The Educational Views of William James and Josiah Royce.

by

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I

Introduction.

1. Statement of the Problem.

When education is mentioned we usually think of our public grammar and high schools as well as of public and private institutions of higher learning who make it their chief and only business. Dewey, in his "Democracy and Education", has called our attention to the fact that all of the activities of life are educational, and so the formal education of the schools should not be thought of as something separated from the rest of life. And so in a general sense the whole of life is educational, and any views which concern life are educational views. But as the public schools and institutions of learning represent the conscious effort of society to preserve and to perpetuate itself, and as the teacher occupies a central place in the school, we will consider educational views from the point of view of the teacher. We do this because we believe the school and the life outside of the school are, as Dewey suggests, not properly two things but two aspects of one life process. So then, any educational views which are of value to the teacher in the school, will likewise be of value to the teacher outside of the school, whether this teacher be the mother in the home, the manager of a factory or anyone who directs the activities of life.

Every teacher faces the problem of formulating for himself a philosophy of education. Some no doubt are hardly conscious of the nature of the task they are engaging in when they formulate their philosophy; they go blindly forward, depending on instinct and getting along the best they can. Others reflect seriously on the problem and want to form their

philosophy in the light of the history of thought. They want to know what the scientific endeavors and the critical reflection of others can offer them as an aid in solving their own problem. While any philosophy of life is, in the broad sense, a philosophy of education, yet there are certain parts of a general philosophy which are of more immediate concern to the teacher. Accordingly, it is our purpose here, not to formulate a philosophy of education for teachers to read and accept, but rather to bring together in brief compass the views of William James and of Josiah Royce as they relate definitely to education. We propose to examine and compare the educational views of a pragmatist and of an idealist, in the hope that they may serve to help each teacher formulate his own philosophy of education. The teachers' search is really a search for guiding principles with which to face the problems of daily life, and if this study serves to give us a better understanding of our problems, and some guidance as to their solution it will have served its purpose.

2. Its Interest and Importance.

The interest we feel in such a study as the one here proposed is, in the first place, the natural desire we have to know what others have thought and done. We have an instinctive love for the past. This is accentuated in the Jewish and Chinese people as evidenced by the esteem with which they regard their ancestors. How often is our conduct guided by precedent. But our interest in what others have thought and done is particularly in those things which are directly related to our own present activities. Not only are we born with curiosity and a desire for knowledge, but, in the second place, our in-

terest grows out of a felt need. The teacher finds himself in charge of a school, and a series of questions come to his mind. What are these pupils anyway? Why are they here? What am I here for? What shall I teach them? How shall I teach them? What is the purpose of education? We begin to wonder, our wonder leads us to seek for light, and we naturally turn for aid to those who have faced and reflected upon like problems before.

It is important that a board of education employing teachers should not only know how much information the teacher possesses and how able he is to direct the experience of children, but also his attitudes and ideals; his philosophy of life. Kilpatrick, following Dewey, has called our attention to concomitant learnings. If history repeats itself, the attitudes and ideals of the teacher will be reflected in the life of the pupil. And so it is highly important that his philosophy should be formulated in the light of the accumulated thought and experience of the race. If we know what others have thought and done, we may cherish their worthy ideals, complete their unfinished tasks, profit by their mistakes and learn from their successes. Royce would excuse a student of philosophy for most everything but ignorance of the history of philosophy. He pointed out that those who attempted to formulate their ideals independently usually arrived at conclusions which were old and poorly conceived. If the race is to make progress, if the teachers of today are to be better than the teachers of yesterday, they must gather up, organize, utilize and then add to the experience of the past. Men who have gathered up and organized with increment the thought of their day, are worth studying. We find in James and Royce two

outstanding representatives who grew up with the present scientific age, kept abreast of the times, and who, in the light of science and history, have each given us a philosophy of life from a different point of view. These honored leaders have left the scene of action, but from their writings we may learn their educational views. Both of them having been popular teachers, writers and lecturers within comparatively recent years, have contributed a decided impetus and trend to the educational currents of our day. A consideration of their views will help us to understand our present educational problems, as well as to give us some guiding principles for their solution, thus aiding each individual to formulate his own philosophy of education.

II

The Educational Views of William James.

1. A Glimpse of the Man.

William James was born in the old Astor house in New York City on the eleventh day of January, 1842, of Scotch-Irish parents. Shortly afterwards they moved to No. 2 Washington Place where the second son, Henry, was born on April 15, 1843. William was the oldest of five children. His father, a theologian and writer, moved about so much that his children received a varied education. James was sent to private schools in New York City. During his early years he spent short irregular periods under tutors and governesses in London and Paris, and one year (1857 - 58) at the College de Boulogne. The family then returned to Newport, but the year 1859 - 60 finds them again abroad, and William and Henry studying in the academy at Geneva. During the winter of 1860 - 61 William studied painting at Newport. It was, no doubt, here that he developed his natural tendency for keen, accurate observation. An incident in his early life illustrates this tendency. "Henry, at the ordinarily 'tough' age of ten, was already animated by a secret passion for authorship, and used to confide his literary efforts to folio sheets, which he stored in a copy-book and which he tried to conceal from his tormenting brother. But William came upon them, and discovered that on one page Henry had made a drawing to represent a mother and child clinging to a rock in the midst of a stormy ocean and that he had inscribed under it: 'The thunder roared and the lightening followed.' William saw the meteorological blunder immediately; he fairly pounced upon it, and he tormented the sensitive romancer about it so unmercifully that the occasion had to be marked by punishments and the inauguration of a

material protectorate over the copy book." (The Letters of William James, Vol. 1, p. 21)

The irregular character of his education continued. In 1861 he entered the Lawrence Scientific School, having given up painting, and two years later entered Harvard Medical School. His course here was interrupted by a trip to Brazil as assistant under Louis Agassiz on the Thayer expedition. Returning from this he studied medicine in Germany, and in 1869 got his M.D. at Harvard. In 1873 he began his professional career at Harvard where he continued for the rest of his life in different positions, first as instructor in Anatomy and Physiology, then instructor in Psychology, Assistant Professor of Physiology, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and finally Professor of Philosophy. Emile Boutroux tells us "the life of Professor James was entirely devoted to studying, experimenting, observing, reading, reflecting, investigating, instructing, talking and writing."

The following description by his son in the introduction to "Letters of William James" is interesting. "He was of medium height (about five feet eight and one-half inches), and though he was muscular and compact, his frame was slight and he appeared to be slender in youth, spare in his last years. His carriage was erect, and his tread was firm to the end. Until he was over fifty he used to take the stairs of his own house two, or even three, steps at a bound. He moved rapidly, not to say impatiently, but with an assurance that invested his figure with an informal sort of dignity. After he strained his heart in the Adirondacks in 1899 he had to habituate himself to a moderate pace in walking, but he never learned to make short

movements and movements of unpremeditated resppnse in a deliberate way. When he drove about the hilly roads of the Adirondacks or New Hampshire, he was forever springing out of the carriage to ease the horses where the way was steep. Great was his brother Henry's astonishment at Chocorua, in 1904, to see that he still got out of a 'democrat wagon' by springing lightly from the top of the wheel. His doctors had cautioned him against such sudden exertions; but he usually jumped without thinking.

"In talking he gesticulated very little, but his face and voice were unusually expressive. His eyes were of that not very dark shade whose depth and color changes with alterations of mood.....He talked in a voice that was low-pitched rather than deep -- an unforgettably agreeable voice, that was admirable for conversation or a small lecture room, although in a very large hall it vibrated and lacked resonance. His speech was full of earnest humorous and tender cadences..... The story of the solemn-minded student who stemmed the full tide of a lecture one day by exclaiming: 'But, Doctor, Doctor .....to be serious for a moment.....,' is already well known.

"People and conversation excited him -- if too many, or too long-continued, to the point of irritation and exhaustion. If, as was sometimes the case, he was moody and silent in a company, it was a sign that he was over-worked and tired out. But when he was aroused to vivacity and floated on the current of congenial discussion, his enunciation was rapid, with occasional pauses while he searched for the right word or figure and pursed his lips as though helping the word to come. Then he talked spontaneously, humorously and often extravagantly.....

Men and women of all sorts felt at ease with him, and anybody .....who had any philosophy in him, was soon expounding his private hopes, faiths, and skepticisms to James with gusto.... In faculty meetings he spoke seldom, and he spent very little time on his feet -- except as called upon -- when professional congresses were thrown open to discussion. Similarly, he was seldom at his best at large dinners or formal occasions.... He was never guilty of abusing anecdote, -- that frequent instrument of social oppression, - but he loved and told a good story when it would help the discussion along and showed a fair spirit of mimicry in relating one."

2. Psychological Views of William James.

It was in the field of psychology that James first won European recognition; in fact it was not until his fame had reverberated from foreign countries that we realized we were holding a "prophet without honor" in our own country. He devoted twelve years of critical study and original research to the preparation of two large volumes called "Principles of Psychology" which he published in 1890. This work was so favorably received that two years later he published a "Briefer Course" which became widely used as a text book in colleges and universities. In 1892, in response to a request from the Harvard Corporation, he prepared a series of lectures on psychology for Cambridge teachers which were later delivered in various places, and finally published in 1899.

(1) Definition and Method of Treatment.

James follows Professor Ladd in defining Psychology as the

"description and explanation of the states of consciousness as such". (Briefer Course, p. 1) He treats Psychology as a natural science, and interprets what he means by a natural science of psychology in this way. We have no one science of all things as all things cannot be completely known, but instead "we have a lot of beginnings of knowledge made in different places, and kept separate from each other merely for practical convenience sake, until with later growth they may run into one body of Truth. These provisional beginnings of learning we call 'the Sciences' in the plural. In order not to be unwieldy, every science has to stick to its own arbitrarily selected problems, and to ignore all others. Every science thus accepts certain data unquestioningly, leaving it to other parts of philosophy to scrutinize their significance and truth. All natural sciences .....assume that a world of matter exists altogether independently of the perceiving mind.....Psychology as a natural science deals with things in the same partial and provisional way. In addition to the material world.....she assumes:-

1. Thoughts and feelings, or whatever other names transitory states of consciousness may be known by,
2. Knowledge, by these states of consciousness, of other things.

These things may be material objects or events, or other states of mind.

"How one thing can know another is the problem of what is called the Theory of Knowledge. How such a thing as a 'state of mind' can be at all is the problem of what has been called Rational as distinguished from Empirical Psychology. The FULL truth about states of mind cannot be known until both Theory of Knowledge and Rational Psychology have said their say. Mean-

while an immense amount of provisional truth about them can be got together, which will work in with the large truth and be interpreted by it when the proper time arrives. Such a provisional body of propositions about states of mind, and about cognitions which they enjoy, is what I mean by Psychology considered as a natural science." (Briefer Course, Intro.)

In the Preface to his Briefer Course, James answers those critics who have found fault with the arrangement of his Principles of Psychology. The pedagogical principle involved makes it worth our stating here. He says, "The order of composition is doubtless unshapely, or it would not be found so by so many. But planless it is not, for I deliberately followed what seemed to me a good pedagogic order, in proceeding from the more concrete mental aspects with which we are best acquainted to the so-called elements which we come to know later by way of abstraction.....I admit that my 'synthetic' order was stumblingly carried out; but this again was in consequence of what I thought were pedagogic necessities.....We really gain a more living understanding of the mind by keeping our attention as long as possible upon our entire conscious states as they are concretely given to us, than by post-mortem study of their comminuted elements."

(2) Fundamental Hypotheses.

"Mental Facts cannot be properly studied apart from the physical environment of which they take cognizance. The great fault of the older rational psychology was to set up the soul as an absolute spiritual being with certain faculties of its

own by which the several activities of remembering, imagining, reasoning, willing, etc., were explained, almost without reference to the peculiarities of the world with which these activities deal. But the richer insight of modern days perceives that our inner faculties are adapted in advance to the features of the world in which we dwell, adapted, I mean, so as to secure our safety and prosperity in its midst. Not only are our capacities for forming new habits, for remembering sequences, and for abstracting general properties from things and associating their usual consequences with them, exactly the faculties needed for steering us in this world of mixed variety and uniformity, but our emotions and instincts are adapted to very special features of that world..... Mind and world in short have been evolved together and in consequence are something of a mutual fit..... The chief result of all this more modern view is the gradually growing conviction that MENTAL LIFE IS PRIMARILY TELEOLOGICAL; that is to say, that our various ways of feeling and thinking have grown to be what they are because of their utility in shaping our reactions to the outer world..... Primarily then, and fundamentally the mental life is for the sake of action of a preservative sort.

"All mental states are followed by bodily activity of some sort..... All states of mind, even mere thoughts and feelings, are motor in their consequences..... The immediate condition of a state of consciousness is an activity of some sort in the cerebral hemispheres..... This conception is the working hypotheses which underlies all the 'physiological psychology' of recent years..... So far as possible then, we are to study the states of consciousness in correlation with

their probable neural conditions. Now the nervous system is well understood today to be nothing but a machine for receiving impressions and discharging reactions preservative to the individual and his kind..... Anatomically, therefore, the nervous system falls into three main divisions, comprising:-

1) The fibres which carry currents in;

2) The organs of central redirection of them; and

3) The fibres which carry them out.

Functionally, we have sensation, central reflection, and motion to correspond to these anatomical divisions". (Briefer Course, Introduction.)

(3) Review of "Talks to Teachers".

Arthur I. Gates in his Psychology for Students of Education published in 1925 makes reference in his bibliographies to five chapters of James' works which deal with Consciousness, Instincts, Emotions, Habit and Will. These five chapters probably represent the parts of his psychology which are of most significance for education today. But James in his lectures to teachers (called Talks on Psychology) has given us his own presentation of psychology in relation to education. His practical applications and maxims are worth noting as they probably represent the clearest presentation of his views. Accordingly, we shall conclude our presentation of his psychological views with a review of his fifteen lectures to teachers.

(a) Psychology and the Teaching Art.

Lecture I. deals with "Psychology and the Teaching Art". Calling attention to the fact that there is really no new psychology worthy of the name but only the old psychology of

Locke's time plus a little physiology of the brain and the theory of evolution he says, "It is only the fundamental conceptions of psychology which are of real value to the teacher. .....Psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application by using its originality..... The science of psychology, and whatever science of general pedagogics may be based on it, are in fact much like the science of war." The principles are:

1) Work your pupil into a state of interest;

2) Reveal impressively that you want to teach; and

3) Fill him with curiosity to know the next steps.

"Divination and perception, not psychological pedagogics or theoretic strategy, are the only helpers here." The teacher's attitude toward the child is concrete and ethical as opposed to that of the psychologist's which is abstract and analytic.

(b) The Stream of Consciousness.

