reason, lest philosophers would make fun of theology.<sup>22</sup>

Among ecclesiastical writers, although there is none who did not acknowledge that sound reason in man was seriously injured by sin, and the will greatly entangled by vicious desires, yet many of them made too near an approach to the philosophers. Some of the most ancient writers appear to me to have exalted human strength, from a fear that a distinct acknowledgment of its impotence might expose them to the jeers of the philosophers with whom they were disputing, and also furnish the flesh, already too much disinclined to good, with a new pretext for sloth. Therefore, to avoid teaching anything which the majority of mankind might deem absurd, they made it their study, in some measure, to reconcile the doctrine of Scripture with the dogmas of philosophy, at the same time making it their special care not to furnish any occasion for sloth. This is obvious from their words.<sup>23</sup>

Calvin noted that Aquinas had subsumed will under intellect.<sup>24</sup> Calvin went on to categorically deny the existence of free will in the natural man.<sup>25</sup> He included Aquinas in the "modern Sophists" who lived after 1100 (birth of Peter Lombard), and noted that there were sounder Schoolmen before Lombard.<sup>26</sup> Calvin asserted that free will exists only in the redeemed man as a special gift of the Holy Spirit.<sup>27</sup>

#### The Limits of Human Reason

Calvin observed a confusion among the philosophers about the existence and perfections of God.<sup>28</sup> He asserted that unaided reason could never reach

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22. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 224.
  23. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 225.
  24. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 227.
  25. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 228.
  26. Loc. cit.
  27. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 230.
  28. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 59-60.

some of the teachings of Scripture.<sup>29</sup> and that reason cannot prove that Scripture is the Word of God.<sup>30</sup> Before the Fall, reason was adequate to obtain eternal life.<sup>31</sup> Reason was corrupted by the Fall and the supernatural gifts within reason have been withdrawn.<sup>32</sup> Natural reason, although it aspires to truth, always stops short of its goal.<sup>33</sup> Natural reason cannot attain pure knowledge of God and of true righteousness.<sup>34</sup> Unredeemed reason cannot receive the Spirit of holiness.<sup>35</sup> With respect to the knowledge of God and of our salvation men are blinder than moles.<sup>36</sup> Previous to regeneration, man is unable to comprehend those things which belong to our salvation.<sup>37</sup> Human reason is ignorant of the true knowledge of the divine Law.<sup>38</sup> Human reason is blind to heavenly things until it is illuminated by the grace of God.<sup>39</sup> The blindness of human reason is manifested not so much in generals as in particulars, which blindness is tested by both tables of the divine Law.<sup>40</sup>

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29. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 76.  
30. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 83.  
31. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 169.  
32. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 233.  
33. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 234.  
34. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 234.  
35. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 236.  
36. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 238.  
37. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 239.  
38. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 241.  
39. Ibid., vol. 1, loc. cit.  
40. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 242.

The Uses of Human Reason

Many of the uses of human reason have been suggested in connection with the abilities of human reason. Calvin added a final exhortation: Do not neglect the gifts of God through natural reason, lest God punish you for your laziness.<sup>41</sup>

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41. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 237.

INSERT B

SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

OF

SECTIONS 1 AND 2

The Categories

A prerequisite for discovering and evaluating John Calvin's teachings on human reason was to outline the basic questions about human reason which are raised in any philosophy of religion. To discover these basic questions sixty-three works in the philosophy of religion (see bibliography, section B) were examined. The principles for selecting these works were as follows:

1. There had to be some explicit statement in the book about the relationship of human reason to religion. Implied relationships between human reason and religion were not used as criteria for selecting these works.

2. Jewish, Roman Catholic, and Protestant viewpoints had to be included.

3. Such typical Protestant viewpoints as conservative, liberal, and neo-orthodox had to be included.

4. Such various philosophical positions as realism, idealism, pragmatism, naturalism, logical positivism, and vitalism had to be included.

5. Both European and American writers had to be included.

6. The works had to have been published since 1900.

From these works an inclusive list of questions about human reason in relationship to religion was collected. In each work the table of contents and the index was inspected in order to note the categories under which statements about human reason were subsumed. After the pertinent

passages had been located the questions on human reason with which the author dealt were noted in his own words, as far as possible. In order to begin to classify the questions, a tentative set of categories was used. All of the questions on human reason were organized under the tentative categories, in so far as each question logically fitted into one of the categories. Questions which did not fit into one of the categories were reserved. New categories were invented.

In constructing section 1 the principle of proportion was carefully observed in order to build a scale of rating, on the basis of which it would be possible to note any questions on human reason which Calvin ignored, underemphasized, treated fully, or overemphasized. The criteria will be as follows: If a question is not mentioned by Calvin, it will be classified as "ignored." If Calvin has treated a question less fully than other religious philosophers studied, it will be classified as "underemphasized." If Calvin has treated a question with fulness approximately equal to that of other religious philosophers studied, it will be classified as "treated fully." If Calvin has treated a question with much greater detail than other religious philosophers studied, it will be classified as "overemphasized."

#### Immediate Historical Background

Section 2 was designed as a tool to provide, if possible, some historical explanation of the general proportion which Calvin's teachings on human reason exhibit. The investigator might have sought a historical explanation and/or explanations in biographical data. This method, however, was not feasible to apply to Calvin, since his apparently most

vital spiritual experiences are involved in considerable obscurity as to time, place, and other circumstances. Therefore, it seemed best to describe the historical setting of John Calvin's discussion of human reason in relationship to religion in terms of three broad historical movements in which he is known to have been deeply involved. The descriptions of the three movements were designed to provide a frame of reference to discover whether Calvin was carried along by them in reaction against them, or perhaps some ambiguous combination of being carried along by and reacting against them simultaneously.

SECTION 3

EXPOSITION OF

CALVIN'S TEACHINGS ON HUMAN REASON

Reason and Revelation

Of the four general types of relationship which may exist between reason and revelation<sup>1</sup> Calvin's teachings clearly place him in the "Revelation Dominant" category.<sup>2</sup> He asserted that in general all wisdom and truth flow from God.<sup>3</sup> Since no religion is genuine which does not accord with truth,<sup>4</sup> and since God's essence is incomprehensible,<sup>5</sup> no genuine religion is possible apart from some kind of revelation. Calvin did allow a general revelation given to all men. God's creation manifests whatever may be known of God, apart from Christ.<sup>6</sup> Natural events illustrate divine power.<sup>7</sup> Even apparently chance events prove divine providence.<sup>8</sup> However, revelation in natural creation is sufficient only to render man without excuse.<sup>9</sup>

Special revelation by means of the light of God's word is necessary for salvation.<sup>10</sup> By faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word

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1. Supra, p. 7
  2. Supra, pp. 11-18.
  3. Calvini Opera, Corpus Reformatorum, volume III, page 44; cf. Institutes of the Christian Religion (Beveridge translation), volume I, page 40. From this point on all references in the footnotes to Calvin's Institutes will be to the French edition of 1560 and to the second edition of the Beveridge translation (1863). These references will be abbreviated, as follows: C. R., III, 44; Inst., I, 40.
  4. C. R., III, 56; Inst., I, 48.
  5. C. R., III, 56; Inst., I, 51.
  6. C. R., III, 60-61; Inst., I, 51.
  7. C. R., III, 67; Inst., I, 55.
  8. C. R., III, 69; Inst., I, 57.
  9. C. R., III, 81-82; Inst., I, 64.
  10. C. R., III, 82; Inst., I, 64.

of God.<sup>11</sup> Scripture gathers together impressions of the Deity and shows us the true God clearly.<sup>12</sup> God the Creator is manifested to us in Scripture.<sup>13</sup> Right and sound doctrine are impossible apart from Scripture.<sup>14</sup> In the Word the character of God, drawn from His works, is accurately and vividly portrayed.<sup>15</sup> The brightness of the Divine countenance is an inextricable labyrinth, apart from the Word.<sup>16</sup>

Scripture bears clear evidence of its own truth.<sup>17</sup> Our faith in doctrine is not established until we have a perfect conviction that God is its author.<sup>18</sup> The prophets and apostles did not dwell on reasons, but appealed to the sacred name of God.<sup>19</sup> The testimony of the Holy Spirit is superior to reason.<sup>20</sup> God alone can properly bear witness to His own words.<sup>21</sup> Scripture carries its own evidence through the testimony of the Spirit, and does not submit to proofs and arguments.<sup>22</sup> Enlightened by the Spirit, we believe in a way superior to human judgment that the Scriptures are from God.<sup>23</sup> We do not ask for proofs or probabilities; we submit our intellect and judgment to the word of God as too transcendent for us to estimate.<sup>24</sup> "We feel a divine energy breathing in it," testifies Calvin. "We are drawn and animated to obey it more vividly and efficiently than could be done by human will or knowledge."<sup>25</sup> The conviction which revelation alone can

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11. C. R., III, 79; Inst., I, 62.
  12. C. R., III, 82; Inst., I, 64.
  13. C. R., III, 84; Inst., I, 65.
  14. C. R., III, 85-86; Inst., I, 66.
  15. C. R., III, 86-87; Inst., I, 66.
  16. C. R., III, 87; Inst., I, 67.
  17. C. R., III, 92; Inst., I, 69.
  18. C. R., III, 94; Inst., I, 71.
  19. Loc. cit.
  20. C. R., III, 95; Inst., I, 72.
  21. Loc. cit.
  22. C. R., III, 96; Inst., I, 72.
  23. Loc. cit.
  24. C. R., III, 97; Inst., I, 72.
  25. C. R., III, 97; Inst., I, 72-73.

produce accords with highest reason, and is more firm and secure than any reason.<sup>26</sup> Any arguments for the truth of Scripture are useless until the testimony of the Holy Spirit, which is above reason, has been received.

In vain were the authority of Scripture fortified by argument, or supported by the consent of the Church, or confirmed by any other helps, if unaccompanied by an assurance higher and stronger than human judgment can give. Till this better foundation has been laid, the authority of Scripture remains in suspense.<sup>27</sup>

Scripture has power to authenticate itself by the manner in which it affects us when we read it.

Here there was good ground for the Apostle's declaration, that the faith of the Corinthians was founded not on "the wisdom of men," but on "the power of God" (1 Cor. ii.5),--his speech and preaching among them having been, "not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power" (1 Cor. ii.5). For the truth is vindicated in opposition to every doubt, when, unsupported by foreign aid, it has its whole sufficiency in itself. How peculiarly this property belongs to Scripture appears from this, that no human writings, however skilfully composed, are at all capable of affecting us in a similar way. Read Demosthenes or Cicero, read Plato, Aristotle, or any other of that class: you will, I admit, feel wonderfully allured, pleased, moved, enchanted; but turn from them to the reading of the sacred volume, and whether you will or not, it will so affect you, so pierce your heart, so work its way into your very marrow, that, in comparison of the impressions so produced, that of orators and philosophers will almost disappear; making it manifest that in the sacred volume there is a truth divine, a something which makes it immeasurable superior to all the gifts and graces attainable by man.<sup>28</sup>

The Scriptures are full of sentiments beyond the power of man to conceive.<sup>29</sup>

Also, great weight is to be given to the antiquity of Scripture.<sup>30</sup>

The Gospels deal with mysteries beyond the capacity of human reason.

Three evangelists give a narrative in a mean and humble style. The proud often eye this simplicity with disdain, because they attend not to the principal heads of doctrine; for from these they might easily

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26. C. R., III, 97; Inst., I, 73.
  27. C. R., III, 98; Inst., I, 74-75.
  28. C. R., III, 99; Inst., I, 75.
  29. C. R., III, 100; Inst., I, 76.
  30. Loc. cit.

infer that these evangelists treat of heavenly mysteries beyond the capacity of man.<sup>31</sup>

The doctrine contained in the Gospels has been given by the Holy Spirit.<sup>32</sup>

Scripture suffices to give a saving knowledge of God only when its certainty is founded on the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit.<sup>33</sup> The office of the Spirit is to seal on our minds the doctrine which the gospel recommends.<sup>34</sup> Any spirit which bypasses the wisdom of God's Word is deservedly suspect.<sup>35</sup> The purpose of the knowledge of God as revealed in Scripture is that we may learn to worship Him with perfect integrity of heart and sincere obedience, and to depend entirely on His goodness.<sup>36</sup> The Scriptural signs of God's presence intimate His incomprehensible essence and curb men's minds.<sup>37</sup> The design of the cherubim with outstretched wings over the ark was to curb presumption.<sup>38</sup> The Scriptural doctrine of the immensity and spirituality of the essence of God refutes the subtleties of profane philosophy.<sup>39</sup> God, referring to His immensity and spirituality, suppresses gross imaginations and checks the audacity of the human mind.<sup>40</sup> All the thoughts of our minds and the words of our mouths should be tested by the Scriptures.<sup>41</sup> Great reverence and sobriety ought to be observed in discussing the mystery of the Trinity.<sup>42</sup> The wisdom, power, and justice of the invisible God are incomprehensible.<sup>43</sup> If Scripture does not direct our inquiries after God, we turn in vain in our

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31. C. R., III, 107; Inst., I, 81.  
32. Loc. cit.  
33. C. R., III, 109; Inst., I, 83.  
34. C. R., III, 111; Inst., I, 85.  
35. Loc. cit.  
36. C. R., III, 115; Inst., I, 89.  
37. C. R., III, 121-22; Inst., I, 92.  
38. C. R., III, 123; Inst., I, 93.  
39. C. R., III, 144-45; Inst., I, 109.  
40. C. R., III, 145; Inst., I, 109.  
41. C. R., III, 148; Inst., I, 111.  
42. C. R., III, 170; Inst., I, 125.  
43. C. R., III, 192; Inst., I, 141.

imaginations.<sup>44</sup>

Reason in pondering the providence of God must be subject to its Maker.<sup>45</sup> The law and the gospel are transcendent mysteries (surmontent de beaucoup nostre capacite).<sup>46</sup> God enlightens minds (ses esleus) with a spirit of understanding (l'esprit d'intelligence), in order to understand mysteries.<sup>47</sup> The Spirit works internally in the minds (coeurs) of men.<sup>48</sup> Irenaeus had observed that the unlimited God limited Himself in Christ, in order to accommodate Himself to our capacity, lest our minds be swallowed up (afin de ne point engloutir nos sens) by the immensity of His glory.<sup>49</sup> The incomprehensible God is not subject to our senses.<sup>50</sup>

If your mind (ton coeur) entertains any misgivings as to the certainty of God's Word, Calvin maintained, it will have no authority at all.<sup>51</sup> You must believe that every word which proceeds from Him is sacred, inviolable truth (tout ce qui procede de luy, est verité ferme et inviolable).<sup>52</sup> Faith is knowledge of God ascertained from His word.<sup>52</sup> The foundation of faith is a previous persuasion of the truth of God.<sup>52</sup> Faith not merely knows that God is, but perceives His will toward us.<sup>53</sup> Faith is "a firm and sure knowledge of the divine favor toward us, founded on the truth of a free promise in Christ and revealed to our minds (a nostre entendement), and sealed on our hearts, by the Holy Spirit."<sup>54</sup> What the mind embraces by faith (ce que

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44. C. R., III, 192; Inst., I, 141-42.

45. C. R., III, 251; Inst., I, 184.

46. C. R., III, 252; Inst., I, 185.

47. Loc. cit.

48. C. R., III, 272; Inst., I, 200.

49. C. R., III, 395; Inst., I, 298.

50. C. R., III, 434; Inst., I, 330.

51. C. R., IV, 17; Inst., I, 474.

52. C. R., IV, 17; Inst., I, 474.

53. C. R., IV, 16-17; Inst., I, 474.

54. C. R., IV, 18-19; Inst., I, 475.

nostre entendement comprend de Dieu par foy) is infinite, and surpasses human understanding (ceste maniere de cognoistre outrepassa toute intelligence).<sup>55</sup> Commenting on "the love of Christ which surpasses knowledge" (Ephesians 3:19), Calvin notes:

No man can approach God without being raised above himself and above the world. On this ground the sophists refuse to admit that we can know with certainty that we enjoy the grace of God; for they measure faith by the perception of the bodily senses. But Paul justly contends that this wisdom exceeds all knowledge; for, if the faculties of man could reach it, the prayer of Paul that God would bestow it must have been unnecessary. Let us remember, therefore, that the certainty of faith is knowledge, but is acquired by the teaching of the Holy Spirit, not by the acuteness of our intellect.<sup>56</sup>

The knowledge of believers rests upon divine veracity rather than demonstration of reason (plus qu'ensiegniez par demonstrance ou argument humain).<sup>57</sup> Calvin gives this explanation of "the hidden mystery" (Colossians 1:26):

Hidden mystery. Here we have a commendation of the gospel-- that it is a wonderful secret of God. It is not without good reason that Paul so frequently extols the gospel by bestowing upon it the highest commendations in his power; for he saw that it was a stumblingblock to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greeks. (1. Cor. i.23.) We see also at this day, in what hatred it is held by hypocrites, and how haughtily it is contemned by the world. Paul, accordingly, with the view of setting aside judgments so unfair and perverse, extols in magnificent terms the dignity of the gospel as often as an opportunity presents itself, and for that purpose he makes use of various arguments, according to the connection of the passage. Here he calls it a sublime secret, which was hid from ages and generations, that is, from the beginning of the world, through so many revolutions of ages. Now, that it is of the gospel that he speaks, is evident

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55. C. R., IV, 29; Inst., I, 482.

56. C. R., LI, 188; Commentaries on the Epistles of Paul to the Galatians and Ephesians, p. 264. From this point on all references to the Commentaries in these footnotes will be to the Calvin Translation Society editions and will be abbreviated as follows: Galatians-Ephesians, 264.

57. C. R., IV, 29; Inst., I, 482.

from Rom. xvi.25, Eph. iii.9, and other similar passages.

The reason, however, why it is so called, is demanded. Some, in consequence of Paul's making express mention of the calling of the Gentiles, are of the opinion, that the sole reason why it is so called is, that the Lord had, in a manner, contrary to all expectation, poured out his grace upon the Gentiles, whom he had appeared to have shut out for ever from participation in eternal life. Any one, however, that will examine the whole passage more narrowly, will perceive that this is the third reason, not the only one, in so far, I mean, as relates to the passage before us, and that other in the Romans, to which I have referred. For the first is--that whereas God had, previously to the advent of Christ, governed his Church under dark coverings, both of words and ceremonies, he has suddenly shone forth in full brightness by means of the doctrine of the gospel. The second is--that whereas nothing was previously seen by external figures, Christ has been exhibited, bringing with him the full truth, which had lain concealed. The third is, what I have mentioned--that the whole world, which had up to this time been estranged from God, is called to the hope of salvation, and the same inheritance of eternal life is offered to all. An attentive consideration of these things constrains us to reverence and adore this mystery which Paul proclaims, however it may be held in contempt by the world, or even in derision.

Which is now revealed. Lest any one should turn aside to another meaning the term mystery, as though he were speaking of a thing that was still secret and unknown, he adds, that it has now at length been published, that it might be known by mankind. What, therefore, was in its own nature secret, has been made manifest by the will of God. Hence, there is no reason why its obscurity should alarm us, after the revelation that God has made of it. He adds, however, to the saints, for God's arm has not been revealed to all, (Isaiah liii.1,) that they might understand his counsel.<sup>58</sup>

"The knowledge of God's mystery" (Colossians 2:2) cannot be attained apart from Christ.

Let us, however, learn from this, that the gospel can be understood by faith alone--not by reason, nor by the perspicacity of the human understanding, because otherwise it is a thing that is hid from us.

The mystery of God I understand in a passive signification, as meaning--that in which God is revealed, for he immediately adds--and of the Father, and of Christ--by, which expression he means that God cannot be known otherwise than in Christ, as, on the other hand, the Father must necessarily be known where Christ is known. For John affirms both: He that hath the Son, hath the Father also: he that hath not the Son, hath also not the Father. (I John ii.23.) Hence

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58. C. R., LII, 95-96; Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, 168-69.

all that think that they know anything of God apart from Christ, contrive to themselves an idol in the place of God; as also, on the other hand, that man is ignorant of Christ, who is not led by him to the Father, and who does not in him embrace God wholly.<sup>59</sup>

Believers cannot evaluate the gifts of God in terms of externals, but in faith must look to the inward glory associated with the final advent of Christ (1 John 3:2).

Now we are the sons of God. He comes now to what every one knows and feels himself; for though the ungodly may not entice us to give up our hope, yet our present condition is very short of the glory of God's children; for as to our body we are dust and a shadow, and death is always before our eyes; we are also subject to thousand miseries, and the soul is exposed to innumerable evils; so that we always find a hell within us. The more necessary it is that all our thoughts should be withdrawn from the present view of things, lest the miseries by which we are on every side surrounded and almost overwhelmed, should shake our faith in that felicity which as yet lies hid. For the Apostle's meaning is this, that we act very foolishly when we estimate what God has bestowed on us according to the present state of things, but that we ought with undoubting faith to hold to that which does not yet appear.

But we know that when he shall appear. The conditional particle ought to be rendered as an adverb of time, when. But the verb appear means not the same thing as when he used it before. The Apostle has just said, it does not yet appear what we shall be, because the fruit of our adoption is as yet hid, for in heaven is our felicity, and we are now far away travelling on the earth; for this fading life, constantly exposed to hundred deaths, is far different from that eternal life which belongs to the children of God; for being enclosed as slaves in the prison of our flesh, we are far distant from the full sovereignty of heaven and earth. But the verb now refers to Christ, when he shall appear; for he teaches the same thing with Paul, in Col. iii. 3, 4, where he says, "Your life is hid with Christ in God: when Christ, who is your life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." For our faith cannot stand otherwise than by looking to the coming of Christ. The reason why God defers the manifestation of our glory is this, because Christ is not manifested in the power of his kingdom. This, then, is the only way of sustaining our faith, so that we may wait patiently for the life promised to us. As soon as any one turns away the least from Christ, he must necessarily fail.

The word to know, shows the certainty of faith, in order to distinguish it from opinion. Neither simple nor universal knowledge

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59. C. R., LII, 96; Philippians, Colossians, Thessalonians, 174-75.

is here intended, but that which every one ought to have for himself, so that he may feel assured that he will be sometime like Christ. Though, then, the manifestation of our glory is connected with the coming of Christ, yet our knowledge of this is well founded.

We shall be like him. He does not understand that we shall be equal to him; for there must be some difference between the head and the members; but we shall be like him, because he will make our vile body conformable to his glorious body, as Paul also teaches us in Phil. iii. 21. For the Apostle intended shortly to show that the final end of our adoption is, that what has in order preceded in Christ, shall at length be completed in us.

The reason that is added may, however, seem inappropriate: for if to see Christ makes us like him, we shall have this in common with the wicked, for they shall also see his glory. To this I reply, that this is to see him as a friend, which will not be the case with the wicked, for they will dread his presence; nay, they will shun God's presence, and be filled with terror; his glory will so dazzle their eyes, that they will be stupified and confounded. For we see that Adam, conscious of having done wrong, dreaded the presence of God. And God declared this by Moses, as a general truth as to men, "No man shall see me and live." (Exod. xxxiii. 20.) For how can it be otherwise but that God's majesty, as a consuming fire, will consume us as though we were stubble, so great is the weakness of our flesh. But as far as the image of God is renewed in us, we have eyes prepared to see God. And now, indeed, God begins to renew in us his own image, but in what a small measure: Except then we be stripped of all the corruption of the flesh, we shall not be able to behold God face to face.

And this is also expressed here, as he is. He does not, indeed, say, that there is no seeing of God now; but as Paul says, "We see now through a glass, darkly." (1 Cor. xiii. 12). But he elsewhere makes a difference between this way of living, and the seeing of the eye. In short, God now presents himself to be seen by us, not such as he is, but such as we can comprehend. Thus is fulfilled what is said by Moses, that we see only as it were his back, (Exod. xxxiii. 23;) for there is too much brightness in his face.

We must further observe, that the manner which the Apostle mentions is taken from the effect, not from the cause; for he does not teach us, that we shall be like him, because we shall see him; but he hence proves that we shall be partakers of the divine glory, for except our nature were spiritual, and endued with a heavenly and blessed immortality, it could never come so nigh to God: yet the perfection of glory will not be so great in us, that our seeing will enable us to comprehend all that God is; for the distance between us and him will be even then very great.

But when the Apostle says, that we shall see him as he is, he intimates a new and an ineffable manner of seeing him, which we enjoy not now; for as long as we walk by faith, as Paul teaches us, we are absent from him. And when he appeared to the fathers, it was not in his own essence, but was ever seen under symbols. Hence the majesty of God, now hid, will then only be in itself seen, when the veil of this

mortal and corruptable nature shall be removed.<sup>60</sup>

A mind (l'entendement) illumined with the knowledge of God is involved in ignorance at first, which is gradually removed,<sup>61</sup> but clear knowledge of the divine favor (une cognoissance de la volonte de Dieu) is the first and principal part of faith.<sup>62</sup> All our conceptions of the power and works of God are evanescent without the word (confus et de nulle fermete sans sa parole).<sup>63</sup> The existence of defect and infirmity (le defect et imbecillite) admonish us how carefully we ought to cling to the word of God (combien nous devons escouter Dieu soigneusement . . . à sa bouche).<sup>64</sup> Without the illumination of the Spirit the word has no effect.<sup>65</sup> Faith is something higher than human understanding (toute intelligence humain).<sup>66</sup>

The Holy Spirit is necessary in order to know the mind and will of God.<sup>67</sup> Calvin fences the doctrine of predestination off from rational criticism by reminding its critics of their blindness apart from the illumination of the Holy Spirit and of the danger of trying to go further than the Spirit Himself leads. In comments on Romans 11:34 he carefully distinguishes between seeking the known will of God in Scripture and curiously prying into the secret counsel of God.

Who has known the mind of the Lord? He begins here to extend as it were his hand to restrain the audacity of men, lest they should clamor against God's judgments, and this he does by stating two reasons: the first is, that all mortals are too blind to take a view of God's predestination by their own understanding, and to reason on a thing unknown is presumptuous and absurd; the other is,

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60. C. R., IV, 330-32; Catholic Epistles, 204-06.

61. C. R., IV, 35; Inst., I, 486.

62. Loc. cit.

63. C. R., IV, 50; Inst., I, 496.

64. C. R., IV, 51; Inst., I, 297.

65. C. R., IV, 53; Inst., I, 499.

66. Loc. cit.

67. C. R., IV, 55; Inst., I, 499-500.

that we can have no cause of complaint against God, since no mortal can boast that God is a debtor to him; but that, on the contrary, all are under obligations to him for his bounty.

Within this limit then let every one remember to keep his own mind, lest he be carried beyond God's oracles in investigating predestination, since we hear that man can distinguish nothing in this case, any more than a blind man in darkness. This caution, however, is not to be so applied as to weaken the certainty of faith, which proceeds not from the acumen of the human mind, but solely from the illumination of the Spirit; for Paul himself in another place, after having testified that all the mysteries of God far exceed the comprehension of our minds, immediately subjoins that the faithful understand the mind of the Lord, because they have not received the spirit of this world, but the Spirit which has been given them by God, by whom they are instructed as to his goodness, which otherwise would be incomprehensible to them.

As then we cannot by our own faculties examine the secrets of God, so we are admitted into a certain and clear knowledge of them by the grace of the Holy Spirit: and if we ought to follow the guidance of the Spirit, where he leaves us, there we ought to stop and as it were to fix our standing. If any one will seek to know more than what God has revealed, he shall be overwhelmed with the immeasurable brightness of inaccessible light. But we must bear in mind the distinction, which I have before mentioned, between the secret counsel of God, and his will made known in Scripture; for though the whole doctrine of Scripture surpasses in its height the mind of man, yet an access to it is not closed against the faithful, who reverently and soberly follow the Spirit as their guide; but the case is different with regard to his hidden counsel, the depth and height of which cannot by any investigation be reached.<sup>68</sup>

Special revelation by the Spirit to believers implies a certain general blindness of human intellect (1 Corinthians 2:10, 11).

But God hath revealed them to us. Having shut up all mankind in blindness, and having taken away from the human intellect the power of attaining to a knowledge of God by its own resources, he now shows in what way believers are exempted from this blindness, --by the Lord's honoring them with a special illumination of the Spirit. Hence the greater the bluntness of the human intellect for understanding the mysteries of God, and the greater the uncertainty under which it labors, so much the surer is our faith, which rests for its support on the revelation of God's Spirit. In this, too, we recognize the unbounded goodness of God, who makes our defect contribute to our advantage.

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68. C. E., XLIX, 230-31; Romans, 446-47.

For the Spirit searcheth all things. This is added for the consolation of the pious, that they may rest more securely in the revelation which they have from the Spirit of God, as though he had said: "Let it suffice us to have the Spirit of God as a witness, for there is nothing in God that is too profound for him to reach." For such is the import here of the word searcheth. By the deep things you must understand--not secret judgments, which we are forbidden to search into, but the entire doctrine of salvation, which would have been to no purpose set before us in the Scriptures, were it not that God elevates our minds to it by his Spirit.

For what man knoweth? Two different things he intends to teach here: first, that the doctrine of the Gospel cannot be understood otherwise than by the testimony of the Holy Spirit; and secondly, that those who have a testimony of this nature from the Holy Spirit, have an assurance as firm and solid, as if they felt with their hands what they believe, for the Spirit is a faithful and indubitable witness. This he proves by a similitude drawn from our own spirit: for every one is conscious of his own thoughts, and on the other hand what lies hid in any man's heart, is unknown to another. In the same way what is the counsel of God, and what his will, is hid from all mankind, for "who hath been his counselor?" (Rom. xi. 34). It is, therefore, a secret recess, inaccessible to mankind; but, if the Spirit of God himself introduces us into it, or in other words, makes us acquainted with those things that are otherwise hid from our view, there will then be no more ground for hesitation, for nothing that is in God escapes the notice of the Spirit of God.

This similitude, however, may seem to be not altogether very appropriate, for as the tongue bears an impress of the mind, mankind communicate their dispositions to each other, so that they become acquainted with each other's thoughts. Why then may we not understand from the word of God what is his will? For while mankind by pretences and falsehoods in many cases conceal their thoughts rather than disclose them, this cannot happen with God, whose word is undoubted truth, and his genuine and lively image. We must, however, carefully observe how far Paul designed to extend this comparison. A man's innermost thought, of which others are ignorant, is perceived by himself alone: if he afterwards makes it known to others, this does not hinder but that his spirit alone knows what is in him. For it may happen that he does not persuade: it may even happen that he does not properly express his own meaning; but even if he attains both objects, this statement is not at variance with the other--that his own spirit alone has the true knowledge of it. There is this difference, however, between God's thoughts and those of men, that men mutually understand each other; but the word of God is a kind of hidden wisdom, the loftiness of which is not reached by the weakness of the human intellect. Thus the light shineth in darkness (John i. 5), aye and until the Spirit opens the eyes of the blind.

The spirit of a man. Observe, that the spirit of a man is taken here for the soul, in which the intellectual faculty, as it is called,

resides. For Paul would have expressed himself inaccurately if he had ascribed this knowledge to man's intellect, or in other words, the faculty itself, and not to the soul, which is endued with the power of understanding.<sup>69</sup>

No one can come to Christ apart from the Holy Spirit.<sup>70</sup> God by His Spirit prepares a person to believe. Without special perception granted by the Holy Spirit it is impossible to believe the Gospel.

No man can come to me, unless the Father, who hath sent me, draw him. He does not merely accuse them of wickedness, but likewise reminds them that it is a peculiar gift of God to embrace the doctrine which is exhibited by him; which he does, that their unbelief may not disturb weak minds. For many are so foolish that, in the things of God, they depend on the opinions of men; in consequence of which, they entertain suspicions about the Gospel, as soon as they see that it is not received by the world. Unbelievers, on the other hand, flattering themselves in their obstinacy, have the hardihood to condemn the Gospel because it does not please them. On the contrary, therefore, Christ declares that the doctrine of the Gospel, though it is preached to all without exception, cannot be embraced by all, but that a new understanding and a new perception are requisite; and, therefore, that faith does not depend on the will of men, but that it is God who gives it.

Unless the Father draw him. To come to Christ being here used metaphorically for believing, the Evangelist, in order to carry out the metaphor in the opposite clause, says that those persons are drawn whose understandings God enlightens, and whose hearts he bends and forms to the obedience of Christ. The statement amounts to this, that we ought not to wonder if many refuse to embrace the Gospel; because no man will ever of himself be able to come to Christ, but God must first approach him by his Spirit; and hence it follows that all are not drawn, but that God bestows this grace on those whom he has elected. True, indeed, as to the kind of drawing, it is not violent, so as to compel men by external force; but still it is a powerful impulse of the Holy Spirit, which makes men willing who formerly were unwilling and reluctant. It is a false and profane assertion, therefore, that none are drawn but those who are willing to be drawn, as if man made himself obedient to God by his own efforts; for the willingness with which men follow God is what they already have from himself, who has formed their hearts to obey him.<sup>71</sup>

The required inward illumination of the heart results only from the teaching by the Holy Spirit.

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69. C. R., XLIX, 340-42; Corinthians, I, 110-12.

70. C. R., IV, 55; Inst., I, 500.

71. C. R., XLVII, 149; John, I, 256-57.

It is written in the Prophets. . . . The way of teaching, of which the prophet speaks, does not consist merely in the external voice, but likewise in the secret operation of the Holy Spirit. In short, this teaching of God is the inward illumination of the heart.<sup>72</sup>

It is the wisdom of the elect that, having been taught by God, they know enough to come to Christ and believe.

Cometh to me. He shows the inseparable connection that exists between him and the Father. For the meaning is, that it is impossible that any who are God's disciples shall not obey Christ, and that they who reject Christ refuse to be taught by God; because the only wisdom that all the elect learn in the school of God is, to come to Christ; for the Father, who sent him, cannot deny himself.<sup>73</sup>

Spurious knowledge of God attained apart from Christ is a deadly abyss.

Not that any man hath seen the Father. As he has hitherto magnified the grace of his Father, so now he earnestly directs believers to himself alone. For both must be joined together; that no knowledge of Christ can be obtained, until the Father enlighten by his Spirit those who are by nature blind; and yet that it is in vain to seek God, unless Christ go before; for the majesty of God is so lofty, that the senses of men cannot reach him. Nay, more, all that knowledge of God which man may think that they have attained out of Christ will be a deadly abyss. When he says that he alone hath known the Father, he means that it is an office which belongs peculiarly to himself, to manifest God to men, who would otherwise have been concealed.<sup>74</sup>

When we are drawn to Christ we are in mind and spirit exalted far above our own understanding (nous sommes totalement ravis par dessus nostre intelligence).<sup>75</sup> The soul, illumined by the Holy Spirit, receives a new eye to contemplate the mysteries of heaven.<sup>75</sup> Only when the human intellect is irradiated by the Spirit of God does it begin to have a taste of those things pertaining to the kingdom of God.<sup>75</sup> A human intellect before it receives the light of the Holy Spirit is stupid and senseless in matters pertaining to the kingdom of God.<sup>75</sup> Thus the disciples on the road to

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72. C. R., XLVII, 149; John, I, 257-58.

73. C. R., XLVII, 150; John, I, 259.

74. C. R., XLVII, 150-51; John, I, 259.

75. C. R., IV, 55; Inst., I, 500.

Emmaus did not understand the meaning of the Old Testament until Christ applied it to Himself (Luke 24:27) and He opened their minds to understand the Scriptures (Luke 24:45).