Lecture II. is a discussion of "The Stream of Consciousness". "In each one of us when awake (and often when asleep) some kind of consciousness is going on. There is a stream, a succession of states, or waves, or fields (or whatever you please to call them) of knowledge, of feeling, of desire, of deliberation, etc., that constantly pass and repass, and constitute our inner life.....We have then <u>fields of consciousness</u>.....and the concrete fields are always complex..... In most of our fields of consciousness there is a core of sensation that is very pronounced.....The sensations are the <u>centre</u> or <u>focus</u>, the thoughts and feelings, the margin of your actually present conscious field.....

In the successive mutations of our fields of consciousness, the process by which one dissolves into another is often very gradual, and all sorts of inner rearrangements of contents occur. Sometimes the focus remains but little changed, while the margin alters rapidly. Sometimes the focus alters and the margin stays. Sometimes focus and margin change places. Sometimes again abrupt alterations of the whole field occur." He treats consciousness entirely on the descriptive level for "the truth is we really do not know the answers to the problems on the explanatory level."

(c) The Child as a Behaving Organism.

A discussion of the functions of consciousness under the caption of "The Child as a Behaving Organism" occupies lecture III. Consciousness has two functions: "It leads to knowledge and it leads to action." He follows a discussion of the historic and evolutionary conceptions of the function of consciousness with the request that, "You adopt with me, in this course of lectures, the biological conception.....that man, whatever else he may be, is primarily a practical being, whose mind is given him to aid in adapting him to this world's life." He does not reject the older conception, so dear to the philosopher, that consciousness leads to knowledge, but believes the second emphasis is of more practical value for the teacher. He leaves this an open question and accepts consciousness as leading to action because it will be of greatest practical use to teachers. He says the fact is that no truth, however abstract, is ever perceived that will not probab-

ly at some time influence our earthly action. "You should regard your professional task as if it consisted chiefly and essentially in training your pupil to behavior, not in the narrow sense of his manners, but in the very widest possible sense, as including every possible sort of fit reaction on the circumstances into which he may find himself brought by the vicissitudes of life."

(d) Education and Behavior.

Lecture IV. deals with "Education and Behavior". "Education, in short, cannot be better described than by calling it the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior." You should get into the habit of regarding the impressions you make on your pupil as all "leading to the acquisition by him of capacities for behavior..... If we reflect upon the various ideals of education that are prevalent in the different countries, we see that what they all aim at is to organize capacities for conduct."

(e) Reactions.

Lectures, V. VI. and VII. deal with Reactions. Reactions are necessary to learning. "No reception without reaction, no impression without correlative expression, this is the great maxim which the teacher ought never to forget." In this connection he commends the old custom of insisting on verbal expression in class recitation. The drawings, note-books and laboratory experiments are good for this reason and especially manual training. "Laboratory work and shop work engender a habit of observation, a knowledge of the difference between

accuracy and vagueness, and an insight into nature's complexity and into the inadequacy of all abstract verbal accounts of real phenomena, which once wrought into the mind remain there as life long possessions. They confer precision; because, if you are doing a thing you must do it definitely right or definitely wrong. They give honesty; for, when you express yourself by making things, and not by using words, it becomes impossible to dissimulate your vagueness or ignorance by ambiguity. They beget a habit of self-reliance; they keep the interest and attention always cheerfully engaged, and reduce the teacher's disciplinary functions to a minimum."

With reference to native and acquired reactions he says, "Every acquired reaction is, as a rule, either a complication grafted on a native reaction, or a substitute for a native reaction which the same object originally tended to provoke. The teacher's art consists in bringing about the substitution or complication, and success in the art presupposes a sympathetic acquaintance with the reactive tendencies natively there." The instinctive reactive tendencies he names as fear, love, curiosity, imitation, emulation, ambition, pugnacity, pride, ownership, and constructiveness.

(f) Laws of Habit.

Lecture VIII. on the "Laws of Habit" is now classic. "Education," says he, "is for behavior, and habits are the stuff of which behavior consists..... The great thing in all education is to make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy." We must make automatic and habitual as early as possible, as many useful reactions as we can. The five maxims which he lays

down for habit formation are:

1) Launch with as decided an initiative as possible.
2) Never suffer an exception to occur till the new habit is securely rooted in your life.
3) Seize the first opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain.
4) Don't preach to your pupils or abound in good talk in the abstract.
5) Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every day.

(g) Association of Ideas.

Lecture IX. on the "Association of Ideas" lays down two fundamental laws of association. "The Law of Contiguity tells us that objects thought of in the coming wave (of consciousness) are such as in some previous experience were next to the objects represented in the wave that is passing away..... The Law of Similarity says that when contiguity fails to describe what happens, the coming objects will prove to resemble the going objects, even tho the two were never experienced together before ..... The teacher can formulate his function to himself therefore in terms of 'association' as well as in terms of 'native and acquired reaction'. It is mainly that of building up useful systems of association in the pupil's mind.....In working associations into your pupils' minds, you must not rely on single cues, but multiply the cues as much as possible. Couple the desired reactions with numerous constellations and antecedents, -- don't always ask a question, for example, in the

same way; don't use the same kind of data in numerical problems; vary your illustrations, etc., as much as you can."

(h) Interest.

Lecture X. shows how instincts and the association of ideas can be utilized in creating interest. "Now some situations appeal to special instincts from the very outset, and others fail to do so until the proper connections have been organized in the course of the person's training. We say of the former sets of objects or situations that they are interesting in themselves and originally. Of the latter we say they are natively uninteresting, and that interest in them has first to be acquired ..... The native interests of children lie altogether in the sphere of sensation..... Living things, then, moving things, or things that savor of danger or blood, that have a dramatic quality, - these are the objects natively interesting to childhood, to the exclusion of almost everything else; and the teacher of young children, until more artificial interests have grown up, will keep in touch with her pupils by constant appeal to such matters as these. Instruction must be carried on objectively, experimentally, anecdotally. The blackboard drawing and story telling must constantly come in.....

"..... Any object not interesting in itself may become interesting through becoming associated with an object in which an interest already exists. The two associated objects grow, as it were, together: the interesting portion sheds its quality over the whole; and thus things not interesting in their own right borrow an interest which becomes as real and as strong as as that of any natively interesting thing..... From all these

facts there emerges a very simple program for the teacher to follow in keeping the attention of the child: Begin with the line of native interests, and offer him objects that have some immediate connection with these..... Next, step by step, connect with these first objects and experiences the later objects and ideas which you wish to instill. Associate the new with the old in some natural and telling way, so that the interest being shed along from point to point, finally suffuses the entire system of objects of thought..... The difference between an interesting and a tedious teacher consists in little more than the inventiveness by which the one is able to mediate these associations and connections, and in the dullness in discovering such transitions which the other shows."

(i) Attention.

Lecture XI. deals with "Attention". There are two types of attention described as active and passive, voluntary and involuntary, or effort and effortless attention. Voluntary attention cannot be continuously sustained. It comes in beats. The teacher may demand this kind of attention in thundering tones, but if he is to keep it "the subject must be made to show new aspects of itself; to prompt new questions; in a word, to change." The involuntary attention is the kind the genius is apt to have who "breaks his engagements, leaves his letters unanswered, neglects his family duties incorrigibly, because he is powerless to turn his attention down and back from those more interesting trains of imagery with which his genius constantly occupies his mind."

There are certain mechanical aids to attention which may have to be used in dull schoolroom work. "The posture must be

changed; places can be changed. Questions, after being answered singly, may occasionally be answered in concert. Elliptical questions may be asked, the pupil supplying the missing word. The teacher must pounce upon the most listless child and wake him up. The habit of prompt and ready response must be kept up. Recapitulations, illustrations, examples, novelty of order, and rupture of routine, above all, the teacher must himself be alive and ready, and must use the contagion of his own example."

"Attention to an object is what takes place whenever that object most completely occupies the mind..... The attentive process, therefore, may be physiologically symbolized by a brain-cell played on in two ways, from without and from within. Incoming currents from the periphery arouse it, and collateral currents from the centers of memory and imagination re-enforce these. In this process the incoming impression is the newer element; the ideas which re-enforce and sustain it are among the older possessions of the mind. And the maximum of attention may then be said to be found whenever we have a systematic harmony or unification between the novel and the old. It is an odd circumstance that neither the old nor the new, by itself is interesting. The absolutely old is insipid; the absolutely new makes no appeal at all. The old <u>in</u> the new is what claims the attention, - the old with a slightly new turn. No one wants to hear a lecture on a subject completely disconnected with his previous experience, but we all like lectures on subjects of which we know a little already, just as, in fashions, every year must bring its slight modification of last year's suit, but an abrupt change from the fashions of one decade into another would be distasteful to the eye. "The genius of the interesting teacher consists in sympathetic divination of the

sort of material with which the pupil's mind is likely to be already spontaneously engaged and in the ingenuity which discovers paths of connection from that material to the matters to be newly learned. The principle is easy to grasp, but the accomplishment is difficult in the extreme."

In reply to the objection that this appeal to the spontaneous interests is 'soft pedagogy' James says, "It is certain that most schoolroom work, till it has become habitual and automatic, is repulsive, and cannot be done without voluntarily jerking back the attention to it every now and then. This is inevitable, let the teacher do what he will. It flows from the inherent nature of the subjects and of the learning mind. The repulsive process of verbal memorizing, of discovering steps of mathematical identity, and the like, must borrow their interest at first from purely external sources, mainly from the personal interests with which success in mastering them is associated, such as gaining of rank, avoiding punishment, not being beaten by a difficulty and the like. Without such borrowed interest, the child could not attend to them at all. But in these processes what becomes interesting enough to be attended to is not thereby attended to <u>without effort</u>. Effort always has to go on, derived interest, for the most part, not awakening attention that is easy, however spontaneous it may now have to be called. The interest which the teacher, by his utmost skill, can lend to the subject, proves over and over again to be only an interest sufficient <u>to let loose the effort</u>. The teacher, therefore, need never concern himself about <u>inventing</u> occasions where effort must be called into play. Let him still awaken whatever sources of interest in the subject he

can by stirring up connections between it and the pupil's nature, whether in the line of theoretic curiosity, of personal interest, or of pugnacious impulse."

(j) Memory.

Lecture XII. which discusses "Memory" is based upon the principle that "there can be no improvement of the general or elementary faculty of memory: there can only be improvement of our memory for special systems of associated things..... The secret of a good memory then is thus the secret of forming diverse and multiple associations with every fact we care to retain..... The one who thinks over his experiences most, and weaves them into systematic relation with each other, will be the one with the best memory..... The art of remembering is the art of thinking.....and when we wish to fix a new thing in either our own mind or a pupil's our conscious effort should not be so much to impress or retain it as to connect it with something else already there. The connecting is the thinking; and if we attend clearly to the connection, the connected thing will certainly be likely to remain within recall."

(k) The Acquisition of Ideas.

Lecture XIII. on "The acquisition of Ideas" affirms that education really consists in acquiring ideas, and that certain ages are suited to the acquisition of particular types of ideas. "I will permit myself to use either the word 'conception', or the still vaguer word 'idea', to designate the inner objects of contemplation, whether these be individual things, like 'the sun' or 'Julius Caesar', or classes of things, like 'animal

kingdom', or finally, entirely abstract attributes, like 'rationality' or 'rectitude'. The result of our education is to fill the mind little by little, as experiences accrete, with a stock of such ideas..... So you see that the process of education, taken in a large way, may be described as nothing but the process of acquiring ideas or conceptions, the best educated mind being the mind which has the largest stock of them, ready to meet the largest possible variety of the emergencies of life.

"In all this process of acquiring conceptions, a certain instinctive order is followed. There is a native tendency to assimulate certain kinds of conceptions at one age, and other kinds of conceptions at a later age. During the first seven or eight years of <u>childhood</u> the mind is most interested in the sensible properties of material things. Constructiveness is the instinct most active; and by the incessant hammering and sawing, and dressing and undressing dolls, putting of things together and taking them apart, the child not only trains the muscles to co-ordinate action, but accumulates a store of physical conceptions which are the basis of his knowledge of the material world through life. Object teaching and manual training wisely extend the sphere of this order of acquisition..... Feed the growing human being, feed him with the sort of experience for which from year to year he shows a natural craving, and he will develop in adult life a sounder sort of mental tissue, even though he may seem to be 'wasting' his time in the eyes of those for whom the only channels of learning are books and verbally communicated information.

"It is not until adolescence is reached that the mind grows able to take in the more abstract aspects of experience, the hidden similarities and distinctions between things, and especially their causal sequences. Rational knowledge of such things as mathematics, mechanics, chemistry, and biology, is now possible..... Later still, not till adolescence is well advanced, does the mind awake to a systematic interest in abstract human relations, properly so called, - sociological ideas and to metaphysical abstractions ..... In all these later studies, verbal material is the vehicle by which the mind thinks..... The more accurately words are learned the better, if only the teacher makes sure that what they signify is also understood."

(1) Apperception.

Lecture XIV. discusses "Apperception". "It verily means nothing more than the act of taking a thing into the mind..... It is only one of innumerable results of the psychological processes of association of ideas; and psychology itself can easily despense with the word, useful as it may be in pedagogics.... In all apperceptive operations of the mind a certain general law makes itself felt, -- the law of economy. In admitting a new body of experience, we instinctively seek to disturb as little as possible of our pre-existing stock of ideas. We always try to name a new experience in some way which will assimulate it to what we already know. We hate anything absolutely new..... A new idea or a fact which would entail extensive rearrangement of the previous system of beliefs, is always ignored or extruded from the mind in case it

cannot be sophistically reinterpreted so as to tally harmoniously with the system.... If an educated man is, as I said, a group of organized tendencies to conduct, what prompts the conduct is in every case the man's conception of the way in which to name and classify the actual emergency. The more adequate the stock of ideas, the more 'able' is the man, the more uniformly appropriate is his behavior likely to be".

(m) The Will.

The last lecture deals with "The Will". "The word 'will' can be used in a broader and in a narrower sense. In the broader sense, it designates our entire capacity for impulsive and active life, including our instinctive reactions and those forms of behavior that have become secondarily automatic and semi-conscious through frequent repetition. In the narrower sense, acts of will are such only as cannot be inattentively performed. A distinct idea of what they are, and a deliberate fiat on the mind's part, must precede their execution..... I will restrict myself in what follows to volition in this narrower sense of the term.

"All our deeds were considered by the early psychologists to be due to a peculiar faculty called the will, without whose fiat action could not occur..... This doctrine was long ago exploded by the discovery of the phenomena of reflex action, in which sensible impressions, as you know, produce movement immediately and of themselves. The Doctrine may also be considered exploded as far as ideas go..... A belief as fundamental as any in modern psychology is the belief at last attained that conscious processes of any

sort, conscious processes merely as such, must pass over into motion, open or concealed..... Action from a single idea has been distinguished from more complex cases by the name of 'ideo-motor' action, meaning action without express decision or effort. Most of the habitual actions to which we are trained are of this ideo-motor sort."

After calling attention to the complex case where two ideas are in the mind, to the exercise by one of them of inhibition, and to the existence of nerves of arrest along side of motor nerves, he applies the notion of inhibition to ideational processes by describing the probable ways one reaches a decision to get up on a cold morning.