Then he opened their understanding. As the Lord had formerly discharged the office of Teacher, with little or no improvement on the part of the disciples, he not begins to teach them inwardly by his Spirit; for words are idly wasted on the air, until the minds are enlightened by the gift of understanding. It is true, indeed, that the word of God is like a lamp, (Ps. cxix. 105); but it shines in darkness and amidst the blind, until the inward light is given by the Lord, to whom it peculiarly belongs to enlighten the blind, (Ps. cxlvi. 8). And hence it is evident how great is the corruption of our nature, since the light of life exhibited to us in the heavenly oracles is of no avail to us. Now if we do not perceive by the understanding what is right, how would the will be sufficient for yielding obedience? We ought, therefore, to acknowledge that we come short in every respect, so that the heavenly doctrine proves to be useful and efficacious to us, only so far as the Spirit both forms our minds to understand it, and our hearts to submit to its yoke; and, therefore, that in order to our being properly qualified for becoming his disciples, we must lay aside all confidence in our own abilities, and seek light from heaven; and, abandoning the foolish opinion of free-will, must give ourselves up to be governed by God. Nor is it without reason that Paul bids men become fools, that they may be wise to God, (1 Cor. iii. 18); for no darkness is more dangerous for quenching the light of the Spirit than reliance on our own sagacity.

That they might understand the Scriptures. Let the reader next observe, that the disciples had not the eyes of their mind opened, so as to comprehend the mysteries of God without any assistance, but so far as they are contained in the Scriptures; and thus was fulfilled what is said, (Ps. cxix. 18), Enlighten mine eyes, that I may behold the wonders of thy law. For God does not bestow the Spirit on his people, in order to set aside the use of his word, but rather to render it fruitful. It is highly improper, therefore, in fanatics, under the pretence of revelations, to take upon themselves the liberty of despising the Scriptures; for what we now read in reference to the apostles is daily accomplished by Christ in all his people, namely, that by his Spirit he guides us to understand the Scriptures, and does not hurry us away into the idle raptures of enthusiasm.

But it may be asked, Why did Christ choose to lose his labor, during the entire period of three years, in teaching them, rather than to open their understandings from the very outset? I reply, first, though the fruit of his labor did not immediately appear, still it was not useless; for when the new light was given to them, they likewise perceived the advantage of the former period. For I regard these words as meaning, not only that he opened their understandings, that in future they might be ready to receive instruction,

if any thing were stated to them, but that they might call to remembrance his doctrine, which they had formerly heard without any advantage. Next, let us learn that this ignorance, which lasted during three years, was of great use for informing them that from no other source than from the heavenly light did they obtain their new discernment. Besides, by this fact Christ gave an undoubted proof of his Divinity; for he not only was the minister of the outward voice, which sounded in their ears, but by his hidden power he penetrated into their minds, and thus showed that what, Paul tells us, does not belong to the teachers of the Church is the prerogative of Him alone, (1 Cor. iii. 7). Yet it ought to be observed, that the apostles were not so destitute of the light of understanding as not to hold certain elementary principles; but as it was only a slight taste, it is reckoned to be a commencement of true understanding when the veil is removed, and they behold Christ in the Law and the Prophets.<sup>76</sup>

Even the lips of Christ were powerless to instill truth apart from the Spirit of truth.<sup>77</sup> We are naturally spiritually blind; the word cannot penetrate our minds (nostre esprit) unless the Spirit, the internal teacher, by His enlightening power makes an entrance for it.<sup>77</sup>

The word of God enables the believer to despise everything which could disturb his peace of mind (ce qui peut tourmenter son esprit). Thus David discovered that the sound sleep of the believer who rests upon the promises of God in the midst of danger is greatly superior to the stupid sleep of unbelievers (Psalms 3:5, 6).

If we retain the reading of the verb in the past tense, David expresses a wonderful and almost incredible steadfastness of mind in that he slept so soundly in the midst of many deaths, as if he had been beyond the reach of all danger. He had doubtless been tossed amidst the merciless waves of anxiety, but it is certain their violence had been allayed by means of faith, so that however much he was disquieted, he reposed in God. Thus the godly never fail in ultimately proving victorious over all their fears, whereas the ungodly, who do not rely upon God, are overwhelmed with despair, even when they meet with the smallest perils. Some think there is here a change of tenses; and, therefore, translate the verbs into the future tense, I will lay me down and will sleep, and will awake, because immediately after a verb of the future is subjoined, The Lord shall uphold me. But as he expresses, by these last words, a

76. C. R., XLV, 816-17; Harmony of the Evangelists, III, 375-76.

77. C. R., IV, 55; Inst., I, 500.

continuous act, I thought it unnecessary to change the tenses in the three first verbs. Still we ought to know, that this confidence of safety is not to be referred peculiarly to the time of his affliction, or, at least, is not to be limited to it: for, in my judgment, David rather declares how much good he had obtained by means of faith and prayer; namely, the peaceful and undisturbed state of a well regulated mind. This he expresses metaphorically, when he says, that he did the ordinary actions of life without being disturbed by fear. "I have not lain," says he, "waking and restless on my bed; but I have slept soundly, whereas such manner of sleeping does not generally happen to those who are full of thought and fear." But let us particularly notice that David came to have this confidence of safety from the protection of God, and not from stupidity of mind. Even the wicked are kept fast asleep through an intoxication of mind, while they dream of having made a covenant with death. It was otherwise with David, who found rest on no other ground but because he was upheld by the power of God, and defended by his help.<sup>78</sup>

Since God is the refuge and strength of the believer, there is no need to fear any change which may occur upon the face of the earth (Psalms 46:1, 2).

God is our refuge and strength. Here the Psalmist begins with a general expression or sentiment, before he comes to speak of the more particular deliverance. He begins by premising that God is sufficiently able to protect his own people, and that he gives them sufficient ground to expect it; for this word machasch, properly signifies. In the second clause of the verse the verb he is found, which we translate in the present, is in the past tense, he has been found; and, indeed, there would be no impropriety in limiting the language to some particular deliverance which had already been experienced, just as others also have rendered it in the past tense. But as the prophet adds the term tribulations in the plural number, I prefer explaining it of a continued act, that God comes seasonably to our aid, and is never wanting in the time of need, as often as any afflictions press upon his people. If the prophet were speaking of the experience of God's favor, it would answer much better to render the verb in the past tense. It is, however, obvious that his design is to extol the power of God and his goodness towards his people, and to show how ready God is to afford them assistance, that they may not in the time of their adversities gaze around them on every side, but rest satisfied with his protection alone. He therefore says expressly that God acts in such a manner towards them, to let the Church know that he exercises a special care in preserving and defending her. There can be no doubt that by this expression he means to draw a distinction between the chosen people of God and other heathen nations, and in this way to commend the privilege of adoption which God of his goodness had vouchsafed to the posterity of Abraham. Accordingly, when I said before that it was a general expression, by intention was not to extend it to all manner of persons, but only to

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78. C. R., XXXI, 54-55; Psalms, I, 33-34.

all times; for the object of the prophet is to teach us after what manner God is wont to act towards those who are his people. He next concludes, by way of inference, that the faithful have no reason to be afraid, since God is always ready to deliver them, nay, is also armed with invincible power. He shows in this that the true and proper proof of our hope consists in this, that, when things are so confused, that the heavens seem as it were to fall with great violence, the earth to remove out of its place, and the mountains to be torn up from their very foundations, we nevertheless continue to preserve and maintain calmness and tranquility of heart. It is an easy matter to manifest the appearance of great confidence, so long as we are not placed in imminent danger: but if, in the midst of a general crash of the whole world, our minds continue undisturbed and free of trouble, this is an evident proof that we attribute to the power of God the honor which belongs to him. When, however, the sacred poet says, We will not fear, he is not to be understood as meaning that the minds of the godly are exempt from all solicitude or fear, as if they were destitute of feeling, for there is a great difference between insensibility and the confidence of faith. He only shows that whatever may happen they are never overwhelmed with terror, but rather gather strength and courage sufficient to allay all fear.<sup>79</sup>

True inward peace comes only with the quiet and faithful acceptance of and reliance upon the promises of God (Isaiah 30:15).

In rest and quietness shall you be safe. Some render shūbāh "repentance." Others render it "rest," and I am more disposed to adopt that rendering; for I think that the Prophet intended frequently to impress upon the people, that the Lord demands more from them than to rely fully upon him. Nor is the repetition of the statement by two words superfluous; for he expressly intended to bring together the words "rest and quietness," in order to reprove the people the more sharply for their distrust and unbelief.

This verse consists of two clauses, a command and a promise. He enjoins the people to be of a quiet disposition, and next promises that their salvation shall be certain. The people do not believe this promise, and consequently they do not obey the command; for how would they render obedience to God, whom they did not believe, and on whose promises they do not rely? We need not wonder, therefore, that they do not enjoy peace and repose; for these cannot exist without faith, and faith cannot exist without the promises, and as soon as the promises have been embraced, souls that were restless and uneasy are made calm. Thus, unbelief alone produces that uneasiness; and therefore the Prophet justly reproves it, and shows that it is the source of the whole evil.

Though our condition be not entirely the same with that of the Jews, yet God commands us to wait for his assistance with quiet dispositions, not to murmur, or be troubled or perplexed, or to distrust his promises. This doctrine must belong equally to all

79. C. R., XXXI, 460-61; Psalms, II, 195-96.

believers; for the whole object of Satan's contrivances is to distress them, and to cast them down from their condition. In like manner had Moses long before addressed them, "You shall be silent, and the Lord will fight for you." (Exod. xiv. 14): Not that he wished them to sleep or to be idle, but he enjoined them to have this peace in their hearts. If we have it, we shall feel that it yields us sufficient protection; and if not, we shall be punished for our levity and rashness.<sup>80</sup>

Silence is an especially apt expression of true faith (Psalms 37:7).

Be silent to Jehovah. The Psalmist continues the illustration of the same doctrine, namely, that we should patiently and meekly bear those things that usually disquiet our minds; for amid innumerable sources of disquietude and conflict there is need of no small patience. By the similitude of silence, which often occurs in the sacred writings, he declares most aptly the nature of faith; for as our affections rise in rebellion against the will of God, so faith, restoring us to a state of humble and peaceful submission, appeases all the tumults of our hearts. By this expression, therefore, David commands us not to yield to the tumultuous passions of the soul, as the unbelieving do, nor fretfully to set ourselves in opposition to the authority of God, but rather to submit peacefully to him, that he may execute his work in silence. Moreover, as the Hebrew word chul, which we have rendered to wait, sometimes signifies to mourn, and sometimes to wait, the word hithcholel, in this place is understood by some as meaning to mourn moderately, or to bear sorrow patiently. It might also be rendered more simply to mourn before God, in order that he might be a witness of all our sorrows; for when the unbelieving give way to doubt and suspense, they rather murmur against him than utter their complaints before him. As, however, the other interpretation is more generally received, namely, that David is exhorting us to hope and patience, I adhere to it. The prophet Isaiah also connects hope with silence in the same sense, (Isaiah xxx. 15).<sup>81</sup>

It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of patient waiting as a means of encouragement and growth in the Christian life (Hebrews 10:36).

For ye have need of patience, &c. He says that patience is necessary, not only because we have to endure to the end, but as Satan has innumerable arts by which he harasses us; and hence except we possess extraordinary patience, we shall a thousand times be broken down before we come to the half of our course. The inheritance of eternal life is indeed certain to us, but as life is like a race, we ought to go on towards the goal. But in our way there are many hinderances and difficulties, which not only delay us, but which would also stop our course altogether, except we had great firmness

80. C. R., XXXVI, 516-17; Isaiah, II, 362-64.

81. C. R., XXXI, 369; Psalms, II, 23-24.

of mind to pass through them. Satan craftily suggests every kind of trouble in order to discourage us. In short, Christians will never advance two paces without fainting, except they are sustained by patience. This then is the only way or means by which we can firmly and constantly advance; we shall not otherwise obey God, nor even enjoy the promised inheritance, which is here by metonymy called the promise.<sup>82</sup>

In short, the mind of man (le coeur de l'homme) cannot be changed for the better except by God's "perverting grace."<sup>83</sup>

In the very arrangement of the subject matter in the Holy Scriptures is to be seen a superiority over the writings of the philosophers.

As philosophers have certain definitions of rectitude and honesty, from which they derive particular duties and the whole train of virtues; so in this respect Scripture is not without order, but presents a most beautiful arrangement, one too which is every way much more certain than that of the philosophers.<sup>84</sup>

The Spirit of God in Scripture does not affect a perpetual observance of exact method.<sup>85</sup> The Scripture system aims that the love of righteousness, to which we are by no means naturally inclined (enclins de nature), may be instilled and implanted into our minds (en noz coeurs).<sup>85</sup> Scripture shows how we have degenerated, that through Christ we are restored to favor with God, and that Christ is set before us as a model, the image of which our lives should express.<sup>86</sup>

The light of intellect (lumiere de nature), enlightened by the Spirit of God, ought to lead us to long for the final resurrection.<sup>87</sup> We must contemplate the heavenly Judge not as our unaided intellect conceives of him (tel que nostre entendement l' imagine de soy-mesme), but as he is portrayed to us in the Scripture.<sup>88</sup> Humility, according to the word of

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82. C. R., IV, 140; Hebrews, 256.  
83. C. R., IV, 101; Inst., I, 530.  
84. C. R., IV, 178-79; Inst., II, 2.  
85. C. R., IV, 179; Inst., II, 2.  
86. C. R., IV, 180; Inst., II, 3.  
87. C. R., IV, 216; Inst., II, 29.  
88. C. R., IV, 257; Inst., II, 61.

God, is the unfeigned submission of a mind (une dejection de nostre coeur sans feintise), overwhelmed by a serious conviction of its own want and misery.<sup>89</sup> To have faith is to possess certainty and complete security of mind (de confirmer son coeur).<sup>90</sup>

When the human mind seeks help for itself in which it is not sanctioned by the word of God (quand l'esprit humain cherche telles secondes aydes), (as they do wherever Popery prevails) it plainly manifests its distrust.<sup>91</sup> No place can be assigned to God; of we would seek Him, we must rise higher than all corporeal or mental discernment (par dessus tout le sens de nostre ame et de nostre corps).<sup>92</sup> The Holy Spirit spoke by the mouth of Paul concerning election.<sup>93</sup> The Apostle shows how unbecoming it is to reduce the works of God to such a law that we can presume to condemn them the moment they accord not with our reason (quand nous n'en pourrions entendre la raison).<sup>94</sup> The Spirit sometimes accommodates his language to our feeble capacity (a la rudesse de nostre sens).<sup>95</sup> All progress in piety is the secret work of the Spirit.<sup>96</sup> To those whom God is not pleased to illumine, He delivers His doctrine wrapped up in enigmas, so that they may not profit by it, but be given over to greater blindness.<sup>97</sup> The grace of God is insipid to men, until the Holy Spirit gives it savor.<sup>98</sup>

Conversion is undoubtedly in the hand of God; whether He designs to convert all can be learned from Himself, when He promises that He will give

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89. C. R., IV, 263; Inst., II, 65.  
90. C. R., IV, 269; Inst., II, 70.  
91. C. R., IV, 400; Inst., II, 168.  
92. C. R., IV, 429; Inst., II, 187.  
93. C. R., IV, 480; Inst., II, 221.  
94. C. R., IV, 490; Inst., II, 229.  
95. C. R., IV, 518; Inst., II, 249.  
96. C. R., IV, 522; Inst., II, 252.  
97. C. R., IV, 523; Inst., II, 252.  
98. C. R., IV, 524; Inst., II, 253.

some a heart of flesh, and leave to others a heart of stone (Ezekiel 36:26).<sup>99</sup> No man approaches God unless previously influenced from above.<sup>100</sup> God's mercy is offered to all who desire and implore it; this none can do, except those whom He has enlightened.<sup>101</sup> He enlightens those whom he has predestined to salvation.<sup>102</sup> Faith, in other words, the illumination of God, distinguishes between the righteous and the wicked; the former feeling the power of the Gospel, the latter obtaining no benefit from it.<sup>103</sup> Though to our apprehension the will of God is manifold, yet He does not in Himself will opposites, but, according to His manifold wisdom (Ephesians 3:10) transcends our sense, until such time as it shall be given us to know how He mysteriously wills what now seems to be adverse to His will.<sup>104</sup> In regard to all things which lie beyond our sight, and far transcend the reach of our intellect (et mesmes que surmont la capacité de nostre entendement), belief must either be founded on the sure oracles of God, or be renounced altogether.<sup>105</sup> Every day we experience how His secret judgments surpass our apprehension (surmontent nostre sens).<sup>106</sup> Since it was in some degree expedient for us to know who are to be regarded as His sons, He has in this matter accommodated Himself to our capacity.<sup>107</sup> In matters of worship and church discipline Calvin expressed a fondness for the canons of the early bishops, whom he considered to have "scarcely departed from the word of God, the only standard."<sup>108</sup>

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99. C. R., IV, 528; Inst., II, 255.  
100. C. R., IV, 528; Inst., II, 256.  
101. C. R., IV, 529; Inst., II, 256.  
102. Loc. cit.  
103. Ibid.  
104. C. R., IV, 530; Inst., II, 257.  
105. C. R., IV, 541-42; Inst., II, 266.  
106. C. R., IV, 575; Inst., II, 288.  
107. Loc. cit.  
108. C. R., IV, 632; Inst., II, 327.

Although the above teachings place Calvin definitely in the "Revelation Dominant" category,<sup>109</sup> there is a small group of teachings which properly belong in the "Reason and Revelation Mutually Opposed" category.<sup>110</sup> Most of these teachings closely resemble Luther's teaching on revelation and reason.<sup>111</sup> Thus, the preaching of the cross is not in accordance with human wisdom (ne plaise point l'esprit humain); it disgusts the unbeliever.<sup>112</sup> Likewise the rejection of Israel at the coming of Christ was not in accordance with reason (il ne sembloit advis que ce fust chose raisonnable).<sup>113</sup> This is the first principle of the Christian life: present your bodies a living sacrifice; be not conformed to this world, but be transformed by the renewing of your mind (Romans 12:1).<sup>114</sup> The Christian "has withdrawn the dominion and government of himself from his own reason (à sa propre raison) that he may give them to God!"<sup>115</sup> This is the first step in the Christian life: abandon ourselves, and devote the whole energy of our minds (toute la force de nostre entendement) to the service of God.<sup>116</sup> This is true obedience: the mind, divested of its own carnal feelings (l'entendement de l'homme estant vuide de son propre sens), implicitly obeys the call of the Spirit of God.<sup>117</sup> Christian philosophy bids reason to "give place and yield complete submission to the Holy Spirit."<sup>118</sup> Calvin has noted a certain arrogance in the manner in which many of the philosophers commend the virtues, which arrogance he saw as the opposite of true Christian humility.

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109. Supra, pp. 11-18.

110. Supra, pp. 24-29.

111. Supra, p. 27.

112. C. R., III, 388; Inst., I, 293.

113. C. R., III, 520; Inst., I, 397.

114. C. R., IV, 184; Inst., II, 7.

115. C. R., IV, 185; Inst., II, 7.

116. Loc. cit.

117. Ibid.

118. Ibid.

Those who have not so renounced themselves have followed virtue at least for the sake of praise. The philosophers who have contended most strongly that virtue is to be desired on her own account, were so inflated with arrogance as to make it apparent that they sought virtue for no other reason than as a ground for indulging in pride.<sup>119</sup>

When the Apostle tells us to deny worldly lusts (Titus 2:11-14) he enjoins us to lay aside our own mind, and renounce whatever our own reason and will dictate (reijetter loin tout ce que nostre raison et volonté mettunt en avant).<sup>120</sup> Scripture (Romans 8:7) declares that the wisdom of our flesh (la prudence de nostre chair) is at enmity with the wisdom of God (la sagesse de Dieu), utterly condemns the vanity of our mind (la vanité de nostre sens), and humbling our reason (mettant hors toute nostre raison); bids us to look only to the will of God.<sup>121</sup>

No teaching of Calvin was found which would properly belong in the "Reason and Revelation in Mutual Harmony" category.<sup>122</sup> Likewise, Calvin totally avoided the "Reason Dominant" category.<sup>123</sup>

#### The Abilities of Human Reason

Calvin did grant to human intellect some limited analytical ability. The intellect (l'entendement), he allowed, usually discerns general definition or essence correctly.<sup>124</sup> Calvin did not ascribe to unaided human reason any ability to synthesize, such as Kant assumed in his Critique of Pure Reason.<sup>125</sup> Likewise Calvin appears not to have dealt with the problem as to whether or not reason can know itself, as raised in Roman Catholic philosophy.<sup>126</sup>

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119. C. R., IV, 186; Inst., II, 8.  
120. C. R., IV, 187; Inst., II, 8-9.  
121. C. R., IV, 405; Inst., II, 172.  
122. Supra, pp. 7-11.  
123. Supra, pp. 19-24.  
124. C. R., III, 324; Inst., I, 242.  
125. Supra, p. 30.  
126. Supra, p. 31.

Reason Can Guide Human Conduct

Reason is competent and can make progress in the studies of politics, economics, mechanical arts, and liberal arts.

(In) matters of policy and economy, all mechanical arts and liberal studies . . . the view to be taken is this: Since man is by nature a social animal, he is disposed, from natural instinct, to cherish and preserve society; and accordingly we see that the minds of all men have impressions of civil order and honesty. Hence it is that every individual understands how human societies must be regulated by laws, and also is able to comprehend the principles of those laws. Hence the universal agreement in regard to such subjects, both among nations and individuals, the seed of them being implanted in the breast of all without a teacher or lawgiver. The truth of this fact is not affected by wars and dissensions . . . Quarrels . . . do not destroy the primary idea of justice. . . . All this is ample proof that, in regard to the constitution of the present life, no man is devoid of the light of reason.<sup>127</sup>

Reason can understand the necessity for law and civil order.<sup>128</sup> The fact that principles of civil law are naturally impressed on every mind proves that no man is totally devoid of the light of reason.<sup>129</sup> All persons have at least some ability and aptitude in both the manual and the liberal arts.

Next come manual and liberal arts, in learning which as all have some degree of aptitude, the full force of human acuteness is displayed. But though all are not equally able to learn all the arts, we have sufficient evidence of a common capacity in the fact, that there is scarcely an individual who does not display intelligence in some particular art. And this capacity extends not merely to the learning of the art, but to the devising of something new, or the improving of what had been previously learned.<sup>130</sup>

Universal reason and intelligence (quelque apprehension universelle de raison) naturally implanted is a special gift of God.<sup>131</sup> The human mind (la nature de l'homme), even though fallen, retains admirable gifts of God, which must not be despised.<sup>132</sup> The Spirit of God confers excellent

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127. C. R., III, 314; Inst., I, 234.  
128. C. R., III, 314; Inst., I, 235.  
129. C. R., III, 314-15; Inst., I, 235.  
130. C. R., III, 315; Inst., I, 235.  
131. Loc. cit.  
132. C. R., III, 315-16; Inst., I, 236.

gifts even upon pagans, for the common benefit of mankind.<sup>133</sup> In order to keep our pride in check, however, we must remember that these abilities of natural reason are possessed only through the mercy of Almighty God.<sup>134</sup>

The power of human reason with respect to the kingdom of God consists of: (1) the knowledge of God, (2) the knowledge of His eternal favor toward us, which is our salvation, and (3) the method of regulating our conduct in accordance with Divine Law.<sup>135</sup> With regard to the first two parts our natural ability is somewhat limited, but the human mind (l'entendement) has somewhat more discernment on the works of righteousness.<sup>136</sup> Scripture asserts that there is a natural ethics (Romans 2:14, 15), and that conscience is alive and serves apart from the written Law of God.<sup>137</sup>

Who show the work of the law written, etc.; that is, they prove that there is imprinted on their hearts a discrimination and judgment by which they distinguish between what is just and unjust, between what is honest and dishonest. He means not that it was so engraven on their will, that they sought and diligently pursued it, but that they were so mastered by the power of truth, that they could not disapprove of it. For why did they institute religious rites, except that they were convinced that God ought to be worshipped? Why were they ashamed of adultery and theft, except that they deemed them evils?

Without reason then is the power of the will deduced from this passage, as though Paul had said, that the keeping of the law is within our power; for he speaks not of the power to fulfil the law, but of the knowledge of it. Nor is the word heart to be taken for the seat of the affections, but only for the understanding, as it is found in Deut. xxix. 4, "The Lord hath not given thee a heart to understand;" and in Luke xxiv. 25, "O foolish men, and slow in heart to believe."

Nor can we conclude from this passage, that there is in men a full knowledge of the law, but that there are only some seeds of what is right implanted in their nature, evidenced by such acts as these--All the Gentiles alike instituted religious rites, they made laws to punish adultery, and theft, and murder, they commended good faith in bargains and contracts. They have thus indeed proved, that

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133. C. R., III, 316; Inst., I, 236.  
134. C. R., III, 317-18; Inst., I, 237.  
135. C. R., III, 813; Inst., I, 238.  
136. C. R., III, 323; Inst., I, 241.  
137. C. R., III, 323; Inst., I, 241.

God ought to be worshipped, that adultery, and theft, and murder are evils, that honesty is commendable. It is not to our purpose to inquire what sort of God that imagined him to be, or how many gods they devised; it is enough to know, that they thought that there is a God, and that honor and worship are due to him. It matters not whether they permitted the coveting of another man's wife,---whether they connived at wrath and hatred; inasmuch as it was not right for them to covet what they knew to be evil when done.

Their conscience at the same time attesting, &c. He could not have more forcibly urged them than by the testimony of their own conscience, which is equal to a thousand witnesses. By the consciousness of having done good, men sustain and comfort themselves; those who are conscious of having done evil, are inwardly harassed and tormented. Hence came these sayings of the heathens-- "A good conscience is the widest sphere; but a bad one is the cruellest executioner, and more fiercely torments the ungodly than any furies can do." There is then a certain knowledge of the law by nature, which says, "This is good and worthy of being desired; that ought to be abhorred."

But observe how intelligently he defines conscience: he says, that reasons come to our minds, by which we defend what is rightly done, and that there are those which accuse and reprove us for our vices; and he refers this process of accusation and defence to the day of the Lord; not that it will then first commence, for it is now continually carried on, but that it will then also be in operation; and he says this, that no one should disregard this process, as though it were vain and evanescent. And he has put, in the day, instead of, at the day,-- a similar instance to what we have already observed.

For when the Gentiles, &c. He now states what proves the former clause; for he did not think it enough to condemn us by mere assertion, and only to pronounce on us the just judgment of God; but he proceeds to prove this by reasons, in order to excite us to a greater desire for Christ, and to a greater love towards him. He indeed shows that ignorance is in vain pretended as an excuse by the Gentiles, since they prove by their own deeds that they have some rule of righteousness: for there is no nation so lost to every thing human, that it does not keep within the limits of some laws. Since then all nations, of themselves and without a monitor, are disposed to make laws for themselves, it is beyond all question evident that they have some notions of justice and rectitude, which the Greeks call preconceptions, prolepseis, and which are implanted by nature in the hearts of men. They have then a law, though they are without law: for though they have not a written law, they are yet by no means wholly destitute of the knowledge of what is right and just; as they could not otherwise distinguish between vice and virtue; the first of which they restrain by punishment, and the latter they commend, and manifest their approbation of it by honoring it with rewards. He sets nature in opposition to a written law, meaning that the Gentiles had the natural light of righteousness,

which supplied the place of that law by which the Jews were instructed, so that they were a law to themselves.<sup>138</sup>

However, natural knowledge of law only renders man inexcusable.<sup>139</sup> Human reason (l'entendement humain), although relatively weak in relationship to the First Table of the Law and the obligations of worship, has more ability with reference to the Second Table of the Law, as related to civil polity.<sup>140</sup> Reason can deduce the intention (il nous faut former un argument au contraire) of a commandment from its elliptical expressions.<sup>141</sup> From some unknown depth in the judgment of God, which we cannot scrutinize, all our ability (tout ce que nous pouvons) proceeds.<sup>142</sup> Civil authority is, in the sight of God, not only sacred and lawful, but the most sacred, and by far the most honorable, of all stations in mortal life.<sup>143</sup>

#### Reason Can Serve Faith

After the Holy Spirit has authenticated Scripture, reason can help and strengthen faith.

On the other hand, when recognizing (the) exemption (of Scripture) from the common rule, we receive it reverently, and according to its dignity, those proofs which were not so strong as to produce and rivet a full conviction in our minds, become most appropriate helps. For it is wonderful how much we are confirmed in our belief, when we more attentively consider how admirably the system of divine wisdom contained in it is arranged--how beautifully it harmonizes in all its parts--and how rich it is in all the other qualities which give an air of majesty to composition. Our hearts are still more firmly assured when we reflect that our admiration is excited more by the dignity of the matter than by the grace of style. For it was not without an admirable arrangement of Providence, that the sublime mysteries of the kingdom of heaven have for the greater part been delivered with a contemptible meanness of words. Had they been adorned with a more splendid eloquence, the wicked might have cavilled, and alleged that this constituted all their force. But now, when an

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138. C. R., XLIX, 37-39; Romans, 96-99.  
139. C. R., III, 324; Inst., I, 241.  
140. C. R., III, 326; Inst., I, 243.  
141. C. R., III, 424-25; Inst., I, 323.  
142. C. R., IV, 56; Inst., I, 501.  
143. C. R., IV, 1130; Inst., II, 654.

unpolished simplicity, almost bordering on rudeness, makes a deeper impression than the loftiest flights of oratory, what does it indicate if not that the Holy Scriptures are too mighty in the power of truth to need the rhetorician's art?<sup>144</sup>

Philosophers maintain the sufficiency of reason (la raison) to govern the conduct of life.<sup>145</sup> Calvin, while limiting the power of reason rather severely on account of the noetic effects of sin, does grant that reason as a natural gift could not be totally destroyed by the Fall of man, and that some sparks still remain and show that man is a rational animal.

For although there is still some residue of intelligence and judgment as well as will, we cannot call a mind sound and entire which is both weak and immersed in darkness. As to the will, its depravity is but too well known. Therefore, since reason, by which man discerns between good and evil, and by which he understands and judges, is a natural gift, it could not be entirely destroyed; but being partly weakened and partly corrupted, a shapeless ruin is all that remains. In this sense it is said (John i. 5), that "the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not;" these words clearly expressing both points--viz. that in the perverted and degenerate nature of man there are still some sparks which show that he is a rational animal, and differs from the brutes, inasmuch as he is endowed with intelligence, and yet, that this light is so smothered by clouds of darkness, that it cannot shine forth to any good effect. In like manner, the will, because inseparable from the nature of man, did not perish, but was so enslaved by depraved lusts as to be incapable of one righteous desire. The definition now given is complete, but there are several points which require to be explained. Therefore, proceeding agreeably to that primary distinction (Book I, ch. XV, sec. 7 and 8), by which we divided the soul into intellect and will, we will not inquire into the power of the intellect.<sup>146</sup>

Natural reason in the natural man aspires to truth to some extent; but it always stops short of its goal.

To charge the intellect with perpetual blindness so as to leave it no intelligence of any description whatever, is repugnant not only to the Word of God, but to common experience. We see that there has been implanted in the human mind a certain desire of investigating truth, to which it never would aspire unless some relish for truth antecedently existed. There is therefore, now, in the human mind,

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144. C. R., III, 98; Inst., I, 75.

145. C. R., III, 300; Inst., I, 225.

146. C. R., III, 312; Inst., I, 233.

discernment to this extent, that it is naturally influenced by the love of truth, the neglect of which in the lower animals is a proof of their gross and irrational nature. Still it is true that this love of truth falls before it reaches the goal, forthwith falling away into vanity.<sup>147</sup>

Nevertheless, natural reason can make a little progress even in spiritual matters (n'est pas tellement stupide, qu'il ne goust quelque petit de choses superieures).

Still, however, man's efforts are not always so utterly fruitless as not to lead to some result, especially when his attention is directed to inferior objects. Nay, even with regard to superior objects, though he is more careless in investigating them, he makes some little progress. Here, however, his ability is more limited, and he is never made more sensible of his weakness than when he attempts to soar above the sphere of the present life.<sup>148</sup>

Natural human reason may establish some show of virtue in society, but it is impotent to establish any claim of righteousness before the judgment-seat of God.<sup>149</sup>

And will make him sagacious. The verb riach, which is here put in the Hiphil conjugation, signifies literally to smell; but may also be explained in an active sense, as meaning to give a keen smell; which agrees better, I think, with this passage, so that this sagacity may be also included among the gifts of the Spirit. And this effect is peculiarly applicable to the person of Christ, namely, that far beyond what the godly are able to conceive, he is endowed with shrewd discernment for governing his people. We ought to attend, first of all, to the metaphor in the verb smell, which means that Christ will be so shrewd that he will not need to learn from what he hears, or from what he sees; for by smelling alone he will perceive what would otherwise be unknown.

In the fear of the Lord. This phrase is viewed by the greater part of commentators as meaning that all the feelings of the heart will be manifest to Christ, so that he will easily judge who are the sincere worshippers of God. But let the reader inquire if it be not a more appropriate meaning, that the fear of God denotes a fixed rule of judging. He expressly distinguishes between the heavenly judgment of Christ and earthly judgments, in order to inform us, that the outward mask of holiness or uprightness is of no avail in his presence.

And he shall not judge after the sight of his eyes. The meaning is, "When we come to the judgment-seat of Christ, not only will outward

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147. C. R., III, 312-13; Inst., I, 234.  
148. C. R., III, 313; Inst., I, 234.  
149. C. R., III, 337; Inst., I, 253.

actions be brought to trial after the manner of human governments, but the life of men will be examined by the standard of true godliness. It does not belong to man to penetrate into the hearts; and those whom we suppose to be very excellent men have frequently nothing but a hollow mask; but Christ judges not from outward appearance, (Luke xi. 17; John ii. 25), for he thoroughly knows and searches our inmost thoughts. His judgment, therefore, is quite different from that of men, who, with all their acuteness and quick sagacity, fall into the most shameful mistakes." Hence it follows that none can be the true worshippers of God but those whom Christ approves. They cannot obtain his approbation, unless they offer a pure and upright mind; for a false and hollow mask cannot deceive him.<sup>150</sup>

The above comments on Isaiah 11:3 are supported by similar exhortations in comments on Psalms 111:10 urging that reason be subordinated in the service of the word of God.

The fear of Jehovah. Having treated of the kindness of God, and paid a well-merited tribute to the law, the prophet goes on to exhort the faithful to reverence God, and be zealous in the keeping of the law. In calling the fear of God, The beginning or source of wisdom, he charges with folly those who do not render implicit obedience unto God. As if he should say, They who fear not God, and do not regulate their lives according to his law, are brute beasts, and are ignorant of the first elements of true wisdom. To this we must carefully attend; for although mankind generally wish to be accounted wise, almost all the world lightly esteem God, and take pleasure in their own wicked craftiness. And as the very worst of men are reputed to be superior to all others in point of wisdom; and, puffed up with this confidence, harden themselves against God, the prophet declares all the wisdom of the world, without the fear of God, to be vanity or an empty shadow. And, indeed, all who are ignorant of the purpose for which they live are fools and madmen. But to serve God is the purpose for which we have been born, and for which we are preserved in life. There is, therefore, no worse blindness, no insensibility so grovelling, as when we contemn God, and place our affections elsewhere. For whatever ingenuity the wicked may possess, they are destitute of the main thing, genuine piety. To the same effect are the words which immediately follow, a good understanding have all they who keep God's commandments. There is great emphasis upon the qualifying adjunct, tob; because the prophet, in inveighing against the foolish opinion to which we have already adverted, tacitly condemns those who delight in their own wicked craftiness. His meaning is, I admit, that they are usually deemed wise who look well to their own interests, who can pursue a temporising policy, who have the

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150. C. R., XXXVI, 237; Isaiah, I, 376-77.

acuteness and artifice of preserving the favorable opinion of the world, and who even practice deception upon others. But even were I to grant that this character belongs to them, yet is their wisdom unprofitable and perverse, because true wisdom manifests itself in the observance of the law. Next he substitutes the keeping of God's commandments for the fear of God. For though all men, without exception, boast that they fear God, yet nothing is more common than for them to live in the neglect of his law. Hence the prophet very properly inculcates upon us the voluntary assumption of his yoke, and submission to the regulations of his word, as the most satisfactory evidence of our living in the fear of God.<sup>151</sup>

The mind is capable of understanding (son ame capable d'intelligence), but not of attaining to heavenly and spiritual wisdom.<sup>152</sup> However, reason can infer from Scripture (il appert et se peut recueillir sans doubt) that Christ by His obedience purchased and merited grace for us.<sup>153</sup>

#### Reason Can Know God

The mere knowledge of reality in the philosophic sense may seem cold and lifeless when compared with the knowledge of the living God, Who acts in the affairs of men and nations. In Calvin's writings there does not appear to be any affirmation of the knowability of reality apart from the knowledge of God. Human knowledge is naturally endowed with some sense of Deity.<sup>154</sup> The conscience of the wicked shows that some idea of God always exists in every human mind.<sup>155</sup> Astronomy, medicine, and all the natural sciences provide a deeper insight into the divine wisdom.<sup>156</sup> Reason can discern the power, wisdom, and goodness of God in the structure of the human body.<sup>157</sup> Consideration of the power of God leads to knowledge of His eternity; reason can deduce eternity of God from the power of God.<sup>158</sup>

151. C. R., XXII, 170-71; Psalms, IV, 318-19.

152. C. R., III, 387; Inst., I, 291.

153. C. R., III, 606; Inst., I, 455.

154. C. R., III, 46; Inst., I, 43.

155. C. R., III, 50; Inst., I, 44.

156. C. R., III, 61; Inst., I, 51.

157. C. R., III, 62; Inst., I, 52.

158. C. R., III, 67; Inst., I, 56.

Reason can deduce the goodness of God from the fact of creation.<sup>159</sup> Reason can deduce the providence, the justice, and the mercy of God from His dealings with people.<sup>160</sup> Reason can deduce the power of God when He crushes the wicked and raises the oppressed and the afflicted.<sup>161</sup> Reason can deduce the divine wisdom from the fact of order in creation.<sup>162</sup> We cannot comprehend God; but we can contemplate His works, and adore His goodness.<sup>163</sup> The knowledge of God arouses the hope of a future life. We can infer another life from the incompleteness of the mercy and the severity of God.<sup>164</sup> The intellect can conceive of (nous concevons par intelligence) the invisible God and angels.<sup>165</sup>

#### The Methods of Human Reason

Human reason does not work in a vacuum. There must be content with which to work. Calvin sought to outline the content by preparing catechisms. Schaff has shown that this was the almost universal method in religion in Calvin's day.<sup>166</sup> Beyond that Calvin was perpetually warning against superficial exercises in logic, which appeared to him to be only so much playing with words. He urged his hearers to observe the methods used by the Holy Spirit of God in setting up the Holy Scriptures.<sup>167</sup>

There is no discussion of philosophical method, scientific method, or historical method as such in the writings of Calvin. Similarly, he appears not to have consciously considered intuition, problem solving, or comprehensive coherence as methods. Brightman is correct in observing that Calvin

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159. C. R., III, 68; Inst., I, 56.

160. C. R., III, 68-69; Inst., I, 56.

161. C. R., III, 70; Inst., I, 57.

162. Loc.cit.

163. C. R., III, 72; Inst., I, 58.

164. Loc. cit.

165. C. R., III, 217; Inst., I, 161.

166. Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, volume 3.

167. C. R., IV, 179; Inst., II, 2.

presents a logically consistent theological method.<sup>168</sup>

#### Historical Method

Although Calvin offered no explicit explanation of historical method in the service of theology, he used it in a manner which was quite advanced for his day in his harmonies, especially in his Harmony of the Evangelists. This harmony, completed August 1, 1555,<sup>169</sup> compares very favorably with the modern work of Burton and Goodspeed.<sup>170</sup> However, Calvin totally disclaimed any originality in historical method, and frankly admitted that he imitated the methodology developed by Martin Bucer (1491-1551).

Whether or not I have succeeded to my expectation, the reader must decide by his own experience. So far from claiming the praise of having brought out something new, I readily acknowledge, as becomes an honest man, that I have adopted this method in imitation of others. Bucer, a man of revered memory, and an eminent teacher of the Church of God, who above all others appears to me to have labored successfully in this field, has been especially my model. As he availed himself of the labors of the ancients who had travelled this road before him, so my toils have been not a little alleviated by his industry and application. Where I use the liberty of differing from him, (which I have freely done, whenever it was necessary), Bucer himself, if he were still an inhabitant of the earth, would not be displeased.<sup>171</sup>

#### Theological Method

In Calvin's prefix to the French edition of 1545 he describes his method as "treating in succession the principal matters which are comprised in Christian philosophy. For he who understands these will be prepared to make more progress in the school of God in one day than any other person in three months, inasmuch as he, in a great measure, knows to what he should refer each sentence, and has a rule by which to test whatever is presented to him."<sup>172</sup> The goal of this method is to "be a kind of key opening up to

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168. Supra, p. 40.

169. Harmony of the Evangelists, I, xxxiii.

170. Ernest deWitt Burton and Edgar J. Goodspeed, A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels in Greek, University of Chicago Press, 1920.

171. Harmony of the Evangelists, I, xl.

all the children of God a right and ready access to the understanding of the sacred volume."<sup>173</sup> The test of the method is an evaluation in the light of Scripture of the proofs adduced from Scripture.<sup>173</sup>

The knowledge of God is not found in prying with presumptuous curiosity into His essence, but in contemplating His works.<sup>174</sup> Christ's injunction to pray in secret implies that prayer has its chief seat in the mind (au coeur et en l'esprit), and requires a tranquility far removed from the turmoil of ordinary cares.<sup>175</sup> In prayer "we are not to neglect those helps which enable the mind, in itself too much disposed to wander, to become sincerely intent on prayer."<sup>176</sup> We need special appointed hours for prayer, during which the whole affections of our minds (toute l'affection de nostre coeur) may be completely occupied with it.<sup>177</sup>

God, who might perfect his people in a moment, chooses not to bring them to manhood in any other way than by the education of the Church (la nourriture de l'Eglise) (Ephesians 4:10-13).<sup>178</sup> By the ministers of the word God "consults our weakness in being pleased to address us after the manner of men by means of interpreters."<sup>179</sup> The authority of the doctrine is not impaired by the insignificance of the men who are called to teach.<sup>180</sup> God "consecrates the mouths and tongues of men to His service, making His own voice to be heard in them."<sup>181</sup> Although the power of God is not confined to external means, he has confined us to his ordinary method of

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172. Inst., I, 23.

173. Inst., I, 23.

174. C. R., III, 71; Inst., I, 57.

175. C. R., IV, 416; Inst., II, 179.

176. C. R., IV, 416-17; Inst., II, 179.

177. C. R., IV, 450; Inst., II, 199.

178. C. R., IV, 569; Inst., II, 284.

179. C. R., IV, 570; Inst., II, 285.

180. Loc. cit.

181. C. R., IV, 570-71; Inst., II, 285.

teaching (preaching the word).<sup>182</sup> Pride, fastidiousness, or emulation lead persons to suppose that reading and meditating in private render public preaching superfluous.<sup>183</sup> The Church can be edified only by external preaching (Exodus 20:24).<sup>184</sup> Paul says the effectual agency of the Spirit was given to him, in order that his doctrine might not be in vain (1 Corinthians 9:2, 2 Corinthians 3:6).<sup>185</sup> The Thessalonians received the word not as the word of men, but as word of God (1 Thessalonians 2:13).<sup>186</sup> As full certainty (certitude de foy) is not necessary for us in order to be able to judge who are the sheep, God has substituted in its place the judgment of Christian love.<sup>187</sup> All heads of doctrine are not equally important in the Church. That God is one, that Christ is God and Son of God, that our salvation depends upon the mercy of God are proper essentials of religion.<sup>188</sup> Some liberty is to be allowed with respect to non-essentials (Philippians 3:15).<sup>189</sup> The false persuasion of absolute holiness springs from insane pride and/or inconsiderate zeal.<sup>190</sup> It is in vain to look for a church altogether free from blemish (Matthew 13).<sup>191</sup> Excessive moroseness (zeal for purity) (ceux qui sont tant scrupuleux et chagrins) is more the result of pride and a false idea of sanctity, than genuine sanctity itself, and true zeal for it.<sup>192</sup> Calvin agrees with Augustine that pious reason and the mode of church discipline ought to regard the unity of the Spirit in

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182. C. R., IV, 571; Inst., II, 285.  
183. C. R., IV, 571; Inst., II, 285.  
184. C. R., IV, 571-72; Inst., II, 286.  
185. C. R., IV, 574; Inst., II, 287.  
186. C. R., IV, 574; Inst., II, 287.  
187. C. R., IV, 576; Inst., II, 288.  
188. C. R., IV, 579; Inst., II, 291.  
189. C. R., IV, 579-80; Inst., II, 291.  
190. C. R., IV, 580-81; Inst., II, 292.  
191. C. R., IV, 582; Inst., II, 292.  
192. C. R., IV, 584; Inst., II, 294.

the bond of peace.<sup>193</sup> In estimating the Church, divine is of more force than human judgment.<sup>194</sup> "Let no one arrogate to himself what is peculiar to the Son alone, and think himself sufficient to winnow the floor and cleanse the chaff, and separate all the tares by human judgment."<sup>195</sup>

On the other hand, only those are accounted sons who are born of the pure and legitimate seed of doctrine.<sup>196</sup> Although the Church is the kingdom of Christ, He reigns only by His word.<sup>197</sup> God uses the ministry of men by making them, as it were, His agents.<sup>198</sup> It forms a most excellent and useful training in humility, when God accustoms us to obey His word though preached by men like ourselves, or, it may be, our inferiors in worth.<sup>199</sup> By the ministers to whom He has committed this office, and given grace to discharge it, God dispenses and distributes his gifts to the Church, and thus exhibits Himself as in a manner actually present by exerting the energy of His Spirit in this His institution, so as to prevent it from being vain or fruitless.<sup>200</sup> The two principal parts of the office of pastor are (1) to preach the Gospel and (2) to administer the sacraments.<sup>201</sup> The two parts of the method of teaching are (1) public addresses and (2) private admonitions (Acts 20:20-31).<sup>202</sup> Pastors must train (instruisent) the people to true piety by the doctrine of Christ, administer the sacred mysteries, preserve and exercise right discipline.<sup>203</sup> Elders (les Anciens) selected from the people to unite with the bishops in pronouncing censures and exercising them

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193. C. R., IV, 584; Inst., II, 294.  
194. C. R., IV, 586; Inst., II, 295.  
195. C. R., IV, 589; Inst., II, 297.  
196. C. R., IV, 603; Inst., II, 307.  
197. C. R., IV, 605; Inst., II, 309.  
198. C. R., IV, 615; Inst., II, 316.  
199. Loc. cit.  
200. C. R., IV, 617; Inst., II, 317.  
201. C. R., IV, 621; Inst., II, 320.  
202. Loc. cit.  
203. C. R., IV, 622; Inst., II, 320.

are a vital part of this training.<sup>204</sup> No one should assume a public office in the Church without a call (Hebrews 5:4, Jeremiah 17:16).<sup>205</sup> "Every minister should also have that secret call of which he is conscious before God--the good testimony of our heart, that we undertake the offered office neither from ambition nor avarice, nor any other selfish feeling, but a sincere fear of God and desire to edify the Church."<sup>206</sup>

The ancient institution of receiving young candidates for the ministry into the order of clerics "was a most sacred and salutary institution, that those who wished to devote themselves and their labor to the Church should be brought up under the charge of the bishop; so that no one should minister in the Church unless he had been previously well trained, unless he had in early life imbibed sound doctrine, unless by stricter discipline he had formed habits of gravity and severer morals, and had been withdrawn from ordinary business."<sup>207</sup> In light of this Calvin complained bitterly that during his day any examination of doctrine was old-fashioned in the election of bishops in the Papacy.<sup>208</sup> Boys, scarcely ten years old were, by permission of the Pope, made bishops.<sup>209</sup> It should be noted that the lips of the prophets were holy and pure when they began to be organs of the Holy Spirit, and that the apostles did not speak their own pleasure, but faithfully delivered the commands of Him by whom they were sent (Matthew 28:19,20).<sup>210</sup> The servants of God are to teach only what they have learned from God Himself; yet, according to the variety of the times, they have had different methods of learning.<sup>211</sup> Those who wish to attain to the knowledge of God

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204. C. R., IV, 624; Inst., II, 321.  
205. C. R., IV, 625; Inst., II, 322.  
206. C. R., IV, 626; Inst., II, 323.  
207. C. R., IV, 641; Inst., II, 333.  
208. C. R., IV, 649; Inst., II, 340.  
209. Loc. cit.  
210. C. R., IV, 722-23; Inst., II, 391.

must always be directed by the eternal wisdom (Matthew 11:27).<sup>211</sup> In ancient times God never manifested himself to men by any other means than by His Son, that is, His own only wisdom, light, and truth.<sup>211</sup> This wisdom did not always display itself in one manner. With the patriarchs He used secret revelations confirmed by signs.<sup>212</sup> Their children and descendants knew by the inward teaching of God (la temoinage de Dieu en leur coeur), that what they heard was from heaven.<sup>212</sup> As a more illustrious form to the Church, God committed and consigned His word to writing.<sup>212</sup> By the prophets God published new oracles which were added to the Law, but flowed from the Law.<sup>212</sup> When at length the Wisdom of God was manifested in the flesh, He fully unfolded to us all that the human mind can comprehend (tout ce qui peut entrer de Dieu en humain esprit), or ought to think of the heavenly Father (et tout ce qui s'en peut penser) (Hebrews 1:1, 2).<sup>213</sup> The Son is to be regarded as His last and eternal testimony.<sup>213</sup> The word "Hear Him" (Matthew 18:5) ordered us to seek the whole doctrine of salvation from Him alone, to depend on Him alone, and cleave to Him alone, to listen only to His voice.<sup>214</sup> "What can now be expected or desired from men, when the very Word of life has appeared before us, and familiarly explained Himself?" (Colossians 2:3, John 4:25).<sup>215</sup>

The only proper method of teaching in the Church is according to the prescription and rule of His written word: that is, to expound the Scriptures.<sup>216</sup> The office which Christ assigns to the Holy Spirit is to bring

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211. C. R., IV, 724; Inst., II, 392.  
212. C. R., IV, 725; Inst., II, 392.  
213. C. R., IV, 726; Inst., II, 393.  
214. C. R., IV, 727; Inst., II, 393.  
215. C. R., IV, 727; Inst., II, 393.  
216. C. R., IV, 728; Inst., II, 394.

to remembrance what His own lips had previously taught (John 14:26, 16:13).<sup>217</sup> "Let the minister speak with the full confidence which becomes a servant of God, provided with a sure message" (1 Peter 4:11).<sup>217</sup> "Banish all the inventions of the human mind (de l'esprit humain), that the pure word of God may be taught and learned in the Church of the faithful" (2 Corinthians 10:4, 5).<sup>218</sup> "The apostles were sure and authentic amanuenses of the Holy Spirit (comme Notaires iurez du saint Esprit); therefore, their writings are to be regarded as the oracles of God, whereas others have no other office than to teach what is delivered and sealed in the Holy Scriptures."<sup>219</sup> "It does not now belong to faithful ministers to coin some new doctrine (de forger de nouveau quelque article de foy)."<sup>220</sup> Faith comes by hearing, and hearing by the word of God (Romans 10:17). "What place is left for any word of man?"<sup>221</sup> God deprives man of the power of producing any new doctrine, in order that He alone may be our master in spiritual teaching.<sup>222</sup> The Papacy says church councils are under the immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, and therefore cannot err. "I say they coin doctrines, in contempt of the word of God."<sup>223</sup> While believers "obtain in the present life only the firstfruits, and as it were, a foretaste of the Spirit, nothing better remains to them, than, under a consciousness of their weakness (leur imbecillité), to confine themselves anxiously within the limits (soigneusement sous les termes) of the word of God."<sup>224</sup> The faithful guardianship of Church consists in this: that the word of the Lord is faithfully preserved

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217. C. R., IV, 728; Inst., II, 394.  
218. C. R., IV, 729; Inst., II, 394.  
219. C. R., IV, 729; Inst., II, 395.  
220. C. R., IV, 729-30; Inst., II, 395.  
221. C. R., IV, 730; Inst., II, 395.  
222. C. R., IV, 730-31; Inst., II, 395.  
223. C. R., IV, 733-34; Inst., II, 396.  
224. C. R., IV, 733-34; Inst., II, 397.

and maintained in its purity.<sup>225</sup> "The Papists place the authority of the Church outside the word of God; we annex it to the word."<sup>225</sup> "Let not the Church be wise in herself, but let her consider her wisdom terminated when her Lord ceases to speak. In this way she will distrust all the inventions of her own reason (elle se deffiera de toutes les inventions de sa raison)."<sup>226</sup> The Holy Spirit "Himself desires to be inseparably connected with the word of God."<sup>227</sup> Our Lord "forbade that anything should be added to His word, and that anything should be taken from it."<sup>227</sup>

Calvin denies the name of Christ to those who assemble, "disregarding the command by which he forbids anything to be added to the word of God or taken from it, determine everything at their own pleasure, who, not content with the oracles of Scripture, that is, with the only rule of perfect wisdom, devise some novelty out of their own head" (Deuteronomy 4:2, Revelation 22:18).<sup>228</sup> "The Pope, with the whole crew of his bishops, shake off obedience to the word of God, invent all things."<sup>229</sup> "The subject matter of conciliar pronouncements is to be judged by the standard of Scripture."<sup>230</sup> The ancient Councils of Nice, Constantinople, the First of Ephesus, Chalcedon, in so far as relates to matters of faith, contain nothing but the pure and genuine interpretation of Scripture (une pure et naturelle interpretation de l'Escriture).<sup>231</sup> "The judgment of these holy men (Council of Chalcedon) was founded on the Scriptures and while we follow it, we desire that the

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225. C. R., IV, 736; Inst., II, 398.  
226. C. R., IV, 737; Inst., II, 398.  
227. C. R., IV, 738; Inst., II, 399.  
228. C. R., IV, 743; Inst., II, 403-04.  
229. C. R., IV, 746; Inst., II, 405.  
230. C. R., IV, 748; Inst., II, 406.  
231. C. R., IV, 749; Inst., II, 407.

word of God, which illumined them may now also illumine us."<sup>232</sup>

Human traditions are not a valid canon for the interpretation of Scripture. Calvin defines human traditions as "all decrees concerning the worship of God, which men have issued without the authority of His word."<sup>233</sup> Conscience, however, is a vital factor in the interpretation of the word of God. Calvin defines conscience as "a sense of divine judgment, as a witness not permitting them to hide their sins, but bringing them as criminals before the tribunal of the judge."<sup>234</sup> The answer of a conscience clear with respect to God (1 Peter 3:21) is a "tranquility of mind (tranquillité d'esprit), when, persuaded of the grace of Christ, we with boldness present ourselves before God."<sup>235</sup> A clear conscience is "inward integrity of heart" (1 Timothy 1:5).<sup>235</sup> A clear conscience "differs widely from intellect (de simple savoir); it is a living inclination to worship God, a sincere desire to live in piety and holiness" (Acts 24:16).<sup>235</sup> Conscience does not refer to church regulations, since "it is related not to men but to God only."<sup>236</sup> "Conscience is superior to all human judgments (qui estoit par dessus les hommes)."<sup>237</sup> God's "will is to us the perfect rule of all righteousness and holiness; thus in the knowledge of it we have a perfect rule of life."<sup>238</sup> "When the right and proper method of worshipping Him is in question, He whom we ought to obey, and on Whose will we ought to depend, alone has authority over our souls."<sup>239</sup> "All the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are hidden

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232. C. R., IV, 751; Inst., II, 408.

233. C. R., IV, 758; Inst., II, 414.

234. C. R., IV, 760; Inst., II, 415.

235. C. R., IV, 761; Inst., II, 416.

236. C. R., IV, 762; Inst., II, 416.

237. C. R., IV, 762; Inst., II, 417.

238. C. R., IV, 762; Inst., II, 419.

239. C. R., IV, 766; Inst., II, 419.

in Christ; believers should beware of being led away from the flock of Christ by vain philosophy, according to the constitutions of men" (Colossians 2:10).<sup>240</sup>

Calvin complains that in the Papacy "frivolous elements of this world are deemed of more value than the heavenly oracles of God."<sup>241</sup> The useless and absurd observances in the Papacy "are pleasing to carnal wisdom (la prudence charnelle)" (Colossians 2:23).<sup>241</sup> "Human traditions deceive by an appearance of wisdom (ont couleur de sagesse pour nous tromper)."<sup>242</sup> Human traditions "being framed by men, the human mind (l'entendement humain) recognizes in them that which is its own, and embraces it to please its vanity (à sa folle et vanité)."<sup>242</sup> With fictitious worship, "the more suspected it is by believers, the more pleasing it is to the human mind (de delecter les hommes)."<sup>242</sup> "Every one in proportion as he is inflated by worldly wisdom, is wonderfully captivated by the glare of ceremonies."<sup>243</sup> Ceremonies in the Papacy "have almost buried Christ."<sup>244</sup> Calvin allows such a measure of ceremonies "as may illustrate and not obscure Christ."<sup>245</sup> "All ceremonies which do not direct men to Christ are corrupt and noxious."<sup>246</sup> Human traditions which ought to be repudiated "include all the laws enacted by men, without authority from the word of God, for the purpose either of prescribing the mode of divine worship, or laying a religious obligation on the conscience, as enjoining things necessary to salvation."<sup>247</sup> It is not

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240. C. R., IV, 767; Inst., II, 419.  
241. C. R., IV, 769; Inst., II, 421.  
242. C. R., IV, 770; Inst., II, 421.  
243. C. R., IV, 770; Inst., II, 422.  
244. C. R., IV, 772; Inst., II, 423.  
245. C. R., IV, 773; Inst., II, 424.  
246. C. R., IV, 775; Inst., II, 424.  
247. C. R., IV, 776; Inst., II, 425.

a property of the church to disregard the limits of the word of God, and wanton and luxuriate in enacting new laws" (Deuteronomy 12:32, Proverbs 30:6).<sup>248</sup>

"The name 'Church' is falsely pretended wherever men contend for that rash human license which cannot confine itself within the boundaries prescribed by the word of God, but petulantly breaks out, and has recourse to its own inventions."<sup>249</sup> "The whole Church is forbidden to add to, or take from, the word of God, in relation to His worship and salutary precepts."<sup>249</sup> Nothing is so offensive to the Lord as to be worshipped by human inventions.<sup>249</sup>

"The whole substance of the doctrine of the apostles is, that conscience must not be burdened with new observances, nor the worship of God contaminated by our inventions."<sup>250</sup> Useless ceremonies in the Papacy cause torture of conscience and bring the believer into bondage. In other words they rob him of the benefits of Christ's blood.<sup>251</sup> The Lord is deprived of his kingdom "as often as He is worshipped with laws of human invention, since His will is to be the sole legislator of His worship" (Matthew 15:9).<sup>251</sup> Part of the reverence due to God "consists in worshipping Him simply in the way which He commands, without mingling any inventions of our own."<sup>252</sup> "Fictitious worship is strictly condemned by the Spirit, inasmuch as it is a departure from the command of God."<sup>253</sup> "Human inventions are in the worship of God impure corruptions."<sup>254</sup> In matters of worship "we must be fools in regard to our own wisdom (tant la sapience de tous les hommes) and all the

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248. C. R., IV, 777; Inst., II, 426.  
249. C. R., IV, 778; Inst., II, 426.  
250. C. R., IV, 779; Inst., II, 427.  
251. C. R., IV, 785; Inst., II, 431.  
252. C. R., IV, 786; Inst., II, 431.  
253. C. R., IV, 786; Inst., II, 431-32.  
254. C. R., IV, 787; Inst., II, 432.

wisdom of men, in order that we may allow Him alone to be wise (un seul Dieu estre sage)."<sup>255</sup> In matters of worship "what could human sense produce but things carnal and fatuous (folles), and savoring of their authors?"<sup>256</sup> Thus Manoah offered sacrifice to God, not from rash movement of his own mind, but by divine inspiration (Judges 13:19).<sup>257</sup> God abominates all the devices of men in His worship (Judges 8:27).<sup>257</sup> "Every adventitious invention, by which men desire to worship God, is nothing else than a pollution of true holiness."<sup>257</sup> "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees: leaven is whatever human doctrine is mixed with the pure word of God" (Matthew 16:6).<sup>257</sup> "Some are not at all moved by reason (par quelque raison), and always require authority."<sup>257</sup> "Ceremonies, in order to be exercises of piety, must lead us directly to Christ."<sup>258</sup> "The whole sum of righteousness, and all the parts of divine worship, and everything necessary to salvation, the Lord has faithfully comprehended, and clearly unfolded, in His sacred oracles, so that in them He alone is the only master to be heard."<sup>259</sup> In explicit details of liturgy, "as He has not delivered any express command, because things of this nature are not necessary to salvation, and for the edification of the Church should be accommodated to varying circumstances of each age and nation; it will be proper, as the interest of the Church may require, to change and abrogate the old, as well as to introduce new forms."<sup>260</sup> "These are not fixed and perpetual obligations to which we are astricted, but external rudiments

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255. C. R., IV, 787; Inst., II, 432.  
256. C. R., IV, 788; Inst., II, 432.  
257. C. R., IV, 788; Inst., II, 433.  
258. C. R., IV, 792; Inst., II, 435.  
259. C. R., IV, 783-94; Inst., II, 436.  
260. C. R., IV, 794; Inst., II, 436.

for human infirmity."<sup>261</sup> Whatever observances we use should be "manifestly useful, and very few in number."<sup>262</sup> "Let us not imagine that the worship of God is improved by a multitude of ceremonies: let not church despise church because of a difference in external discipline."<sup>262</sup>

With respect to the jurisdiction of the Church, it is to be noted that "Church tribunals go back to the apostolic age" (1 Corinthians 12:28, Romans 12:8, 1 Timothy 5:17).<sup>263</sup> "The word of the gospel, by whomsoever it may be preached, is the very word of God, promulgated at the supreme tribunal, written in the book of life, ratified firm and fixed in heaven."<sup>264</sup> "The power of the keys is simply the preaching of the gospel; Christ did not give this power to men but to His word, of which He made men the ministers."<sup>264</sup> Part of the power of the keys "relates to the discipline of excommunication which has been committed to the Church" (Matthew 18: 17, 18).<sup>265</sup> "Let pastors cease to censure manifest iniquities, let them cease to chide, accuse, and rebuke; for there are Christian magistrates who ought to correct these things by the laws and the sword."<sup>266</sup> "The spiritual power on which the Pope plumes himself (se glorifie) . . . is impious contradiction of the word of God, and unjust tyranny against His people."<sup>267</sup> Spiritual power in the Papacy includes: framing new doctrines, traditions, and church jurisdiction.<sup>268</sup> Over against the teaching of the Papacy it should be noted that "Christ intended to debar the ministers of His word from civil domination and worldly power" (Matthew 10:25, 26).<sup>269</sup>

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261. C. R., IV, 794; Inst., II, 436.  
262. C. R., IV, 796; Inst., II, 437.  
263. C. R., IV, 797-98; Inst., II, 439.  
264. C. R., IV, 801; Inst., II, 440.  
265. C. R., IV, 801; Inst., II, 441.  
266. C. R., IV, 803; Inst., II, 442.  
267. C. R., IV, 807; Inst., II, 445.  
268. C. R., IV, 807-08; Inst., II, 445.  
269. C. R., IV, 808; Inst., II, 445.

The saving doctrine of Christ in the life of the Church cannot be maintained apart from the proper administration of church discipline.<sup>270</sup>

"We already see some beginnings of a fearful devastation in the Church from a total want to care and method in managing the people."<sup>271</sup> "The first foundation of discipline is to provide for private admonition."<sup>272</sup> "We must distinguish between private sins and public sins."<sup>272</sup> "Some sins are mere delinquencies; others crimes and flagrant iniquities."<sup>273</sup> "Churches cannot long stand without this bond of discipline."<sup>274</sup> There are three ends to which the Church has respect in thus correcting and excommunicating. The first is "that God may not be insulted by the name of Christians being given to those who lead shameful and flagitious lives;"<sup>274</sup> "The Lord's Supper must not be profaned by a promiscuous admission."<sup>275</sup> The second is "that the good may not be corrupted by constant communication with the wicked."<sup>276</sup> "Such is our proneness to go astray, that nothing is easier than to deduce us from the right course by bad example" (1 Corinthians 5:6, 1 Corinthians 5:11).<sup>276</sup> The third is "that the sinner may be ashamed, and begin to repent" (2 Thessalonians 3:14, 1 Corinthians 5:5).<sup>277</sup> "Flagrant iniquities require a sharper remedy."<sup>278</sup> "It is the discipline of Christ, to Whom all sceptres and diadems should submit, and to Whom princes should submit."<sup>279</sup> "The Church, in exercising severity, ought to accompany it

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270. C. R., IV, 820; Inst., II, 453.  
271. C. R., IV, 820-21; Inst., II, 453.  
272. C. R., IV, 821; Inst., II, 454.  
273. C. R., IV, 822; Inst., II, 454.  
274. C. R., IV, 823; Inst., II, 455.  
275. C. R., IV, 824; Inst., II, 455.  
276. C. R., IV, 824; Inst., II, 456.  
277. C. R., IV, 824-25; Inst., II, 456.  
278. C. R., IV, 826; Inst., II, 456-57.  
279. C. R., IV, 827; Inst., II, 457.

with the spirit of meekness" (2 Corinthians 2:7).<sup>280</sup> "Let us not consign to destruction" the person of the penitent, "which is in the hand, and subject to the decision, of the Lord alone."<sup>281</sup> "Christ confines the power of binding to the censure of the Church" (Matthew 18:18).<sup>282</sup> "Anathema is rarely, if ever, to be used."<sup>282</sup> "Private individuals must not, when they see vices less carefully corrected by the Council of the Elders, immediately separate themselves from the Church."<sup>283</sup> We ought to follow the advise of Augustine that "every pious reason and mode of church discipline ought always to have regard to the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace."<sup>283</sup> Schismatics "pervert to sacrilegious schism and purposes of excision the correction of a brother's fault, which in Scripture is enjoined to be done with moderation, without impairing the sincerity of love or breaking the bond of peace."<sup>284</sup> Augustine further advised that "if the contagion of sin has seized the multitude, mercy must accompany living discipline."<sup>284</sup> Moreover, Augustine warned that "counsels of separation are vain, sacrilegious, and pernicious, because impious and proud, and do more to disturb the weak good than to correct the wicked proud."<sup>284</sup> "Fasting has its value as preparation for prayer; after a full meal the mind (l'esprit) does not so rise toward God as to be borne along by an earnest and fervent longing for prayer, and perseverance in prayer."<sup>285</sup> "The life of the pious should be tempered with frugality and sobriety, so as to exhibit, as much as may be, a kind of

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280. C. R., IV, 827; Inst., II, 458.  
281. C. R., IV, 829; Inst., II, 459.  
282. C. R., IV, 830; Inst., II, 459.  
283. C. R., IV, 831; Inst., II, 460.  
284. C. R., IV, 833; Inst., II, 461.  
285. C. R., IV, 836; Inst., II, 463.

fasting during the whole course of life."<sup>286</sup> "The fast of hypocrites is not only useless and superfluous fatigue, but the greatest abomination."<sup>287</sup> "The celibacy of the clergy is contrary to the word of God."<sup>288</sup>

Religious vows made in contradiction of the word of God are a source of many superstitious errors.<sup>289</sup> "All fictitious worship, which we ourselves devise for the purpose of serving God, is not in the least degree acceptable to him, however pleasing it may be to us."<sup>290</sup> "The Lord not only openly rejects, but grievously abhors, such worship."<sup>290</sup> No worship can be acceptable to God save that which is approved by His word.<sup>291</sup> "If you vow abstinence from wine, as if there were any holiness in so doing, you are superstitious; but if you have some end in view which is not perverse, no one can disapprove."<sup>292</sup> "The law . . . considered in itself, is the way to eternal life, and its inefficacy to give eternal life is owing to our depravity (nostre perversité)."<sup>293</sup>

"Akin to the preaching of the gospel, we have another help to our faith in the sacraments."<sup>294</sup> "A sacrament is . . . an external sign, by which the Lord seals on our consciences His promises of good will toward us, in order to sustain the weakness of our faith, and we in our turn testify our piety towards Him, both before Himself, and before angels as well as men."<sup>295</sup> "Because our souls are implanted in bodies (nous habitons

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286. C. R., IV, 838; Inst., II, 464.  
287. C. R., IV, 839; Inst., II, 465.  
288. C. R., IV, 847; Inst., II, 469.  
289. C. R., IV, 850; Inst., II, 472.  
290. C. R., IV, 851; Inst., II, 473.  
291. C. R., IV, 852; Inst., II, 474.  
292. C. R., IV, 856; Inst., II, 476.  
293. C. R., IV, 867; Inst., II, 483.  
294. C. R., IV, 877; Inst., II, 491.  
295. C. R., IV, 878; Inst., II, 491-92.

en nos corps), He delivers spiritual things under things visible."<sup>296</sup>

"Whenever God offered any sign to the holy Patriarchs, it was inseparably attached to doctrine, without which our senses would gaze bewildered on an unmeaning object."<sup>297</sup> "The promise is sealed by the sacrament."<sup>298</sup> "Faith is the proper and entire work of the Holy Spirit, enlightened by Whom we recognize God and the treasures of His grace, and without Whose illumination our mind (nostre esprit) is so blind that it can see nothing, so stupid (tellement desprouveu) that it has no relish for spiritual things."<sup>299</sup>

First, the Lord teaches us and trains us by His word. Secondly, He confirms us by His sacraments. Thirdly, "He illumines our mind (nostre entendement) by the light of His Holy Spirit, and opens up an entrance into our hearts for His word and sacraments, which would otherwise only strike our ears, and fall upon our sight, but by no means affect us inwardly."<sup>300</sup>

"The sacraments duly perform their office only when accompanied by the Spirit, the internal Master, Whose energy alone penetrates the heart (les coeurs sont percez), stirs up the affections (les affections touchées), and procures access for the sacraments into our souls."<sup>300</sup> "The Sacraments do not avail one iota without the energy of the Holy Spirit; yet in hearts previously taught by that preceptor, there is nothing to prevent the sacraments from strengthening and increasing faith."<sup>301</sup> "Christ acts in our minds above the measure of nature by special grace."<sup>301</sup> "That which confirms and increases faith, is nothing else than the preparing of our minds

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296. C. R., IV, 880; Inst., II, 493.  
297. C. R., IV, 881; Inst., II, 494.  
298. C. R., IV, 882; Inst., II, 494.  
299. C. R., IV, 886; Inst., II, 496.  
300. C. R., IV, 886; Inst., II, 497.  
301. C. R., IV, 887; Inst., II, 497.

by (the) internal illumination (of the Holy Spirit) to receive that confirmation which is set forth by the sacraments."<sup>302</sup>

That the word may not fall upon our ear, or the sacraments be presented to our eye in vain, (the Holy Spirit) shows that it is God who there speaks to us, softens our obdurate hearts, and frames them to the obedience which is due His word, in short, transmits those external words and sacraments from the ear to the soul (de l'esprit). Both word and sacraments, therefore, confirm our faith, bringing under view the kind intentions of our heavenly Father, in the knowledge (en l'intelligence) of which the whole assurance of our faith depends, and by which its strength is increased; and the Spirit also confirms our faith when, by engraving that assurance on our minds (en nostre coeurs), He renders it effectual.<sup>303</sup>

"The word of God, when addressed to any stubborn spirit (si elle tomb en quelque dure cervelle et rebells), will remain without fruit, as if thrown upon the barren waste, but when it meets with a soul which the hand of the heavenly Spirit has subdued, will be most fruitful (Matthew 13:4, Luke 8:15)."<sup>304</sup> "Paul . . . when he would remind the Corinthians how God had given effect to his labors . . . boasts that he possessed the ministry of the Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:4); just as if his preaching were inseparably connected with the power of the Holy Spirit, in inwardly enlightening the mind (pour leur illuminer les entendements), and stimulating it (et esmouvoir leurs coeurs)."<sup>304</sup> "The apostles exert the power of the Spirit in their preaching, inasmuch as God uses them as instruments which He has ordained for the unfolding of His spiritual grace."<sup>305</sup> "God spiritually nourishes our faith by means of the sacraments, whose only office is to make His promises visible to our eye, or rather, to be pledges of His promises."<sup>306</sup> "Sacraments are signs of sacred and spiritual things."<sup>307</sup>

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302. C. R., IV, 887; Inst., II, 497-98.  
303. C. R., IV, 888; Inst., II, 498.  
304. C. R., IV, 889; Inst., II, 498.  
305. C. R., IV, 889; Inst., II, 499.  
306. C. R., IV, 890; Inst., II, 499.  
307. C. R., IV, 892; Inst., II, 500.