"(1) I may forget for a moment the thermonetric conditions, and then the idea of getting up will immediately discharge into act: I shall suddenly find that I have got up - or

(2) Still mindful of the freezing temperature, the thought of the duty of rising becomes so pugnent that it determines action in spite of inhibition. In the latter case I have a sense of energetic moral effort, and consider that I have done a virtuous act.

"All cases of willful action properly so called, of choice after hesitation and deliberation, may be conceived after one of these patterns..... Voluntary action, then, is at all times a resultant of the compounding of our impulsions with our inhibitions. From this it follows immediately that there will be two types of will, in one of

which impulsions will predominate, in the other inhibitions. We may speak of them as the precipitate and the obstructed will, respectively."

Regarding the education of the will he says it should not be "broken" as John Wesley advised but rather direct the child's attention to something else, leading him back to the idea at which he has balked by a circutious line of association, and spring the idea on him again before he recognizes it, and likely it will discharge before he inhibits it. "But let us now close in a little more closely on this matter of the education of the will. Your task is to build up a <u>character</u> in your pupils; and a character, as I have so often said, consists in an organized set of habits of reaction. Now of what do such habits of reaction themselves consist? They consist of tendencies to act characteristically when certain ideas possess us, and to refrain characteristically when possessed of other ideas."

"If, then, you are asked, 'In what does a moral act consist when reduced to its si plest and most elementary form?' you can make only one reply. You can say <u>it consists in the effort of attention by which we hold fast to an idea</u> which but for that effort of attention would be driven out of the mind by the other psychological tendencies that are there. To think, in short, is the secret of will, just as it is the secret of memory..... Thus are your pupils to be saved: first, by the <u>stock of ideas</u> with which you furnish them; second, by the amount of <u>voluntary</u>

attention that they can exert in holding to the right ones, however unpalatable; and third, by the several habits of acting definitely on these latter to which they have been successively trained."

There are two types of inhibition, the one by repression or negation, the other by substitution. The later is the best. The reason James gives for believing in free will is because "if free will were true, it would be absurd to have the belief in it fatally forced upon us."

3. Philosophical Views of William James.

(1) Introductory Statements.

William James was a pluralist, a pragmatist and a radical empiricist. But as pragmatism ranges herself on the side of pluralism (Pragmatism p.161) and as the pragmatic conception of the truth relation is central in his doctrine of experience (The Meaning of Truth, Preface) we may say that his fundamental philosophy of life was the philosophy of pragmatism. H. Heath Bawden, speaking of the philosophy of pragmatism in 1910 says, "At the present time it is connected with the names of three men, Professor William James of Harvard University, Mr. F.C.S. Schiller of Oxford University, England, and Professor John Dewey of Columbia University, each being associated with a distinct phase of the movement. Professor James emphasizes the practical meaning of philosophy for every-day life, and in describing his point of view uses the

words 'pragmatism' and 'radical empiricism'. Mr. Schiller defends the rights of religious faith and feeling in determining our beliefs, and prefers the term 'humanism'. His philosophy has much in common with what in other quarters has come to be called 'personalism'. Professor Dewey is the champion of the scientific empirical method in philosophy. This method is quite generally known as 'instrumentalism', but in a recent article described by Professor Dewey himself as 'immediate empiricism'. (Principles of Pragmatism, p.9)

It is with the pragmatism of William James that we are here concerned. In 1906 at Lowell Institute in Boston and again in January of 1907 he delivered a series of lectures setting forth his views on the subject which were subsequently in the same year published under the caption of "Pragmatism - A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking". "It is said that James' 'Pragmatism' was for a time the most widely circulated non-fiction book in the New York Public Library, and President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia has described it as the philosophy 'which, when unfolded to the man on the street, causes him to howl with delight, because at last he understands things'." (Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy, p.54)

This first publication, particularly because of its conception of truth, evoked so much criticism that he gathered together all the writings of his pen on this subject and published them in 1909 in "The Meaning of Truth". We shall consider pragmatism first from the point

of view of its history as related by James, then, as it is both a philosophical method and a theory of truth we shall consider each of these in order concluding with a discussion of pragmatism in relation to education.

(2) History of Pragmatism

"A glance at the history of this idea will show you still better what pragmatism means. The term is derived from the Greek word πράγμα, meaning action, from which our words practice and practical come. It was first introduced into philosophy by Mr. Charles Pierce in 1878. In an article entitled 'How to Make our Ideas Clear', in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for January of that year Mr. Pierce, after pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, we need only to determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object, then, we need only to consider what conceivable effects of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive significance at all.

"This is the principle of Pierce, the principle of

pragmatism. It lay entirely unnoticed by anyone for twenty years, until I, in an address before Professor Howison's philosophical union at the University of California, brought it forward again and made a special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the times seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at present fairly spots the pages of philosophical journals. It is evident that the term applies itself conveniently to a number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective name and that it has 'come to stay'." (Pragmatism, pp. 46,47)

(3) The Pragmatic Method.

"The pragmatic method is a method of settling metaphysical disputes that might otherwise be interminable." (Pragmatism p. 45) It is based upon the fundamental principle that "there can be no difference anywhere that doesn't make a difference elsewhere - no difference in abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on somebody, somehow, somewhen, somewhere." (Pragmatism, pp. 49-50) Pragmatism not only attempts to settle disputes by bringing the abstract problems into the realm of experience where we can handle them but she is forward looking. The pragmatic method is an attitude of orientation, "the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 'categories', supposed necessities; and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts." (Pragmatism, p. 55)

Suppose an individual comes face to face with the

problems of God, free will and design. As a good pragmatist he immediately turns his attention to experience and asks, What difference will it make if these things be true or if they be false? What consequences follow of a practical sort if the ideas be true, and what practical consequences may we expect if they are false? This is the pragmatic method in practice. With reference to these questions James concludes, "Design, free-will, the absolute mind, spirit instead of matter, have for their sole meaning a better promise as to the world's outcome." (Pragmatism, p. 127)

A concise definition of pragmatism written by James for Baldwin's 'Dictionary of Philosophy' may help to clearify our thought regarding the pragmatic method. It is "the doctrine that the whole 'meaning' of a conception expresses itself in practical consequences, consequences either in the shape of conduct to be recommended, or in that of experience to be expected, if the conception be true; which consequences would be different if it were untrue and must be different from the consequences by which the meaning of other conceptions is expressed. If a second conception should not appear to have other consequences, then it must be only the first conception under a different name. In methodology it is certain that to trace and compare their respective consequences is an admirable way of establishing the differing meanings of different conceptions." (Copied from The Americana, Vol. 22)

(4) The Pragmatic Conception of Truth.

Perhaps the most penetrating, significant question ever asked by anyone is the question Pilot asked Jesus: "What is truth?" It expresses the ultimate goal of philosophical endeavor, and the yearning of many hearts. Pragmatism proposes an understandable answer to this question, understandable because it keeps the problem within the limits of experience. All agree that "truth is a property of certain of our ideas. It means their 'agreement' as falsity means their 'disagreement' with reality." (Pragmatism p. 198) But just what is reality - that with which an idea must be in agreement to be true? The idealist contends that the reality is to be found in the object. The pragmatist affirms that reality is to be determined by the 'workableness' of the idea.

The idealist says ideas "are true whenever they are what God means we ought to think about an object." The Copyist's view says that ideas possess truth "just in proportion as they approach to being copies of the Absolute's eternal way of thinking." The pragmatist says, "Granted an idea or belief to be true, what concrete difference will its being true make in anyone's actual life? What experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash value in experiential terms? The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: True Ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those we cannot." (Pragmatism, pp. 199-200)

Truth is indeed agreement with reality, and reality for the pragmatist is experience. Realities mean, (1) Concrete facts, (2) "Abstract kinds of things and relations perceived

intuitively between them," and (3) the "whole body of other truths already in our possession". Realities mean things of common sense sensibly present, or else common sense relations as for example dates, distances, places, kinds or activities. "To 'agree' in the widest sense with reality can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings, or to be put into such working touch with it as to handle either it or something connected with it better than if we disagreed." (Pragmatism p. 212)

Truth then is not something 'static' but is the 'process' of verifying an idea. "The truth of an idea is not stagnant property inherent in it. Truth <u>happens</u> to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact a process". When ideas are verified it is by use of what is called the function of agreeable leading, that is, the ideas "lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they instigate, into or up to, or towards other parts of our experience with which we feel all the while - such feeling being among our potentialities - that the original ideas remain in agreement. The connections and transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, harmonious, satisfactory." (Pragmatism, p. 201) Suppose then a new idea comes to me. To test its truth I do not seek to find out whether the object of the idea is real, but I turn to my own experience, and I try the idea out to see whether it is in agreement with the rest of my ideas. If I find there is agreement, and that the idea works, then the idea is made true. "Truth is <u>made</u>, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience." (Pragmatism ;. 218) But each

individual does not make all of his own truth, that is, he does not verify all of the ideas himself which he holds as true for "truth lives for the most part on a credit system..... We trade truths.... But beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole superstructure." (Pragmatism, p. 207)

There is for the pragmatist, no absolute truth, but all truth is relative. "The greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths". (Pragmatism, p.78) In the process of making, truth must be continually altered and changed in the light of experience. "For one truth-process completed, there are a million in our lives that function in the state of nacency." (Pragmatism, p. 207) And even our most assured truths are true only in so far as they work. We see this in the application of pragmatism to religion. He says that "on pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypotheses if consequences useful to life flow from it. Universal conceptions, as things to take account of, may be as real for pragmatism as particular sensations are. They have, indeed, no meaning and no reality if they have no use. But if they have any use they have that amount of meaning. And the meaning will be true if the use squares with life's other uses..... On pragmatic principles, if the hypotheses God works satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true..... Experience shows that it certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all other working truths." (Pragmatism, pp. 273, 299)

It remains here to view the pragmatic conception of truth in relation to the doctrine of Radical Empiricism. James thus explains his use of this name. "I say 'empiricism', because it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact as hypotheses liable to modification in the course of future experience; and I say 'radical', because it treats the doctrine of monism itself as an hypothesis, and, unlike so much of the halfway empiricism that is current under the name of positivism or agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all experience has got to square.

"Radical empiricism consists (1) first of a postulate, (2) next of a statement of fact, (3) and finally of a generalized conclusion.

(1) "The postulate is that the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience. (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.)

(2) "The statement of fact is that the relations between things conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.

(3) "The generalized conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure." (Meaning

of Truth, Preface)

The conception of truth as the property of 'workableness' in the idea, or the relation which exists between the idea and its practical consequences is central in the doctrine of radical empiricism. We have called attention to this doctrine here because it shows clearly that truth is something within the realm of experience. Things outside of experience may exist, but they become real only as they are experienced, for truth is not something that is attached to the object of an idea, but to the consequences of an idea as expressed in actual living.

(5) Pragmatism and Education.

Perhaps we can best apply the philosophy of pragmatism to education by answering from the pragmatic point of view ten questions which, later in our discussion, are answered from the point of view of an idealist.. We think of pragmatism as it was expounded by William James, but as this doctrine has become so popular under the leadership of John Dewey, we shall, where his emphasis might be different from that of James, indicate it by parenthetical insertions.

(1) What is the real nature of education?

The acquisition or accumulation of workable ideas and habits (skills and attitudes).

(2) What is the real aim of education?

The broadening of experience with a view to developing desirable capacities for conduct. (The enrichment and control of experience.)

(3) What is the means of education, the curriculum?

Life activities which stimulate the acquisition of ideas (racial, social and personal) and provide occasion for testing them in practice.

(4) What is the right attitude toward the body in physical education?

As the behaving organism which is the home of ideas and the means of their verification its cultivation is essential for effective participation in life (life's interests and activities).

(5) What is moral education?

Bringing the will of man (man's tendencies) into harmony with the practical (and social) interests of life, or developing the power to keep workable ideas focal in consciousness.

(6) What is aesthetic education?

Developing the capacity to experience (by participation) those things which refine and ennoble life.

(7) What is social education?

It is so adjusting individual behavior to the practice of other individuals that there will be a maximum of agreement and a minimum of conflict. (Sharing in common activities and experiences.)

(8) What is intellectual education?

It consists in the acquisition of ideas adequate to meet the emergencies (or regular and irregular situations) of life.

(9) What is vocational education?

It is the organization of behavior in the interests of the practical needs of life (involving industrial intelligence).

(10) What is religious education?

It is ~~the~~ cultivating those beliefs from which consequences useful to life flow through engaging in the activities which they stimulate.

Education then, is to prepare for complete living in this world. An ideal world there may or may not be, but we are citizens of this world now, and it is with its present problems that we are concerned. It is the business of education to prepare the individual for the highest type of citizenship. The terminus ad quem is the world's perfection, to be realized through making the most of the world as we experience it.

4. Summary of the Educational Views of William James.

(1) Summary of Psychological Views.

The educational views of William James as revealed in his psychology may be summarized in this way. The child is a conscious individual. Consciousness is conditioned by cerebral processes. Mind is motor, that is it leads to action. Consciousness or mind exists to enable the individual properly to adjust himself to his environment. Teaching is an art for which psychology, a science, can only supply fundamental principles. The stream of consciousness leads to continuous activity, the organization of which is the teacher's business. To direct the acquisition and organization of behavior one must

understand what the existing tendencies to behavior are, and how new reactions can be acquired. New reactions grow out of old ones. The teacher who would direct the growth must understand the soil. No impression without expression; no education without activity. Education is for behavior, and habits are the stuff of which behavior consists. Initiative, exercise, persistence and effort are essential to habit formation.

The teacher's task may also be defined in terms of consciousness. In the stream of consciousness ideas are related as they have been previously experienced together or as they resemble each other. To furnish the mind with ideas, build up a variety of associations. Interest depends upon associating new ideas with instinctive and acquired ideas already interesting. Attention should be secured by appealing to spontaneous interests. Mechanical aids are available but less desirable. The old in the new is what claims attention. Not effortless attention, but the release of effort in attention is the teacher's objective. Memory is developed through richness and variety of associations. Education results in the acquisition of ideas. The process of acquisition should be directed in the light of the natural cravings of the growing child. Will is the power of sustained attention; the power to hold an idea in the focus of consciousness. The essentials of an education are a stock of ideas, powers of voluntary attention in holding to the right ones, and proper habits of reacting. Inhibit bad reactions by substituting good ones.

(2) Summary of Philosophical Views.

Pragmatism is practical. As a method it seeks meanings in consequences as revealed in conduct. Differences in the

meanings of ideas are to be described in terms of differences in the conduct they produce. Attention is directed forward into the stream of experience; away from first things, categories, principles, supposed necessities. As a genetic theory of truth it is continuously creative. New ideas are true when they have been verified in experience; when it has been demonstrated that they work. Reality is to be found in the consequences of an idea, in the experience it produces, rather than in the idea's object. The power to borrow beliefs verified by others makes progress possible. Religious beliefs are true if useful, but their truth consists in their usefulness. The reality of the object is neither affirmed nor denied, except as it becomes a part of experience. Truth, as the property of workableness in ideas, is delimited by experience. There can be for the individual no truth except that of his experience.