"The schools of the Sophists have taught that the sacraments . . . in use in the Christian Church justify, and confer grace, provided only that we do not interpose the obstacle of mortal sin."<sup>308</sup> Justification by sacraments "entangles miserable minds (elle lie et enveloppe les entendements humains)", already of their own accord too much inclined to the earth, in a superstitious idea, which makes them acquiesce in the spectacle of a corporeal object rather than in God Himself."<sup>309</sup> "The assurance of salvation does not depend on participation in the sacraments, as if justification consisted in it."<sup>309</sup> We should accept the dictum of Augustine that "in the elect alone the sacraments accomplish what they represent."<sup>310</sup> "In order that you may not have a sign devoid of truth, but the thing with the sign, the Word which is included in it must be apprehended by faith."<sup>311</sup> "The office of the sacraments differs not from the word of God; and this is to hold forth and offer Christ to us, and in Him, the treasures of heavenly grace."<sup>312</sup> The sacraments "avail no farther than accompanied by the Holy Spirit to open our minds and hearts, and make us capable of receiving this testimony, in which various distinguished graces are clearly manifested."<sup>313</sup> In the sacraments "the internal grace of the Spirit . . . is distinct from the external ministration."<sup>314</sup> "The term sacrament . . . includes . . . all the signs which God ever commanded men to use, that He might make them sure and confident of the truth of His promises."<sup>315</sup> "No divine promise has ever

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308. C. R., IV, 892-93; Inst., II, 501.

309. C. R., IV, 893; Inst., II, 501.

310. C. R., IV, 894; Inst., II, 501.

311. C. R., IV, 895; Inst., II, 502.

312. C. R., IV, 896; Inst., II, 503.

313. C. R., IV, 897; Inst., II, 503.

314. C. R., IV, 897; Inst., II, 503-04.

315. C. R., IV, 898; Inst., II, 504.

been offered to man except in Christ; hence when (sacraments) remind us of any divine promise, they must of necessity exhibit Christ."<sup>316</sup> "Circumcision was a sign by which the Jews were reminded that whatever comes of the seed of man--in other words, the whole nature of man--is corrupt, and requires to be cut off."<sup>316</sup> "The Scholastic dogma (les Dicateurs de l'escole) . . . by which the difference between the sacraments of the old and new dispensations is made so great, that the former did nothing but shadow forth the grace of God, while the latter actually confer it, must be exploded (est du tout à reietter)."<sup>317</sup> "God regards not the external ablution (baptism) by which we are initiated into religion, unless the mind is purified inwardly (le courage soit purge par dedans)" (1 Corinthians 10:5).<sup>318</sup> "The reality of baptism consists not in external ablution, but in the testimony of a good conscience" (1 Peter 3:21).<sup>318</sup> "Those wretched sophists are perhaps deceived by the extravagant eulogiums on our signs which occur in ancient writers."<sup>319</sup> "All the trifling talk of sophists concerning the opus operatum (tout ce que les Sophists ont gazouillé de l'oeuvre ouvree, qu'ils appellent en leur gergon), is not only false, but repugnant to the very nature of sacraments, which God appointed in order that believers, who are void and in want of all good, might bring nothing of their own, but simply beg."<sup>320</sup>

"Baptism is the initiatory sign by which we are admitted to the fellowship of the Church, that being ingrafted into Christ we may be accounted

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316. C. R., IV, 902; Inst., II, 506.  
317. C. R., IV, 904; Inst., II, 507-08.  
318. C. R., IV, 906; Inst., II, 508.  
319. C. R., IV, 908; Inst., II, 510.  
320. C. R., II, 910; Inst., II, 511.

children of God."<sup>321</sup> "The very meaning of baptism (is) that it may fix our minds on Christ alone."<sup>322</sup> Men, "from the grossness of their minds, are excessively attached to external things."<sup>323</sup> "It is lawful for me and all the godly to reject whatever men have presumed to add to the institution of Christ."<sup>324</sup> "There is nothing more holy, or better, or safer, than to be contented with the authority of Christ alone."<sup>324</sup> "It is improper for private individuals to take upon themselves the administration of baptism."<sup>325</sup> "Our children, before they are born, God declares that He adopts for His own when He promises that He will be a God to us, and to our seed after us. In this promise their salvation is included" (Genesis 17:7).<sup>326</sup> "Children who happen to depart this life before an opportunity of immersing them in water, are not excluded from the kingdom of heaven."<sup>327</sup> "The sacrament is afterwards added as a kind of seal, not to give efficacy to the promise, as if in itself invalid, but merely to confirm it to us."<sup>328</sup> "Children of believers are not baptized, in order that though formerly aliens from the Church, they may then, for the first time, become children of God, but rather are received into the Church by a formal sign, because, in virtue of the promise, they previously belonged to the body of Christ."<sup>328</sup>

Infant baptism agrees with the institution of Christ and the nature of baptism as a sign. "Everything applicable to circumcision applies also to baptism, excepting always the difference in the visible ceremony."<sup>329</sup>

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321. C. R., IV, 910-11; Inst., II, 513.  
322. C. R., IV, 912; Inst., II, 513-14.  
323. C. R., IV, 914; Inst., II, 514.  
324. C. R., IV, 928; Inst., II, 524.  
325. C. R., IV, 929; Inst., II, 524.  
326. C. R., IV, 930; Inst., II, 525.  
327. C. R., IV, 932; Inst., II, 526.  
328. C. R., IV, 932; Inst., II, 526.  
329. C. R., IV, 938; Inst., II, 531.

"To this analogy and comparison (circumcision and baptism) we are led by that rule of the Apostle, in which he enjoins us to bring every interpretation of Scripture to the analogy of faith" (Romans 12:3, 6).<sup>330</sup> Baptism has been substituted for circumcision, and performs the same office.<sup>330</sup> Reason shows that baptism is properly administered to infants.<sup>330</sup> "When we see that the sign is subservient to the word, we shall say that it is subordinate, and assign it the inferior place."<sup>331</sup> "The children of the Jews, because, when made heirs of that covenant, they were separated from the heathen, were called a holy seed; for the same reason the children of Christians, or those who have only one believing parent (1 Corinthians 7:14), are called holy, and, by the testimony of the Apostle, differ from the impure seed of idolaters."<sup>332</sup> "If the testimony by which the Jews were assured of the salvation of their seed is taken from us . . . by the advent of Christ, the grace of God, which was formerly given to the Jews, is more obscure and less perfectly attested to us."<sup>333</sup> "Our Lord Jesus Christ, to give an example from which the world might learn that He had come to enlarge rather than to limit the grace of the Father, kindly takes the little children in His arms, and rebukes His disciples for attempting to prevent them from coming" (Matthew 19:13).<sup>334</sup> "If it is right (une chose raisonnable) that children should be brought to Christ, why should they not be admitted to baptism, the symbol of our communion and fellowship with Christ? If the kingdom of heaven is theirs, why should they be denied the sign?"<sup>335</sup> Infant

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330. C. R., IV, 938; Inst., II, 531.  
331. C. R., IV, 939; Inst., II, 532.  
332. C. R., IV, 939-40; Inst., II, 532.  
333. C. R., IV, 940; Inst., II, 532.  
334. C. R., IV, 940; Inst., II, 533.  
335. C. R., IV, 941; Inst., II, 533.

baptism, which receives such strong support from Scripture, is by no means of human invention.<sup>336</sup> "The Lord punishes the arrogance of those who forthwith condemn (leur temerité et outrecuidance, de ce que follement et desraisonnablement ils condamnent) whatever their carnal sense cannot comprehend."<sup>337</sup> "The divine seal communicated to the child, as with the impress of a seal, confirms the promise given to the godly parent, and declares that the Lord will be a God not to him only, but to his seed iusques en mille generations."<sup>338</sup> "Let those, then, who embrace the promise of mercy to their children, consider it as their duty to offer them to the Church, to be sealed with the symbol of mercy."<sup>339</sup> "Children derive some benefit from their baptism, when, being ingrafted into the body of the Church, they are made an object of greater interest to the other members."<sup>339</sup> "When (children) have grown up, they are thereby strongly urged to an earnest desire of serving God, who has received them as sons by the formal symbol of adoption, before, from nonage, they were able to recognize Him as their father."<sup>339</sup> "We are directed by the infallible guidance of Scripture (pourtant voici la droite intelligence où nous mene l'Escriture)."<sup>340</sup> The minds of men wander to and fro when they substitute their dreams (l'esprit de l'homme s'adonnant à forger fables et imaginations semblable à songes) for the infallible word of God.<sup>341</sup> "Let us fix on the very complete resemblance between baptism and circumcision, as seen in the internal office, the promise, the use, and the effect."<sup>342</sup> "For if fulness of life consists in the perfect knowledge of God, since some of those whom

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336. C. R., IV, 942; Inst., II, 534.  
337. C. R., IV, 942-43; Inst., II, 534.  
338. C. R., IV, 943; Inst., II, 534.  
339. C. R., IV, 943; Inst., II, 535.  
340. C. R., IV, 946; Inst., II, 537.  
341. C. R., IV, 950; Inst., II, 539-40.  
342. C. R., IV, 951; Inst., II, 540.

death hurries away in the first moments of infancy pass into life eternal, they are certainly admitted to behold the immediate presence of God."<sup>343</sup> John 5:24 serves to show "that we must not deem baptism so necessary as to suppose that every one who has lost the opportunity of obtaining it has forthwith perished."<sup>344</sup>

Calvin's theological method is inseparably bound to the Lord's Supper and the benefits conferred by it. "Christ seems to me to have intended to teach something more express and more sublime in that noble discourse (John 6), in which he recommends the eating of His flesh -- viz. that we are quickened by the true partaking of Him, which He designated by the terms eating and drinking, lest anyone should suppose that the life which we obtain from Him is obtained by simple knowledge."<sup>345</sup> Communion in the Lord's Supper "is a mystery which I feel, and therefore freely confess that I am unable to comprehend with my mind (comprendre en mon esprit), so far am I from wishing anyone to measure its sublimity by my feeble capacity."<sup>346</sup>

Though the mind is more powerful than the tongue in expression (l'entendement ait plus de vertu à penser et estimer que la langue à exprimer), it too is overcome and overwhelmed by the subject (communion in the Lord's Supper). All then that remains is to break forth in admiration of the mystery, which it is plain that the mind is inadequate to comprehend (auquels à droitement penser l'entendement ne peut suffire), or the tongue to express.<sup>347</sup>

Though it seems an incredible thing that the flesh of Christ, while at such a distance from us in respect to place, should be food to us, let us remember how far the secret power of the Holy Spirit surpasses all our conceptions (en sa hautess tous noz sens), and how foolish it is to wish to measure its immensity by our feeble capacity (en nostre mesure). Therefore, what our mind does not comprehend (ce

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343. C. R., IV, 954; Inst., II, 542.  
344. C. R., IV, 963; Inst., II, 547.  
345. C. R., IV, 981; Inst., II, 560.  
346. C. R., IV, 983; Inst., II, 561.  
347. C. R., IV, 985; Inst., II, 561.

que nostre entendement ne peut concevoir) let faith conceive--viz. that the Spirit truly unites things separated by space.<sup>348</sup>

"Truly the thing signified He exhibits and offers to all who sit down at that spiritual feast, although it is beneficially received by believers only who receive this great benefit with true faith and heartfelt gratitude."<sup>349</sup>

"The sacred mystery of the Supper consists of two things--the corporeal signs, which presented to the eye, represent invisible things in a manner adapted to our weak capacity, and the spiritual truth, which is at once figured and exhibited by the signs."<sup>350</sup> "I leave no room for the cavil, that when I say Christ is conceived by faith, I mean that He is only conceived by the intellect and imagination (que nous recevons Jesus Christ seulement par intelligence et pensee). He is offered by the promises, not that we may stop short at the sight or mere knowledge (a une simple contemplation et nue) of Him, but that we may enjoy true communion with Him."<sup>351</sup> "The Schoolmen (Les Theologiens scholastiques), horrified at this barbarous impiety (of Palinode, that the body of Christ is locally present in the wafer), speak more modestly, though they do nothing more than amuse themselves with more subtle delusions."<sup>352</sup> The Papists have fabricated without authority from the word Christ's carnal presence in the sacrament.<sup>353</sup> "It is impossible for the mind of man to disentangle itself from the immensity of space, and ascend to Christ even above the heavens."<sup>354</sup>

"The sacred symbols of the Supper . . . are received not by the imagination

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348. C. R., IV, 986; Inst., II, 563.  
349. C. R., IV, 986-87; Inst., II, 563.  
350. C. R., IV, 987; Inst., II, 564.  
351. C. R., IV, 988; Inst., II, 564.  
352. C. R., IV, 989-90; Inst., II, 565.  
353. C. R., IV, 990; Inst., II, 566.  
354. C. R., IV, 996; Inst., II, 568.

or intellect (ou pensee) merely, but are enjoyed in reality as the food of eternal life."<sup>355</sup>

"Our enemies . . . invidiously pretend that human reason (le sens humain) will not allow us to believe what Christ uttered with His sacred mouth."<sup>356</sup> "That Christ was seated at table under their eye, and yet was contained invisible under the bread . . . is repugnant to all reason (ils s'accordent sans aucune replique à ce qui leur a esté dit)."<sup>357</sup> "Fanatical men . . . give out that we are so wedded to human reason (d'etre tellement addonnez à la raison humaine), that we attribute nothing more to the power of God than the order of nature admits, and common sense dictates."<sup>358</sup> "It is not agreeable to human reason (plus accordante au sens humain) that the flesh of Christ penetrates to us, so as to be our food."<sup>359</sup> "The gift of interpretation . . . should throw light upon the word (par lequel la Parolle soit entendue comme elle doit)."<sup>360</sup> "In the mysteries of faith we do not consult common apprehension (du sens naturel), but, with the placid docility and spirit of meekness which James recommends (James 1:21), receive the doctrine which has come from heaven."<sup>361</sup> "We have no wish to know how Christ is hid under the bread: we are satisfied with His own words 'This is My body.' We again study, with no less obedience than care, to obtain a sound understanding of this passage (la vraye intelligence de ce passage), as of the whole of Scripture."<sup>362</sup>

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355. C. R., IV, 1003; Inst., II, 571.  
356. C. R., IV, 1010; Inst., II, 575.  
357. C. R., IV, 1011; Inst., II, 576.  
358. C. R., IV, 1012; Inst., II, 577.  
359. C. R., IV, 1012-13; Inst., II, 577.  
360. C. R., IV, 1014; Inst., II, 578.  
361. C. R., IV, 1015; Inst., II, 578.  
362. C. R., IV, 1015; Inst., II, 579.

We do not, with preposterous fervor, rashly, and without choice, lay hold of whatever first presents itself to our minds (à nos sens); but, after careful meditation (apres avoir bien medité et considéré le tout), embrace the meaning (le sens) which the Spirit of God suggests. Trusting to Him, we look down, as from a height, on whatever opposition may be offered by earthly wisdom (la sagesse terrienne). Nay, we hold our minds captive (nous tenons nos entendements captifs), not allowing them one word of murmur, and humble them, that they may not presume to gainsay. In this way, we have arrived at that exposition of the words of Christ, which all who are moderately versant in Scripture know to be perpetually used with regard to the sacraments. Still, in a matter of difficulty, we deem it not unlawful to inquire, after the example of the blessed Virgin, "How shall this be?" (Luke 1:34).<sup>363</sup>

"The doctrine which we have laid down is taken from the pure word of God, and rests on its authority."<sup>364</sup>

"The body with which Christ rose is declared, not by Aristotle, but by the Holy Spirit, to be finite, and to be contained in heaven until the last day."<sup>364</sup> "It is our duty so to embrace what Christ absolutely declares, as to give it an unreserved assent (pour vallable sans exception)."<sup>365</sup> "I speak not of Papists, whose doctrine is more tolerable, or at least more modest (ou pour le moins mieux colérée)" than the doctrine of the ubiquity of the body of Christ.<sup>366</sup> "There is a true distinction in the schools (une distinction vulgaire entre les theologiens Sorboniques) which I hesitate not to quote. 'Although the whole Christ is everywhere, yet everything which is in Him is not everywhere,' I wish the Schoolmen had duly weighed the force of this sentence, as it would have obviated their absurd fiction of the corporeal presence of Christ."<sup>367</sup> "Seeing this mystery (the presence of Christ in communion) is heavenly, there is no necessity to bring Christ

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363. C. R., IV, 1015-16; Inst., II, 579.

364. C. R., IV, 1016; Inst., II, 579.

365. C. R., IV, 1023; Inst., II, 584.

366. C. R., IV, 1025-26; Inst., II, 585-86.

367. C. R., IV, 1027; Inst., II, 586.

on the earth that He may be connected with us."<sup>368</sup> "Should anyone ask me as to the mode, I will not be ashamed to confess that it is too high a mystery either for my mind to comprehend (pour le comprendre en mon esprit) or my words to express; and to speak more plainly, I rather feel than understand it (i'en sen plus par experience que ie n'en puis entendre)." "The truth of God, therefore, in which I can safely rest, I here embrace without controversy."<sup>369</sup>

I reject the absurdities which appear to be unworthy of the heavenly majesty of Christ (et les folles imaginations contrevenantes a sa Maieste), and are inconsistent with the reality of his human nature. Since they must also be repugnant to the word of God, which teaches both that Christ was received into the glory of the heavenly kingdom, so as to be exalted above all the circumstances of the world (Luke 24:26), and no less carefully ascribes to Him the properties belonging to a true human nature.<sup>369</sup>

"This (the above) ought not to seem incredible or contradictory to reason . . . because, as the whole kingdom of Christ is spiritual, so whatever He does in His Church is not to be tested by the wisdom of this world."<sup>369</sup>

"The analogy of faith (la regle de la foy) by which Paul enjoins us to test every interpretation of Scripture, is clearly with us in this matter."<sup>370</sup> "Had all their thoughts been kept in due subjection to the word of God, they certainly would have listened to what He Himself has said, 'Take, eat, and drink,' and obeyed the command by which He enjoins us to receive the sacrament, not to worship it."<sup>371</sup> It is "dangerous in matters of such difficulty to wander from the simple word of God to the dreams of our own brain (d'extravaguer en noz fantasies)."<sup>372</sup> "The office of the sacrament is to aid the infirmity of the human mind (l'entendement de

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368. C. R., IV, 1027; Inst., II, 587.  
369. C. R., IV, 1028; Inst., II, 587.  
370. C. R., IV, 1029; Inst., II, 588.  
371. C. R., IV, 1037; Inst., II, 593.  
372. C. R., IV, 1038; Inst., II, 593.

l'homme), assisting it in rising upwards, so as to perceive the height of spiritual mysteries."<sup>373</sup> "Scripture, itself, also, besides carefully narrating the ascension of Christ, by which He withdrew His bodily presence from our eye and company, that it might make us abandon all carnal thoughts of Him, whenever it makes mention of Him, enjoins us to raise our minds upwards and seek Him in heaven, seated at the right hand of the Father" (Colossians 3:2).<sup>374</sup> "Those who devised the adoration of the sacrament, not only dreamed it of themselves, without any authority from Scripture, where no mention of it can be shown . . . ; but, disregarding Scripture, forsook the living God, and fabricated a god for themselves, after the lust of their own hearts."<sup>375</sup> "For this is the school of the Holy Spirit, that best of masters, in which such progress is made, that while nothing is to be acquired anywhere else, we must willingly be ignorant of whatever is not there taught."<sup>375</sup> "The host worshippers . . . disregarding the command to eat, fasten on the mutilated promise, 'This is my body,' that they may pervert it to rites alien from the institution of Christ."<sup>376</sup> The "promise has been given to those who observe the command connected with it, and that those who transfer the sacrament to another end, have no countenance from the word of God (sont destituez de toute parole de Dieu)."<sup>376</sup> "There cannot be a right administration of the Supper without the word. Any utility which we derive from the Supper requires the word. Whether we are to be confirmed in faith, or exercised in confession, or aroused to duty, there is need of preaching. Nothing, therefore, can be more preposterous than

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373. C. R., IV, 1038; Inst., II, 593.  
374. C. R., IV, 1038-39; Inst., II, 594.  
375. C. R., IV, 1039; Inst., II, 594.  
376. C. R., IV, 1040; Inst., II, 595.

to convert the Supper into a dumb action."<sup>377</sup> "We are to regard those words (of consecration of the elements) as a living sermon, which is to edify the hearers, penetrate their minds (qui entre en leurs entendements), being impressed and seated in their hearts, and exert its efficacy in the fulfilment of that which it promises."<sup>378</sup> "The frowardness of human confidence, which cannot restrain itself (la legierete et folie avec la hardiesse de l'esprit humain) . . . is always sporting and wantoning in the mysteries of God."<sup>379</sup> "The audacity of human reason (l'audace de la raison et sagesse humaine) (in the Roman Catholic doctrine of concomitance) objects and says, 'the bread is the blood,' and 'the wine is the body,' as if the Lord had without reason distinguished His body from His blood, both by words and signs!"<sup>380</sup>

"The sounder Schoolmen (in receiving the dogma of the Mass) have spoken somewhat more tolerably than their successors."<sup>381</sup> It has "been most clearly proved by the word of God, that this mass, however glossed and splendid, offers the greatest insult to Christ, suppresses and buries His cross, consigns His death to oblivion, takes away the benefit which it was designed to convey."<sup>382</sup> "This most powerful axe, the word of God, will cut down and destroy it (the mass)."<sup>382</sup> "The cross of Christ is overthrown the moment an altar is erected."<sup>383</sup> It is certain that God does not command the Mass, and our missal doctors "cannot support it by one syllable of Scripture."<sup>384</sup>

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377. C. R., IV, 1042; Inst., II, 596.  
378. C. R., IV, 1042-43; Inst., II, 596.  
379. C. R., IV, 1048; Inst., II, 600.  
380. C. R., IV, 1053; Inst., II, 603.  
381. C. R., IV, 1057; Inst., II, 607.  
382. C. R., IV, 1058; Inst., II, 607.  
383. C. R., IV, 1060; Inst., II, 608.  
384. C. R., IV, 1067; Inst., II, 613.

"The Lord has given us a table at which we may feast, not an altar on which a victim may be offered; He has not consecrated priests to sacrifice, but ministers to distribute a sacred feast."<sup>385</sup> "Since men have been denied the power of making new sacraments in the Church of God, it were to be wished, that in those which are of God, there should be the least possible admixture of human invention."<sup>386</sup> "Those sacramentary doctors (les Papists) are not only unsupported by the word of God, but also by the consent of the early Church."<sup>387</sup> "Everything pertaining to Christianity was prescribed and contained in Scripture."<sup>388</sup> "The Romanist and Schoolmen (les Theologiens Romanisques), whose wont it is to corrupt all things by erroneous interpretation, anxiously labor to find a sacrament here (in the practice of penitence)."<sup>389</sup> "All that we here proposed was to combat that novel invention of a sevenfold sacrament in ecclesiastical orders of which we nowhere read except among the silly ravings of the Sorbonnists and Canonists (mais seulement en ces badaux de theologiens Sorboniques et Canonists)."<sup>390</sup> "Who can tolerate the ignorant garrulity of these sophists? (ces Sophistes babillans si follement)."<sup>391</sup>

The Relationship of Human Reason to the Total Personality

The soul consists of two parts: intellect and will, Calvin held.

Philosophers, being unacquainted with the corruption of nature, which is the punishment of revolt, erroneously confound two states of man which are very different from each other. Let us therefore hold, for the purpose of the present work, that the soul consists of two parts, the intellect and the will . . . the office of the intellect

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385. C. R., IV, 1070; Inst., II, 615.  
386. C. R., IV, 1079; Inst., II, 620.  
387. C. R., IV, 1083; Inst., II, 625.  
388. C. R., IV, 1089; Inst., II, 629.  
389. C. R., IV, 1094; Inst., II, 629.  
390. C. R., IV, 1105; Inst., II, 641.  
391. C. R., IV, 1122; Inst., II, 647.

being to distinguish between objects, according as they seem deserving of being approved or disapproved; and the office of the will, to choose and follow what the intellect declares to be good, to reject and shun what it declares to be bad (Plato in Phaedro). We dwell not on the subtlety of Aristotle, that the mind has no motion of itself; but that the moving power is choice, which he also terms the appetitive intellect. Not to lose ourselves in superfluous questions, let it be enough to know that the intellect is to us, as it were, the guide and ruler of the soul; that the will always follows its beck, and waits for its decision, in matters of desire. For which reason Aristotle truly taught, that in the appetite there is a pursuit and rejection corresponding in some degree to affirmation and negation in the intellect (Aristot. Ethic. lib. vi. c. 2). Moreover, it will be seen in another place . . . how surely the intellect governs the will. Here we only wish to observe, that the soul does not possess any faculty which may not be duly referred to one or other of these members.<sup>392</sup>

Philosophers in general maintain the primacy of reason over will and sense-data.

Philosophers generally maintain that reason dwells in the mind like a lamp, throwing light on all its counsels, and, like a queen, governing the will--that it is so pervaded with divine light as to be able to consult for the best, and so endued with vigour as to be able perfectly to command; that, on the contrary, sense is dull and short-sighted, always creeping on the ground, groveling among inferior objects, and never rising to true vision; that the appetite, when it obeys reason, and does not allow itself to be subjugated by sense, is borne to the study of virtue, holds a straight course, and becomes transformed into will; but that when enslaved by sense, it is corrupted and depraved so as to degenerate into lust.<sup>393</sup>

Calvin observed, apparently with some satisfaction, that philosophers were compelled to admit all kinds of practical difficulties in the way of establishing the primacy of reason. Calvin charged that many ancient theologians, who should have known better, feared to deny the primacy of reason, lest philosophers would make fun of theology.<sup>394</sup>

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392. C. R., III, 228; Inst., II, 168-69.

393. C. R., III, 298; Inst., I, 224.

394. C. R., III, 299-300; Inst., I, 224-25.

Among ecclesiastical writers, although there is none who did not acknowledge that sound reason in man was seriously injured by sin, and the will greatly entangled by vicious desires, yet many of them make too near an approach to the philosophers. Some of the most ancient writers appear to me to have exalted human strength, from a fear that a distinct acknowledgment of its impotence might expose them to the jeers of the philosophers with whom they were disputing, and also furnish the flesh, already too much disinclined to good, with a new pretext for sloth. Therefore, to avoid teaching anything which the majority of mankind might deem absurd, they made it their study, in some measure, to reconcile the doctrine of Scripture with the dogmas of philosophy, at the same time making it their special care not to furnish any occasion for sloth. This is obvious from their words.<sup>395</sup>

Calvin noted that Aquinas had subsumed will under intellect.<sup>396</sup> Calvin went on to categorically deny the existence of free will in the natural man.<sup>397</sup> He included Aquinas in the "modern Sophists" who lived after 1100 (birth of Peter Lombard), and noted that there were sounder Schoolmen before Lombard.<sup>398</sup> Calvin asserted that free will exists only in the redeemed man as a special gift of the Holy Spirit.<sup>399</sup>

#### Behavior

"Nature would lead to a simple and primitive knowledge of God, if Adam had not sinned."<sup>400</sup> "Abstract knowledge of God can exist only in a depraved human mind."<sup>401</sup> "The impious do not deny the essence of God, but His justice and providence."<sup>402</sup> "The Holy Spirit calls those apostates who in the blindness of their minds, substitute demons in the place of God."<sup>403</sup> "Our nature is corrupt and degraded in consequence of the Fall."<sup>404</sup>

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395. C. R., III, 300; Inst., I, 226.  
396. C. R., III, 303; Inst., I, 227.  
397. C. R., III, 304; Inst., I, 228.  
398. Loc. cit.  
399. C. R., III, 307; Inst., I, 230.  
400. C. R., III, 43; Inst., I, 40.  
401. C. R., III, 45; Inst., I, 41.  
402. C. R., III, 53-54; Inst., I, 47.  
403. C. R., III, 77; Inst., I, 61.  
404. C. R., III, 215; Inst., I, 160.

Emotion

"The perverse suppression of feelings seldom leads to entire ignorance of God."<sup>405</sup> While "heart" and "mind" are often synonymous in Calvin, there are a few places where "heart" stands for the emotions over against the intellect. "The word is not received when it merely flutters in the brain (voltige seulement au cerveau), but when it has taken deep root in the heart (elle a prins racine au profond du coeur)."<sup>406</sup> "There is more distrust in the heart than blindness in the mind (plus deffiance au coeur que d'aveuglement d'esprit); it is more difficult to inspire the soul with security than to imbue it with knowledge (il est plus difficile de donner assurance au coeur, que d'instruire l'entendement)."<sup>406</sup> "The Holy Spirit as a seal, seals upon our hearts the promises, the certainty of which was previously impressed upon our minds (pour seeller en noz coeurs les mesmes promesses, lesquelles il a premierement imprimées en nostre entendement)" (Ephesians 1:13, 14; 2 Corinthians 1:22, 2 Corinthians 5:5).<sup>406</sup> "All human desires (les desirs et appetits) are evil, because nothing pure and upright can proceed from a corrupt and polluted nature."<sup>407</sup>

Insight, Intuition, Mystic Experience

"None comprehend the mysteries of God save those to whom it is given."<sup>408</sup> "Paul's conversion shows a heavenly power compelled him to preach what he once destroyed."<sup>409</sup> "The Holy Spirit bestows wisdom and the faculty of speech."<sup>410</sup> Every good thought proceeds from the Spirit alone.<sup>411</sup> "We

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405. C. R., III, 59; Inst., I, 49.  
406. C. R., IV, 57; Inst., I, 501.  
407. C. R., IV, 81-82; Inst., I, 518.  
408. C. R., III, 98; Inst., I, 73.  
409. C. R., III, 108; Inst., I, 82.  
410. C. R., III, 167; Inst., I, 123.  
411. C. R., III, 167; Inst., I, 123.

are the temple of God, only if the Holy Spirit dwells in us."<sup>412</sup> "Wisdom, understanding, prudence proceed from the Spirit."<sup>413</sup> "The Spirit of holiness is given to believers only."<sup>414</sup> "Through the influence of the Spirit our mind, our will, our study (l'entendement, volonté et poursuite) are guided to what is good."<sup>415</sup> "The knowledge of God the Creator is useless apart from faith in Christ."<sup>416</sup> "Apart from faith in Christ there is little profit in contemplating the wonders of heaven and earth" (1 Corinthians 1:21).<sup>417</sup> "After the Fall, no knowledge of God without a Mediator was effectual to salvation" (John 1:13).<sup>418</sup> "We can have no knowledge of our salvation until we behold God in Christ" (Colossians 1:15).<sup>419</sup> "Reason cannot know (c'est en vain que nous sommes enseignez) righteousness by precept, until Christ imputes righteousness, and the person is born of the Spirit" (Romans 10:4).<sup>420</sup> "The promises of the Law lead us by faith to accept the Gospel."<sup>421</sup> "Even the children of God, previous to their effectual calling, being destitute of the Spirit of holiness, freely indulge the lusts of the flesh; they are not subdued in mind."<sup>422</sup>

"Faith perceives (nous entendons (par foy)) by Christ's ascension that the Lord has opened access to the heavenly kingdom."<sup>423</sup> "Faith perceives (nous reconnaissons (par foy)) that Christ is our advocate and intercessor."<sup>423</sup> "Faith discerns (nous concevons (par foy)) His power, on which

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412. C. R., III, 168; Inst., I, 123.  
413. C. R., III, 170; Inst., I, 125.  
414. C. R., III, 317; Inst., I, 236.  
415. C. R., III, 382; Inst., I, 288.  
416. C. R., III, 388; Inst., I, 292.  
417. C. R., III, 388; Inst., I, 293.  
418. C. R., III, 388-89; Inst., I, 293.  
419. C. R., III, 394; Inst., I, 297.  
420. C. R., III, 399; Inst., I, 302.  
421. C. R., III, 400; Inst., I, 303.  
422. C. R., III, 407; Inst., I, 308.  
423. C. R., III, 596; Inst., I, 450.

depend our strength, might, resources, and triumph over hell."<sup>424</sup> "Without the Holy Spirit our minds are dark and our hearts perverse (il n'y a qu'a-veuglement d'esprit et perversité de coeur)."<sup>425</sup> "Christ is of no benefit to us until the Spirit affects our minds."<sup>425</sup> "By faith the Holy Spirit brings us to the light of the Gospel" (John 1:12).<sup>426</sup> "The Holy Spirit is the internal teacher (Ephesians 1:13), through Whom the promise of salvation penetrates into our minds (transperce nox ames)."<sup>427</sup> "The Holy Spirit opens the intellectual eye (les yeux de l'entendement)."<sup>427</sup> "Christian teaching is in vain apart from the internal teaching of the Holy Spirit."<sup>428</sup> "Faith consists of knowledge of God and Christ" (John 17:3).<sup>429</sup> "The highest wisdom is to go forward in a calm and teachable spirit; believers should wait for further illumination on any matter on which they differ" (Philippians 3:15).<sup>429</sup> "The mind (l'entendement de l'homme) must be enlightened and the heart confirmed by faith."<sup>430</sup> "The proper assent of faith is more a matter of the heart than the head (au coeur plutost qu'au cerveau), of the affection than the intellect (et d'affection plutost que l'intelligence)" (Romans 1:5).<sup>431</sup> "The faith of the elect can never be effaced, since the Spirit of God is a sure pledge and seal of adoption."<sup>432</sup>

"It is not sufficient for the mind (l'entendement) to be illumined by the Spirit of God unless the heart is also strengthened and supported by

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424. C. R., II, 596; Inst., I, 450.  
425. C. R., IV, 6; Inst., I, 465.  
426. C. R., IV, 6-7; Inst., I, 465.  
427. C. R., IV, 7; Inst., I, 466.  
428. C. R., IV, 7-8; Inst., I, 466.  
429. C. R., IV, 12; Inst., I, 471.  
430. C. R., IV, 18; Inst., I, 475.  
431. C. R., IV, 20; Inst., I, 476.  
432. C. R., IV, 25; Inst., I, 479.