Pragmatic education is practical education. It seeks to equip the individual with workable ideas and capacities for useful conduct which have been verified and tested in practice. The curriculum is designed to engage the pupil in those activities from which consequences useful to life flow. It is concerned with ideals and beliefs only as they prove to be of service in meeting life's demands. Its interests are limited to those things which lie within the realm of actual experience.

III

The Educational Views of Josiah Royce

1. The Philosopher.

A man's views of life are always colored by his own experiences, and so if we know something of the personal history of the man whose views we are to study, we can better understand and appreciate his philosophy. We are fortunate here to have the words of Professor Royce himself as spoken at the Walton Hotel at Philadelphia on December 29, 1915. At the close of a dinner given in his honor, Royce expressed his appreciation by giving a brief account of his life, a part of which we here quote. (Philosophical Review, Vol. 25, 1916)

"I was born in 1855 in California. My native town was a mining town in Sierra Nevada, - a place five or six years older than myself. My earliest recollections include a very frequent wonder as to what my elders meant when they said that this was a new community. I frequently looked at the vestiges left by the former diggings of miners, saw that many pine logs were rotten, and that a miner's grave was to be found in a lonely place not far from my own house. I dimly reflected that this sort of life had apparently been going on ever since men dwelt thereabouts. The logs and the grave looked old. The sunsets were beautiful. The wide prospects when one looked across the Sacramento Valley were impressive, and had long interested the people of whose love for my country I heard much. What was there in this place that ought to be called new, or for that matter crude? I wondered, and gradually came to feel that part of my life's business was to find out what all this wonder meant.

"My earliest teachers in philosophy were my mother,

whose private school, held for some years in our own home, I attended, and my sisters, who were all older than myself, and one of whom taught me to read. In my home I heard the Bible very frequently read, and very greatly enjoyed my mother's reading of Bible stories, although, so far as I remember, I was very generally dissatisfied with the requirements of observance of Sundays, which stand out somewhat prominently in my memory..... I did early receive a great deal of training in dialectics, from the sister nearest to me in age. She was three years my senior. She was very patiently persistent in showing me the truth. I was nearly as persistent in maintaining my own views. Since she was patient, I believe that we seldom quarrelled in any violent way. But, as I remember, our dear mother used, when the wrangling grew too philosophical, to set me the task of keeping still for an hour.....

"I was not a very active boy. I had no physical skill or agility. I was timid and ineffective, but seemed to have been, on the whole, prevailingly cheerful, and not extremely irritable, although I was certainly given to petty mischief, in so far as my sisters did not succeed in keeping me under their kindly watch.....

"My earliest patriotic experience came at the end of the Civil War, when the news of the assassination of Lincoln reached us. Thenceforth, as I believe, I had a country as well as a religious interest.....

"When we went to live in San Francisco, I for the first time saw, first San Francisco Bay, and then the ocean itself, which facinated me, but which for a long time taught me little.

"About June 1866, I began to attend a large Grammar School in San Francisco. I was one of about a thousand boys. The ways of training were new to me. My comrades very generally found me disagreeably striking in my appearance, by reason of the fact that I was read-headed, freckled, countrified, quaint, and unable to play boys' games. The boys in question gave me my first introduction to the 'majesty of the community'. ..... Yet my mates were not wholly unkind, and I remember lifelong friendships which I formed in that Grammar School.....

"In the year 1871 I began to attend the University of California where I received my first degree in 1875..... After graduation I studied in Germany, and later in the John Hopkins University (Ph.D., 1878), still later a while returning to the University of California from 1878 to 1882 (Instructor in English). Since 1882 I have been working at Harvard."

It is interesting to note that it was through the influence of William James that Royce was brought to Harvard, where he began work as Instructor of Philosophy in 1882, and ten years later became Professor of Philosophy, which position he held until his death in 1916. Aside from his teaching at Harvard he wrote a number of books and articles, lectured widely and held prominent positions. In 1903 he was president of the American Philosophical Association.

2. The Teachers' Needs.

In an article published under the caption, "Is there a Science of Education" (Educational Review, Vol. 1, 1891 pp. 15-25, 121-132) Royce reveals in a general way his own

conception of the teachers' needs. He concludes that "there is no science of education that will not need constant and vast adaptation to the needs of this teacher or that, constant modification in the presence of the live pupil, constant supplementing by the divine skill of the born teacher's instincts." But teachers "do need a scientific training for their calling. Instinct, unchastened by science, is blindly self-confident, and when it goes astray its fall from grace is irreparable; its very innocence then proves its doom..... There is no universally valid science of pedagogy that is capable of any complete formulation, and of direct application to individual pupils and teachers. Nor will there ever be one so long as human nature develops, through cross-breeding in each new generation, individual types that never were there before; so long as history furnishes, in every age, novel social environments, new forms of faith, new ideals, a new industrial organization, and thus new problems for education."

The teacher needs to know all he can "of the subject matter he is to teach" and "of certain branches of science that promise to be of service to all teachers in general, whatever their special callings."

"The teacher ought to be a man of ideals. The end of education is ethical. We desire to give to the state a loyal subject, and society a worthy fellow-worker. To this end we labor with our pupils..... I myself hold to the possibility of an universal ethical principle..... I am impelled to think that the pedagogy of the future will have, as one of its duties, the encouragement of a reasonable ethical reflection among our teachers..... I desire, then to see

more efforts, both within and without the churches, to train teachers to a clear consciousness about duty, and about its meaning. And I desire the study of ethics, without ceasing to be truly devout, to become also, as time goes on, more and more scientific in spirit and in content.....

"The teacher, I say, should furthermore be a naturalist, and the department of natural history which directly concerns him is called psychology..... When I said the teacher should be a naturalist, I meant that he should be in the habit of observing the mental life of children for its own sake, and of judging the relative value of its moods and tendencies. For such observation of the live child his study of published psychological researches ought primarily to be meant to prepare him."

There is then, no set of rules that a teacher can blindly follow but only general guiding principles. He needs a philosophy of life which defines for him his goal, and he needs to know how to study and to understand the child whom he is trying to help reach this goal. He needs to understand the laws of growth that he may be able to direct the progress of the child as he progresses toward the desired end.

3. Psychological Views of Josiah Royce.

(1) Method of Procedure.

The Teacher's Professional Library, edited by Nicholas Murray Butler, includes a book, "Outlines of Psychology", written by Josiah Royce in 1903. In this book he expresses his psychological views and brings them in at least twelve

places to focus directly on the problems of education which are of concern to the teacher. After indicating in general his method of treating psychology, we shall consider these twelve educational applications in connection with the doctrines out of which they grow.

(2) Basic Dualism.

While Royce treats philosophy from the point of view of the one infinite, Absolute Self, he deals with psychology from the point of view of finite man who is limited by time and space and who seems conscious of two worlds, a world of description and a world of appreciation. So then, while his philosophic position is that of constructive or absolute idealism, his psychological position is that of dualism. This is clearly reflected in his definition of psychology and in following statements regarding the relation of mental and physical.

"Psychology is, namely, the doctrine which attempts to describe our mental life, and, as far as possible, to discover its conditions and its laws. And by our mental life, as opposed to our physical life, we mean a certain collection of states and processes with which, from moment to moment, each one of us is, in his own case, very directly or immediately acquainted, while, on the other hand, it is impossible that anyone else besides the original observer, whose mental life this is, should ever get this immediate sort of acquaintance with just this collection of states and processes." (page 1) "We all of us not only have our mental states, but also appear to give these mental states a physical expression in certain bodily acts." (p.6) "We not only express our minds through our

movements, but seem to ourselves to be dependent, for at least very much of our mental life, upon more or less definite physical conditions..... A more scientific study, moreover, shows that not merely some but all of our mental states vary with physical conditions of one sort or another. (page 9) "The expressive physical functions (acts, gestures, words, habits, etc.) in which our mental life gets its outward representation and embodiment, are all of them as physical events, determined by physiological processes that occur in our nervous systems..... On the other hand, however, those numerous physical conditions, both within and without our bodies, which have been mentioned as appearing to determine in some way our mental states, prove to be conditions that are effective in so far as they at the same time physically influence our nervous systems." (page 10) These quotations are sufficient to illustrate what we mean by his dualistic position.

(3) The Signs of the Presence of Mind.

His general treatment of psychology as the Physical signs of the Presence of Mind is based on this conception. These physical signs are classified as Sensitiveness, Docility, and Initiative.

(a) Sensitiveness.

With reference to the first of these he says, "Beings that seem to us to possess minds show in their physical life what we may call a great and discriminating sensitiveness

to what goes on at any present time in their environment. And by this their sensitiveness we here mean something which, though a sign of mind, is itself purely physical, viz., a capacity, observable from without, to adjust themselves by fitting movements, or by their internal physical functions, to what takes place near them. This sensitiveness is called discriminating because..... it is a tendency to respond to some changes (e.g. light or sound) rather than to others, and to various changes in various fitting ways." Speaking of the sensitiveness of plants to certain environmental stimulus he says, "Greater, quicker, or else more highly elaborate is the sensitiveness of the beings that appear to have minds." (page 21) Sensitiveness is manifested in two ways, by the tendency to discriminate between feelings, and the tendency to discriminate between physical facts. His treatment of feelings is unique and his theory bears an important relation to the doctrine of initiative. Instead of the common classification of feelings into two kinds, satisfaction and dissatisfaction or sometimes called pleasantness, and unpleasantness, he makes a dual classification in this way.

I. (1) Pleasantness _____ (2) Unpleasantness.

Consciousness of organic condition.

Building up _____ Breaking down.

II. (3) Quiescence _____ (4) Restlessness.

Consciousness of Motor tendencies.

Passive attention _____ Active attention.

This two dimension arrangement makes possible the classification of certain feelings which do not naturally fall under the one dimension type. "We tend to regard with restlessness whatever tendency involves our interest in immediately future changes. The emotions of expectation, of curiosity, of fear, of hope, of suspense are especially coloured by restless feelings." (p. 180) On the other hand, the absence of motor tendencies, or our regard for the past, is usually associated with a feeling of quiescence. In speaking of our discriminating sensitiveness of objects, Royce calls our attention to the findings of Loeb, namely, that there exist in beings without nervous systems tendencies to react in certain ways to physical and chemical stimulus, which leads to the conclusion that sensitiveness is not in itself an absolute sign of the presence of the mind. However, where we know there is a mind this sensitiveness is always present and it "possesses a very great importance for the interpretation of what mental life is taking place." (page 31)

(b) Docility.

Docility is, simply stated, the power to show the effects of past experience in present conduct, or the tendency to learn by experience. "By the docility of an animal we mean the capacity shown in its acts to adjust these acts not merely to a present situation, but to the relation between this present situation and what has occurred in the former life of this organism..... The term 'docility' is chosen therefore as a convenient name both for the physical

manifestations of the animal's power to profit by experience, and for the mental processes that accompany this same power." (p.38) This docility which is regarded as "the most persuasive of all the signs of the presence of mind is governed by two general laws, namely, the Law of Cerebral Habit and the Law of Mental Association. The result of frequency, recency and intensity on cerebral processes is well known. These cerebral processes accompany and condition mental processes. The law of mental association is practically identical with the law of cerebral habit, except that in the realm of consciousness no two experiences exactly repeat. and again certain cerebral habits may be reduced to lower nerve centers and fall below the realm of consciousness. But just as brain functions may be simultaneous or successive, so we may have simultaneous or successive associations.

(c) Initiative.

Mental Initiative is the name used to designate that inward spontaneous tendency which manifests itself in novel acts such as are involved in inventiveness and critical decisions. It is not something entirely apart from instincts, habits or sensitiveness, but that tendency which leads to a variation of our conduct from what may be called the natural course. It is conditioned by organic growth and the feeling of restlessness. "The apparently spontaneous variations of our habits which appear in the course of life, and which cannot be altogether explained as due to external stimulation, have as their principal internal cause

this restlessness..... The environment and the inherited tendencies of an organism determine at any moment specific acts. The already acquired habits of the organism determine how these acts shall be based upon former actions. So far, however, the environment appears as the one source of whatever novelties are to appear in conduct; while the organism appears disposed to persist in its former modes of conduct, or to repeat such actions as its ancestral tendencies, its experience and its docility, predetermine. But if, amongst the various reactions of the organism, there are such as take the form of a restless search for novelty of environment and of conduct, then novelties will appear in the actions of the organism -- novelties which are due, in an important measure, to the tendencies which the organism itself has inherited. And yet the resulting acts will not be mere repetitions of ancestral acts, because they will have resulted from novel relations to an environment. It thus comes to be the case with the organism and with the mind, as it is with the emigrant to a foreign country. In the new country he leads a new life, and not the life of his ancestors. This result is indeed due to environment. Yet the new environment would never have come to him if he had not wandered." (p. 318-319)

There are various kinds of mental initiative. There are the Plays of Children. "Playful activity appears spontaneous because it is carried out when there is no necessity of carrying it out..... The spontaneous aspect of the playful function lies especially in the restless overflow of activities that the playful organism shows."

(p.321) The eagerness with which children persist in playful activity also illustrates this restlessness. Another kind is found in the Activities of Youth, where we find the initiative illustrated in the "power of the organism to persist in seeking new adjustments, whether the environment at first suggests them or not, to persist in struggling toward its wholly unknown goal, whether there is any apparent opportunity for reaching such a goal or not." (p. 325) In the social tendency called Individualism, and in the ordinary activities of the Attentive Functions we have further illustrations of mental initiative. But enough has been said to indicate what is meant by mental initiative as being a sign of the presence of mind.

(4) Educational Applications.

With this brief survey of his general psychological views, we shall turn to the specific educational applications which grow out of these and related views.

(a) Defective Sense Organs.

Sensitiveness is a sign of the presence of mind, but its absence does not indicate that a child is dull. "A teacher may be disposed to charge a pupil with stupidity, when a closer examination reveals the fact that the defect in the child's conduct is due to some slighter derangement of sense organs. So the short-sighted or the astigmatic pupil may be accused of stupidity, or inattentiveness, or even malicious unwillingness to study, because his defect of vision makes him unable to discriminate objects seen on a

blackboard at a certain distance, or in certain relationships to one another. Similar accusations may be even more easily made with injustice in case a pupil suffers from a slight deafness..... The signs of mental life are misinterpreted, in such wise that what is due to a defect of sense organs is judged as a defect of the intellect, or of the will, in other words, as a defect in the habits and in the self direction of the pupil." (p. 27, 28) Accordingly, if a child is able to make good use of past experience in his present conduct, but is slow to respond to his present environment, it is quite probable that he has defective sense organs. So then, out of the doctrine of the dependent relation of the mental life upon the nervous system we derive the practical conclusion that teachers should be careful to detect and correct sensory defects.