His power."<sup>433</sup> "Faith, as a gift from God, purifies the mind (l'entendement de l'homme est illuminé) so as to give it a relish for divine truth, and afterwards established it therein (le coeur est en ici fortifié)."<sup>434</sup> "What the mind has imbibed (ce que l'entendement a receu) (through the Holy Spirit) must be transfused into the heart (soit planté dedans le coeur)."<sup>435</sup> "If the illumination of the Spirit is the true source of understanding in the intellect (la vraie intelligence de nostre esprit), much more manifest is His agency in the confirmation of the heart."<sup>435</sup> "Faith is subject to various doubts, so that the minds (les ames) of believers are seldom at rest."<sup>435</sup> "Until the last day we cannot possess the blessing of salvation without transcending the reach of our intellect (qu'en surmontant la capacité de nos entendements)" (Romans 8:24).<sup>436</sup> "The abundance of joy which God has treasured up for those who fear Him cannot be truly known without making a most powerful impression (qu'elle n'esmeuve le coeur)."<sup>436</sup> "Before the mind (la conscience, Lat. mens) of the sinner can be inclined to repentance, he must be aroused by the thought of divine judgment."<sup>437</sup> "Repentance consists of (1) mortification of the flesh and (2) quickening by the Spirit."<sup>438</sup> "The Holy Spirit, instilling His holiness into our souls, so inspires them with new thoughts and affections (à nouvelles pensées et affections), that they may justly be regarded as new."<sup>439</sup> "The aim of regeneration is to form in us anew the image of God, which was sullied, and all but effaced by the transgression of Adam" (2 Corinthians 3:18, Ephesians 4:23, 24; Colossians

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433. C. R., IV, 53; Inst., I, 499.  
434. C. R., IV, 54; Inst., I, 499.  
435. C. R., IV, 57; Inst., I, 501.  
436. C. R., IV, 63; Inst., I, 505.  
437. C. R., IV, 74; Inst., I, 514.  
438. C. R., IV, 75; Inst., I, 515.  
439. C. R., IV, 75-76; Inst., I, 515.

3:10, 2 Corinthians 4:16).<sup>440</sup>

In prayer "we must keep all our wishes subordinate to the will of God, because it belongs to Him to prescribe what He wishes us to ask."<sup>441</sup> "Our salvation begins by the doctrine in which our religion is contained, but doctrine must be transfused into the breast (entre au dedans du coeur), and pass into the conduct, and so transform us into itself, as not to prove unfruitful."<sup>442</sup> "Consecrated and dedicated to God, we should not think (penser), speak, design (mediter), or act without a view to His glory."<sup>443</sup> "We are not our own; therefore neither is our reason (raison) or will to rule (dominer) our acts and counsels (noz conseils)."<sup>443</sup> "We are God's; therefore, let His wisdom (sa sagesse) and will preside over all our actions."<sup>443</sup> "Almost forgetting ourselves, we are faithfully to make it our study to obey God and His commandments."<sup>444</sup> "When Scripture enjoins us to lay aside private regard to ourselves, it not only divests our minds (elle efface de nostre coeur) of an excessive longing for wealth, or power, or human favor, but eradicates all ambition and thirst for worldly glory, and other more secret pests."<sup>445</sup> "The self-denial which Christ demands (Matthew 16:24), as soon as it takes hold of the mind (duquel quand le coeur de l'homme est une fois occupé), leaves no place for pride, show, and ostentation; for avarice, lust luxury, or effeminacy, or other vices engendered by self-love."<sup>446</sup> "There is a world of iniquity treasured up in the human soul; this is the only remedy: deny yourself, (et sans avoir esgard à ce

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440. C. R., IV, 76; Inst., I, 515.  
441. C. R., IV, 176; Inst., I, 582.  
442. C. R., IV, 182; Inst., II, 4.  
443. C. R., IV, 184; Inst., II, 7.  
444. C. R., IV, 185; Inst., II, 7.  
445. C. R., IV, 185; Inst., II, 7-8.  
446. C. R., IV, 186; Inst., II, 8.

qui nous plaist), direct your whole mind to the pursuit of those things which the Lord requires of you."<sup>447</sup> "Paul, to set our minds free from all entanglements (pour despestrer nos ames de tous liens), recalls us to the hope of a blessed immortality."<sup>448</sup> "However much the carnal mind (la chair) may seem self-sufficient in the pursuit of honor or wealth, neither intellect nor labor will be of any avail, unless the Lord prospers both."<sup>449</sup> "He who has entirely resigned himself to the Lord will have a composed mind (aura une telle affection); and will neither deem himself wretched or murmur against God because of his lot."<sup>450</sup> "Knowledge of divine providence leads to a placid and grateful mind (d'un coeur paisible et non ingrat)."<sup>451</sup> "Our minds are contracted (notre coeur est enserré) by the bitterness we naturally feel under the cross, but to the same extent expanded with spiritual joy."<sup>452</sup>

Those whom Christ "enlightens by His wisdom He redeems (quand il nous illumine de sa sagesse, il nous rachette)."<sup>453</sup> "Men's minds (les coeurs des hommes) are not withdrawn from desire of well-doing when they are deprived of the idea of merit."<sup>453</sup> "Prayer digs us those treasures which the Gospel of our Lord (discloses) to the eye of faith."<sup>454</sup> "The first rule of right prayer is: the mind (notre entendement) must lay aside carnal thoughts and cares (cogitations charnelle) which might interfere with the direct and pure contemplation of God and be borne and raised above itself."<sup>455</sup> "The

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447. C. R., IV, 186; Inst., II, 8.  
448. C. R., IV, 187; Inst., II, 9.  
449. C. R., IV, 195; Inst., II, 13.  
450. C. R., IV, 196-97; Inst., II, 14-15.  
451. C. R., IV, 197; Inst., II, 15.  
452. C. R., IV, 210; Inst., II, 23.  
453. C. R., IV, 305; Inst., II, 99.  
454. C. R., IV, 363; Inst., II, 146.  
455. C. R., IV, 366; Inst., II, 148.

mind (l'entendement, Lat., mens), distracted by foreign and extraneous cares, is drawn down from heaven."<sup>456</sup> "God gives us the guidance of the Spirit in our prayers to dictate what is right (Dieu nous donne son Esprit pour maister lequel nous enseigne et dicte), and regulate our affections" (Romans 8:26).<sup>457</sup> "God subdues all minds and hearts to voluntary obedience when by the secret inspiration of His Spirit He displays the power of His word, and raises it to the place of honor which it deserves."<sup>458</sup> "The pious know how sinful it is to insist on knowing the causes of the divine will; the will of God is the supreme rule of righteousness (Augustine), so that everything which He wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of His willing it."<sup>459</sup> "There are two species of calling: (1) a universal call, by which God, through the external preaching of the word, invites all men alike, even those for whom He designs to be called a savor unto death, and the ground of a severer condemnation, and (2) a special call which, for the most part, God bestows on believers only, when by the internal illumination of the Spirit He causes the word preached to take deep root in their hearts (que la doctrine soit enracinée en leurs coeurs)."<sup>460</sup> Gregory grievously and perniciously errs, when he says that "we are conscious only of our calling, but are uncertain of our election."<sup>461</sup> "We are beset with violent temptations, which we would be altogether unable to withstand, were they not set free from earthly objects, and devoted to

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456. C. R., IV, 366; Inst., II, 148.  
457. C. R., IV, 369; Inst., II, 150.  
458. C. R., IV, 434; Inst., II, 189.  
459. C. R., IV, 488; Inst., II, 227.  
460. C. R., IV, 516; Inst., II, 247.  
461. C. R., IV, 517; Inst., II, 248.

the heavenly life."<sup>462</sup> "None participate in the benefits of Christ save those who raise their minds to the resurrection (sinon en eslevant nos esprits a la resurrection)."<sup>463</sup> "God ascribes to Himself the illumination of the mind (nos esprit) and renewal of heart (nos cocurs)."<sup>464</sup>

### Intellect

"Dullness of mind is due to sloth and ingratitude."<sup>465</sup> "God has reserved the treasure of intelligence for His children; the rest of mankind is ignorant and stupid."<sup>466</sup> "The ability of the human mind (l'esprit) to transcend space and time proves it survives the dissolution of the body."<sup>467</sup> "On account of depravity, reason is a variance with itself, containing warring factions."<sup>468</sup> "Philosophers always presuppose in man a reason by which he is able to guide himself aright."<sup>469</sup> Intellect includes sense-data.<sup>470</sup> "Reason as 'hegemon' distinguishes between good and evil, just and unjust, what to follow and what to shun."<sup>471</sup> "Philosophers are blind, in looking for order and arrangement in fallen man."<sup>472</sup>

"We were originally endowed with reason and intelligence (raison et intelligence), in order to cultivate a holy life, and to contemplate our immortality."<sup>473</sup> "Only in God may we regain those qualities of which we are now destitute (vuides et despourveuz)."<sup>474</sup> "The human mind (l'esprit humain) is especially credulous when subjected to flattery."<sup>474</sup> "Our

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462. C. R., IV, 532-33; Inst., II, 260.  
463. C. R., IV, 533; Inst., II, 260.  
464. C. R., IV, 574; Inst., II, 287.  
465. C. R., III, 80; Inst., I, 62.  
466. C. R., III, 97; Inst., I, 73.  
467. C. R., III, 217; Inst., I, 161.  
468. C. R., III, 226; Inst., I, 167.  
469. C. R., III, 228; Inst., I, 168.  
470. C. R., III, 228-29; Inst., I, 169.  
471. C. R., III, 229; Inst., I, 169.  
472. Loc. cit.  
473. C. R., III, 282; Inst., I, 210.  
474. C. R., III, 283; Inst., I, 211.

estimate of the abilities of human reason is blinded by innate self-love."<sup>475</sup>  
"Excessive confidence in human nature destroys sound intelligence."<sup>476</sup> "Man  
is prone to overweening confidence in his own intelligence and integrity."<sup>477</sup>  
Origen had differentiated between intellect and will by saying that reason  
discerns between good and evil, whereupon will chooses one of the other.<sup>478</sup>  
Augustine had maintained: "It is a power of reason and will to choose the  
good, grace assisting,--to choose the bad, grace desisting."<sup>478</sup> Peter  
Lombard and the Schoolmen had subsumed will under intellect.<sup>478</sup> Calvin  
looks at intellect as it now exists and sees "reason corrupted by the Fall;  
soundness of mind (l'intégrité de l'entendement) and integrity of heart  
were withdrawn; this constitutes the corruption of natural gifts."<sup>479</sup>  
"Reason, though weak and immersed in darkness, was not totally destroyed by  
the Fall; a shapeless ruin is all that remains."<sup>480</sup> "A new understanding  
(entendement) is required, in order to keep the law" (Psalms 119:34,  
Colossians 1:9, 10).<sup>481</sup> "Regeneration does not enlighten the mind (nos  
esprits) in a single day--it is a process."<sup>482</sup> "The Schoolmen admit that  
the deliberation of reason must precede choice."<sup>483</sup> Calvin observes that  
for the most part "man chooses without reason (sans raison et sans conseil)  
upon the basis of natural instinct."<sup>483</sup> The "flesh" as used in Scripture  
often "includes mind as used over against Spirit; 'flesh' is everything we

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475. C. R., III, 283; Inst., I, 211.  
476. C. R., III, 284; Inst., I, 211.  
477. C. R., III, 284; Inst., I, 212.  
478. C. R., III, 302; Inst., I, 227.  
479. C. R., III, 311-12; Inst., I, 233.  
480. C. R., III, 312; Inst., I, 233.  
481. C. R., III, 327; Inst., I, 244.  
482. C. R., III, 328; Inst., I, 244.  
483. C. R., III, 329; Inst., I, 245.

have from nature" (Ephesians 4:23, Ephesians 4:17, 18, Isaiah 40:2).<sup>484</sup>

"The Apostle Paul argues that defect of intelligence is proved by apostacy from God."<sup>485</sup> "The minds of unbelievers are blinded" (2 Corinthians 4:4, Ephesians 2:2).<sup>486</sup>

"Inclination of heart (Psalms 119:112) means readiness of mind (un courage franc et alaigre)."<sup>487</sup> "To worship God, do justice, obey the law, and follow good works are proper offices of mind (l'entendement) and will."<sup>488</sup> "The mind of man is so entirely alienated from the righteousness of God that he cannot conceive, desire, or design (imaginer, concevoir ne comprendre) anything but what is wicked, distorted, foul, impure, and iniquitous; the heart is possessed by sin, so that it can breathe out only corruption and rottenness."<sup>489</sup> "If there is some show of goodness, the mind (l'entendement) is interwoven with hypocrisy and deceit; the soul (le coeur) bound with fetters of wickedness."<sup>489</sup> The Tenth Commandment "seeks to regulate the thoughts of the mind (les pensees de l'entendement), so that they may not be depraved and bent."<sup>490</sup> "Properly all the powers of the mind (de l'ame) should be occupied with Christian love; otherwise it is diseased."<sup>490</sup> "Insofar as the mind (ton coeur) is devoid of Christian love, it must be under the influence of concupiscence."<sup>490</sup> "God requires a mind (un coeur) strong enough not to be prompted in the slightest degree contrary to the law of love."<sup>490</sup> "The human mind (l'entendement de l'homme),

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484. C. R., III, 332-33; Inst., I, 249.  
485. C. R., III, 334; Inst., I, 251.  
486. C. R., III, 354; Inst., I, 266.  
487. C. R., III, 376; Inst., I, 283.  
488. C. R., III, 380; Inst., I, 286.  
489. C. R., III, 387; Inst., I, 291.  
490. C. R., III, 467; Inst., I, 355.

blinded and darkened, is very far from being able to rise to a knowledge of the divine will; nor can the heart, fluctuating with perpetual doubt, rest secure in such knowledge."<sup>491</sup> "Through the faculties of the mind (en l'ame) we are assailed with sudden motions (toward sin), and we perceive sensual or form conceptions of mental objects (concevoir en l'entendement quelque chose, ou apprehender en son sens)."<sup>492</sup>

"Philosophers give the government of man to reason alone (ils enseignent que la seule raison doit regir et moderer l'homme)."<sup>493</sup> "The Christian will religiously direct (his whole mind) (il pensera) to God."<sup>494</sup> "He who has learned to look to God in everything he does is diverted from all vain thoughts (detourne facilement son esprit de toute vaine cogitation)."<sup>494</sup> "A mind given to license and devoid of fear is contrary to the reverence due to God."<sup>495</sup> "The eye of our mind and the affection of our heart faint and fail, and are carried contrary to God's will."<sup>496</sup> "The primary seat (of prayer) is in the mind and heart (au coeur et en l'esprit); prayer itself is properly an effusion and manifestation of internal feeling before Him who is the searcher of hearts."<sup>497</sup> "The third petition (of the Lord's Prayer) asks that God may create new thoughts and new minds (esprits et courage nouveaux)."<sup>498</sup> "Temptations are depraved conceptions of our minds (mauvaises conceptions de nostre entendement) which provoke us to transgress the law."<sup>499</sup> "The mind (l'esprit de l'homme) cannot be infected

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491. C. R., IV, 19; Inst., I, 475.  
492. C. R., IV, 81; Inst., I, 518.  
493. C. R., IV, 185; Inst., II, 7.  
494. C. R., IV, 186; Inst., II, 8.  
495. C. R., IV, 367; Inst., II, 149.  
496. C. R., IV, 369; Inst., II, 150.  
497. C. R., IV, 416; Inst., II, 179.  
498. C. R., IV, 436; Inst., II, 191.  
499. C. R., IV, 444; Inst., II, 195.

with a more pestilential error than that which disturbs the conscience, and deprives it of peace and tranquility in regard to God."<sup>500</sup>

The Physical Body and Sense Data

"All knowledge gained from the use of images in worship is fallacious and spurious."<sup>501</sup> "We must think beyond sense-data to things invisible, in order to guard against perverse imaginings."<sup>502</sup> "Man consists of body and soul or spirit (le corps et l'ame)."<sup>503</sup> "The sleep of the body is an evidence of immortality."<sup>504</sup> "The soul (l'ame) as distinct from the body is the principal part of man."<sup>505</sup> "The taint of sin resides in the flesh and the spirit (chair et esprit)."<sup>506</sup> Calvin admits the five sense organs of Plato as "true, pleasant, and useful to be known."<sup>507</sup> Calvin rejects the common dogma that man is corrupted in his senses while his reason remains whole and his will is scarcely impaired.<sup>508</sup> "Our minds (nos esprits) are blinded, and our senses are corrupt."<sup>509</sup> However, "the flesh, through excessive indulgence, infects the mind with its impurity (l'entendement de son ordre), so as to lose the discernment of honor and rectitude."<sup>510</sup> "Under sensual devotion to luxury, the mind lies buried (leur esprit y est ensevely)."<sup>511</sup> "Pleasures condemned (by God) withdraw the heart from chastity and purity (and) darken the intellect (son entendement rendu stupide)."<sup>512</sup> "A reward is promised to good works, in order to support the

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500. C. R., IV, 510; Inst., II, 243.  
501. C. R., III, 126; Inst., I, 95.  
502. C. R., III, 194; Inst., I, 143.  
503. C. R., III, 216; Inst., I, 160.  
504. C. R., III, 217; Inst., I, 161.  
505. C. R., III, 218; Inst., I, 161.  
506. C. R., III, 218; Inst., I, 161.  
507. C. R., III, 226; Inst., I, 167.  
508. C. R., III, 301-02; Inst., I, 226.  
509. C. R., III, 388; Inst., I, 293.  
510. C. R., IV, 221; Inst., II, 33.  
511. C. R., IV, 222; Inst., II, 33.  
512. C. R., IV, 224; Inst., II, 34.

weakness of our flesh by some degree of comfort; but not to inflate our minds with vain glory (non pas pour enfler de gloire nostre coeur).<sup>513</sup>

Calvin commends words or singing, provided the feeling of the mind goes along with them (moyennant qu'ils suivent l'affection du coeur).<sup>514</sup>

By words and singing "the thought of God is kept alive on our minds (en ce faisant ils aident l'intention de l'homme), which, from their fickle and versatile nature, soon relax, and are distracted by various objects, unless various means are used to support them."<sup>514</sup> "Singing tempered to

gravity befitting the presence of God and angels, both gives dignity and grace to sacred actions, and has a very powerful tendency to stir up the mind to true zeal and ardor in prayer."<sup>515</sup> In singing "we must carefully

beware lest our ears be more intent on the music than our minds on the spiritual meaning of the words (que les esprits au sense spirituel des parolles).<sup>516</sup> "The kingdom of God consists of two parts: (1) when God

by the agency of His Spirit corrects all the depraved lusts of the flesh, and (2) when He brings all our thoughts into obedience (il plie et form tous nos sens) to His authority (see comments on Matthew 6).<sup>517</sup> "If our

sense is not able (nostre sens ne peut comprendre) till after long expectation to perceive what the result of prayer is, or experience any benefit from it, still our faith will assure us of that which cannot be perceived by sense--namely, that we have obtained what was fit for us."<sup>518</sup> "It would

be inconsistent (il n'y auroit nul propos) with reason, that the body, in which Paul bore the marks of the Savior, and in which he magnificently

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513. C. R., IV, 335; Inst., II, 123.  
514. C. R., IV, 419; Inst., II, 181.  
515. C. R., IV, 420; Inst., II, 181-82.  
516. C. R., IV, 420; Inst., II, 182.  
517. C. R., IV, 433; Inst., II, 189.  
518. C. R., IV, 452; Inst., II, 200.

extolled Him should lose the reward of the crown" (Galatians 6:17, Philip-  
pians 3:20, 21).<sup>519</sup> "Our ignorance and sloth (nostre rudesse et paresse)  
(I may add, the vanity of our mind) (j'adiouste aussi la vanité de nos  
esprits) stand in need of external helps."<sup>520</sup>

Social Dimensions

"The prevailing state of mind of the impious is brutal oblivion."<sup>521</sup>  
"Presumption and wantonness have been added to the darkness of ignorance."<sup>522</sup>  
"The Stoic proposition that the names of God can be deduced from nature is  
an appeal to human vanity."<sup>523</sup> "Human opinion of the heavenly mysteries is  
the parent of error."<sup>524</sup> "That our natural powers to rise to a pure and  
clear knowledge of God are dull is no excuse."<sup>525</sup> "Profane men want the  
authority of Scripture proved by reason."<sup>526</sup> "The philosophers who have  
corrupted the truth of God are in rebellion."<sup>527</sup> "The Sophists are guilty  
of "presumption, garrulity, and temerity."<sup>528</sup> "The knowledge of God is not  
complete apart from the knowledge of man."<sup>529</sup> Yet man's nature must be con-  
sidered in its original integrity. There is a great danger in attending  
only to the natural ills of man (qu'en demonstrent trop cruellement les vices  
naturels de l'homme).<sup>530</sup>

"The tumultuous aspect of human affairs makes us unfit for judging  
(nous ostent le jugement)."<sup>531</sup> "Sometimes the Lord deprives His enemies of

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519. C. R., IV, 550; Inst., II, 270.  
520. C. R., IV, 561; Inst., II, 280.  
521. C. R., III, 54; Inst., I, 47.  
522. C. R., III, 75; Inst., I, 59.  
523. C. R., III, 76; Inst., I, 60.  
524. C. R., III, 78; Inst., I, 61.  
525. C. R., III, 80; Inst., I, 62.  
526.= C. R., III, 95; Inst., I, 72.  
527. C. R., III, 117; Inst., I, 89.  
528. C. R., III, 176; Inst., I, 128.  
529. C. R., III, 215; Inst., I, 159.  
530. C. R., III, 215; Inst., I, 159.  
531. C. R., III, 215; Inst., I, 160.

all presence of mind (il leur oste l'entendement à ce qu'ils ne puissent prendre bon conseil).<sup>532</sup> "Sometimes God leaves His enemies in possession of intellect (donnant entendement pour voir et entendre ce qu'est expedient), but fills them with terror and dismay."<sup>533</sup> "That man should be blinded by the will and command of God and yet be punished for blindness is an apparent absurdity."<sup>534</sup> "God blinds the minds of men, smites them with giddiness, intoxicates them with stupor, and hardens their hearts" (Romans 1:26; 11:8).<sup>535</sup> "Wicked and obstinate men may have God's orders engraved in their minds" (Psalms 105:5, Isaiah 10:10).<sup>536</sup> "The spirit of error which blinds unbelievers is sent from God himself."<sup>537</sup> "God, acting on the mind, heart, and will of the reprobate blinds, inclines, and hardens."<sup>537</sup> "God works in His elect in two ways: Inwardly by His Spirit; outwardly, by His Word. By His Spirit He illumines their minds (les entendements) and trains their hearts to the practice of righteousness, making them new creatures; by His Word He stimulates them to long and seek for this renovation."<sup>538</sup> "The minds (le coeur) of the reprobate are not inwardly moved and affected to curb them."<sup>539</sup> "Not the mind (le coeur), but terror and shame, restrain the reprobate."<sup>540</sup>

The Law of God removes the obscurity of the law of nature and makes a lively and permanent impression upon our minds (touchant plus vivement notre esprit et memoire).<sup>541</sup> "The Law compels us to survey our power

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532. C. R., III, 258; Inst., I, 189.  
533. C. R., III, 258-59; Inst., I, 189.  
534. C. R., III, 270; Inst., I, 198-99  
535. C. R., III, 272; Inst., I, 200.  
536. C. R., I I, 273; Inst., I, 201.  
537. C. R., III, 356; Inst., I, 267.  
538. C. R., III, 368; Inst., I, 277.  
539. C. R., III, 406-07; Inst., I, 307.  
540. C. R., III, 407; Inst., I, 307.  
541. C. R., III, 417; Inst., I, 317.

(nos forces) and confess our total inability to fulfil its demands."<sup>542</sup>

"Keeping the Sabbath requires us to desist from all the acts of our own mind (d'une estude continuelle durant ceste vie)."<sup>543</sup> "As by the revolt of the first man, the image of God could be effaced from his mind and soul (de l'entendement et ame), so there is nothing strange in His shedding some rays of grace on the reprobate and afterwards allowing these to be extinguished."<sup>544</sup> "Sluggishness (nonchallance) may extinguish the light of faith" (John 8:31, 32).<sup>545</sup> "The Papists, having lost all shame (concerning confession), have been given over to a reprobate mind."<sup>546</sup> "Rash credulity destroys judgment (d'une credulite volage sont souvent aveuglez)."<sup>547</sup> "The reprobate are hateful to God, and that with perfect justice, since those destitute of His Spirit cannot produce anything that does not deserve cursing."<sup>548</sup>

#### Soul and Spirit

"The motions, faculties, and endowments of the soul illustrate the glory of God."<sup>549</sup> "Conscience is a sign of the immortality of the spirit."<sup>550</sup>  
"The knowledge of God proves the immortality of the soul."<sup>550</sup> "The noble faculties of the human mind (l'ame) are evidence of an immortal essence."<sup>550</sup>  
"The soul (l'ame) is the proper seat of the image of God."<sup>551</sup> Calvin rejects "Augustine's speculation that the soul (l'ame), as intellect (intel-

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542. C. R., III, 418; Inst., I, 318.  
543. C. R., III, 448; Inst., I, 340.  
544. C. R., IV, 25; Inst., I, 479.  
545. C. R., IV, 27; Inst., I, 480.  
546. C. R., IV, 116; Inst., I, 542.  
547. C. R., IV, 175; Inst., I, 581.  
548. C. R., IV, 530-31; Inst., II, 257.  
549. C. R., III, 64; Inst., I, 53.  
550. C. R., III, 217; Inst., I, 161.  
551. C. R., III, 219; Inst., I, 162.

ligence), will, and memory, mirrors the Trinity."<sup>552</sup> "Man's soul (son ame), agitated and distracted, is therefore not of the essence of God."<sup>553</sup> "Souls are created out of nothing."<sup>554</sup> "Of the philosophers, only Plato maintained distinctly the immortality of the soul."<sup>555</sup> "The soul inhabits the body, animates all its parts, and holds first place in regulating conduct."<sup>556</sup> "We must reject the notion of two souls; sentient and rational."<sup>557</sup> "For the edification of the pious, a simple definition of the faculties of the soul is better than the subtle discussion of the philosophers."<sup>557</sup> "Men do nothing except at the secret inspiration of God."<sup>558</sup> "The secret inspiration of God directs to its end whatever we conceive in our minds (tout ce que nous concevons)."<sup>559</sup> "The spirit corrects not only the sensual part of the soul, but all its parts (Ephesians 4:23)."<sup>560</sup> "The faculties of the soul are seated in the mind (l'entendement) and the heart."<sup>561</sup> "In Scripture 'flesh' is usually the whole soul, not merely the sensual part of it, over against God" (John 3:6, 7).<sup>562</sup>

#### Will

"The wilful rejection of God leads to confused knowledge of Him."<sup>563</sup> "Pride and stubbornness lead to spiritual blindness."<sup>564</sup> "Vanity and pride are apparent in vain speculation and rash imagination about God."<sup>565</sup> "Stub-

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552. C. R., III, 223; Inst., I, 165.  
553. C. R., III, 224; Inst., I, 165.  
554. C. R., III, 224; Inst., I, 166.  
555. C. R., III, 225; Inst., I, 166.  
556. C. R., III, 225; Inst., I, 166-67.  
557. C. R., III, 226; Inst., I, 167.  
558. C. R., III, 270; Inst., I, 199.  
559. C. R., III, 272; Inst., I, 200.  
560. C. R., III, 294; Inst., I, 218.  
561. C. R., III, 298; Inst., I, 224.  
562. C. R., III, 332; Inst., I, 249.  
563. C. R., III, 56-57; Inst., I, 48.  
564. C. R., III, 52-53; Inst., I, 46.  
565. C. R., III, 53; Inst., I, 46.

bornness stifles the light of nature in knowing God."<sup>566</sup> "Daring sinners madly banish all remembrance of God."<sup>566</sup> "The deliberate stupifaction of the mind by the impious does not banish the judgment of God."<sup>567</sup>

"Choice belongs to the will."<sup>568</sup> "Man, in his original upright state, was able to obtain eternal life by free will."<sup>568</sup> "Man fell only by his will."<sup>568</sup> "Philosophers start with the proposition that man is not a rational animal unless he is free."<sup>568</sup> "Philosophers declare that there are no such things as virtue and vice, unless man is free."<sup>569</sup> Bernard defined free will as "consent, in regard to the indestructible liberty of the will, and the inalienable judgment of reason."<sup>570</sup> Aquinas put free will between reason and appetite, nearer to appetite.<sup>571</sup> "The power of choice belongs to will rather than to intellect (l'entendement)," Calvin notes.<sup>572</sup> Man is infected by a "forward bias of mind since his corruption by the Fall, so that man sins voluntarily."<sup>573</sup> "The doctrine of the cooperation of the human will (with the grace of God) of the sophists is excluded by the doctrine of perseverance."<sup>574</sup> "Design (conseil) is a deliberate consent of the will, after passion has taken possession of the mind (de l'homme)."<sup>575</sup> "Covetousness (concupiscence) may exist without such deliberation and assent (sans telle deliberation ou consentment), when the mind (le coeur) is only stimulated and tickled by vain and perverse objects."<sup>575</sup>

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566. C. R., III, 53; Inst., I, 47.  
567. C. R., III, 54; Inst., I, 47.  
568. C. R., III, 229; Inst., I, 169.  
569. C. R., III, 229-30; Inst., I, 169.  
570. C. R., III, 302-03; Inst., I, 227.  
571. C. R., III, 303; Inst., I, 227.  
572. C. R., III, 328; Inst., I, 245.  
573. C. R., III, 339; Inst., I, 254.  
574. C. R., III, 348; Inst., I, 261.  
575. C. R., III, 467; Inst., I, 355.

Wholeness

"Our mind cannot conceive of God, without rendering some worship to Him."<sup>576</sup> "True knowledge of God naturally implanted is degenerate as we observe it."<sup>577</sup> "Let each human nature point to God, who governs all natures."<sup>578</sup> "All correct knowledge of God originates in obedience."<sup>579</sup> "The image of God in man refers to the soul and extends to everything in the nature of man which surpasses the animals."<sup>580</sup> "The image of God denotes the integrity of Adam before the Fall, when his intellect was clear, his affections subordinate to reason (ses affections bien reiglees), and all his senses duly regulated (bien attrempez)."<sup>581</sup> "The primary seat of the image is in the mind (l'esprit) and heart, or in the soul (l'ame) and its powers (ses facultez)."<sup>581</sup> "The image of God was not utterly destroyed and effaced in the Fall, but corrupted and deformed."<sup>582</sup> "The renewal of the image of God through the Spirit includes (1) knowledge and (2) true righteousness and holiness."<sup>582</sup> "The original image of God was manifested as light of intellect (clarte d'esprit), rectitude of heart, and soundness of every part."<sup>582</sup> "The image included everything which has any relationship to spiritual (spirituelle) and eternal life."<sup>583</sup> "The image of God (John 1:40) is existence combined with the light of intelligence (intelligence et raison)."<sup>583</sup> "In the Fall the image was vitiated and almost destroyed; nothing remains but a confused, mutilated, tainted ruin; but the

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576. C. R., III, 44; Inst., I, 40.  
577. C. R., III, 52; Inst., I, 46.  
578. C. R., III, 66; Inst., I, 55.  
579. C. R., III, 86; Inst., I, 66.  
580. C. R., III, 220-21; Inst., I, 164.  
581. C. R., III, 221; Inst., I, 164.  
582. C. R., III, 222; Inst., I, 164.  
583. C. R., III, 223; Inst., I, 165.

original image partly remains in the elect."<sup>584</sup> "Before the Fall reason, intelligence, prudence, and judgment (engin, prudence, jugement, et discretion) enabled man to rise to God and to eternal blessedness."<sup>585</sup> "Choice (election) was later added, will being submissive to the authority of reason (a la reigle et attrempance de raison)."<sup>585</sup> There was "only the highest rectitude in mind and will before the Fall."<sup>585</sup> "Originally, mind was sound (l'entendement estoit sain et entier) and will was free."<sup>586</sup> "The weakness of original man's will is hidden in the counsel of God; yet this weakness is no excuse for man."<sup>586</sup>

"True self-knowledge consists of (1) the excellence of our original nature and (2) our misery since Adam's fall."<sup>587</sup> "The aim of the original image of God was to raise our minds (pour dresser nos esprits) to the pursuit of virtue" (Genesis 1:27).<sup>587</sup> "Self-knowledge should show us our lack of faculties and inability to perform our God-given duty."<sup>588</sup> "Original sin is a hereditary corruption and depravity of our nature, extending to all parts of the soul."<sup>589</sup> "Everything which is in man, from the intellect (l'entendement) to the will, from the soul even to the flesh, is defiled and perverted with this concupiscence."<sup>590</sup> "All parts of the soul were possessed by sin, ever since Adam revolted from the fountain of righteousness. For not only did the inferior appetites entice him, but abominable impiety seized upon the very citadel of the mind (la plus excellent de don

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584. C. R., III, 223; Inst., I, 165.  
585. C. R., III, 229; Inst., I, 169.  
586. C. R., III, 230; Inst., I, 170.  
587. C. R., III, 281-82; Inst., I, 210.  
588. C. R., III, 285; Inst., I, 212.  
589. C. R., III, 291-92; Inst., I, 217.  
590. C. R., III, 293; Inst., I, 218.

esprit), and pride penetrated to his inmost heart" (Romans 7:12).<sup>591</sup> "Sin has seized on both mind (l'esprit) and the heart."<sup>592</sup> "The whole man is deluged by sin" (Romans 8:7).<sup>593</sup> "The intellect and the will of the whole man is corrupt" (John 3:6, Romans 8:8).<sup>594</sup> "Man is blind, intoxicated with self-love, puffed up with infatuated confidence (enflé d'une folle outre-cuidance) in his own powers."<sup>595</sup> "Man, swollen with arrogance and ambition, is blinded with self-love, unable to humble and abase himself and confess his misery."<sup>596</sup> "The body plus the soul (l'ame et le corps) equal the whole man."<sup>597</sup> "We are naturally averse to God; unless self-denial precedes, we shall never tend to that which is right; hence we are enjoined to be renewed in the spirit of our mind (de l'esprit de nostre entendement)."<sup>598</sup> "In consequence of the corruption of nature, all our faculties are so vitiated and corrupted, that a perpetual disorder and excess is apparent in all our actions."<sup>599</sup> "Doctrine is not an affair of the tongue, but of the life; it is not apprehended by the intellect and memory merely (d'entendement et memoire), like other branches of learning; but is received only when it possesses the whole soul, and finds its seal and habitation in the inmost recesses of the heart."<sup>600</sup> "Flimsy sophists (ces babillars) are contented to let the Gospel play upon their lips, when, from its efficacy, it ought to penetrate the inmost affections of the heart, fix its seat in the soul,

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591. C. R., III, 293; Inst., I, 218.  
592. C. R., III, 294; Inst., I, 218.  
593. C. R., III, 294; Inst., I, 219.  
594. C. R., III, 331-32; Inst., I, 249.  
595. C. R., III, 402; Inst., I, 304.  
596. C. R., III, 417; Inst., I, 317.  
597. C. R., III, 545; Inst., I, 415-16.  
598. C. R., IV, 76; Inst., I, 515.  
599. C. R., IV, 81; Inst., I, 518.  
600. C. R., IV, 182; Inst., II, 4.

and pervade the whole man one hundred thousand times more than the frigid discourses of philosophers (cent mille fois que toutes les exhortations philosophiques)."<sup>601</sup> "God uniformly recommends integrity as the principal part of worship, meaning by integrity real singleness of mind."<sup>602</sup> "In all prayer, public and private, using the tongue without the mind (sans le coeur) is displeasing to God."<sup>603</sup>

#### The Limits of Human Reason

Calvin observed a confusion among the philosophers about the existence and perfections of God.<sup>604</sup> He asserted that unaided reason could never reach some of the teaching of Scripture,<sup>605</sup> and that reason cannot prove that Scripture is the Word of God.<sup>606</sup> Before the Fall, reason was adequate to obtain eternal life.<sup>607</sup> Reason was corrupted by the Fall and the supernatural gifts within reason have been withdrawn.<sup>608</sup> Natural reason, although it aspires to truth, always stops short of its goal.<sup>609</sup> Natural reason cannot attain pure knowledge of God and of true righteousness.<sup>610</sup> Unredeemed reason cannot receive the Spirit of holiness.<sup>611</sup> With respect to the knowledge of God and of our salvation men are blinder than moles.<sup>612</sup> Previous to regeneration, man is unable to comprehend those things which belong to our salvation.<sup>613</sup> Human reason is ignorant of the true knowledge

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601. C. R., IV, 182; Inst., II, 4-5.  
602. C. R., IV, 183; Inst., II, 5.  
603. C. R., IV, 421; Inst., II, 183.  
604. C. R., III, 75-76; Inst., I, 59-60.  
605. C. R., III, 100; Inst., I, 76.  
606. C. R., III, 110; Inst., I, 83.  
607. C. R., III, 229; Inst., I, 169.  
608. C. R., III, 311-12; Inst., I, 233.  
609. C. R., III, 312-13; Inst., I, 234.  
610. C. R., III, 313-14; Inst., I, 234.  
611. C. R., III, 317; Inst., I, 236.  
612. C. R., III, 318-19; Inst., I, 238.  
613. C. R., III, 321; Inst., I, 239.

of the divine law.<sup>614</sup> Human reason is blind to heavenly things until it is illumined by the grace of God.<sup>615</sup> The blindness of human reason is manifested not so much in generals as in particulars, which blindness is tested by both tables of the divine Law.<sup>616</sup>

Reason Cannot Express Mystical Experience

"The human mind (l'entendement, understanding, sense, judgment), on account of its weakness, cannot come to God without the help of His sacred word."<sup>617</sup> "Reason is not able to establish the divine authority of Scripture; we need the testimony of the Holy Spirit."<sup>618</sup> "Defending the Scripture does not implant the certainty which faith requires."<sup>619</sup> "Reason cannot prove to an infidel that Scripture is the Word of God."<sup>621</sup> "Scripture accommodates itself to the rude and gross intellect of man."<sup>621</sup> "In reading the Scriptures our thought is not to indulge in curiosity about useless things."<sup>622</sup> "Modesty and sobriety require that in obscure matters thought should not go beyond the Word of God."<sup>622</sup> "The word, like the sun, is of no use to the blind."<sup>623</sup>

Reason Cannot Know God's Essence

"The question of the essence of God is a frigid speculation."<sup>624</sup>  
"Faulty ideas of God lead to corrupt worship."<sup>625</sup> Calvin speaks of the

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614. C. R., III, 325; Inst., I, 243.  
615. C. R., III, 321; Inst., I, 240.  
616. C. R., III, 324; Inst., I, 242.  
617. C. R., III, 88; Inst., I, 67.  
618. C. R., III, 94; Inst., I, 71.  
619. C. R., III, 95; Inst., I, 72.  
620. C. R., III, 110; Inst., I, 83.  
621. C. R., III, 117-18; Inst., I, 90.  
622. C. R., III, 195; Inst., I, 144.  
623. C. R., IV, 55; Inst., I, 500.  
624. C. R., III, 45; Inst., I, 41.  
625. C. R., III, 53; Inst., I, 46.