(b) Training Special Functions.

The old idea that training of the mind in one field, as for example, in the classic languages, equipped it to function in other fields has been altered by the study of the nervous conditions of our mental life. We find that the "brain tends to do the sort of thing it has already done" and that "each of the numerous habits of the brain means, then, tendencies to the excitement of localized tracts and paths under given physical conditions." (p. 66, 67) So then it results that the "training of one specialized cerebral function, in any particular case, may not result in the training of some other specialized function, even where we, viewing the matter from without, have supposed that these two functions were very intimately connected. The question as to

just what effect the training of one special function will have upon other functions, or upon general tendencies of the brain, is therefore a question to be answered by specific experience. This, the teacher, in estimating the general effects of new educational devices upon the pupils, must always remember." (p. 69, 70) This is somewhat in harmony with the principles which Gates lays down, namely, "Learn the act in the way it is to function in actual life." (Psychology for Students of Education p. 283) The transfer of learning then is not so general as we had formerly supposed, and Royce suggests that experience must indicate to what extent this is possible in kindred fields. The conclusion is that the teacher should strive to have the child develop those habits which will be useful in life. Our training should be in the field where we expect to function.

(c) Inhibition.

Some important principles are derived from a study of inhibition. "The brain cortex directs, by itself alone, and apart from cooperation of lower nervous centers, no externally observable motor process. What it does is partly to combine and elaborate, partly to guide by slight alterations, and partly to hold back or inhibit the activities which other centers left to themselves, would carry out in response to the sensory stimuli which reach them..... What in any situation we are restrained from doing is as important as what we do." (p. 70, 71) This is clearly illustrated in the case of vision. To observe one object it becomes necessary to refrain from observing numerous others equally perceptible. In

teaching children there are many "Thou shalt nots" to be taught. The best way to do this is to appeal to the higher functions, for "the higher a given function is, the more numerous are the inhibitory influences that it exercises over lower centers..... You in vain teach, then, self-control, unless you teach more than self-control." (pp. 74, 77) In other words, if we engage the higher centers in positive activities, the lower centers will yield to their stronger influences.

Another aspect of inhibition is that in intellectual work where the higher centers are exercised, there is a nervous expenditure of energy involved in the act of keeping the lower centers inhibited. Then in addition to this, the physiological condition of inactivity in the inhibited centers results in disturbed nutritive processes and a degeneration of the organism. So both the weariness resulting from nervous expenditure and the restlessness due to inactivity are relieved by a change of work. So then if one frequently varies his work it will prove restful. "Young children should never be asked to continue long any one type of inhibitory process." (p. 78) So then the principles of positive teaching and of variety in class-room procedure grow out of a study of the nervous conditions of inhibition.

(d) Similarity and Difference.

Consciousness is characterized by unity and variety or by similarity and difference. An important practical application is based on this truth. "If it is our purpose to make anyone, as for instance a pupil, clearly conscious of

some kind of difference between facts, we carefully choose facts that, while similar to one another in as many other ways as possible, clearly manifest just this particular difference. On the other hand, if we wish to make one observe a similarity, as happens when we desire to illustrate a law or a type or a class of facts, we carefully present different instances of this same type, that is, we illustrate sameness through difference, and difference through sameness. And in both cases we tend to succeed in proportion as we bring the differences and the samenesses that are to be studied into some single unity of consciousness, by presenting various objects at once." (p. 94)

(e) Cultivation of Sense Organs.

We made reference to the importance of the sense organs in considering their defects. But not only do sense organs form our contact with the external world, but "the weight of the experimental and pathological evidence is to the effect that we are unaware of our own movements except in terms of sensory experiences which thus accompany and result from their occurrence. To the outgoing nervous current in the motor nerves, consciousness does not directly correspond. But all the more must our sensory experiences become important for the support of our voluntary as well as of our intellectual life, in view of the fact that our sensory experience is not only a constant accompaniment of the processes that determine our movements, but furnishes the basis for the only knowledge that we are able to possess of what our movements are..... The development and support of mental activities of every grade is dependent upon

the constant and proper use of the sense organs. Every cultivation of even the highest inner life involves a cultivation of the sense organs. To use a very imperfect simile: the sense organs are related to the higher mental life, somewhat as the keys and stops of the organ are related to the music. In vain is the organist's skill, if the keys and stops will not work. In vain is the composer's art, if the mechanism of the instrument is not also in working order." (p. 127-8) We wish Royce would tell us more specifically just how a teacher should go about it to train the senses. He suggests though that one should provide a selective environment suited to the development of those sense organs we are particularly interested in cultivating.

(f) Mental Imagery.

Our present mental images depend upon the present state of the brain. There is an important relation between images and conduct. "The whole normal life of our imagination has a most intimate connection to our conduct, and should not be studied apart from conduct. The central processes which our images accompany form themselves a part of our reaction to our environment, and our more organized series of mental images actually form part of our conduct..... Many teachers suppose that to train the imagination of children involves something quite different from training their motor processes. But the normal imagination of healthy children is likely to get a rich expression in the form of their plays, of their dramatic impersonations, of their story-telling, and of their questions about things. And the most wholesome training of the imagination is properly to be carried out in connection with the train-

ing of conduct..... Good imagery is that which leads us to correct opinions and to useful conduct, as well as to harmoniously agreeable and satisfactory states of consciousness in general..... The teacher who endeavors to train all pupils as if they were alike good visualizers, will indeed, in view of the fact that the good visualizers are numerous, obtain many successes. But he will be likely to regard as stupid those pupils who perhaps are defective only in the particular type of mental imagery which he asks them to use. There are some branches of early education, especially spelling, whose successful acquisition must to a considerable extent depend upon the choice, on the pupil's part, of the right sort of mental imagery for the retaining of the desired facts. What the right sort is, will depend upon whether such a pupil is rather of the visual, of the auditory, or of the motor type. For this will determine whether he most readily learns to spell by eye, by ear or by means of the use of his tongue. In cases where the pupil himself finds difficulty in choosing the right imagery, the teacher may do well to discover something of what his type of imagination is, and direct his attention accordingly." (p. 160-162)

(g) Training of Perception.

Our reactions to objects take the form of acquired habits. "The accompanying consciousness, in so far as it is simple, and is determined by our habits of direct adjustment to objects that are repeatedly present, constitutes what we call our perception of these objects..... Our present conscious perception of any object which impresses our sense organs is a sort of brief abstract and epitome of our previous

experience in connection with such objects..... The practical application of all this is obvious. If you are to train the powers of perception, you must train the conduct of the person who is to learn how to perceive. Nobody sees more than his activities have prepared him to see in the world. We can observe nothing to which we have not already learned to respond. The training of perception is as much a practical training as is the learning of a trade. And it is this principle upon which the value of all arts, such as those of drawing, of experimenting and of workmanship depend, in so far as such arts are used, as in all modern training is constantly done, for the sake of developing the power to perceive. It is because he has played music that the musician so well perceives music. It is because of his habits of workmanship that the skilled artisan or engineer can so well observe the things connected with his trade." (p. 219-227) We see then that both the training of the imagination and the training of the powers of perception depend upon the training of conduct.

(h) Assimilation.

The doctrine of Assimilation has an important practical bearing on education. It has to do with the relation of the new to the old in acquiring ideas and is somewhat akin to the now known doctrine of apperception advocated by Herbart. "New ideas are likely to be assimilated to ideas such as we already possess. New fashions of thinking tend, as we form them, to lose something of their novelty by assimilation with older ways of thinking. Our whole life, both of conduct and of intellect, both of volition and of comprehension, is

therefore prevaded by interpretations of new facts in terms of old facts, by reductions of new practices to the form of old practices, and by a stubborn resistance, which increases with our age and training, to the formation of novel customs, or to the acceptance of novel opinions..... Novel objects, that are otherwise indifferent, and that are presented to the senses, tend to awaken our attention, and to become objects of definite consciousness, at the moment when we are able in some respect to recognize them. Apart from some decided importance which a novel object possesses for our feelings, the new in our experience, in so far as it is unassimilable, tends to escape our notice..... The way for new experiences that are to be assimilated must be carefully prepared. If a pupil is to be made to understand novel objects, they must be made, as far as possible, to seem relatively familiar to him at each step of the process, as well as relatively novel. Otherwise he may simply fail to notice them. Sense in vain presents what organized experience is not prepared to assimilate. The exceptions to this rule occur, as just pointed out, only in case either of very intense experiences or of experiences that appeal pretty strongly to the feelings. Since experiences of this latter sort play too small a part in the practical work of teaching, the law of assimilation must be especially and consciously considered by the teacher. We see in our world, in general, what we come prepared to see." (pp. 234-236)

(i) Differentiation.

The bearing of succession upon simultaneity in the acquiring of new powers to discriminate has an important bearing on the whole process of education." To learn about a

new subject matter that involves complex relationships of any sort includes, in the first place, long series of successive acts properly arranged, - acts of sensory observation, of recalling images, of repeating words, of drawing diagrams, of performing experiments, and so on indefinitely. Then we acquire gradually the power to 'survey at a glance' the results slowly brought to consciousness through these successive acts. This process of surveying at a glance involves a high degree of differentiation of our simultaneous consciousness. This differentiation of the simultaneous slowly results from the repeated acts, and from the powers of discrimination which have been cultivated in connection with them. The more successful we have been in the successive acts, the more skillful we shall be in the perception of relationships between simultaneous facts. The results of our deeds may thus be surveyed by us as if from above, as the traveler who has reached a height looks back with appreciation on the country through which he has wnadered, while unless he had wandered through it, or through similar country, the view from above would mean little to him..... An important practical result follows as to the meaning of the prominence that the dramatic element has in all instruction. Narrative more readily appeals to us than does description, because the former calls upon us rather more for the formation of distinct but simultaneous groups of images, while the latter plainly appeals to our power to repeat, in the form of images, successive acts with whose types we are familiar.... Narrative has the advantage of fixing our attention upon the kind of discrimination which

we find easiest, namely, the discrimination of successive facts..... For the trainer of minds the general resulting advice is: Undertake to systematize this differentiation of consciousness through fitting series of successive deeds. Remember that without such successive deeds there is no noteworthy intellectual understanding of simultaneous facts. The whole process of education is therefore a dramatic process, an interpretation of truth through conduct, a learning to appreciate the universe by successively responding to various parts of it, a reaching of unity through variety, an attainment of synthesis through analysis." (pp. 254-258)

(j) Social Instincts.

In the consideration of instincts Royce strikes another keynote which is of value to teachers. According to his classification there are two fundamental instincts, namely, Imitation and Opposition. He says, "The preservation of a happy balance between the imitative functions and those that emphasize social contrasts and oppositions forms the basis for every higher type of mental activity. And the entire process of conscious education involves a deliberate appeal to the docility of these two types of social instincts. For whatever else we teach to a social being, we teach him to imitate. And whatever use we teach him to make of his social imitations in his relations to other men, we are obliged at the same time to teach him to assert himself, in some sort or way, in contrast to his fellows, and by virtue of the arts which he possesses." (p.279)

(k) Initiative.

We have made reference to the unique distinction Royce makes in his classification of the feelings. Out of this feeling of restlessness which is a basic accompaniment of initiative there springs an engerness to do tasks that are in themselves unpleasant. The whole doctrine of interest and effort, is related to his practical application of Initiative to education. "Nothing is more significant for mental life than the cultivation of strenuous activity. Every sign of such a tendency should be encouraged by the teacher. It is equally true that every effort should be made not to confuse such activities with those which merely give a child pleasure. The purpose of the teacher is not merely to aid the child'to do what he likes to do'. The purpose of the teacher is to assist the child to become eager to do something that is in itself of a rationally significant tendency. That this eagerness is pleasant is indeed often the case. But the pleasure is by-play. The restless eagerness is the essential. And it is such eagerness that accompanies us into later life, wherein we may often be deeply interested in life, even when we find only very moderate pleasure in it." (p 332) This restless eagerness which the teacher is to encourage, or mental initiative as it is called, is based upon an elemental love of rational novelty. While this doctrine does not fit in well with materialistic behaviorism, it seems to fit the facts of life. The purpose of the teacher is then not merely to give the child immediate pleasure, but to stimulate his interest in worth while things, which in themselves may not be immediately pleasant. We notice Royce does not say

to take a switch and pound this restless eagerness into the pupil, but to encourage and develop that restless eagerness which is naturally in the child.

Royce's treatment of the will is so closely related to the doctrine of initiative that we may mention it in passing. The will is not an aspect of consciousness but the sum of the whole. Instead of being a department of our consciousness, which directs activities and bears the moral responsibility for what happens, it is the sum total of all of our consciousness. And our consciousness is in turn determined by our activities, and our activities are determined by tendencies of heredity, docility and environment. So then, as far as the physical world is concerned we have no power of choice.

(1) The Organization of Experience.

In view of the recent emphasis upon experience it seems fitting that we should close this section of our discussion with a presentation of our author's conception of the nature and importance of the Intellectual Life. This quotation gives a good summary of his educational views. Some definitions will first be necessary to make the meaning clear.

"All the contents of the stream of consciousness, in so far as we learn from them, - are contents of intellect....Not only that given states now pass, but that certain former states have been, guides us in our dealing with the world. In so far as we either recognize or otherwise profit by this relation between our present and our former states, or in so far as, by virtue of such a relation to the past states, we are led to expect any future state, our mental states are said to be <u>experiences</u>, and they then have, in addition to their direct

value as feelings, an indirect value as indications of truth, as sources of knowledge, or, once more, as intellectual conditions. This 'indirect value' we have called their 'intellectual value'. The laws of docility determine how our mental states come to get this, their intellectual value..... The practical study and proper guidance of the intellectual life constitutes one of the principal problems of civilization. All efforts to deal with the problem must set out from the fact that the intellectual life is precisely the 'organization of experience', and that, on the other hand, both the expression and the very existence of the intellect are dependent upon the formation of rational habits of conduct, useful motor adjustments.

"The first principle is itself twofold. It means that the intellectual life depends, as to its genesis in each of us, upon experience, and that, apart from experience, we have no intellectual guidance. It also means that no experience is of importance unless it is organized, and that chaotic or irrationally ordered experience is useless, and may be worse than useless. The second principle shows, in general terms, how experience is organized. It is organized by teaching certain fitting habits of conduct (imitative processes, constructive activities, language-functions, habits of attentive observation), such as are at once constant, familiar, and accurate as to their general types, and at the same time plastic, adaptable, and controllable, with reference to novel circumstances that may arise. That this complex object may be attained in case of healthy brains is itself a matter of ex-

perience. How to attain it belongs to the art of the teacher - an art whose rules, so far as they can be stated abstractly at all, must be founded on the laws of habit, of interest, and of inhibition - all of them laws that can best be stated in terms of the physical functions of the brain. At all events, he teaches in vain who does not in some way organize the activities, the intellectually expressive deeds of his pupils. Thought is either action or nothing."