"folly of vain curiosity, licentious desire, and overweening confidence in pursuing forbidden knowledge as inexcusable."<sup>626</sup> "Eulogies on nature tend to suppress the name of God."<sup>627</sup> "The notion of a universal mind tends to banish the true God."<sup>628</sup> "Philosophers, who tried by reason to pierce the incomprehensible nature of God, shamefully disagree."<sup>629</sup> "The Egyptians labored to make the mystic philosophy of Isis and Osiris appear rational; it is not."<sup>629</sup> "The human mind is dull and blind in heavenly mysteries."<sup>630</sup> "The testimony of the creature to the glory of God is not sufficient for salvation."<sup>631</sup> "Our minds (nos esprits) are heavy, sluggish, and inactive-- God speaks therefore of His spirituality."<sup>632</sup> "As our own thoughts of God are foolish, so our language respecting Him is absurd."<sup>633</sup> "The human mind cannot know the essence of God."<sup>634</sup> "Philosophy tends to reduce God to the Prime Mover."<sup>635</sup> "Natural reason cannot attain pure knowledge of God and true righteousness."<sup>636</sup> "Men are blinder than moles on the knowledge of God and especially our salvation."<sup>637</sup> Calvin agrees with Augustine that "human reason (nostre raison) is unable to understand the things of God."<sup>638</sup> "Human reason cannot infer from a survey of the world that God is Father."<sup>639</sup>

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626. C. R., III, 53; Inst., I, 47.  
627. C. R., III, 64; Inst., I, 53.  
628. C. R., III, 66; Inst., I, 55.  
629. C. R., III, 76; Inst., I, 60.  
630. C. R., III, 77; Inst., I, 60.  
631. C. R., III, 81; Inst., I, 62.  
632. C. R., III, 145; Inst., I, 109.  
633. C. R., III, 148; Inst., I, 111.  
634. C. R., III, 175; Inst., I, 128.  
635. C. R., III, 236; Inst., I, 174.  
636. C. R., III, 313-14; Inst., I, 234.  
637. C. R., III, 318-19; Inst., I, 238.  
638. C. R., III, 328; Inst., I, 244.  
639. C. R., III, 388; Inst., I, 292.

"No philosophical knowledge of God is possible; we cannot form any just conception of the character of God, without feeling overawed by His majesty, and bound to do Him service."<sup>640</sup> "Reason (l'homme), by means of natural law, cannot determine a form of worship acceptable to God."<sup>641</sup>

"Reason cannot infer confidence toward God from the moral purity of our lives."<sup>642</sup> "Our gross minds (nostre ignorance et imbecillité d'esprit) are unable to conceive of God's ineffable glory."<sup>643</sup> "The human mind (les esprits humains) does not readily allow itself to be curbed."<sup>644</sup> "Why, by infatuated inquisitiveness, plunge yourselves into an abyss which reason (raison) itself tells you will prove your destruction?"<sup>645</sup> "Job and the Prophets declare the incomprehensible wisdom (la sagesse incomprehensible) and dreadful power of God."<sup>645</sup> "The stupidity of the human mind (l'outrage de l'entendement humain) should be punished with fearful destruction, whenever it attempts to rise in its own strength to the height of divine wisdom."<sup>646</sup> "Plato acknowledged that the chief good of man consisted in union with God; he could not, however, form even an imperfect idea of its true nature."<sup>647</sup>

Reason Cannot Fathom the Mysteries of the Christian Faith

"Time order in the Trinity is an accommodation to the limits of the human mind (l'entendement)."<sup>648</sup> "The human mind enters a labyrinth when-

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640. C. R., III, 416; Inst., I, 317.  
641. C. R., III, 417; Inst., I, 317.  
642. C. R., IV, 58; Inst., I, 502.  
643. C. R., IV, 429; Inst., II, 187.  
644. C. R., IV, 458; Inst., II, 205.  
645. C. R., IV, 492; Inst., II, 230.  
646. C. R., IV, 510; Inst., II, 243.  
647. C. R., IV, 533; Inst., II, 260.  
648. C. R., III, 171; Inst., I, 126.

ever it indulges in curiosity about the Trinity."<sup>649</sup> "Scripture is the boundary within which reason may operate with respect to God."<sup>650</sup> "The mind is not to inquire into the mystery of the ranks and numbers of angels."<sup>652</sup> "The attributes of God are described according to the capacity of our limited intelligence (à notre capacité pour être entendue de nous)."<sup>653</sup> "The carnal mind is the source of objection (le sens charnelle ne comprends) against the providence of God."<sup>654</sup> "Scripture proves the blindness of reason in spiritual matters. See John 1:4, 5, John 1:13, Matthew 16:17; Psalms 36:9, 1 Corinthians 12:3, John 3:27, Deuteronomy 29:2, 4, Jeremiah 24:7, John 6:44."<sup>655</sup> "No one can enter the kingdom of God unless his mind has been enlightened by the Holy Spirit."<sup>656</sup> "The Spirit, with a wondrous and special energy, forms the ear to hear and the mind to understand."<sup>656</sup> "Christ's preaching accomplishes nothing unless the inner teacher, the Spirit, opens the way into our minds."<sup>656</sup> "Scripture proves the need of the light of the Holy Spirit. See 1 Corinthians 2:14, 1 Corinthians 2:9, 1 Corinthians 1:20, Ephesians 1:17, Ephesians 1:18, Psalms 119:18, James 1:17, John 14:26."<sup>657</sup> "Natural reason (l'entendement humain) apart from revelation can never discern the First Table of the Law."<sup>658</sup> "No man aspires to eternal blessedness without the impulse of the

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649. C. R., III, 176; Inst., I, 129.  
650. C. R., III, 192; Inst., I, 142.  
651. C. R., III, 200; Inst., I, 147.  
652. C. R., III, 201; Inst., I, 148.  
653. C. R., III, 268; Inst., I, 195.  
654. C. R., III, 270; Inst., I, 198.  
655. C. R., III, 319-21; Inst., I, 238.  
656. C. R., III, 321; Inst., I, 240.  
657. C. R., III, 321-22; Inst., I, 240-41.  
658. C. R., III, 325-26; Inst., I, 243.

Spirit."<sup>659</sup>

"Human reason cannot reach the knowledge (cognoissance) of faith, which goes beyond sense-data (sens)."<sup>660</sup> "A boundless subject cannot be comprehended by our feeble and narrow capacities (nous ne pouvons comprendre en nostre petitesse)" (1 Corinthians 13:9, 12).<sup>661</sup> "Man is dull in discerning (leur rudesse et imbecillite` a` comprendre) divine mysteries" (1 Corinthians 2:11).<sup>662</sup> "Human discernment (la prudence humaine) is so defective and lost that the first step in the school of Christ is to renounce it" (Matthew 11:25, Luke 10:21).<sup>662</sup> "Human reason is like a veil which hides the divine mysteries, which are revealed only to babes" (Matthew 16:17, 1 Corinthians 2:14).<sup>663</sup> "Knowledge certified by the Spirit does not imply that we are able to subject the incomprehensible counsel of God to our feeble intellect (a` la petitesse de nostre entendement)."<sup>664</sup> "The mind cannot rise to a perception and foretaste of the divine goodness, without at the same time being wholly inflamed with love of God."<sup>665</sup> "The 'renewing of the mind' (Romans 12:2, Ephesians 4:23) was unknown (a este ignoree) to all the philosophers."<sup>666</sup> "Philosophic patience does not rise to knowledge of diving providence; it rises no higher than to Stoic necessity."<sup>667</sup> "Our mind (notre coeur) never rises seriously to desire and aspire after the future, until it has learned to despise the present life."<sup>668</sup>

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659. C. R., III, 329; Inst., I, 245.  
660. C. R., IV, 29; Inst., I, 482.  
661. C. R., IV, 35-36; Inst., I, 487.  
662. C. R., IV, 54; Inst., I, 499.  
663. C. R., IV, 54-55; Inst., I, 499  
664. C. R., IV, 59; Inst., I, 503.  
665. C. R., IV, 63; Inst., I, 505.  
666. C. R., IV, 185; Inst., II, 7.  
667. C. R., IV, 209; Inst., II, 23.  
668. C. R., IV, 212; Inst., II, 26.

"Our complete dependence upon Christ is a 'secret and hidden philosophy' which cannot be learned by syllogisms (ne peut entendre par syllogismes), a philosophy thoroughly understood by those whose eyes God has so opened as to see in His light."<sup>669</sup> "Reason cannot explain the facts of election and reprobation."<sup>670</sup> "The human mind (l'entendement humain), when it hears (the doctrine of eternal election), cannot restrain its petulance (son intemperance), but (boils and rages) as if aroused by the sound of a trumpet."<sup>671</sup> "The Apostle (Romans 9:20,21) intimated that the procedure of divine justice is too high to be scanned by human measure (a la mesure humain), or comprehended by the feebleness of human intellect (comprins en la petitesse de l'entendement des hommes)."<sup>672</sup> "It is a monstrous infatuation in man to seek to subject that which has no bounds to the little measure of their reason (en une si petite mesure comme est leur entendement)."<sup>673</sup> "Look at the narrowness of your own mind (a vostre petitesse), and say whether it can comprehend the decrees of God."<sup>674</sup> "While many philosophers maintained the immortality of the soul, few of them assented to the resurrection of the body--a subject too difficult for human apprehension (les sens humains) to reach it."<sup>675</sup> "The glorification of our body is an inestimable miracle, which by its magnitude absorbs our senses (tous noz sens)" (Philippians 3:21).<sup>676</sup> "The mode of the resurrection is called a mystery, to curb a licentious indulgence (bride la license de speculer

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669. C. R., IV, 362; Inst., II, 146.  
670. C. R., IV, 485; Inst., II, 224.  
671. C. R., IV, 485; Inst., II, 225.  
672. C. R., IV, 490; Inst., II, 229.  
673. C. R., IV, 491; Inst., II, 229.  
674. C. R., IV, 492; Inst., II, 230.  
675. C. R., IV, 535; Inst., II, 261.

trop hardiment) in free and subtle speculation (et trop subtilement)."<sup>677</sup>

"Language cannot describe the severity of the divine vengeance on the reprobate; their pains and torments are figured by darkness, wailing and gnashing of teeth, unquenchable fire, and an ever-gnawing worm" (Matthew 8:12, 22:13, Mark 9:43, Isaiah 66:24, 30:33, 2 Thessalonians 1:9).<sup>678</sup> "To God alone must be left the knowledge of His Church, of which His secret election forms the foundation."<sup>679</sup> "To embrace the unity of the Church, it is not necessary to see it with our eyes, or feel it with our hands."<sup>680</sup> "Our weakness does not permit us to leave the school (of the Church) until we have spent our whole lives as scholars."<sup>680</sup>

Reason Cannot Discern the Meaning of the Universe

"The bright lamps of creation are insufficient to lead us into the right path."<sup>681</sup> "Human reason cannot comprehend the knowledge of God manifested by the creation of the world."<sup>682</sup> "A detailed revelation on Creation was necessary on account of the sluggishness and groveling nature of our intellect (l'esprit tardif et hebeté)."<sup>683</sup> "The human mind (l'esprit) is not to indulge in vicious and harmful speculation on the timing of the Creations. As Augustine has well said: 'God made hell for the inquisitive.'<sup>684</sup> "Human reason (raison), until it is subdued to the obedience of faith, objects to the progressive steps in the creation narrative."<sup>685</sup> "Thought must

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677. C. R., IV, 551; Inst., II, 271.  
678. C. R., IV, 558; Inst., II, 275.  
679. C. R., IV, 564; Inst., II, 282.  
680. C. R., IV, 567; Inst., II, 283.  
681. C. R., III, 79; Inst., I, 62.  
682. C. R., III, 79-80; Inst., I, 62.  
683. C. R., III, 190-91; Inst., I, 141.  
684. C. R., III, 191; Inst., I, 141.  
685. C. R., III, 193; Inst., I, 142.

be kept within the bounds of propriety, lest speculation lead away from faith."<sup>686</sup> "Even the unwilling carnal mind (le sens humain) notices the power of God in the creation; but stops there."<sup>687</sup> "Even the philosophers teach that all the parts of the world are invigorated by the secret inspiration of God."<sup>687</sup>

Reason Cannot Bring Happiness

"Pertaining to the Law of God, an unredeemed human mind (un entendement) can neither acquire wisdom nor listen to advice."<sup>688</sup> "The human mind needs divine direction every moment" (Psalms 119:10).<sup>689</sup> "Man, after determining by right reason what is good, does not choose what he knows or pursue what he chooses."<sup>690</sup> "The teachings of the Law transcend our capacity (la faculté des hommes): therefore we cannot benefit from the promises for keeping it."<sup>691</sup> "Excessive confidence in reason leads man to substitute a hypocritical for a real righteousness."<sup>692</sup> "Our mind (notre esprit) cannot lay hold on life through the mercy of God apart from fear of His wrath and our eternal death."<sup>693</sup> "Obscure passages of Scripture convict us of ignorance, keep us modest, show the measure of our faith, and dispose us to learn."<sup>694</sup> "The vanity of the human intellect (la vanité de l'entendement humain) is that it is completely in the dark as to matters which it is of the highest importance to know" (Ecclesiastes 3:19).<sup>695</sup> "Moral

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686. C. R., III, 194; Inst., I, 143.  
687. C. R., III, 233; Inst., I, 172.  
688. C. R., III, 326; Inst., I, 243.  
689. C. R., III, 328; Inst., I, 244.  
690. C. R., III, 329; Inst., I, 245.  
691. C. R., III, 400; Inst., I, 302.  
692. C. R., III, 403; Inst., I, 305.  
693. C. R., III, 574; Inst., I, 435.  
694. C. R., IV, 12-13; Inst., I, 471-72.  
695. C. R., IV, 59; Inst., I, 502.

philosophy can only tell us to live agreeably to nature."<sup>696</sup> "Philosophers in their commendation of virtue never rise higher than the natural dignity of man."<sup>697</sup> "The philosophers are arrogant in their manner of commending virtue."<sup>698</sup>

Probability and Tentativeness

"Even the philosophers are too stupid to see the bright manifestations of God in His works; each one appropriates to himself some special error."<sup>699</sup> "Even Plato, the most religious of the philosophers, is addicted to error."<sup>700</sup> "The madness of the common herd of philosophers is profaning the truth of God exceeds all bounds."<sup>700</sup> "Every individual mind being a kind of labyrinth, no wonder almost every man has his own god."<sup>700</sup> "Immense crowds of gods have issued from the human mind."<sup>700</sup> "Superstitious corruptions furnish abundant evidence of the blindness of the human mind."<sup>701</sup> "The Platonic philosophy of angels as a bridge to God is presumptuous and superstitious (nous faut reietter ceste philosophie de Plato)."<sup>702</sup> "Devils are minds or spirits endued with sense and intellect (esprits ayans intelligence)."<sup>703</sup> "Philosophical speculation on the difference between the image and the likeness of God is absurd."<sup>704</sup> "Carnal sense (la raison charnelle) tends to attribute all events to fortune and fortuitous causes."<sup>705</sup>

"The feebleness of our intellect causes the will of God to appear manifold and divided."<sup>706</sup> "On account of the dulness of our sense (la tardivete)

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696. C. R., IV, 180; Inst., II, 3.  
697. C. R., IV, 181; Inst., II, 4.  
698. C. R., IV, 186; Inst., II, 8.  
699. C. R., III, 74-75; Inst., I, 59.  
700. C. R., III, 75; Inst., I, 59.  
701. C. R., III, 76; Inst., I, 60.  
702. C. R., III, 204; Inst., I, 150.  
703. C. R., III, 210; Inst., I, 155.  
704. C. R., III, 220; Inst., I, 163.  
705. C. R., III, 234; Inst., I, 173.

de nostre sens), the wisdom of God seems multiform."<sup>707</sup> "The human mind (l'inclination naturelle qui est en nous) is so prone to go astray that it will more quickly draw error from one little work than truth from a long discourse."<sup>708</sup> "Philosophy, though it contains some truth about God, is mixed with monstrous falsehoods. It contains no knowledge of salvation. Human reason cannot approach this subject."<sup>709</sup> "Deception begins at the examination of particulars."<sup>710</sup> "Reason (intelligence de justice) when tested by the Divine Law is found to be blind in many respects."<sup>711</sup> "Reason (notre raison et intelligence) is exposed to delusion, liable to error, entangled by snares, and ever wandering from the right direction."<sup>712</sup> "Philosophy cannot perceive depraved desires."<sup>713</sup>

#### Reason Limited by the Quality of the Emotions

"Paul not only condemns the inordinate nature of the appetites, but, in particular, declares that the understanding (l'entendement) is subjected to blindness, and the heart to depravity" (Ephesians 4:17, 18).<sup>714</sup> "Our mind (l'esprit de nostre entendement) needs to be renewed (Ephesians 4:23, Romans 12:2), not merely the appetites suppressed."<sup>714</sup>

#### Reason Conditioned by Society

"The Fifth Commandment is repugnant to the perversity of the human mind (de nostre nature)--which, puffed up with ambitious longings, will scarcely allow itself to be subject."<sup>715</sup> "Paul represses the wantonness

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706. C. R., III, 275-76; Inst., I, 202.  
707. C. R., III, 276; Inst., I, 202-03.  
708. C. R., III, 306; Inst., I, 229.  
709. C. R., III, 319; Inst., I, 238.  
710. C. R., III, 324; Inst., I, 242.  
711. C. R., III, 325; Inst., I, 243.  
712. C. R., III, 327; Inst., I, 243.  
713. C. R., III, 326; Inst., I, 243.  
714. C. R., III, 294; Inst., I, 218.  
715. C. R., III, 453; Inst., I, 344.

and pruriency of the human mind (toute outrecuidance de l'esprit humain).<sup>716</sup>  
"Emmity before reconciliation by Christ,' 'the curse,' 'separation from God,' are expressions adapted to our limited capacity to understand (à nostre sens, afin de nous faire entendre).<sup>717</sup> "Our minds are utterly incapable (nostre coeur n'est point capable) of the injunction to honor our neighbor above ourselves (Romans 12:10, Philippians 2:3) until our natural feelings are suppressed."<sup>718</sup> "Such is the pride of human intellect (selon que nostre nature est orgueilleuse) that every man would despise all others, and in his turn be despised, if every man were sufficient for himself."<sup>719</sup>

#### Reason Marred by Sin

"The overestimation of our powers of mind is due to our confining our thoughts to human pollution."<sup>720</sup> "Man is guilty of corrupting the seed of divine knowledge so wondrously deposited in his mind."<sup>721</sup> "The human mind (l'esprit, spirit, breath, mind, intellect, wits; fancy, wit, sense, humor, temper, genius, a turn, meaning) is prone to forget God and inclined to every kind of error."<sup>722</sup> "The human mind (l'esprit) is a perpetual forge of idols."<sup>723</sup> "The human mind (l'entendement) is stuffed with presumptuous rashness."<sup>723</sup> "The human mind (les esprits humains) is prone to indulge in vain (frivoles) subtleties."<sup>724</sup> "Reason is of little value in the sight of God" (2 Corinthians 3:5, Psalms 94:11, Genesis 6:5, 8:21).<sup>725</sup> "Everything which our mind (nostre entendement) conceives, meditates, plans, and

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716. C. R., III, 530; Inst., I, 404.  
717. C. R., III, 573; Inst., I, 435.  
718. C. R., IV, 188; Inst., II, 9.  
719. C. R., IV, 616; Inst., II, 316.  
720. C. R., III, 40; Inst., I, 38.  
721. C. R., III, 81; Inst., I, 62.  
722. C. R., III, 86; Inst., I, 66.  
723. C. R., III, 129; Inst., I, 97.  
724. C. R., III, 249; Inst., I, 183.  
725. C. R., III, 327; Inst., I, 244.

resolves is always evil."<sup>726</sup> "The vanity of man is that all the thoughts which proceed from the human mind are foolish, frivolous, perverse, and insane" (Jeremiah 17:9, Romans 3:10-18).<sup>727</sup> "The human mind (l'entendement humain) is wanton; it invents modes of worship in order to gain the favor of God; this irreligious affectation of religion is innate in the human mind (en nostre esprit)."<sup>728</sup> "The Law of heaven was enacted to restrain our minds (nos ames); human law does not scrutinize secret thoughts."<sup>729</sup> "Our minds (nostre entendement) are prone to vanity and presumption and tend naturally toward idolatry."<sup>730</sup> "Our stupid minds are wont to devise (nostre entendement controuve) carnal and frivolous religious observances."<sup>731</sup> "Our minds waver (nos coeurs chancellent) until, contented with the grace of God, we seek it in peace" (Psalms 33:12).<sup>732</sup> "Rebekah shows how prone the human mind is to turn aside (combien l'entendement humain est suiet a glisser et se destourner du bon chemin) whenever it gives itself the least indulgence."<sup>733</sup> "Such is the proneness of our mind to vanity (nos esprit est enclin à vanite), that it can never adhere to the truth of God, and such its dulness, that it is always blind even in His sight."<sup>734</sup> "Those who frame life after their own counsel are restless in mind (en quelle inquietude d'esprit)."<sup>735</sup> God "knows the boiling restlessness of the human mind (combien l'entendement de l'homme brusle d'inquietude), the fickleness

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726. C. R., III, 327; Inst., I, 244.  
727. C. R., III, 333; Inst., I, 250.  
728. C. R., III, 420; Inst., I, 319.  
729. C. R., III, 422; Inst., I, 321.  
730. C. R., III, 430; Inst., I, 327.  
731. C. R., III, 434; Inst., I, 330.  
732. C. R., IV, 46; Inst., I, 494.  
733. C. R., IV, 51; Inst., I, 497.  
734. C. R., IV, 53; Inst., I, 498-99.  
735. C. R., IV, 194; Inst., II, 13.

with which it is borne hither and thither, its eagerness to hold opposites at one time in its grasp, its ambition."<sup>736</sup> God "estimates our actions in a way very different from the way human reason or philosophy would estimate them (le iugement de la raison humain ou philosophique)."<sup>736</sup> "Our blind and stupid reason (notre raison folle et aveuglée) tends to confine itself within the little measure of its own vanity."<sup>737</sup>

#### The Uses of Human Reason

Many of the uses of human reason have been suggested in connection with the abilities of human reason. Apart from the question of ability, Calvin does give some detailed attention to the uses of human reason.

#### Apologetics

"Reason may use the unscriptural words 'person' and 'trinity' to combat heresy."<sup>738</sup>

#### Critique of Revelation

"Reason tests alleged miracles by their results. The question is: Do they promote true worship?"<sup>739</sup> "Reason observes the activity of Satan, as a test to distinguish the divine word from false doctrines."<sup>740</sup> "Reason prescribes a measure in religion, departure from which is superstition."<sup>741</sup> "The intellect exposes the errors of anthropomorphism."<sup>742</sup> "Reason observes Hebrew parallelisms in the Psalms."<sup>743</sup>

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736. C. R., IV, 224; Inst., II, 34.  
737. C. R., IV, 366-67; Inst., II, 148.  
738. C. R., III, 152; Inst., I, 114.  
739. C. R., III, 19; Inst., I, 10.  
740. C. R., III, 31; Inst., I, 17.  
741. C. R., III, 141; Inst., I, 104.  
742. C. R., III, 145-46; Inst., I, 110.  
743. C. R., III, 168; Inst., I, 124.

Knowledge of God

"The knowledge of God's benefits inspires the union of reverence and love to God."<sup>744</sup> "True knowledge of God leads to reverence and dependence upon Him."<sup>745</sup> "The purpose of human intellect is to know that the whole universe is governed by Divine energy alone."<sup>746</sup> "Practical knowledge (of the deity of Christ) is more sure and solid than any idle speculation."<sup>747</sup> "By holy meditation on the immense treasures of the wisdom and goodness in God's creation our minds should recall and dwell on them (penser et ruminer à bon escient)."<sup>748</sup> "The principal use of understanding is to discern the blessedness of union with God."<sup>749</sup> "The purpose of reason is to study to approach God."<sup>749</sup> "The arts of deliberation and caution are to be used in the service of divine providence (l'industrie de consulter et se garder a esté inspirée de Dieu aux hommes)."<sup>750</sup>

Social Structure

"Reason supports the use of oaths on certain occasions (ils sont fondez sur bonne raison et exemple de l'Escriture)."<sup>751</sup> "The human mind (nostre nature) naturally inclines to attest love to the dead, when in the presence of God."<sup>752</sup> "The whole form of church government in the Papacy is repugnant to nature and reason (contrevenant a nature et raison)."<sup>753</sup> "To fix down Christ and the Holy Spirit and the Church to a particular spot, . . . is not

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744. C. R., III, 44-45; Inst., I, 41.  
745. C. R., III, 45; Inst., I, 41.  
746. C. R., III, 125; Inst., I, 94.  
747. C. R., III, 166; Inst., I, 122.  
748. C. R., III, 212; Inst., I, 156.  
749. C. R., III, 226; Inst., I, 167.  
750. C. R., III, 255; Inst., I, 187.  
751. C. R., III, 445; Inst., I, 338.  
752. C. R., IV, 174; Inst., I, 581.  
753. C. R., IV, 661; Inst., II, 348.

only impious and insulting to Christ, but absurd and contrary to common sense."<sup>754</sup>

### Theology

"Reason tests the soundness of a doctrine—whether or not it is in harmony with the word of God."<sup>755</sup> "Reason, obedient to Christ, properly evaluates the writings of the Fathers."<sup>756</sup> "Reason opposes the Fathers to the modern Sophists, who contaminate the word of God."<sup>757</sup> "Reason, upon the basis of Scripture, discerns the true Church."<sup>758</sup> "The Holy Scriptures contain perfect doctrine, but beginners need the guidance (of a reasonable outline)."<sup>759</sup> "Proofs from Scripture are based upon argument demonstrated from Scripture."<sup>760</sup> "Only true knowledge of God can eradicate error in religion."<sup>761</sup> "After we receive Scripture reverently, the following proofs become appropriate helps: (1) the arrangement of Scripture, (2) the dignity of the subject matter, (3) its unpolished simplicity of style, and (4) the power of the truth therein contained."<sup>762</sup> "Human testimonies are to be used in subordination as secondary helps to our weakness."<sup>763</sup> "Man was created to meditate on the heavenly life. The knowledge of it is engraved on the soul."<sup>764</sup> "Argument from reason proves that the purpose of the Law was to keep alive the Messianic hope."<sup>765</sup> "Reason exposes the absurdities

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754. C. R., IV, 716; Inst., II, 386.  
755. C. R., III, 18; Inst., I, 9.  
756. C. R., III, 19; Inst., I, 10.  
757. C. R., III, 24; Inst., I, 13.  
758. C. R., III, 27; Inst., I, 14.  
759. Inst., I, 22.  
760. Inst., I, 23.  
761. C. R., III, 87; Inst., I, 67.  
762. C. R., III, 98; Inst., I, 75.  
763. C. R., III, 109; Inst., I, 83.  
764. C. R., III, 225-26; Inst., I, 167.  
765. C. R., III, 397; Inst., I, 301.

of the scholastic doctrines of satisfaction and penance."<sup>766</sup> "We cannot pray unless our mind (l'entendement) rises, strenuously exerting itself against all impediments."<sup>767</sup> "The eternal counsel of God, apart from the word, is a fatal abyss; but proper investigation of what is exhibited in the word reaps rich fruits of consolation."<sup>768</sup> "We should know how to make a right use of what is rightly written; but let us not inconsiderately wrest it to purposes different from that to which it ought to be confined."<sup>769</sup> "Use your God-given abilities, lest He punish you for sloth."<sup>770</sup>

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766. C. R., IV, 159; Inst., I, 570.  
767. C. R., IV, 367-68; Inst., II, 149.  
768. C. R., IV, 510; Inst., II, 243.  
769. C. R., IV, 513; Inst., II, 245.  
770. C. R., III, 317; Inst., I, 237.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. Calvin's doctrine of human reason belongs in the "Revelation Dominant" category.<sup>1</sup> There is also a small but important group of teachings which belong in the "Reason and Revelation Mutually Opposed" category.<sup>2</sup>

2. Contrary to popular opinion, Calvin overemphasized the abilities of human reason.<sup>3</sup> It is true that he ignored the ability of reason to analyze, to synthesize, to know itself, and to know reality. Yet Calvin allowed even to unregenerate reason a tremendous scope in the guidance of conduct.<sup>4</sup> The capacity of regenerate human reason in the service of faith is almost unlimited.<sup>5</sup> Calvin treated fully the ability of natural reason to know God.<sup>6</sup>

3. Compared with philosophy of religion in general, Calvin greatly overemphasized method in human reason.<sup>7</sup> Again, his emphasis was decidedly one-sided. Calvin ignored philosophical method, scientific method, and intuition, logical consistency, problem-solving, and comprehensive coherence as methods. Calvin overemphasized historical method, when it is considered that theory of history is almost ignored in philosophy of religion.<sup>8</sup> Also Calvin was greatly

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1. Supra, pp. 141-62.
  2. Supra, pp. 163-64.
  3. Supra, cf. pp. 29-34 and pp. 164-73.
  4. Supra, pp. 165-68.
  5. Supra, pp. 168-72.
  6. Supra, pp. 172-73.
  7. Supra, cf. pp. 35-42 and pp. 173-205.
  8. Supra, cf. p. 38 and p. 174.

in advance of his day in the use of historical method. Calvin greatly overemphasized theological method, almost to the point of treating it definitively and exhaustively.<sup>9</sup>

4. Calvin treated fully the relationship of human reason to the total personality.<sup>10</sup> Within this category, however, he overemphasized intellect,<sup>11</sup> and greatly overemphasized mystical experience.<sup>12</sup>

5. Calvin underemphasized the limits of human reason.<sup>13</sup> This is perhaps explained by the fact that he saw with perfect clarity the one main limit of theological method, namely: "Scripture is the boundary within which reason may operate with respect to God."<sup>14</sup>

6. Calvin greatly underemphasized the uses of human reason.<sup>15</sup> Historically this may be explained by Calvin's belief that the later Scholastics made a very bad use of human reason. With some scorn Calvin condemned "the subtlety and sophistry of Thomas (d'Aquin) that the foreknowledge of merit is the cause of predestination."<sup>16</sup> With bitterness he exclaimed, "There is enough wisdom in the word of God—without Thomas Aquinas."<sup>17</sup>

7. Calvin on the whole rejected the primacy of the intellect in Aristotle and the philosophical theology of Scholasticism. In the categories it was necessary to postulate that Calvin may have been

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9. Supra, pp. 174-205.
  10. Supra, cf. pp. 42-65 and pp. 205-29.
  11. Supra, pp. 215-19.
  12. Supra, pp. 208-15.
  13. Supra, cf. pp. 66-87 and pp. 229-42.
  14. Supra, p. 233.
  15. Supra, cf. pp. 87-100 and 242-45.
  16. C. R., IV, 480; Inst., II, 221.
  17. C. R., IV, 481; Inst., II, 221.

substantially influenced by Aquinas, in order to avoid a possible bias toward Calvinism at that point in the construction of the categories. This postulation was found to be unwarranted.