4. Philosophical Views of Josiah Royce.

We have already stated that Royce was a constructive idealist. He has not written a philosophy of education, but has left it for his students to apply his general principles to this particular field. He has expressed his views regarding ethics however, and this is of value to the teacher who in this day of increased crime takes the problem of moral education seriously. Whether we regard education as preparation for life, or participation in life, or both, the value we attach to life itself is important, for it determines just how seriously we are going to consider this whole problem of education. It makes a difference whether we regard the little boy who comes to our school to learn as a mass of molecules assembled in the form of a living, sensitive, reacting organism that will some day disintegrate and vanish into nothingness, or whether we regard him as a conscious immortal being who exists as a part of an infinite conscious Self. It is our purpose here to call attention to the central truths of Royce's philosophy by answering in brief the questions,

What is Idealism? What is Loyalty? and, How do these conceptions effect education?

(1) The Nature of Idealism.

Idealism is the theory "that the whole universe, including the physical world is essentially one live thing, a mind, one great Spirit, infinitely wealthier in his experiences than we are, but for that very reason to be comprehended by us only in terms of our own wealthiest experience." (Spirit of Modern Phil. p. 17) It is a "belief in a spiritual principle at the basis of the world, without the reduction of the physical world to a mere illusion". In the eleventh lecture of his "Spirit of Modern Philosophy", Royce asserts that, "the business of the present lecture is to tell you in what sense and for what reasons I am an idealist." We cannot here trace the development of his argument, but merely call attention to some assertions that will clear up our understanding of this spiritual conception.

He says "there is nothing so clear, so certain, as the existence and unity of that infinite conscious Self..... About the finite world, we know in general only what experience teaches us and science records. There is nothing in the universe absolutely sure except the infinite. (p. 345) The non-physical, non-temporal, non-spacial character of this idealistic Self is made clear in the following quotation. "The living God, whom idealism knows, is not the first cause in any physical sense, at all..... He isn't anywhere in space or in time. He makes from without no worlds. He is no hypothesis of empirical science." The idea of causation belongs to things

of finite experience and therefore cannot be thought of in connection with this infinite uncaused spiritual self. (p.348)

"My reason for believing that there is one absolute World-Self, who embraces and is all reality, whose consciousness includes and infinitely transcends our own, in whose unity all the laws of nature and all the mysteries of experience must have their solution and their very being, - is simply that the profoundest agnosticism which you can possibly state in any coherent fashion, the deepest doubt which you can anyway formulate about the world or the things that are therein, already presupposes, implies, demands, asserts, the existence of such a World-Self." (p. 349) In developing his argument he points out two aspects, analytic and synthetic idealism. Analytic idealism says that all that can be known is ideas. Synthetic idealism points out that the world objective to our minds is not unknowable, but unknown, and therefore capable of being known. If it exists at all as a possibility of knowledge it must therefore, by the very fact of existence, now be the knowledge of somebody. And this somebody is the World-Self which idealism postulates.

We may now ask, What relation does man, the being to be educated, sustain to this World-Self? Of course, we are a part of this self, as is also the world of nature, which as finite beings, we experience as objective. The only way we can know the Self is through what we experience, and what we experience falls into two worlds. There is the World of Description which includes those things which exist in time and

and are characterized by permanence and universality. Those things which yield to the categories of description constitute for us an outer world as one that is different from an inner World of Appreciation. It turns out in the argument that only what has been appreciated can be described. The world that can be described is the world of facts, the world with which science deals, the mechanical world. The world of appreciation is a moral world, in which freedom reigns. And so the absolute Self, from the point of view of man has two aspects, one temporal and mechanical, the other eternal and free. As both of these worlds are experienced by man, he is a part of them both. To the extent that he is a part of the natural mechanical world he is subject to rigid law, and to the extent that he belongs to the world of appreciation, to the moral world, he is free, as free as the absolute Self of whom both worlds are a part. Thus man, the educable being belongs to a world of rigid necessity as well as to a world of freedom, both worlds being one in the eternal Self. But the world Self is in no sense bound because of the fact that a world of rigid law is a part of this Self. Our Physical world is but an aspect of the true world. (p. 420) He is in every respect free. The natural world of law which exists in time and space, only exists because of his own free will, he chose that it should be so, though he did not create it as something external to himself, for the Self is All and there can be nothing external. As Royce says, "You are not morally free to change laws in <u>this</u> world. But you are moral and free because you are in the eternal sense a part of the eternal World-Creator, who never

made the world at any moment of time, but whose choice of this describable world of time in its wholeness is what constitutes the world of appreciation, which is the world of truth." (p. 434) Such in general is the nature of idealism.

(2) The Conception of Loyalty.

This rather vague outline of idealism will become clearer as we develop the ethical conception of Loyalty which when rightly conceived, Royce regards as, "the heart of all the virtues, the central duty amongst all duties." It is based upon the conception that truth is not fluid, transient, inaccessable, but that it is eternal, in fact it is the very eternal Self of which we have been speaking.

(a) Loyalty Defined.

Loyalty is first defined as the willing and thorough devotion of a man to his cause. It implies three things: 1. A cause to which a man is loyal; 2. A willing and thorough devotion to this cause and, 3. An expression of devotion in some sustained and practical way. Loyalty is both a personal attitude and a social attitude, for it implies the grouping of many individuals together in one cause. The value of loyalty is that it cures hesitancy and gives unity, fixity and stability to life. It solves the eternal conflict between the self-will and the social will. We are born into a society bound by traditional customs, and we are born with a desire to do as we please. "Loyalty, then, fixes our attention upon some cause, bids us look without ourselves to see this

unified cause is, shows us thus some one plan of action, and says to us, 'In this your cause is your life, your will, your opportunity, your fulfilment." (Philosophy of Loyalty p. 42) "What form of loyalty is the right one, we are hereafter to see. But unless you can find some sort of loyalty, you cannot find unity and peace in your active living." (p. 46)

(b) Loyalty and Individualism.

To the objections that loyalty is opposed to individualism, that it is the tool of the oppressor; that it is a cloak for individual sins; that it opposes duties and rights; that it is opposed to spirituality, Royce answers that the cause to which one is loyal is the cause of his choice. Ethical individualism expressed in the quest for power is uncertain, insatiable and impossible. It is only in the willing devotion of self to a cause which is bigger than self, outside of self and yet inclusive of self that one really finds self-realization.

(c) Loyalty Illustrated.

This conception is made clearer by an illustration which Royce uses extensively in his exposition. It is an incident of English History often cited as a precedent in the discussions of constitutional privileges of the House of Commons which illustrates the personal worth and beauty of loyalty. "In January, 1642, just before the outbreak of hostilities between King Charles I and the Commons, the King resolved to arrest certain leaders of the opposition party in Parliament. He accordingly sent his herald to the House to demand the sur-

render of these members into his custody. The speaker of the house in reply solemnly appealed to the ancient privileges of the House, which gave to that body jurisdiction over its own members, and which forbade their arrest without its consent. The conflict between the privileges of the House and the royal prerogative was herewith definitely initiated. The King resolved by a show of force to assert at once his authority; and, on the day following that upon which the demand sent through his herald had been refused, he went in person, accompanied by soldiers, to the House. Then, having placed his guards at the doors, he entered, went up to the Speaker, and naming the members whom he desired to arrest, demanded, 'Mr. Speaker, do you espy these persons in the House?' You will observe that the moment was a unique one in English history. Custom, precedent, convention, obviously were inadequate to define the Speaker's duty in this most critical instance. How, then, could he most admirably express himself? How best preserve his genuine personal dignity? What response would secure to the Speaker his own highest good? Think of the matter as one of the Speaker's individual worth and reputation. By what act would he do himself honor?

"In fact, as the well-known report, entered the Journal of the House, states, the Speaker at once fell on his knee before the King and said: 'Your Majesty, I am the Speaker of the House, and, being such, I have neither eyes to see nor tongue to speak save as this House shall command; and I humbly beg your Majesty's pardon if this is the only answer that I can give to your Majesty'.

"Now, I ask you not, at this point, to consider the Speaker's reply to the King as a deed having historical importance, or in fact as having value for anybody but himself. I want you to view the act merely as an instance of a supremely worthy personal attitude. The beautiful union of formal humility (when the Speaker fell on his knee before the King) with unconquerable self-assertion (when the reply rang with so clear a note of lawful defiance); the willing and complete identification of his whole self with his cause (when the Speaker declared that he had no eye nor tongue except as his office gave them to him), - these are characteristics typical of a loyal attitude. The Speaker's words were at once ingenious and obvious. They were in line with the ancient custom of the realm. They were also creative of a new precedent. He had to be inventive to utter them; but once uttered, they seem almost commonplace in their plain truth. The King might be offended at the refusal; but he could not fail to note that, for a moment, he had met with a personal dignity greater than kingship, - the dignity that any loyal man, great or humble, possesses whenever he speaks and acts in the service of his cause." (Phil. of Loyalty pp. 103-106)

(d) Loyalty to Loyalty.

The next question that comes, after we have seen the value of loyalty, is, Loyalty to what? How shall one go about it to select a cause? To this Royce answers that "a cause is good, not only for me, but for mankind, in so far as it is essentially a loyalty to loyalty, that is, is an aid and a furtherance of loyalty in my fellows..... In

so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause, and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less..... In choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty." (pp. 114-121)

The cause then, is itself loyalty, and this is to be thought of not individually alone but universally. He says, "all the common virtues, in so far as they are indeed defensible and effective, are special forms of loyalty to loyalty, and are to be justified, centralized, inspired, by the one supreme effort to do good, namely, the effort to make loyalty triumphant in the lives of all men." (p. 129) My individual loyalty depends upon a very characteristic and subtle union of natural interest and free choice, but the cause of my choice, whatever it be, ought to be such as to further the cause of universal loyalty.

(e) Loyalty as Practical.

Loyalty is not something unpractical and removed from everyday life but "all those duties which we have learned to recognize as the fundamental duties of the civilized man, the duties that every man owes to every man, are to be rightly interpreted as special instances of loyalty." (p. 139) Such things as truth, honesty, fidelity, justice and benevolence may be suggested as examples of these duties. Loyalty then, is something practical which can be taught in the school-room, the home, and it is a growing and expanding conception which

finally becomes universal. In actually making a choice however, I may face a difficulty because I do not know enough about my cause. But the practical thing to do is to make a decision, to select a cause, and to do this intelligently if possible, but otherwise do it in ignorance. At any rate make a decision, for your life will be better for having made it even though you select and are loyal to a wrong cause, than it would be if you lived without loyalty. And having made your decision, be loyal to your decision. Do not change unless you find that your cause is out of harmony with Universal loyalty. And having your cause, your cause becomes your conscience. It is your guide in life, for your conscience is your conception of the relation of the present situation to the ideal - which is your cause.

But now we ask, Does all this abstract thinking about loyalty have any bearing on practical life, on problems with which education is concerned? Yes, it does. There are some distinctly American problems with which the philosophy is concerned. There is the problem of our foreign population. But it is not merely a problem of destroying one cause of loyalty and substituting another. "The problem here in question is not merely the problem of giving instruction in the duties of citizenship to those to whom our country is new, nor yet of awakening and preserving patriotism. It is the problem of keeping alive what we know to be the central principle of the moral life." (p. 212) We must not miss the central truth here that loyalty is essentially something good in itself. "The loyalty of the common people is precisely the most precious moral treasure of our world." We are to respect the loy-

alty of our foreign citizenship, to train them in loyalty, and to expand it, for true loyalty is vital to the life of the nation and of the world. Another need for true loyalty is found in our political and labor organizations. The practical need here is for a true conception of loyalty as social and universal, and not the blind fostering of the interests of one particular group without regard for the loyalty of other groups or individuals.

Our American Civilization is facing two dangers which are moral in character. On the one hand, "loyalty is not sufficiently prominent amongst our explicit social ideals. Loyalty is too often confused and discouraged instead of glorified and honored." (p 213) We do not think of it as having any value in itself as we should, we do not strive to attain it, nor are we educating for it as we should. On the other hand, loyalty is too seldom conceived of as rationally loyalty to universal loyalty. True loyalty does not foster class hatreds. It takes no delight in great armies, thought these may be necessary at times for the sake of expediency. If Royce were writing today, I think he would say, true loyalty leads us in the direction of the League of Nations, of a world brotherhood, of international good will, all because we are bound together in the common cause of universal loyalty.

(f) Loyalty and Teaching.

The question comes up, How shall we teach loyalty to the masses? "(1) You should aid them to possess and to keep those physical and mental powers and possessions which

are the necessary conditions for the exercise of loyalty. (2) You should provide them with manifold opportunities to be loyal, that is, with a maximum of significant, rational enterprises, such as can be loyally carried out; you should, if possible, secure for them a minimum of the conditions that lead to the conflicts of various forms of loyalty; and you should furnish them with a variety of opportunities to get social experience of the value of loyalty. (3) You should explicitly show them that loyalty is the best of human goods, and that loyalty to loyalty is the crown and real meaning of loyalty." (p. 214) Royce thinks that we should show opportunities for loyalty and teach by precept and example, and that we should help people realize what true loyalty is." Our young people grow up with a great deal of their attention fixed upon <u>personal success</u>, and also with a great deal of training in sympathetic sentiments; but they get far too little knowledge, either practical or theoretical, of what loyalty means." (p.220) We too often train for class loyalty without respect for the rational choice of the individual and for loyalty to the community and to the nation, and we might add, to the world.

The training of the individual for loyalty is possible because by nature we all have the capacity for loyalty. But this capacity is not developed in the early years of life. However, it has its beginnings, in the home and the school, and it is a tragic thing for a teacher to destroy the code of loyalty among the children by persuading one to tell on another. "The parent or the teacher who trifles with the code of honor of children by encouraging the talebearer, or by even

requiring that a child should become an informer, is simply encouraging disloyalty. He outrages the embryonic conscience of his young charges." (pp. 262-3) But the individual does not normally arrive at the natural period of developing loyalty until the adolescence period, though the flower which begins to bud now, and which soon bursts into full bloom has been growing for a long time. Loyalty is developed in athletic contests, etc., in youth, and we see it in the fraternal organizations among adults. But elaborate organizations for loyalty naturally belong to adult life. "The coming of true loyalty may be seriously hindered by the too early organization of the perfectly natural gang of boys into some too elaborate social structure. Harm has been done of late years by too much aping of athletic and fraternity life in connection with the lower grades of schools." (p. 265) Royce objects to the premature forcing of loyalty in youth, and the criticism of fraternities and athletics by a merciless public which is a fertile cause of developing this type of loyalty. He suggests such things as fair play in sports and more "dignified modes of celebrating great occasions" as for example, the Fourth of July, as a means of training our youth for loyalty.

"We constantly need, all of us, individual training in the art of loyalty. How is this work accomplished in the social order? In answering this question let history and daily social experience be our guides. The main lessons that these guides teach us, as I think, are three: First, our loyalty is trained and kept alive by <u>personal leaders</u>. Secondly

the higher forms of loyalty involve a momentous process which I shall call Idealizing the Cause. Thirdly, loyalty is especially perfected through great strains, labors, and sacrifices in the service of the cause." (p. 268-9)

(g) Loyalty and the Absolute.

The conception of Loyalty we have been considering leads us again to the conception of the absolute Self. "So far we have defined the moral life as loyalty, and have shown why the moral life is for us the best life. But now we want to know what truth is behind and beneath the moral life.....We want to see the relation of loyalty to the real universe." The community idea must be grasped if we are to understand loyalty. Loyalty begins with the individual, that is it finds its expression in the individual, who is a part of a social group. And all social groups have a group consciousness which group minds are a part of the universal consciousness of the absolute eternal Self. And so in being loyal to our group, to our chosen cause we are in reality being loyal to the cause of causes, to the truth of truths, to the eternal Self. "Both the reality and the good of a loyal man's cause must be objects of the loyal man's belief in order that he should be able to get the experience of loyalty..... A Spiritual Unity of life, which transcends the individual experience of any man, must be real." (p. 309)

(h) Loyalty and Pragmatism.

A word may be in order here as to the relation of this philosophy of Loyalty with its basic conception of Truth to

the philosophy of Pragmatism. In defence of his conception of truth as eternal Royce says, "Whoever talks of any sort of truth whatever, be that truth moral or scientific, the truth of common sense or the truth of philosophy, inevitably implies, in all his assertions about truth, that the world of truth of which he speaks is a world possessing a rational and spiritual unity, is a conscious world of experience, whose type of consciousness is higher in its level, than is the type of our human minds, but whose life is such that our life belongs as a part to this living whole..... Whoever is loyal serves what he takes to be the truth, namely, his cause." (Philosophy of Loyalty pp. 313-4) He applies his inevitable logic to Pragmatism as expounded by William James in this fashion. "For Professor James' Pragmatism, despite its entertaining expressions of horror of the eternal, actually does state one aspect of eternal truth. It is, namely, eternally true that all search for truth is a practical activity, with an ethical purpose, and that a purely theoretical truth, such as should guide no significant active process, is a barren absurdity." (p. 326) Thus we see that the idealist accepts truth as eternal, but also as practical, and the determination of what is practical and true, involves a consideration of consequences. Pragmatism says the verification process is truth, whereas idealism says this verification process is a way of finding truth. "But loyalty does not live by selling its goods for present cash in the temple of its cause." (p. 330) Loyalty, to which idealism is basic, involves personal sacrifices which may bring no immediate or seemingly remote practical good to the individual, but the truly loyal is serving

a cause which is bigger than self, which is worthy of the complete investment of self to the end that the cause may gain, altho no good practical consequences accrue to the individual, except as he is a part of his cause. That such causes of loyalty actually exist, that truth itself is real, is what pragmatism denies, and is what idealism affirms.

(3) Idealism and Education.

We have reviewed briefly the philosophy of Royce from the point of view of Idealism and of Loyalty. It now remains to view his philosophy from the point of view of education. In an article called "Royce's Idealism in Education" which was read before the American Philosophical Association at a dinner given at Philadelphia in honor of Josiah Royce's 60th birthday, and which was later published in the "Philosophical Review" (Vol. 25, 1916, pp. 473-478) Dr. H. H. Horne, formerly a student of Royce at Harvard, has given us an excellent summary of Royce's idealism from the point of view of education. It includes a statement of the motives animating Royce's Idealism, a statement of the relation of the educand to the ideal world, and the answer of idealism to ten questions bearing on the main problems of education.

The motives animating Royce's idealism are: (1) No reconstruction of the actual, but interpretation of the actual in large terms of rationality by means of dialectic. (2) No concession to naturalistic or realistic types of philosophy - but by supplementing "Description" with "Appreciation", the

preservation of the interests of morality and religion. (3) As opposed to dualism and pluralism the Unity of the world. "The whole of experience" is an integrated total unity.

The subject of education is man. "He is really a citizen of an ideal world, but he doesn't realize it; his naturalistic beginnings are consistent with his ethical goal: his progress in development is a process of deepening his consciousness; he is both a self and a socius..... The maladjustments between selves which we call evil are the conditions of winning the highest good through their conquest; in this struggle with evil man has freedom through union with the whole; as a unique expression of infinite will, he has immortality..... The goal is the organic being, comprehending both the static and the dynamic viewpoints, a Life of lives, a Self of selves, an Individual of individuals."

Idealism's answer to the main problems of education is here given.

1. "What is the real nature of education? The realization of selfhood.
2. What is the real aim of education? The union in acting and thinking of the finite with the infinite.
3. What is the means of education, the curriculum? The natural and social order, the sciences describing the regularities in the activities of the Self of nature, the humanities acquainting us with the Self of man.
4. What is the right attitude toward the body in physical education? As a part of the material world, really expressive of purpose, it requires cultivation in the interest of the whole man it serves.

5. What is moral education? It is, ultimately, bringing the will of man into harmony with his own best self, which is the absolute will for him.
6. What is aesthetic education? It is bringing man into appreciation of the perfect, which characterizes the whole of experience as well as certain selected portions of it.
7. What is social education? It is bringing the individual into the sense of the unity and mutuality of the different centers of experience.
8. What is intellectual education? It is an acquaintance of man with those mechanisms and necessities of the world which enable him to survive, to keep his engagements and to progress.
9. What is vocational education? It is the equipment of life with skill akin to that displayed in the activity of the world will.
10. What is religious education? It is the recognition that allphases of education are abstractions until they find their unity with each other in conscious relationship to the life of the All or God.

"The ultimate solvent is the conscious unity of all reality... There is an education of the individual and of the race; each is a process of realizing ideals and fulfilling purposes expressed in temporal succession. There is an education of the body and of the mind; each is a phase of one process of making man. There is cultural and vocational education, - theoretical and practical phases of one process of growth. There is an education of the school and an education of life,

two phases of one process of living. There is an education under authority and an education under freedom, but the two are limiting terms. Each individual being a unique embodiment of the absolute will, has priceless worth and requires complete development, which is democracy in education, limited, however, by the conception of good citizenship."

5. Summary of the Educational Views of Royce.

We have seen that, according to Royce, a teacher needs to be guided by a knowledge of ethics and of psychology, the one a study in philosophy, the other scientific, though he desires that both should become increasingly scientific.

(1) Summary of Psychological Views.

From the point of view of psychology he teaches dualism. There is a mind, and there is a physical being which gives it expression. But the mind is not a separate entity with faculties of its own. All of his psychology centers in the organism, particularly in the nervous system. The mind, as such, is something with which the individual alone is acquainted, and with which no one else can in the fullest sense be acquainted. But the mind receives a physical expression, and so one is able to determine in part what is in the mind of another by observing his conduct. But this physical expression of mind is determined by the nervous system. While our movements and our conduct express our minds, these movements are determined by the organic action of our nervous systems. On the other hand, that mental life with which we are acquainted varies and is largely determined by physical conditions which affect our minds only as they affect our nervous systems. So then our conduct and our mental life are both dependent upon our nervous systems. We have a mind, a very definite mental life, but this is not a determining factor in conduct. It is something which <u>accompanies</u> the activities of the organism, and <u>is expressed</u> by the organism, but does not determine how the organism shall act. It makes no choices or decisions for the direc-

tion of conduct.

Discriminating sensitiveness, docility and initiative were pointed out as evidences of the presence of mind. All of these depend on the nervous system. Our sensitiveness is the tendency of the organism to adjust itself to environmental conditions of certain types in certain ways. Docility is the ability to retain experience for future use. The nervous system is such that instinctive and habitual action tends to be preserved. Initiative is the tendency to novel conduct with which the feeling of restlessness is closely associated, yet restlessness is the result of motor tendencies of the organism, and so the cause for initiative is found in the organism. A developing organism tends to novel forms of conduct. Old habits and inherited instinctive tendencies when combined with novel environments, beget new forms of conduct.

Applying psychology to the field of education we noted the importance of healthy sense organs for a good mental life. The laws of habit, based on the way the nervous system works, suggested the importance of training the child in the way he is to act in later life, for there is less transfer of learning than we formerly supposed. Hence new educational devices are to be judged in the light of the habits they will form in the child. From the principle of inhibition we learned the importance of positive teaching, for if the higher centers are engaged in activity, the lower centers will yield to their stronger influence. The importance of varied activity and a warning against too prolonged application to one task is likewise suggested by the study of inhibition. A method of in-

struction is based upon the fact of unity and variety in consciousness. We tend to note things which are similar and bring them together into a thought unity while on the other hand, things that are different beget a consciousness of variety. We are conscious at one time of both unity and variety. To teach unity, or similarity, provide instances of similarity in a context of difference; to teach difference, provide instances of difference in a context rich in similarity.

Not only should we correct defective sense organs, but make it a point to develop them. All we know of our environment and in fact, of our own movements depends upon them, so we should seek their cultivation by selecting an environment suited to the purpose. We noted that training in imagery and training in perception both depend on training in conduct. It is another illustration of how mental processes accompany and correspond to cerebral processes. The teacher who trains in imagery must note that there are eye, ear, and motor minded children, and one skilled in one type of imagery may be deficient in another. The training of perception demands a life rich in activities, for conduct provides the material out of which perceptions are made. We understand the new in terms of the old, and the teacher who would have a child assimilate new material, new ideas, must present these ideas in relation to some already familiar. Again, out of the law of differentiation, we derive the conclusion that the way to teach difference, or the power to survey at a glance, is to first teach successively. We comprehend the whole when we understand the parts. It is easier to grasp successive facts than to grasp them when presented all at once. The fact that

description requires the holding of many facts in consciousness at one time, makes it more tedious than story telling.

The social instincts are important because we live in a society. Imitation, or the tendency to be like one's fellows, and opposition, or the tendency to oppose and be different from one's fellows must be trained and brought into harmony. The whole doctrine of interest and effort is related to the feeling of restless eagerness which accompanies Initiative. It is the business of the teacher to make children eager to do tasks which in themselves may or may not yeild pleasure, but which are rationally significant. He should cultivate in his children the habit of strenuous activity. A restless eagerness to do a task, regardless of the pleasure element, is essential. Finally, in our psychological review, we noted the importance of organizing experience. Its existence and organization depends upon habits, conduct and useful motor adjustments. Unorganized experience is worthless. Experience is organized by the formation of right habits of adjustment. The organization of experience presupposes a healthy brain and is directed by the laws of its functioning.

(2) Summary of Philosophical Views.

There is, in the philosophy of idealism one universal ethical principle. All of life is brought into unity in the Eternal Self. While for finite beings there is a world of Description and a world of Appreciation, as it were a material and a spiritual, yet for the Infinite there is but one whole. And it is in the unity of this Self that all of life

is unified. Truth becomes eternal for there is but one truth, and a universal ethical principle is possible.

The heart of virtues and the duty of duties consists in bearing a right relation to this Eternal Self, to Truth, to Loyalty. Man is free to choose the cause of eternal Truth, and though he may err and blunder in his service, yet his devotion and sacrifice for what he takes to be the truth will be for him his highest good in life, for it will bring unity into a life which is otherwise fighting the war between self assertion and submission to external authority.

Our conception of our cause, of truth as eternal, is social and so brings not only the greatest good to the individual but to the whole of mankind. The cause is loyalty, and I should so choose and so serve my cause that there will be more of loyalty in the world rather than less. The cause is something real. I as an individual have an actual existence as a part of the Eternal. My cause, which binds many individuals together into one has an actual existence as a part of the Eternal. And all of the human causes are together in the one Unity and have their existence as a part of the Eternal. And yet the Eternal is more than just the sum total of all of these causes. The presence of evil in the world is just a necessary condition to the exercise of loyalty, which is the highest good.

We should train for loyalty by encouraging loyalty as it exists in embryo in children, and encourage it in adults by providing leaders, specific causes and occasions for ser-

vice. Holidays should be capitalized in the interest of training for loyalty.

IV

The Educational Views of James and Royce Compared.

1. The Value of Psychology for Teachers.

Is the study of psychology valuable for teacher? James is inclined to warn us against expecting too much from it because, being a science, it does not give rules for concrete cases, but is abstract and analytic. The teacher's attitude toward the child is ethical and concrete, and demands something more specific than general principles. It demands the originality of an inventive mind to apply the principles which psychology has to offer. Royce emphasizes the peril of being without a knowledge of the science of psychology. To trust blindly to instincts without the correction and guidance which the principles of psychology can supply is to run the risk of being a total failure. But both James and Royce agree that, though the science of psychology is unable to supply the detailed information which the art of teaching demands, yet a knowledge of psychology is of value for teachers.

According to James, it is the "fundamental conceptions" which are of value. These the teacher ought to know. Such fundamental conceptions as the nature of consciousness, habit formation and the association of ideas are of practical use to the teacher. If, for example, the teacher conceives of consciousness as motor, this conception serves to simplify his task and to bring it within the range of his understanding. When he sits before

a school-room and gazes into forty little faces, he conceives of forty little streams of consciousness, each a little world by itself to which he has no access. But when he understands that mental processes are conditioned by cerebral processes, and that consciousness issues in activity, then he has a clue as to how he may go about it to understand what is in the mind of each child, and as to how he may direct his mental life. He conceives his task in terms of behavior and conduct. If the teacher desires to cultivate in his pupils new habits, it is of value to know that new habits are related to old instinctive and acquired reactions even though psychology cannot say in each case just what instinctive and acquired reactions the child has. If the teacher knows that such things exist, and is directed to look for them and to relate the new habits he desires to cultivate to them, then his study of psychology has been of real value. If the teacher knows the principles of the association of ideas he can hunt for points of contact between the lesson he is teaching and the spontaneously interesting ideas already in the pupil's mind, and thus profit by psychology, even though it is unable to dictate a set of contacts universally applicable. Regarding such practical problems of the teacher's profession as discipline, interest, and attention, psychology cannot solve them, but it is of untold value in that it tells the teacher how to go about the task.

Royce thinks the chief value of psychology is in that it prepares one to be an observer of child nature. The habit of observing the mental life of children, especially where one observes merely for the love of it and for the sake of seeing what he can find, rather than for some preconceived practical purpose, naturally results in an understanding of the children as they are. It enables one to judge the relative value of the different moods and tendencies. As all children are not alike, it enables one to observe and to understand their differences.

We may say then, that a knowledge of psychology serves to supplement and support the teacher's instinctive ability. By acquainting him with the general laws which govern the learning process, it enables him to direct and control it. By teaching him how to observe and to understand child nature, it enables him to utilize the general laws in specific cases.