8. Calvin's debt to Lutheran Augustinianism is obvious.<sup>18</sup>

9. That Calvin owed something to Renaissance humanism is obvious. Calvin depended upon the Greek New Testament and other literary labors of Erasmus.<sup>19</sup> Also, Calvin was greatly indebted to the Latin style of Mathurin Cordier.<sup>20</sup> Calvin was considerably indebted to Valla for his historical criticism of the papacy and of the authorship of the Apostles' Creed.<sup>21</sup> However, there is no mark of the Renaissance on Calvin's theory of reason as such, which may indicate that the humanists of that period simply used reason fully but somewhat uncritically.

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18. Supra, pp. 110-18.

19. Supra, pp. 124-25.

20. Supra, p. 126.

21. Supra, p. 122.

SECTION 4

IMPLICATIONS

FOR

THEORY OF REFORMED PROTESTANT CHRISTIAN EDUCATION<sup>1</sup>

The investigator at first concluded that there were no necessary implications for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education to be drawn either from the shape of the categories in exposition or from the conclusions with respect to each category. It soon became apparent, however, that the real significance of the categories for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education was not to be found in the form<sup>1a</sup> of Calvin's teachings as revealed by the categories. Rather, the significance of the categories lies in the manner in which they have been riddled with holes and split down the middle by Calvin's teachings on human reason.

Reformed Protestant Christian Education Should be Oriented Toward the Mysteries of the Christian Faith

The first general feature of Calvin's doctrine of human reason revealed by the categories is that Calvin's teachings are shot through with mystical elements.<sup>1b</sup> God's essence is incomprehensible. Therefore, special

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1. See note on "Reformed," Supra, p. 14.

1a. "Form" here refers to the proportion exhibited in the exposition between Calvin's teachings on human reason and the categories of human reason. No implication has been drawn from the degree of emphasis by Calvin within any category (Supra, pp. 246-47).

1b. "Mystical" is here used in the popular sense of "beyond human understanding" and in the epistemological sense of "belief that ultimate truth may be grasped through intuition." It is not used in the theological sense of "belief in the possibility of union with God through spiritual meditation and submission."

revelation is necessary for salvation.<sup>2</sup>

Apart from Scripture, right and sound doctrine is impossible. Scripture bears clear evidence of its own truth. Scripture does not submit to proofs or arguments. Enlightened by the Holy Spirit, we believe in a way superior to human judgment that the Scriptures are from God. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is superior to reason. The word of God is too transcendent for us to estimate.<sup>3</sup> Arguments for the truth of Scripture are useless apart from the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Scripture is immeasurably superior to all the gifts and graces attainable by man. The impression produced by Scripture is so powerful that the writings of orators and philosophers almost disappear by comparison. The Scriptures are full of sentiments beyond the power of man to conceive. The Gospels, especially, deal with mysteries beyond the capacity of reason.<sup>4</sup> Scripture suffices to give a saving knowledge of God only when its certainty is founded on the inward persuasion of the Holy Spirit. The office of the Spirit is to seal on our minds the doctrine which the gospel recommends. Scripture signs of God's presence intimate His incomprehensible essence and curb men's minds. The Scripture doctrine of the immensity and spirituality of the essence of God refutes the subtleties of profane philosophy.<sup>5</sup>

The Holy Trinity is a fathomless mystery. Likewise, the wisdom, power, and justice of the invisible God are incomprehensible.<sup>5</sup> The Law and the Gospel are transcendent mysteries. The incomprehensible God is

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2. Supra, p. 141. A comparison of Calvin's doctrine of revelation (Supra, pp. 141-64) with the exposition in terms of the other categories of reason (Supra, pp. 165-245) shows that throughout his teachings on human reason the "mysteries of the Christian faith" are the most prominent feature.

3. Supra, p. 142.

4. Supra, p. 143.

5. Supra, p. 144.

not subject to our senses.<sup>6</sup> What the mind embraces by faith is infinite, and surpasses human understanding.<sup>7</sup> No man can approach God without being raised above himself and above the world. When "the Sophists" argue that we cannot know with certainty that we enjoy the grace of God, it is because "the Sophists" measure faith by the physical senses. The certitude given by faith is a form of knowledge, but it is acquired by the teaching of the Holy Spirit and not by the acuteness of our intellect. "The mystery hidden for ages and generations but now made manifest to His saints" (Colossians 1:26) is a wonderful secret of God.<sup>8</sup> We should revere and adore the mystery of the gospel. What was, in its own nature, secret has been manifested by the will of God. The knowledge of God's mystery (Colossians 2:2) cannot be attained apart from Christ. The gospel can be understood by faith alone--not by reason.<sup>9</sup>

Believers cannot evaluate the gifts of God in terms of externals, but in faith must look to the inward glory associated with the final advent of Christ (1 John 3:2). Our present condition is very far short of the glory of God's children. With undoubting faith we must hold to that which does not yet appear. In heaven is our real bliss. We are now traveling far away on the earth. This fading life is very different from that eternal life which belongs to the children of God. Our faith cannot stand otherwise than by looking to the final coming of Christ.<sup>10</sup> The Christian may be assured that he will eventually be like Christ.

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6. Supra, p. 145.

7. Supra, pp. 145-46.

8. Supra, p. 146.

9. Supra, p. 147.

10. Supra, p. 148.

Christ will make our vile bodies conformable to His glorious body (Philippians 3:21). When Paul said that we shall see Christ as He is, he indicated a new and ineffable manner of seeing Him.<sup>11</sup> The clear knowledge of the divine favor is the first and principal part of faith. Our conceptions of the power and works of God are like vapor, apart from the word. Without the illumination of the Spirit the word has no effect. Faith is something higher than understanding. Apart from the Holy Spirit we cannot know the mind and will of God. All mortals are too blind to view God's predestination by their own understanding. To reason about it is presumptuous and absurd. The certitude of faith proceeds not from mental acumen, but solely from the illumination of the Spirit.<sup>12</sup>

The entire doctrine of salvation would have been to no purpose apart from the Spirit of God. The word of God is a kind of "hidden wisdom," too high to be reached by the weakness of human intellect.<sup>13</sup> The soul, illumined by the Holy Spirit, receives a new eye to contemplate the mysteries of heaven.<sup>14</sup> When Christ by His Spirit guides us to understand the Scriptures, He does not hurry us away into the idle raptures of Enthusiasm.<sup>15</sup> Even the lips of Christ were powerless to instill truth

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11. Supra, p. 149.

12. Supra, p. 150.

13. Supra, p. 152.

14. Supra, p. 153.

15. Supra, p. 155. "Enthusiasm" was a technical term at the time of the Reformation, and was used to denote an undisciplined conglomeration of holiness sects. Calvin in his sermons often referred to these people as les phrénétiques. Calvin in expounding the Scriptures always sought to discover that broad middle ground of agreement which lay between the superficial rationalism of the Papacy on the one hand and the delirium of the uncritical devotees of the Spirit on the other hand.

apart from the Spirit of Truth. We are naturally spiritually blind. The word cannot penetrate our minds unless the Spirit, the internal teacher, by His enlightening power makes an entrance for it.<sup>16</sup> Faith and prayer are instruments in obtaining the peaceful and undisturbed state of a well-regulated mind. The believer, having God as his refuge and strength, need not fear any change which may occur.<sup>17</sup>

The mind of man cannot be changed for the better except by God's "preventing grace."<sup>17a</sup> The superiority of Scripture over the writings of the philosophers is to be seen in the very arrangement of the subject matter. The light of intellect, enlightened by the Spirit, ought to lead us to long for the final resurrection.<sup>18</sup> To have faith is to possess certainty and complete security of mind. The Spirit sometimes accommodates His language to our feeble capacity. All progress in piety is the secret work of the Spirit.<sup>19</sup> Every day we experience how His secret judgments surpass our apprehension.<sup>20</sup> Reason must be subordinated in the service of the word of God (Psalms 111:10).<sup>21</sup> In evaluating the Church, divine judgment weighs more than human judgment.<sup>22</sup> Conscience is a vital factor for interpreting the word of God. A clear conscience differs widely from intellect. Conscience is superior to all human judgments.<sup>23</sup>

Ceremonies, in order to be exercises in piety, must lead us directly to Christ.<sup>24</sup> The order of instruction in the divine economy is as follows:

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16. Supra, p. 156.

17. Supra, p. 157.

17a. "Preventing" here means "coming before."

18. Supra, p. 160.

19. Supra, p. 161.

20. Supra, p. 162.

21. Supra, p. 171.

22. Supra, p. 177.

23. Supra, p. 183.

24. Supra, p. 184.

First the Lord teaches us and trains us by His word. Secondly, He confirms us by His sacraments. Thirdly, He illumines our minds by the Light of His Holy Spirit. Christ acts in our minds above the measure of nature by special grace.<sup>25</sup> In the elect alone the sacraments accomplish what they represent.<sup>26</sup> Communion in the Lord's Supper is "a mystery which I feel, and therefore freely confess that I am unable to comprehend with my mind."<sup>27</sup> The mode of the presence of Christ at the Lord's Supper is "too high a mystery for my mind to comprehend." "I rather feel than understand it."<sup>28</sup>

The proper first goal of a Christian education is emotional security. The ability to comprehend the mysteries of God is a special gift, not received by everyone.<sup>29</sup> The physical body of the Christian is the temple of God if the Holy Spirit dwells there. The Spirit of holiness is given to believers only. The knowledge of God is useless apart from faith in Christ. After the Fall, no knowledge of God without a Mediator was effectual to salvation (John 1:13). Reason cannot know righteousness until Christ imputes it and the person is born of the Spirit (Romans 10:4). Faith perceives by Christ's ascension that the Lord has opened access to the heavenly kingdom and that Christ is our advocate and intercessor.<sup>30</sup> Without the Holy Spirit our minds are dark and perverse. Christian teaching is in vain apart from the internal teaching of the Holy Spirit. The proper assent of faith is more a matter of affection than of intellect.

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25. Supra, p. 191.  
26. Supra, p. 193.  
27. Supra, p. 198.  
28. Supra, p. 202.  
29. Supra, p. 208.  
30. Supra, p. 209.

The Spirit of God is a sure pledge and seal of the adoption of the elect and that the faith of the elect can never be destroyed.<sup>31</sup> What the mind receives through the Holy Spirit must be planted within the heart. The agency of the Holy Spirit in confirming the heart is much more evident than His agency in granting understanding to the intellect. Possession of the blessing of salvation transcends the reach of our intellect.<sup>32</sup>

Salvation begins with receiving the teachings of the Christian religion, but doctrine must enter into the heart and pass into conduct.<sup>33</sup> Self-denial requires that the Christian love God with his whole mind, in order to pursue what the Lord requires. Intellect cannot avail to provide any degree of blessedness, until the Lord prospers the labors of the intellect. Those whom Christ enlightens He also redeems. Prayer digs out the treasures which the gospel discloses to the eye of faith.<sup>34</sup> The mind naturally tends toward distraction and worldly cares, which detract from the contemplation of the heavenly life. The Spirit of God guides us in prayer to make proper requests and regulates our affections in asking (Romans 8:26). Everything which God wills must be held to be righteous by the mere fact of His having willed it.<sup>35</sup> God ascribes to Himself the illumination of our minds and the renewal of our hearts.<sup>36</sup>

Reason cannot fathom the mysteries of the Christian faith.<sup>37</sup> The attributes of God are described according to the limited capacity of our

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31. Supra, p. 210.  
32. Supra, p. 211.  
33. Supra, p. 212.  
34. Supra, p. 213.  
35. Supra, p. 214.  
36. Supra, p. 215.  
37. Supra, p. 232.

intelligence. No one can enter the kingdom of God unless his mind has been illumined by the Holy Spirit. Natural reason apart from special revelation can never discern the First Table of the Law.<sup>38</sup> The knowledge of faith goes beyond sense-data. Man is dull in discerning divine mysteries. Human reason is like a veil which hides the divine mysteries. None of the philosophers knew of "the renewing of the mind" (Romans 12:2, Ephesians 4:23),<sup>39</sup> Reason cannot explain the facts of election and reprobation. Human reason cannot apprehend the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. The glorification of our body is a miracle of such magnitude that it is beyond our power to evaluate. The mode of the resurrection is a mystery.<sup>40</sup> Only God can understand the Church of Jesus Christ.<sup>41</sup>

Calvin's strong emphasis upon the mysteries of the Christian faith is presupposed by such typical documents of the Calvinist tradition as the Heidelberg Catechism and the Westminster Shorter Catechism. The Heidelberg Catechism, composed by several authors of whom Zacharias Ursinus and Caspar Olevianus were the most important, was published in 1563. It was translated into thirty languages and quickly adopted by the Reformed Churches of Germany, the Netherlands, Hungary, Transylvania, and Poland. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, convened in Philadelphia in 1870, authorized its use. It was a standard of the (German) Reformed Church in the United States, first merged into the Evangelical and Reformed Church, and now merged again into the United Church of Christ. In 1792 the Reformed Church in America adopted the

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38. Supra, p. 233.

39. Supra, p. 234.

40. Supra, p. 235.

41. Supra, p. 236.

"Heidelberger" as a doctrinal standard.

Down to this day the Heidelberg Catechism is required reading and study in the Reformed Church in America. The Constitution as revised in June, 1959, provides (article 2, section 10) that "every minister must explain to his congregation at an ordinary service on the Lord's Day the points of doctrine contained in the Heidelberg Catechism, so that the exposition may be completed within the term of four years."<sup>42</sup> Since the contents of the Heidelberg Catechism have been divided into fifty-two sections, each one designed to provide ample instruction for one Lord's Day,<sup>43</sup> the above constitutional provision practically requires that one Sunday morning worship service out of every four, on the average, shall be given over to the exposition of the Heidelberg Catechism. The revised Constitution further provides for the enforcement of article 2, section 10, by requiring that once a year the minister and elder delegate from each local church shall answer at the meeting of Classis (article 10, section 12) the following question: "Are the points of doctrine contained in the Heidelberg Catechism explained from time to time in your church as required in the Constitution of the Reformed Church in America?"<sup>44</sup> The Stated Clerk of each Classis is required to report to the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America the number of churches which fail to live up to the constitutional requirement to preach the catechism. In the report to the Synod of 1959 there were only nine churches delinquent in this respect out of about eight hundred churches reporting.<sup>45</sup> The

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42. Proposed Revision of the Constitution of the Reformed Church in America, p. 8.

43. Reformed Standards of Unity, pp. 23-55.

44. Proposed Revision of the Constitution, p. 28.

45. Minutes of the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, June, 1959, pp. 368-69.

investigator has been unable to locate any record of a church which was disciplined for failure to observe this prescribed method of Christian education.

From the existence of these regulations with respect to the Heidelberg Catechism a minor implication for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education in churches which require systematic catechetical study is that no educational practices contrary to the theory behind this type of use of catechism should be introduced in said churches. A possibly stronger minor implication would be that any new educational practices introduced in churches which require systematic catechetical study should be in positive harmony with the theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education which is behind the catechetical requirements. With these possible minor implications in mind, the examination of mystical elements presupposed by the catechisms proceeds.

The first question in the Heidelberg catechism is: "What is thy only comfort in life and death?" Part of the answer given is: "That I, with body and soul, both in life and in death, am not my own, but belong to my faithful Savior Jesus Christ, who with his precious blood has fully satisfied for all my sins, and redeemed me from all the power of the devil."<sup>46</sup> Note the elements of mystery at the very beginning. The believer says that his owner is a Person who lived on earth nearly two thousand years ago Who by shedding His blood in death at that time paid the price for sins that would be committed nearly two thousand years later. This same Owner retains possession of the believer in the next

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46. Reformed Standards of Unity, p. 23.

life as well as in this life. Apart from the price of the blood of the Owner, the believer would now be under the control of a mysterious sinister authority called "the power of the devil." The believer's Owner was also the believer's "faithful Savior" nearly two thousand years before the believer came into existence.

As if this were not enough mystery to come out the first time the believer opens his mouth, the answer to the first question continues with more mystery. The answer goes on to say: "and (Jesus Christ) so preserves me that without the will of my Father in heaven not a hair can fall from my head; yea, that all things must work together for my salvation."<sup>47</sup> Here is the mystery of a Divine Providence which reaches down to, effects, and controls all the minute details of daily living. This mystery cannot be verified by empirical observation. In fact, it often happens that history seems to deny even the possibility of such infinite and detailed care of one person's life by an Almighty Creator. What can be seen and tested by our ordinary standards of measurement would often seem to be a veil to hide the truth of this article of faith. The mystery that in the life of the believer nothing comes by chance, but all things are ordered by the fatherly hand of God;<sup>48</sup> should prevade any theory of Christian education in those churches officially committed to the Heidelberg Catechism as a true popular summary of that which is taught by the Bible as the word of God. This mystery has the very practical value of enabling the believer to be patient in adversity and thankful in prosperity, and to see

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47. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

48. Ibid., p. 29.

the positive side of both, so that his spiritual life may be advanced by any outward change in his condition, whether apparently for better or manifestly for worse.<sup>49</sup>

The mystery continues. The believer concludes his answer to the first question of the catechism, saying: "Wherefore, by his Holy Spirit, he also assures me of eternal life, and makes me heartily willing and ready henceforth to live unto him." Note the mystery of the Holy Spirit, the mystery of assurance of salvation, and the mystery of the dedicated Christian life. Note also that in the answer as a whole we are immediately introduced to the mystery of the Holy Trinity. The mystery of the Holy Spirit is one side of the mystery of the Trinity in that the Holy Spirit is said to be "co-eternal with the Father and the Son."<sup>50</sup> The mystery of the Holy Spirit and the mystery of the Christian life are combined in that it is said of the Spirit "that he is also given to me, makes me by a true faith partaker of Christ and all his benefits, comforts me, and shall abide with me forever."<sup>51</sup> The mystery of assurance of salvation relates the testimony of the biblical saints to the experience of the present-day Christian believer.

All of this mystery is contained in the answer to the first question of the Heidelberg Catechism. While it is not maintained that all of the one hundred twenty-nine questions and answers are equally pervaded with mysterious elements, the above brief analysis of mystery presupposed in the first question and answer should be sufficient to show the basically

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49. Loc. cit.

50. Ibid., p. 35.

51. Loc. cit.

mysterious premises of the Heidelberg Catechism as a whole.

The Westminster Shorter Catechism was prepared by the Westminster Assembly in 1647. It was adopted by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland in 1648. It was adopted by the Presbyterian Synod of New York and Philadelphia in May, 1788. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, at least in its opening sentences, treats the mysteries of the Christian faith somewhat less subjectively than does the Heidelberg Catechism. Between the Heidelberg (1563) and Westminster (1647) catechisms there lived a rationalistic critic of the Calvinistic formulation of the Christian mysteries. His name was Jacobus Arminius (1560-1609). His teachings were to a considerable extent responsible for the "Five Articles" (1610) of the anti-Calvinistic Remonstrance. Then at the Synod of Dordrecht (1618-19) the Calvinist formulation of the mysteries came under considerable fire, particularly over the question of how to relate them to subjective Christian experience which was at least capable of some objective description.

The Westminster Shorter Catechism avoided some of the difficulties occasioned by the subjectivism of the Heidelberg Catechism. Nevertheless, the experiential quality of the Christian mysteries is fully present in the Westminster formulation. The principal difference is that it is not quite so obvious, at least at the beginning.

The first question in the Westminster Shorter Catechism is: "What is the chief end of man?" The answer given is: "Man's chief end is to glorify God, and to enjoy him forever." To "glorify" here means to honor, to do honor to, or to hold in honor. How can infinitesimal, puny man bring any honor to God whose infinity surpasses the bounds of a space

which man cannot even begin to comprehend? How can a creature of a day add anything to the honor of One who is from everlasting to everlasting? How can whimsical, changeable man honor Him who in His essential nature is unchangeable? Can we with our tiny grasp of a little bit of knowledge honor Him who is all-wise? How can we in our weakness and frailty add anything to Him who is infinite and perfect in power? How can we honor His holiness, when "holiness" by definition is that which pertains to Him? Surely we can add nothing to His justice, Whose acts are just, merely by the fact of His having willed them. How is the mixture of good and evil in man to add to His perfect goodness? Can our quest for truth add anything to Him who is truth? Yet the catechism says man's chief end is to "glorify" God. Surely here is a great mystery which pervades the whole catechism.

Randolph Crump Miller was very properly aiming at more depth in Christian education when he asserted that its clue is "the rediscovery of a relevant theology which will bridge the gap between content and method, providing the background of Christian truth," etc.<sup>52</sup> One would have to add that a "relevant theology" would be a theology capable of adequately interpreting the Christian mysteries to our age. Calvin's teachings on human reason imply first that any theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education should give adequate attention to the mysteries of the Christian faith and should be oriented primarily toward them. The basic subject matter of Reformed Protestant Christian education is the Mystery--the incomprehensible God.

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52. Randolph Crump Miller, The Clue to Christian Education, p. 15.

Reformed Protestant Christian Education Should Distinguish Between  
Unregenerate Human Reason and Regenerate Human Reason, and Should  
Orient Itself Toward the Latter

Calvin's doctrine of human reason in the exposition would appear to split the categories right down the middle according to whether he is speaking of unregenerate human reason or regenerate human reason. This distinction within human reason is a corollary of his doctrines of election and reprobation, which also split the categories. Its importance for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education is that it provides an answer to the question: Who are the candidates for a Christian education? Calvin's theory of human reason implies that only the elect are proper candidates for a Christian education. Thus, there is no such thing as "education into religion."<sup>53</sup>

Calvin maintains that God enlightens the minds of His elect with a spirit of understanding, in order that they may be able to understand the mysteries of the Christian religion. The Spirit works internally in the minds of men.<sup>54</sup> The arm of God (Isaiah 53:1) has not been revealed to all men.<sup>55</sup> As far as the image of God is renewed in us, we have eyes prepared to see God. The elect will see Christ as a friend. The wicked will dread His presence. They will shun God's presence and be filled with terror. His glory will dazzle their eyes. They will be stupified and confounded. Even the mind illumined by the knowledge of God is involved in ignorance at first, which is only gradually removed.<sup>56</sup>

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53. A. Victor Murray, Education Into Religion.

54. Supra, p. 145.

55. Supra, p. 147.

56. Supra, p. 149.

Though the whole doctrine of Scripture surpasses in its height the mind of man, yet access to it is not closed to the faithful, who reverently and soberly follow the Spirit as their guide: Special revelation by the Spirit to believers implies a certain general blindness of human intellect (1 Corinthians 2:10, 11).<sup>57</sup> Those who have testimony from the Holy Spirit have a firm and solid assurance.<sup>58</sup> No one can come to Christ apart from the Holy Spirit. We ought not to wonder if many refuse the gospel. Not all are drawn. God bestows the grace to come on the elect.<sup>59</sup> It is the wisdom of the elect that, having been taught by God, they know enough to come to Christ and believe. When we are drawn to Christ we are in mind and heart exalted far above our own understanding. Only when the human intellect is irradiated by the Spirit of God does it begin to have a taste of those things pertaining to the kingdom of God. A human intellect before it receives the light of the Holy Spirit is stupid and senseless in matters pertaining to the kingdom of God.<sup>60</sup> Words are idly wasted on the air, until the minds are enlightened by the gift of understanding. No darkness is more dangerous for quenching the light of the Spirit than reliance on our own sagacity.<sup>61</sup>

There is a great difference between insensibility and the confidence of faith (Psalms 46:1). Peace and repose cannot exist without faith (Isaiah 30:15). Unbelief alone produces uneasiness.<sup>62</sup> The Holy Spirit spoke by the mouth of Paul concerning election. To those whom God is

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57. Supra, p. 151.

58. Supra, p. 152.

59. Supra, p. 153.

60. Supra, p. 154.

61. Supra, p. 155.

62. Supra, p. 158.

not pleased to illumine, He delivers His doctrine wrapped up in enigmas, so that they may not profit by it, but be given over to greater blindness. The grace of God is insipid to men, until the Holy Spirit gives it savor.<sup>63</sup> Conversion is in the hand of God. Whether He deigns to convert all can be learned from Himself, when He promises that He will give some a heart of flesh, and leave to others a heart of stone (Ezekiel 36:26).<sup>64</sup> No man approaches God unless previously influenced from above. God's mercy is offered to all who desire it and implore it. This none can do, except those whom He has enlightened. He enlightens those whom He has predestined to salvation. Faith, in other words, the illumination of God, distinguishes between the righteous and the wicked; the former feeling the power of the Gospel, the latter obtaining no benefit from it.<sup>65</sup>

However, it must be admitted by way of concession to a less sharp distinction between unregenerate human reason and regenerate human reason that the principles of civil law are naturally impressed on every mind. Universal reason and intelligence naturally implanted are special gifts of God. The human mind, even though fallen, retains admirable gifts of God, which must not be despised.<sup>66</sup> The Spirit of God confers excellent gifts even upon pagans, for the common benefit of mankind. However, with regard to the knowledge of God and our salvation, our natural ability is somewhat limited. Yet there is a natural ethics (Romans 2:14, 15), and conscience is alive apart from the written Law of God.<sup>67</sup> There is a certain

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63. Supra, p. 161.

64. Supra, pp. 161-62.

65. Supra, p. 162.

66. Supra, p. 165.

67. Supra, p. 166.

knowledge of the law by nature. The Gentiles before Christ had the natural light of righteousness.<sup>68</sup> Yet natural knowledge of law only renders man inexcusable before God.<sup>69</sup> Natural reason in the natural man aspires to truth to some extent, but it always stops short of its goal.<sup>70</sup> Natural reason can make a little progress even in spiritual matters. Nevertheless, natural reason is impotent to establish any claim of righteousness before the judgment-seat of God.<sup>71</sup> All the wisdom of the world, apart from the fear of God, is vanity or empty show.<sup>72</sup> The natural mind is capable of understanding, but not of attaining to, heavenly and spiritual wisdom.<sup>73</sup> As full certainty is not necessary for us in order to be able to judge who are the sheep, God has substituted in its place the judgment of Christian love.<sup>74</sup>

The word of God, when addressed to any stubborn spirit will remain without fruit, as if thrown upon the barren waste. Yet when the word meets a soul which the heavenly Spirit has subdued, it will be most fruitful (Matthew 13:4, Luke 8:15).<sup>75</sup> God has reserved the treasure of intelligence for His children; the rest of mankind is ignorant and stupid in spiritual discernment. Philosophers are blind, in looking for order and arrangement in fallen man.<sup>76</sup> The human mind, blinded and darkened, is very far from being able to rise to a knowledge of the di-

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68. Supra, p. 167.  
69. Supra, p. 168.  
70. Supra, p. 169.  
71. Supra, p. 170.  
72. Supra, p. 171.  
73. Supra, p. 172.  
74. Supra, p. 176.  
75. Supra, p. 192.  
76. Supra, p. 215.

vine will.<sup>77</sup> The prevailing state of mind of the impious is brutish oblivion.<sup>78</sup> The spirit of error which blinds unbelievers is sent from God himself. God works in His elect in two ways: inwardly, by His Spirit; outwardly, by His word. By His Spirit He illumines their minds and trains their hearts to the practice of righteousness, making them new creatures; by His word He stimulates them to long and to seek for this renovation. The minds of the reprobate are not inwardly moved and affected to curb them. Not the mind, but terror and shame, restrain the reprobate.<sup>79</sup> The reprobate are hateful to God, and that with perfect justice, since those destitute of His Spirit cannot produce anything that does not deserve cursing.<sup>80</sup> Daring sinners banish all remembrance of God. Yet the deliberate stupefaction of the mind by the impious does not banish the judgment of God.<sup>81</sup>

Natural reason cannot attain pure knowledge of God and of true righteousness. Unredeemed reason cannot receive the Spirit of holiness.<sup>82</sup> Human reason is blind to heavenly things until it is illumined by the grace of God.<sup>83</sup> The human mind is dull and blind with respect to the heavenly mysteries.<sup>84</sup> Pertaining to the Law of God, an unredeemed human mind can neither acquire wisdom nor listen to advice. Human intellect is completely in the dark as to matters which it is of the highest im-

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77. Supra, pp. 217-18.

78. Supra, p. 221.

79. Supra, p. 222.

80. Supra, p. 223.

81. Supra, p. 225.

82. Supra, p. 229.

83. Supra, p. 230.

84. Supra, p. 231.

portance to know.<sup>85</sup> The human mind is prone to forget God and inclined to every kind of error. The human mind is a perpetual forge of idols.<sup>86</sup> All the thoughts which proceed from the human mind are foolish, frivolous, perverse, and insane. Our minds are prone to vanity and presumption and tend naturally toward idolatry.<sup>87</sup>

With respect to this distinction between unregenerate human reason and regenerate human reason in the teachings of John Calvin, it is freely admitted that churches in the Reformed tradition have not always held it firmly. For example, the Presbyterian Church, U. S. A., now merged into the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, apparently under some pressure from liberal theology, about 1900 compromised this distinction.

Chapter III of the Westminster Confession asserts plainly Calvin's doctrines of election and reprobation as consequences of God's eternal decree. It states that "by the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death."<sup>88</sup> With regard to the elect it says that "those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love."<sup>89</sup> With regard to the reprobate it declares that "the rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable

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85. Supra, p. 236.

86. Supra, p. 240.

87. Supra, p. 241.

88. The Confession of Faith of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, pp. 14-15.

89. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath, to the praise of his glorious justice."<sup>90</sup> Then, after the customary manner of King James I (1566-1625), the Confession warns that the teaching of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care.<sup>91</sup>

Apparently about 1900 some of the "northern Presbyterians" did not like this plain statement of election and reprobation any too well. At any rate in 1903 a "declaratory statement" was added to the Confession for the purpose of "disavowal by the Church of certain inferences drawn from statements in the Confession of Faith."<sup>92</sup> Specifically, it modified the statement concerning the elect with the reservation "that concerning those who are saved in Christ, the doctrine of God's eternal decree is held in harmony with the doctrine of his love to all mankind, his gift of his Son to be the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and his readiness to bestow his saving grace on all who seek it."<sup>92</sup> The original declaration concerning the reprobate was radically altered to say "that concerning those who perish, the doctrine of God's eternal decree is held in harmony with the doctrine that God desires not the death of any sinner, but has provided in Christ a salvation sufficient for all, adapted to all, and freely offered in the gospel to all; that men are fully responsible for their treatment of God's gracious offer;

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90. Ibid., p. 17.

91. Loc. cit.

92. Ibid., p. 118.

that his decree hinders no man from accepting that offer; and that no man is condemned except on the ground of his sin."<sup>93</sup> In the original Confession the initiative in election or reprobation is always with God. In the "declaratory statement" the initiative in election or reprobation may be with man. At the very least the existence of such a "declaratory statement" reveals a widespread confusion concerning the inner meaning of this historically precious insight of the Reformed faith--the doctrine of election and reprobation.

A little hedging here, however, is in order. Here we need the qualification suggested by D. Campbell Wyckoff that "the church we see is only a reflection of the true and invisible Church."<sup>94</sup> Even regenerate human reason at its best cannot accurately define the boundaries of the true and invisible Church. Therefore, if anyone comes and says that he acknowledges Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior, that he subscribes to the Apostles' Creed at least approximately as it is taught in the Reformed churches, that he promises to persevere in the communion of the Christian Church and in the diligent use of all the means of grace, and he is willing to submit himself to the discipline of the visible Church: such a one must be received as a member of the visible Church unless there is open evidence of insincerity in his confession, and he should be treated as if he were of the elect.

Reason fully dedicated to Christ is so superior to undedicated reason in discerning the mysteries of the Christian faith that Reformed

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93. Loc. cit.

94. D. Campbell Wyckoff, The Task of Christian Education, pp. 72-73.

Protestant Christian education should not waste time on undedicated reason, but should address itself to dedicated reason in the elect.

The Covenant Theology, Prominent in the Teachings of Calvin, Implies that the Experience of the Christian Mystery is Transmissible from Parent to Child. Reformed Protestant Christian Education Should Regard this Form of Transmission as the Normal Method of Communicating the Gospel.

According to Calvin, God adopts the children of believers before they are born.<sup>95</sup> God's covenant with Abraham (Genesis 17:7) was to Abraham and to his descendants after him throughout their generations for an everlasting covenant. Since infant baptism is "the Christian circumcision" (Colossians 2:11), the promise to the child of the Christian believer must be at least as full as was the promise to the faithful under the Old Testament, by "the analogy of faith." Baptism of infants, then, is a sign that they already belong to Christ, merely by having at least one parent who is a Christian.<sup>95</sup> Baptism is not necessary to salvation. Children who die without baptism are not excluded from the kingdom of God.<sup>95</sup> Yet infant baptism is a wonderful sign confirming the promise given to the godly parent.<sup>96</sup> Also baptized children are benefited by being objects of special interest in the church.<sup>96</sup> The reality of baptism does not consist in the outward washing, but in the testimony of a clear conscience which it gives to the recipient of the sacrament.<sup>97</sup>

The best modern exposition of Calvin's doctrine on how the Christian mystery is transmitted from parent to child was written by a liberal Congregational minister, the Rev. Horace Bushnell (1802-1876). His Christian

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95. Supra, p. 195.

96. Supra, p. 197.

97. Supra, p. 194.

Nurture, especially the posthumous edition of 1876, is, on the whole a good exposition of Calvin's position. His thesis that "the child is to grow up a Christian, and never know himself as being otherwise"<sup>98</sup> is the correct conclusion to be drawn from Calvin's doctrine on infant baptism. Bushnell's emphasis upon the Christian family as the primary group in Christian nurture is excellent. Also his argument in favor of the church membership of baptized children is sound.<sup>99</sup> Bushnell correctly inferred that the parents addressed by Paul in his letters to the Colossians and the Ephesians were parents not only in the flesh, but they also "in the Spirit communicated both a personal and a Christian life."<sup>100</sup> "These children are presumptively in the Lord, apart from all expectations and processes of adult conversion."<sup>101</sup> "The baptized child is a believer and a member of the church."<sup>102</sup> Bushnell did not profess to be an exact expositor of Calvin's views upon the subject. He confessed, "I cannot answer for an exact agreement of my doctrine with that of Calvin."<sup>103</sup>

This implication that the experience of the Christian mystery is transmissible has not been invalidated by George Albert Coe's well-known criticisms of transmissive education. Coe maintained that the transmission theory does not work.<sup>104</sup> He alleged that "not only does transmissive education fail of its full intent; it creates evil for which it is loath to accept responsibility."<sup>105</sup> He then enumerated what he considered to be

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98. Horace Bushnell, Christian Nurture, p. 10.  
99. Ibid., pp. 162-94.  
100. Ibid., p. 163.  
101. Ibid., p. 164.  
102. Ibid., p. 168.  
103. Ibid., p. 181.  
104. George A. Coe, What is Christian Education?, p. 46.  
105. Loc. cit.

the five major faults of the then-prevailing type of transmissive education in religion: (1) "Transmissive education hands on our faults, but conceals them, and by concealment adds to their prestige."<sup>106</sup> (2) "Transmissive education employs either force or evasion in the interest of effectiveness."<sup>107</sup> (3) "Transmissive education, its eyes fixed upon content, is slow to apprehend the forces at work."<sup>108</sup> (4) "Transmissive education, thinking to make men obedient to God, brings some men into subjection to others."<sup>109</sup> (5) "The best contribution of transmissive education is its by-products. It is weakest where it thinks it is strongest."<sup>110</sup>

The manner in which Christian experience should be transmitted from parent to child in Reformed Protestant Christian education is strongly supported by another side of Coe's theory. Coe observed that "the prevailing habits of Christians, which are changing habits, supply an interpretative background to anything that teacher or textbook or sermon or the Bible says, and to any worship or other activity that is included in the church programme."<sup>111</sup> It is exactly in the realm of "interpretative background" that the role of the family is so important in transmitting Christian experience. Are there regular family prayers, engaged in sincerely and naturally? Is there daily worship in the home? Do prayer, Bible reading, and worship contribute to the smoothest possible human relations? Is it apparent in difficult situations faced by the Christian family that prayer and worship have been helpful? Is the manner of earning

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106. Loc. cit.

107. Ibid., p. 50.

108. Ibid., p. 52.

109. Ibid., p. 55.

110. Ibid., p. 57.

111. Ibid., p. 26.

a living consistent with Christian principles expressed in the family devotions? Are family prayers and devotions a fruitful source of new ethical insights, which are faithfully acted upon? It is in this realm that assurance can be gained from Coe's observation that "education always is transmissive; no one need fear that it will ever cease to be this."<sup>112</sup> There is no inconsistency between this type of transmission and Coe's insistence that "learning to be a Christian should be an experience of free creativity."<sup>113</sup> With respect to transmission through the Christian family the investigator would agree with Coe that "the mainly effective factor in Christian education is the human relations that accompany the teaching rather than the content of the teaching."<sup>114</sup>

This implication pertaining to the role of the family in the whole process of Christian education has been strongly supported in the report written by Paul H. Vieth<sup>115</sup> on a two-year study of the status of Christian education by sixty outstanding religious educators and specialists in other fields of the church's life and work. Vieth asserts the primacy of the home in Christian education, saying, "The family is primary in God's economy. It is the most potent influence in the development of personality. It may be the most effective means of Christian education. Nowhere else may religion be taught so easily and with such abiding results as in the home."<sup>116</sup> Our experience of God as Father and ourselves as His children will be either greatly enriched or immeasurably impover-

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112. Ibid., p. 27.

113. Ibid., p. 33.

114. Ibid., p. 58.

115. Paul H. Vieth, The Church and Christian Education, pp. 168-92.

116. Ibid., p. 168.

ished by a satisfying experience of Christian fellowship or the lack of it in the home. "The reality and quality of religion are constantly tested within the home. Concealment is difficult and often impossible. Life-changing influence is inevitable."<sup>117</sup> "Throughout childhood and adolescence a boy's character may be more easily affected by association with his parents and brothers and sisters than by any other factor. He imitates the habits of the members of his family or reacts against the examples set him."<sup>118</sup>

Vieth points out that Sunday school was never intended to supersede the home as the teacher of religion.<sup>119</sup> Purposeful Christian nurture in the modern home has been neglected.<sup>120</sup> Curriculum study should proceed on the assumption that Christian parents should be the chief teachers of religion.<sup>121</sup> The educational mission of the church includes guidance in the teaching of religion at home.<sup>122</sup> Vieth quotes from a statement in 1940 of the former International Council of Religious Education, as follows: "As the primary and most intimate social group, the family is potentially the most important means of Christian education for all its members."<sup>123</sup> In 1947 Vieth noted that officially the churches had done little or nothing about this insight into the nature of Christian education. In 1960 the present investigator confirms Vieth's observation of 1947, except that he notes a new proliferation of family devotional

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117. Ibid., p. 169.

118. Loc. cit.

119. Ibid., p. 171.

120. Ibid., p. 172.

121. Loc. cit.

122. Ibid., p. 177.

123. Ibid., p. 180.

material is beginning to appear. "The home may become a center of religious influence, but it is not inherently so," notes Vieth. "Guidance is needed to help it realize and assume this, its highest function. Effort expended by the church at this point might bring manifold returns through extension of the influence of Christian nurture into numerous homes of the parish."<sup>124</sup> The Vieth Committee on the Study of Christian Education made the following recommendation: "That the International Council of Religious Education examine its present and prospective program, its literature, and its structure to discover the degree to which home religion receives the attention it deserves, and that it then revise its program, processes and structure so that the pre-eminence given to the family in its statements of basic philosophy is apparent in the full round of Council activities."<sup>125</sup> Vieth concludes that "the church school will have a rebirth of power if the church will go to the people where they live, if it will help them to establish and maintain a normal religious life within the home."<sup>126</sup>

Frank Gabeléin has reported on a three-year study by the Committee on Philosophy and Practice of Christian Education, National Association of Evangelicals. The section on "Christian Education and the Home"<sup>127</sup> starts by recognizing the decline of the American home that has taken place since 1900.<sup>128</sup> Responsibility has been shifted from parents to school.<sup>129</sup> The home-training of young children, however, cannot be

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124. Ibid., p. 184.

125. Ibid., pp. 186-87.

126. Ibid., p. 191.

127. Frank E. Gaebelein, Christian Education in a Democracy, pp. 237-57.

128. Ibid., p. 237.

129. Ibid., p. 238.

delegated.<sup>130</sup> The ultimate responsibility for a child is not with state, school, or church, but with his or her parents.<sup>131</sup> "Only through a reformation in family life will the let-down in morals be checked."<sup>132</sup>

On the positive side, according to Gabelein, "a good home provides for young children the most perfect of educational situations. It is here that the child has his earliest opportunity to learn."<sup>133</sup> "Home learning goes on in a natural life-situation which institutional education finds it impossible to match."<sup>134</sup> "The feelings accompanying learning at home are often more intense and leave more vivid impressions than feelings in a less natural setting."<sup>135</sup> "When it comes to teaching, parents have the incalculable advantages which grow out of home relationships."<sup>136</sup> "The mere fact of the child's dependence upon his father and mother for assistance soon establishes a confidence which is strengthened by everyday experience."<sup>137</sup> The Christian home has four marks: (1) both parents are Christians; (2) they are individually and unitedly serving God; (3) the Bible and prayer are central; and (4) the children are raised according to the Word of God.<sup>138</sup> "Being a Christian involves for parents as well as children nothing less than a personal experience of the Savior."<sup>139</sup> "Fathers and mothers cannot reasonably expect their sons and

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130. Ibid., p. 239.

131. Loc. cit.

132. Ibid., p. 242.

133. Loc. cit.

134. Ibid., p. 243.

135. Loc. cit.

136. Loc. cit.

137. Loc. cit.

138. Ibid., p. 244.

139. Loc. cit.

daughters to occupy higher spiritual ground than that on which they themselves are standing."<sup>140</sup> "For Christians all work is religious in that it should be done as a service for God."<sup>141</sup> "If the Bible is for parents the very Word of God, a book read regularly and lived by, children will know it. Likewise with prayer; parents who know the way to the throne of grace and who go there day by day are giving their children a priceless spiritual heritage."<sup>142</sup> "Blessing at table, so often forgotten even by church members, is not a triviality. Nor is the holding of family prayers of minor importance."<sup>143</sup> "Emotionally disciplined parents mean emotionally disciplined children. But the converse is also true. Tensions between fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters, will make such tensions more likely outside."<sup>144</sup> "The home with its worship and ministry cannot in its sphere of family religion neglect discipline."<sup>145</sup> "Parents who are endeavoring prayerfully and devotedly to raise their families in the nurture and admonition of the Lord are doing a work second to none in difficulty and importance."<sup>146</sup>

The Liturgy of the Reformed Church in America in the office for the administration of baptism to infants gives a full statement of the position of children of believers as being already "in Christ," as Calvin taught.

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140. Ibid., p. 245.  
141. Loc. cit.  
142. Ibid., p. 246.  
143. Ibid., p. 247.  
144. Ibid., p. 255.  
145. Ibid., p. 256.  
146. Loc. cit.

Although our young children do not understand these truths, we may not therefore exclude them from Baptism. For as they are, without their knowledge, partakers of the condemnation in Adam, so are they again received unto grace in Christ. For God has spoken unto Abraham, the father of all the faithful, and therefore unto us and our children, saying, "I will establish My covenant between Me and thee and thy seed after thee in their generations, for an everlasting covenant; to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." This He also testified unto us by the Apostle Peter, saying, "For the promise is unto you, and to your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call." Our Lord Jesus Christ also took young children in His arms, put His hands upon them, and blessed them, and said, "Suffer the little children to come unto Me, and forbid them not; for of such is the kingdom of God."

Children are therefore to be baptized as heirs of the kingdom of God and of His covenant; and parents are bound to instruct their children in the duties and privileges connected therewith, when they shall arrive at years of discretion.<sup>147</sup>

This liturgy, however, is weak in drawing out the consequences of the church membership of infant children of believers. In fact there is only one reference to this subject. The parents are asked, "Do you acknowledge that although our children are by nature sinful and guilty before God, they are sanctified in Christ and therefore, as members of His Church, ought to be baptized?"<sup>148</sup> Unfortunately, in the use of this question the phrase "by nature sinful and guilty before God" in the qualifying clause has often obscured the positive statements of the main clause that these children are "sanctified in Christ" and "members of His Church."

In The Book of Common Worship (Presbyterian, U. S. A.) the order of the administration of the sacrament of baptism to infants (on the whole considerably briefer than the same order in the Reformed Church

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147. The Liturgy of the Reformed Church in America, p. 19.

148. Ibid., p. 20.

in America) gives much less attention to expounding the theology of the covenant and considerably more attention to the implications of the church membership of infants. In its statement of the theology of the covenant there is no attempt to explain the relationship of infant baptism to God's covenant with Abraham. The whole exposition is done in three short sentences based upon Psalms 103:17, 18, Isaiah 40:11, and Acts 2:39.<sup>149</sup> It then goes on in some detail to trace the implications of the church membership of children. The minister is to say: "God our Father, who has redeemed us by the sacrifice of Christ, is also the God and Father of our children. They belong, with us who believe, to the membership of the Church through the covenant made in Christ, and confirmed to us by God in this Sacrament, which is a sign and seal of our cleansing, of our engrafting into Christ, and of our welcome in the household of God."<sup>150</sup> "Saint Paul also declared that the children of believers are to be numbered with the holy people of God."<sup>151</sup> Immediately after the baptism of the infant the minister is to stress the responsibility of the whole congregation in assisting the parents to train the child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. The minister is to say: "This child is now received into Christ's Church: And you the people of this congregation in receiving this child promise with God's help to be his sponsor to the end that he may confess Christ as his Lord and Savior and come at last to His eternal kingdom. Jesus said, 'Whoso shall receive

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149. The Book of Common Worship, p. 121.

150. Ibid., pp. 121-22.

151. Ibid., p. 122.

one such little child in My name receiveth Me."<sup>152</sup>

If Experience of the Christian Mystery is Transmissible from Parent to Child, and not Vice Versa, Any Efforts to Improve the Quality of Reformed Protestant Christian Education Should Begin at the Adult Level

Calvin regards the worship service as an essential part of the education of the Church (Ephesians 4:10-13).<sup>153</sup> With respect to the ministry of the word, God consecrates the mouths and tongues of men to His service, making His own voice to be heard in them.<sup>153</sup> God has confined us to His ordinary method of teaching (preaching the word).<sup>154</sup> All of the heads of doctrine are not equally important in the Church.<sup>155</sup> Some liberty is to be allowed with respect to non-essentials (Philippians 3:15).<sup>155</sup> It is vain to look for a church altogether free from blemish.<sup>155</sup> Regeneration does not enlighten the mind in a single day--it is a process.<sup>156</sup>

Church discipline is an important means of adult education in the Church, just as home discipline is an important means of childhood education in the family. Church discipline ought always to regard the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace.<sup>157</sup> "Let no one imagine he can separate the wheat from the tares by human judgment."<sup>158</sup> The saving doctrine of Christ in the life of the Church cannot be maintained apart from the proper administration of church discipline.<sup>159</sup> The first foundation of church

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152. Ibid., p. 123.  
153. Supra, p. 175.  
154. Supra, pp. 175-76.  
155. Supra, p. 176.  
156. Supra, p. 216.  
157. Supra, pp. 176-77.  
158. Supra, p. 177.  
159. Supra, p. 188.

discipline is provision for private admonition, in order that the Lord's Supper may not be profaned by promiscuous admission.<sup>160</sup> Secondly, the good must not be corrupted by constant communication with the wicked.<sup>160</sup> Thirdly, church discipline is to be exercised in order that sinners may be ashamed, and begin to repent.<sup>160</sup> However, the process of church discipline must not be rushed. Private individuals must not separate themselves from the Church, if the elders are slow in correcting vice.<sup>161</sup>

William Clayton Bower in a section on religious education and public education<sup>162</sup> asks what the church can do better than the school. He says, "It is possible for a church to provide a sustained and sustaining fellowship in which the growing person is a participant with status and responsibility."<sup>163</sup> Such a sustaining fellowship at the childhood level cannot last very long in a church apart from an adequate fellowship at the adult level capable of providing guidance and setting the tone for childhood fellowship.

H. Shelton Smith insists that "the Church is something more than merely a group of like-minded persons who get together and form a social fellowship. The Church is, for faith, the unique creation of God and the Holy Spirit. This is the basis of its being a true koinonia, a true community of the Spirit."<sup>164</sup> This koinonia for its continuity requires strong adult participation. Again, Miller notes: "The relevance of the

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160. Loc. cit.

161. Supra, p. 189.

162. William Clayton Bower, Christ and Christian Education, pp. 100-28.

163. Ibid., p. 120.

164. H. Shelton Smith, Faith and Nurture, p. 146.

nature and function of the Church to every child committed to its care should be obvious. If every baptized person is a member of the Church, the fundamental principle of every congregation should be the granting of these rights of 'belongingness' to every child. The Church's preparation for receiving the child begins with the education of his parents."<sup>165</sup>

Similarly, Lewis Joseph Sherrill defined the koinonia present in the Church in terms which for the sake of continuity imply a certain type of adult fellowship. "Koinonia is a kind of community which transcends ordinary human community in that God is present and participant in the community. For the connotation of koinonia is that the Spirit of God is forthgoing into, and present in, every relationship within the community."<sup>166</sup> In seeking to improve religious education by concentration on the nature of religious fellowship at the adult level it is necessary to keep in mind the dangers inherent in centering theory of Christian education too much upon the Church. D. Campbell Wyckoff points out that theory, in this case, may be reduced to concentration upon the church as an institution or as a human community.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, more than thirty years ago Coe saw some of the dangers inherent in the child-centered church and the need for solid improvement at the adult level. He remarked, "There is a great popular self-deception that must be overcome. The almost universal notion that the time for getting our education is childhood and youth, whereas in adult life we settle down to the use of our education

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165. Randolph Crump Miller, op. cit., p. 81.

166. Lewis Joseph Sherrill, The Gift of Power, p. 50.

167. D. Campbell Wyckoff, The Gospel and Christian Education, p. 91.

for the rest of our days, is a blunder. It is a pernicious error, more deleterious to the spiritual life than much that bears the opprobrium of sinfulness."<sup>168</sup>

The importance of adult education in any program for improving education is now coming to be widely recognized. In 1951 the Ford Foundation established a Fund for Adult Education. Malcolm S. Knowles in 1957 reported that perhaps a third of the adult population of the United States was engaged in some form of systematic study.<sup>169</sup>

The International Journal of Religious Education, official publication of the Division of Christian Education, National Council of Churches, devoted its May, 1959, issue to "The Christian Education of Adults." Virgil E. Foster, editor, reported that there are now fifteen million adults in study groups under church auspices.<sup>170</sup> Foster observes that "nothing is more important for the education of children and young people than that a church have dedicated adult Christians whose commitment includes continual growth."<sup>171</sup> Lawrence C. Little, upon the basis of Thorndike's early investigations and of current studies of adult learning, affirms that "cumulative evidence confirms the proposition that whether and to what extent a person learns depends, not so much upon age, as upon how much he wants to learn and upon his past habits and attitudes toward learning."<sup>172</sup> He points

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168. George A. Coe, op. cit., p. 212.

169. Malcolm S. Knowles, "Charting the Course of Adult Education in America's Future," Adult Leadership, vol. 6, no. 4 (October, 1957), p. 100.

170. Virgil E. Foster, "What are you doing about it?" International Journal of Religious Education, vol. 35, no. 9 (May, 1959), p. 3.

171. Loc. cit.

172. Lawrence C. Little, "New demands for adult education," International Journal of Religious Education, vol. 35, no. 9 (May, 1959), p. 5.

out that "churches cannot hope to accomplish their aims in Christian education of children and youth without giving proper attention to the Christian education of adults."<sup>173</sup> "An understanding of what is involved in Christian living is determined, not only by what is taught, but also by what is observed in the lives of the more mature members of the community. In fact, the behavior of adults affects the standards and practices of the young more than the precepts of teachers."<sup>174</sup> Margaret K. Hale defines Christian maturity in terms of the searching adult. She says, "The Christian who no longer seeks spiritual insight and an understanding of God is an immature Christian. His understanding of himself and of his responsibilities has reached an impasse because he is no longer learning."<sup>175</sup> She continues, "Christian maturity is a readiness to reorganize spiritual understanding, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, to meet the needs and demands of a changing world. It is expressed in the realignment of life according to increased spiritual insight."<sup>176</sup> Knowles reminds us that "learning implies growth. Such growth is stimulated when individuals face live issues and participate actively in honest inquiry and discussion of the facts."<sup>177</sup> Maurice D. Bone has studied ways of producing warm, personal relationships in the adult program of the church. He examines: (1) sense of belonging, (2) seriousness of purpose, (3) variety of experiences, (4) essential recreation, and (5) service to those who are suffer-

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173. Ibid., p. 7.

174. Loc. cit.

175. Margaret K. Hale, "The Searching Adult," International Journal of Religious Education, vol. 35, no. 9 (May, 1959), p. 9.

176. Loc. cit.

177. Malcolm S. Knowles, "Use effective methods," International Journal of Religious Education, vol. 35, no. 9 (May, 1959), p. 15.

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Corroboration of the Above Four Implications

Approximately during the time when the present investigator was studying Calvin's teachings on human reason for their possible implications for theory of Reformed Protestant Christian education, there was a study going on, the results of which tend to corroborate the above four implications. The Board of Education of the Presbyterian Church, U. S., in 1955 appointed a non-staff committee of scholars, teachers, and other leaders to make a fresh study of the communication of the Christian faith through the educational work of the Church. This committee proceeded to work independently of any programs and materials then in use or recommended by said Board. Representatives of the Boards of Education of the Moravian Church, of the Reformed Church in America, and of the (then) United Presbyterian Church of North America collaborated in this study. After two years the committee presented its report entitled "Toward a Curriculum for the Covenant Community" in October, 1957. In February, 1959, the Board of Christian Education of the Presbyterian Church, U. S., adopted the report as "setting forth the basic presuppositions and guiding principles upon which it wished to have curriculum developed."<sup>179</sup> In April, 1959, the Board of Christian Education of the Reformed Church in America took a similar action. Meanwhile, the United Presbyterian Church of North America had been merged and had begun to use the Faith and Life curriculum already developed by the (former)

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178. Maurice D. Bone, "A new look at fellowship," International Journal of Religious Education, vol. 35, no. 9 (May, 1959), p. 24.

179. Basic Presuppositions and Guiding Principles for the Educational Work of the Church, p. 2.

Presbyterian Church, U. S. A.

During the summer of 1959 the document Basic Presuppositions and Guiding Principles for the Educational Work of the Church as adopted by the Presbyterian Church, U. S., and by the Reformed Church in America came to the desk of the present investigator. When he noticed from the table of contents the extent to which this document had paralleled his own work and that major implications had been drawn, the investigator deliberately did not look at the implications but put the document in a sealed envelope in order to make a comparison after he had finished drawing his own independent implications. For the purpose of that comparison the implications drawn in the document Basic Presuppositions are here reproduced:<sup>180</sup>

The Committee suggests that the following are the major implications and unique emphases of the paper:

1. The principles call for a whole scheme of Christian education to be developed in the light of the primacy of revelation. Thus pupil, teacher, church, minister, all stand under the judgment and need the redemption of God and must work together to accomplish this purpose. Everyone is a learner, a seeker after God's will, and only as one participates actively in the redemptive enterprise can he be eligible for the role of teacher.

2. The principles represent a strong emphasis upon the Bible, so that it becomes central in the curriculum because it is central in the life of the church. The use of the Bible, moreover, is in harmony with its own unique character as the record of revelation. A curriculum built upon these principles, therefore, will give opportunity for increased knowledge of the total message of the Bible, and at the same time allow the Bible to speak for itself in such a way that the individual is brought into encounter with the living God.

3. The principles represent the conviction that God has willed to use the whole life of the church as witness to and instrument for confronting men with his living Word. In its

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180. Ibid., p. 14.

curriculum, therefore, the church must take account of the educational role of the whole Christian fellowship and must not depend only on materials, formal patterns of education, and the selection and training of individual teachers.

4. The principles represent the conviction that the covenant between God and his people is a way of life which is unique, but which is also a powerful witness to society and brings about change in society. The perfection of the life of the covenant people through the educational work of the church has as the end in view the fulfillment of the ultimate purpose of God that all men may be drawn to him through Jesus Christ.

5. The principles grow out of the conviction that revelation occurs within a covenant relation; that is to say, God comes to man as to one with whom he wishes to enter into a relationship of mutual faithfulness. He is not concerned to convey information about himself for the sake of satisfying neutral curiosity about his nature and purpose of providing for mystical aspiration. He is concerned to enter into a profound and life-giving relationship with persons who will receive him as the God and receive life from his hands.

6. The principles call for an educational procedure which will be consistent with the fact and manner of revelation, relying upon the work of the Holy Spirit. More emphasis will be placed on the education that comes out of a living situation in home and church, with a clear understanding of the necessity for a person to respond and grow in an experience of God that has its origin and fruition in the depth of one's selfhood.

7. The principles represent the conviction that a major emphasis should be placed on adults, for this emphasis, more than emphasis on any other single age group, will help the church develop the qualities of the covenant community in all areas of life.

8. The principles suggest that the church's treatment of its children will center in their inclusion in the community of the covenant people of God as children of the covenant. This will tend to place increased emphasis on the value of participation in community life and worship through which the child can be brought to a sense of vocation and stewardship as the beloved child of God.

9. The principles suggest that adults in the covenant community have a significant responsibility for the Christian nurture of all children. Parents, therefore, will need the inspiration, support, and guidance of the whole covenant community in the fulfillment of their special responsibilities.

10. The principles call for a leadership training which will be based on the fact that revelation is given in a living relationship of encounter and response between God and man.

The church's educational task cannot be thought of merely as teaching individuals specific methods by which they will be expected to pass down a body of truth to "learners." This truth means that the teacher must have himself entered into a living relationship with God. His teaching will be founded on the single story of redemption that is told through the Bible. These needs of teachers for personal relationship to God and for comprehension of the Bible should be taken into account in all leadership training programs.

11. The principles recognize that although it is not the teacher's primary responsibility to pass down creed and dogma, nevertheless, the teacher will need to recognize that creeds and doctrinal propositions are latent in the experience of man with God and serve as guideposts and correctives, and must be formulated to strengthen and support faith in the presence of doubt and distress that are brought about by the conflicting claims of culture and by the exigencies of life.

It should be noted that Implication 1 of Basic Presuppositions is another way of stating the first major implication of this thesis.<sup>181</sup> Implication 2 is an obvious corollary which this investigator has subsumed under his first major implication. Implication 10 that leadership training should be conducted in a manner in harmony with the nature of revelation is a legitimate extension of the principle embodied in the first major implication. Implication 3 on the educational role of the whole Christian church, Implication 4 on the witness of the covenant community to society as a whole, and Implication 5 on God's entrance into life-giving relationship through the covenant are direct logical deductions from the distinction between unregenerate human reason and regenerate human reason which the investigator has drawn out in his second main implication.<sup>182</sup> Implication 6 on the living situation in home and church, Implication 8 that children are included in the covenant

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181. Supra, pp. 246-62.

182. Supra, pp. 263-71.

community, and Implication 9 that the whole church is responsible, together with parents, for the Christian nurture of all children in the church follows naturally from the transmissibility of the experience of the Christian mystery from parent to child which has been maintained by the investigator in his third main implication.<sup>183</sup> Implication 7 that major emphasis should be placed upon adult education is very close to the fourth main implication of this thesis that improvement of Reformed Protestant Christian education must take place first at the adult level.<sup>184</sup> Implication 11 on the role of the teacher in handling creed and dogma is not a direct deduction from Calvin's teachings on human reason. It is a fair inference from the form and intention of Calvin's Institutes and from Calvin's own personal use of catechisms in teaching.

Note on the Possible Relevance of These Implications to Reformed-Church-Related Colleges

Even if the relevance of these implications to Reformed-Church-related colleges were entirely clear, their implementation to any specific college situation would tend to be fragmentary and partial, even at best. There are infinite variables in selection of college faculty, selection (or lack of selection) of students, relationship to the community in which the college has its setting, economic handicaps, pattern of relationship between college and church, and other factors.

There are widely varying patterns of relationship between colleges and the churches to which they are related. From the point of view of a denominational board of education these varying patterns of church control require

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183. Supra, pp. 271-81.

184. Supra, pp. 281-85.

different approaches by denominational executives who seek to modify existing educational policy to conform to denominational goals. As an example of a strict pattern of church control, Calvin College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, is owned and operated by the Christian Reformed Church.<sup>185</sup> Its Board of Trustees is answerable directly to the General Synod of the Christian Reformed Church. Every Christian Reformed congregation is levied to support the college. As early as 1947 the assessment was \$5.00 per church family.<sup>186</sup> As an example of a less strict pattern of church control, Hope College in Holland, Michigan, is governed by a fifty-six-member Board of Trustees, only nine of whom are elected by the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America. The President of the College and the Executive Secretary of the Board of Education of the Reformed Church in America are members. Thirty-nine members are elected by the various Particular Synods (of which there are six in the United States). The other six are members at large elected by the Board of Trustees themselves.<sup>187</sup> As an example of a considerably more loose pattern of church control, Central College in Pella, Iowa, is governed by a fifty-one-member Board of Trustees, only one of whom is elected by the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America. Twenty-two members are elected by Classes<sup>188</sup> in California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin. Three members are elected by the Particular Synods<sup>188a</sup> of Albany, New Jersey, and New York. Three members are elected by the alumni association. The other

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185. John Kromminga, The Christian Reformed Church, p. 146.

186. Ibid., p. 147.

187. Hope College Bulletin, 1959-1961 Catalogue, p. 7.

188. A Classis in Reformed Churches is a deliberative body of ministers and elders, similar to a presbytery.

188a. A Particular Synod in Reformed Churches is a church court, or council, next above the Classis.

twenty-two are members at large elected by the Board of Trustees themselves. It so happens that almost all of the trustees are members of Reformed Churches.<sup>188b</sup> It appears that in the calendar year 1958 Central College received from the Reformed Church in America about \$120,000<sup>188c</sup> out of a total "Educational"<sup>188d</sup> income of about \$420,000.<sup>188e</sup> It is not intended here to imply that Central College, with its decentralized structure of church control, is any less church-related than tightly controlled Calvin College, for example. It is asserted merely that with respect to any denominational educational policy the problems of communication and implementation may be different.

Despite these various patterns of church control over Reformed-Church-related colleges, there is considerable general agreement as to what the Church college ought to be. With respect to the first implication of this thesis, that Reformed Protestant Christian education should be oriented toward the mysteries of the Christian faith, it is found to be generally accepted at the college level. Howard F. Lowry, president of the College of Wooster (Presbyterian), Wooster, Ohio, has maintained that "a Church college begins with a commitment to a divine truth which those who found or perpetuate it believe has been revealed to men and has been tested by both thought and experience."<sup>189</sup> He stresses the mysteries of the Christian

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188b. The Rev. Bernard J. Mulder, D. D., Executive Secretary of the Board of Education of the Reformed Church in America, and the Rev. Gerrit T. Vander Lugt, Ph. D., D. D., President of Central College, are the investigator's sources of information on the structure of the Board of Trustees of Central College.

188c. This figure is inferred from the financial statement of the Board of Education of the Reformed Church in America found in Report of Board of Education, Reformed Church in America, 1958, p. 34.

188d. As contrasted with "Non-Educational" income on investments.

188e. Minutes of the General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, June, 1959, p. 65.

faith. For those responsible for a Church college, Lowry declares, "there is still much they do not understand--mysteries unsolved and much yet to be discovered. Their own religion is a source not yet exhausted."<sup>190</sup> Hope College officially aims to interpret all learning through a Christian view of the world based upon the Word of God. One of its aims and purposes is: "To introduce the student to the organized fields of learning, interpreted through the Christian view of the world, man and his culture, based upon revealed truth as presented in the Word of God, so that he will further develop a proper sence of values."<sup>191</sup> The aims and purposes of Central College are "definitely Christian, as they are based on the great affirmations of the Christian faith as found in the Apostles' Creed."<sup>192</sup> Again, "the College seeks to permeate the whole world of life and education with the Christian spirit, and thus promote wise interpretation of facts. The whole educational program is predicated upon the acceptance of Christ as God's self-disclosure and man's Saviour and Lord."<sup>193</sup> Such statements as these could be multiplied many times, thus showing that trustees, administrators, teachers, and others responsible for Reformed-Church-related colleges are well aware that they are operating within the framework of the mysteries of the Christian faith.

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190. Ibid., p. 102.

191. Hope College Bulletin, 1959-1961 Catalogue, p. 9.

192. Central College Centennial Bulletin-Catalogue, 1953, p. 18.

193. Ibid., p. 19.

The second implication of this thesis, that Reformed Protestant Christian education should orient itself toward regenerate human reason, means at the college level that the religious commitment of a student should be firmly established before he applies for admission to a Reformed-Church-related college. Lowry defines a Christian college as "a community existing around a group of learners, both teachers and students, who confess Jesus Christ as their Savior and Lord."<sup>194</sup> However, he allows that within limits "they invite to their inquiry those who may not hold their premises or yet share their practical commitment."<sup>195</sup> The first aim of Hope College is "to develop Christian character, nurturing and strengthening faith in God, in Jesus Christ as God's Son and only Saviour and Lord, and in the Bible as the inspired Word of God, our only rule of faith and practice."<sup>196</sup> This aim assumes that the student who applies for admission already possesses a Christian character to be developed. Central College, however, under the terms of its charter, is to offer "equal advantages to all students having the required literary and moral qualifications irrespective of denomination or religious profession."<sup>197</sup> Thus, for example, if a person of the Jewish faith wished to be admitted for either cultural or professional reasons, his application should be given fair consideration, provided it could be established that he was an active member of his own worshipping community. However, in view of the general goal of encouraging "Christian character and good citizenship--a sense of responsibility to God and man,"<sup>198</sup> it is hardly

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194. Howard Lorry, op. cit., p. 102.

195. Ibid., p. 103.

196. Hope College Bulletin, 1959-1961 Catalogue, p. 9.

197. Central College Centennial Bulletin-Catalogue, 1953, p. 18.

198. Ibid., p. 18.

conceivable that an applicant with no religious commitment could be admitted.

On the third implication of this thesis with regard to the covenant theology, it may fairly be taken for granted that the covenant community already exists at the Reformed-Church-related college. Lowry describes the effect of the covenant community as follows: "The work a college does, at any rate, is not confined to the classroom. It is done within the whole experience of the community--in common worship, in practical projects undertaken, in community service, and in the variety of extracurricular life."<sup>199</sup> He goes on to note: "In one sense, Christianity cannot be studied at all; it must be lived, however imperfect that effort be. One learns out of association with those who are making such an effort something that cannot be learned from books alone."<sup>199a</sup> As for the membership of the covenant community, Lowry observes as a parallel and corollary of the Old Testament covenant theology that "the Christian community of the Church college will include every member--professors, cooks, deans, students, janitors, presidents, trustees, and groundmen."<sup>200</sup> Hope College "seeks to foster a close personal relationship between students and faculty and to promote a sense of unity and cooperation in the college community, for it believes that these characteristics are among the distinctive advantages of the smaller liberal arts colleges."<sup>201</sup> Central College says "a religious atmosphere favorable to personal development surrounds Central's students,"<sup>202</sup> and goes

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199. Howard Lowry, op. cit., p. 113.

199a. Ibid., p. 113.

200. Loc. cit.

201. Hope College Bulletin, 1959-1961 Catalogue, p. 8.

202. Central College Centennial Bulletin-Catalogue, 1953, p. 19.

on to mention "the strong, well-attended churches in Pella"<sup>203</sup> and the "wholesome city of 4500 people."<sup>204</sup> Proper behavior for members of the Church college community is that which is "becoming to a Christian, that is consonant with membership in the Community whose God is the Lord, the Community of those who have passed from death unto life because they love the brethren."<sup>205</sup>

With respect to the fourth implication of this thesis, that any efforts to improve the quality of Reformed Protestant Christian education should begin at the adult level, it is here that Reformed-Church-related colleges are most aware of their opportunity to improve the quality of adult leadership. Lowry sees this as a broad opportunity. He observes, "A fair number of the graduates of a Church college should serve the Church in full-time tasks, at home and overseas. But the college should also contribute an even greater number of devoted laymen as leaders for Church and society in every walk of life."<sup>206</sup> Hope College lists as one of its aims: "To train the whole of man for the whole of life and to send forth well-informed, consecrated Christian leaders into every walk of life."<sup>207</sup> Central College aims to guide the student into "proficiency in his chosen field, and a foundation for post-graduate study."<sup>208</sup>

A recent exploratory study of the impact of college teaching found that "the values of American college students are remarkably homogeneous, considering the variety of their social, economic, ethnic, racial and reli-

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203. Ibid., p. 20.

204. Ibid., p. 21.

205. Alexander Miller, "Unprincipled Living: the Ethics of Obligation," in Christianity and Crisis, Vol. XX, No. 4, March 21, 1960, p. 29.

206. Howard Lowry, op. cit., p. 120.

207. Hope College Bulletin, 1959-1961 Catalogue, p. 9.

208. Central College Centennial Bulletin-Catalogue, 1953, p. 19.

gious backgrounds, and the relatively unrestricted opportunities they have had for freedom of thought and personal development."<sup>209</sup> This study concludes that the curriculum has no discernible influence on values,<sup>210</sup> that the quality of teaching has relatively little effect upon the value-outcomes of general education,<sup>211</sup> and that the method of instruction seems to have only a minor influence on students' value judgments.<sup>212</sup> One minor observation possibly favorable to the work of the Church colleges is that "a climate favorable to a redirection of values appears more frequently at private colleges of modest enrolment."<sup>213</sup>

It must be freely admitted that basic character formation has taken place long before college, and that the opportunity of the college to effect any basic reorganization of values is strictly limited. Kirkland notes that "the decisive value-orientation has probably already been made," and that "the college seems in most cases to be able to do precious little about effecting any basic changes in these core values."<sup>214</sup> Jacob allows that "college may be too ephemeral an experience to mold a person's convictions of supreme reality."<sup>215</sup> These latter observations would be in harmony with the Reformed Protestant Christian theory of education as a life-time occupation and proposition. In terms of Reformed theology, sanctification is a process which continues from the cradle to the grave. If Jacob's observations on the effect of a college education are valid criticisms of Reformed-Church-related colleges, they may indicate that perhaps the original selec-

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209. Philip E. Jacob, Changing Values in College, p. 1.

210. Ibid., p. 5.

211. Ibid., p. 7.

212. Ibid., p. 8.

213. Ibid., p. 9.

214. William Kirkland, "American Culture and Campus Culture," in Christianity and Crisis, Vol. XX, No. 3, March 7, 1960, p. 22.

215. Philip E. Jacob, op. cit., p. 57.

tion of students has not been sufficiently rigid. Perhaps in some years the admission bars were slightly lowered in order to keep the enrolment at a decent level. Finally, there is a factor which studies of the type conducted by Philip Jacob can never adequately measure. This factor is the probability that the best fruits of a Reformed-Church-related college education will appear at a period in life much later than the actual college experience.

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