2. Different Educational Emphases in their Psychologies.

As we read the educational psychologies of these two men, we are conscious of the fact that they seem different, and yet there seems to be no place, unless it is in the doctrine of the will, where one can put his finger down and say, this is where they clash. Both deal with psychology as a science and attempt to keep out of the field of philosophy. Both deal with it from the teacher's point

of view. Both are dealing with the same facts. Just where does the difference lie? It is when we understand the different philosophies of the men that we come to understand the different educational emphases in their psychologies. It seems that we have here an excellent example of how a man's philosophy of life influences his thinking in the field of science. James, as a pragmatist, writes from a practical point of view. Behavior and conduct are the important things. He is interested in the mental life, in the stream of consciousness and the association of ideas because a knowledge of these things helps teachers to teach. It helps them to solve the practical problems of the school-room such as interest, attention, memory work and learning new material. Royce, writing from the point of view of an idealist is interested primarily in the mental processes. Psychology is valuable because it helps the teacher to observe and understand mental life. He is interested in behavior and conduct as it helps the teacher to understand and to guide the intellectual life, whereas James is interested in the intellectual life because it leads to the control of behavior.

We can make this distinction clear by concrete references. In his Talks to Teachers James says, "Education, in short, cannot be better described than by calling it the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior." (Page 17)

Royce, on the other hand, thinks that, "the practical study and proper guidance of the intellectual life constitutes one of the principle problems of civilization ....." and that, "both the expression and the very existence of the intellect are dependent upon the formation of rational habits of conduct, useful motor adjustments." (Page 68) It is clear that James thinks the important thing is behavior. Royce believes the intellectual life is first in importance. But James is not a materialist. He recognises the existence of states of consciousness, and as we have seen, deals with them in his treatment of psychology. But mind is teleological and motor. He sees mind as something which has for its purpose the proper adjusting of the individual to his environment. He sees it as something which leads to action, and it is with this action that he is primarily concerned. He sees those things which are concrete and practical, which lie within the realm of our immediate experience. Royce, on the other hand, is not impractical. He places the emphasis on the intellectual life because, as we have seen in his philosophy, he conceives of mind as being eternal. But our conscious life is not something entirely unrelated to our physical being. While our minds and our bodies are treated as distinct, yet the very existence of the mental life as well as its expression depends upon the body. The relation is such that a healthy intellectual life demands a healthy brain. The organization of our mental life means the organization of the means of its expression, or of behavior. Thought

leads to action, and this action, as we have seen in the discussion of sensitiveness, is adjustment by "fitting movements" to the environment. And so Royce believes in the organization of behavior, and in the teleological function of mind. As far as this present world is concerned, I believe he would agree with James that the function of mind is "Primarily" teleological, but as in his philosophy he conceives of the mind as something having infinite worth by virtue of its relation to the eternal, he refrains in his psychology from regarding it primarily as an instrument which serves the individual in his endeavor to meet the practical emergencies of daily life.

Regarding the will, there is a decided difference between James and Royce. But I doubt not that if one would put into practice the psychology of Royce, and encourage the development in the child of that "restless eagerness" to do something that is in itself "rationally significant" even though it may yield no immediate pleasure, he would get about the same result that one would get who followed the teaching of James by encouraging the child to "keep the faculty of effort alive by a little practice every day." According to James the will is the exercise of this power of effort by holding to the right idea until it discharges into action. The essence of a moral act consists in this power of sustained attention. But according to Royce

our will is not "an aspect of consciousness but the sum of the whole". Our power of sustained attention is not a faculty or an aspect of consciousness, but it is the sum of tendencies of heredity, docility and environment. In his novel treatment of feelings he calls attention to a feeling of restlessness which is basic to initiative and might be considered as equivalent to what James calls effort, except that this feeling is the accompaniment of certain motor tendencies of the organism. Novel responses and variations of conduct are described by Royce as the result of inner organic changes such as growth, or as the response of native and acquired tendencies to a novel environment. There is then, as far as behavior in this concrete world is concerned, no power of moral choice which rests with the individual. In his treatment of philosophy we find that the freedom of the individual consists in his power to choose the Absolute. But his dualistic psychology leaves behavior in this world uninfluenced by anything which may be described as mind or the intellectual life.

Another difference of emphasis is found in the treatment of the instincts. James mentions at least ten instincts which are characteristic of the individual, and urges the teacher to utilize these as they are basic to the formation of new habits and to the securing of interest. Different reactive tendencies are prominent at different periods of the child's life. Royce mentions the two outstanding social

instincts of imitation and opposition and emphasizes their importance. While we do not find here a clash of opinions, it seems to indicate that there are two general points of view, the one individualistic, the other social.

3. Similar Educational Emphases in their Psychologies.

Both James and Royce agree in according to the nervous system a central place in their psychologies. James regards the activity of the cerebral hemispheres as the immediate condition of a state of consciousness, and conceives of the nervous system as a machine which receives impressions, redirects them and discharges them into action. This conception destroys the older notion of Locke regarding the faculties of the mind. It gives the mind a mechanical nature which yields itself to the control of laws. The child can be conceived of as a behaving organism whose action may be largely directed by controlling the impressions which are received by the nervous system. With this conception Royce is in hearty agreement. While he makes more of the conscious life as being something in itself, yet its very nature and content is determined by the activity of the nervous system. The reaction of the nervous system is an expression of the conscious life, because consciousness accompanies this reaction. Accordingly he says a healthy brain is important, and warns teachers against thinking a child stupid or dull when the real trouble may be some defect

in the sense organs. The sense organs should be cultivated, for it is only by means of the reports they give that we are conscious of our own activities. We must depend upon them for our information.

James and Royce agree that capacities for behavior grow out of participation in behavior. In his discussion of reactions to which we have referred James emphasizes the importance of laboratory work because it brings the child out of the abstract into the concrete and practical. He learns things very definitely. Verbal expression, notebooks and manual training are good for they give opportunity for expression and, "no impression without correlative expression." James favors the teaching of ideas in words, provided the child knows what the words mean. Royce calls attention to the fact that our mental imagery and our perceptions are trained by training in conduct. He considers the teacher teaches in vain who does not in some way "organize the activities, the intellectually expressive deeds of the pupils." Because the nervous system is central and furnishes the material for consciousness, it must function if consciousness is to develop; and functioning means activity.

Another similar emphasis is in relation to the formation of habits. What Royce says of the training of special functions is based upon the same principles that James bases his discussion of the laws of habit

upon. As cerebral activity tends to repeat itself it is possible to form habits which become so thoroughly fixed as to be carried on without the individual being aware of what is going on.

The emphasis of James on the aquisition of ideas accords with that of Royce on assimilation. It is really the old idea of apperception, the tendency to interpret the new in terms of the old, which is being emphasized. The importance of talking to the child in language that he can understand, and of arousing his interest in the new by associating it with his present experience is all based upon the principles that it is 'the old in the new that attracts our attention,' and, 'we see in our world what we come prepared to see'.

While our authors differ regarding the will, they agree that in dealing with the resistance of an individual to an idea, or to a form of conduct, it is better to substitute a new idea than to direct the attention to the repression of the one now functioning in the child. Royce explains very clearly that the higher centers are stronger than the lower nerve centers, and if the higher centers can be engaged in some positive activity, the lower centers will yield to their stronger influence. This emphasis on positive teaching rather than repression is well worth noting.

The final point of agreement to which we call attention is that of the organization of experience and behavior. When James says the organization of

behavior is the teacher's job, he makes rather a mechanical limitation with which Royce might not wholly agree. He would say it is the "organization of experience", of the mental life, which is the business of the teacher. But the way to go about this is by organizing the "habits of conduct." And so, as far as the teacher's art is concerned Royce says the rules by which it is to be guided "must be founded upon the laws of habit, of interest, and of inhibition -- all of them laws which can best be stated in terms of the physical functions of the brain."

4. Pragmatism Versus Idealism as an Educational Philosophy.

In comparing pragmatism with idealism as an educational philosophy we are of course concerned with pragmatism and idealism as represented in the views of William James and of Josiah Royce. Where these views can be illuminated by comparison with the present emphases, particularly the emphases of Dewey and Kilpatrick in the application of pragmatism to education, special reference will be made to it. Otherwise we shall speak of pragmatism as meaning the pragmatism of James, and of idealism as the idealism of Royce. We shall consider from these two points of view the conceptions of the pupil, of the teacher, of subject matter and of the goal of education.

(1) Conceptions of the Pupil.

Let us first view the pupil through the eyes of the pragmatist. What does he see when he sees a little boy

or girl coming to school? He sees an organism in action. If a baseball from the adjoining field flies in the direction of the child, he dodges. The action seems to be of a preservative sort. The child seems conscious of what is going on around him. He acts and reacts to situations he finds himself confronted with. An idea is suggested, and it leads to action. The pragmatist observes that the action is intended to serve some practical purpose. So then to the pragmatist this child is a behaving organism with a stream of consciousness constantly issuing in activity of a practical sort. If the activity does not prove to be practical, then it needs to be organized.

Observing many children the pragmatist finds they have natural instincts with which they are born, and that different types of instincts are active at different ages. The small child is naturally interested in things of sensation, while in adolescence a love for rational knowledge develops, and later an interest in human relationships. The child has will power, the power to hold to certain ideas and to let others alone (Dewey would not say "will"). He is a being with character, his character being determined by the extent to which his habits of reaction are organized.

To the pragmatist the child is conceived of as a citizen of this world. He is an active participant in the life he is living right now and his chief need is the ability to meet the practical emergencies of life. His organized set of reactions are good or bad depending on whether or not

they work. He may be an immortal being, this is not known, but regardless of whether he is or not, the thing he needs most now is to know how to get along in this world. His highest good consists in the organization of behavior in a practical way that will work. It would seem that the value of the child, for the pragmatist, is to be measured by his working capacities.

Suppose we now view the pupil from the point of view of the idealist. When he sees the child coming to school he sees a conscious human being. Every act of the organism seems to indicate the presence of mind. The sensitiveness which makes him dodge the coming baseball, the docility which makes him more careful the next time he walks that same path while the game is going on, and the tendency to novel forms of conduct all indicate to the idealist the presence of mind. The child is truly a behaving organism, and in fact as far as his observable behavior is concerned he is acting in a world of rigid necessity. The organization of experience is what the child needs, so that he will be able to meet the practical demands of life.

But to the idealist the child is more than a citizen of this world, in fact there is but one world and that is the ideal world. As a citizen of the ideal world, he is a free conscious individual and also a social being. Because of his oneness with the eternal oneness of the Absolute Self, the child is an immortal being who has something in common with every other human being. He has the natural social instincts of imitation and opposition. The child's ethical char-

acter is determined by the extent to which he has come into the actual realization of unity with the Self. His highest good is found in loyalty because it unifies life and solves the problem which grows out of the clash of individuality and social demands. The value of the child is determined by his relation to the ideal world. He is a being of priceless worth.

(2) Conceptions of the Teacher.

What is the place of the teacher in the educative process? What is his job? The pragmatist says the teacher is an artist. It is his business to apply the science of pedagogy to the child. He should stimulate the child by the intensity of his own interest in the subject. His task is chiefly and essentially that of training the pupil to behavior, or it may be conceived of in terms of the association of ideas. As mind is motor, to acquire ideas is to acquire behavior. The teacher should so impress the child that the impressions will lead to the acquisition by him of capacities for conduct which are suited to the varied needs of life. He is not merely to tell the child a lot of facts to be remembered, but to lead him into the acquisition of ways of behaving. (Dewey places the emphasis on controlling the activities of the child through controlling the environment.) It is the teacher's business to feed the growing child on experiences which he naturally craves. To do this he must know that new reactions are related to old ones, and new ideas are acquired when attached to those already in the possession of the child. He must discern what the spon-

taneously interesting ideas of the child are, and devise ways and means of connecting them with the ideas he wants to teach. He must find ways of connecting the new habits he wants to form to the existing reactions. It is the teacher's business to stimulate the child to exercise the faculty of effort. The teacher's job has been well done when her pupil has been furnished with a set of workable ideas adequate to meet the emergencies of life, has developed the power to hold to the right ideas at the right time and when he has been trained to react to the ideas in the right way. The right way is the way that works in the practical situations of life. The teacher's business then is to guide and direct the acquisition of experience.

The idealist agrees with the pragmatist that it is the business of the teacher to organize the activities of the child. However these activities are considered as intellectually expressive deeds. Both agree that the teacher is an artist whose business it is to observe the children, to determine what existing habits and ideas are present and to relate the new ideas and activities to those already acquired. The teacher should observe and detect such things as defective sense organs, whether the pupil is eye, ear or motor minded, and should adjust her methods of teaching to the condition of the child. The teacher as conceived of by the idealist is interested in the mental life of the child, but training of mental life is accomplished through training in conduct.

To this extent there is agreement.

The idealist, however, demands more of the teacher than that he be a practical man, able to develop in the child workable capacities for conduct. The teacher should be a man of ideals. He should reflect critically on ethics, and have a clear conception of duty. His task is not finished when the pupil has habits of reacting that enable him to adjust himself to the emergencies of this life. We infer from Royce's treatment of Loyalty, that the teacher should encourage a natural growth of ethical conceptions and of religion. The teacher's task is not entirely within the realm of experience, but he is to lead the child to an appreciation of the Eternal Self, and to inspire him with loyalty. This is to be done by nourishing the instinctive social self of the child. He can do this by refraining from repressing it, providing occasions for its expression and by being himself a leader. The teacher, from the idealist point of view, is not only a director of activities, but a leader who stimulates and encourages by precept and example.

(3) Conceptions of Subject- Matter.

What shall the teacher teach? The pragmatist says, teach what is practical. The subject-matter should not be abstract ideas which are worthless when the child gets out of school, but teach him something that is concrete and usable. In his treatment of reactions James suggests such things as note book work and manual training, because these things demand concrete activity and

a thing done in manual training, for example, must be done definitely right or definitely wrong. If words are taught, what they signify must be clearly understood. The subject matter should consist in activities which lead to the formation of fitting habits, -- that is habits suited to the needs of the life the child is to live. Morals should be taught through the activities the child engages in. The child will learn to be honest in his work, if for example he is making a hall-rack or a lamp stand, because every act will have practical consequences. He may misrepresent the truth in words and because they are often vague and meaningless he can get by with it, but the wood will appear in exactly the shape he leaves it. If he honestly works hard, is careful and profits by the suggestions of the instructor, the joints will fit, and he will find that it works to put forth honest effort. The ethical content of the curriculum then, will grow out of the practical activities in which the child engages.

While James thinks that workable ideas which the child can grasp in terms of his own experience can be taught in class room proceedure, Dewey places the emphasis wholly on activities (Democracy and Education). There is no such thing as separate subject matter which the child should strive to grasp, according to Dewey, but for the child the only thing is the activity in which he is engaged. The subject matter is the activity, and as a result of this activity the child will be stimulated to search for knowledge of arithmetic, geography

and history because this knowledge will be essential to the solution of problems that arise. According to this theory there is no cut and dried subject matter. What the lesson for the next day will be depends on what the spontaneous interest of the active child may suggest. Accordingly the pragmatist is interested, not so much in remembering a vast amount of material, but in developing the art of thinking, for thinking is really the secret of remembering.

The idealist says the teacher should know all he can of the subject matter he is to teach. As the individual is a part of the world of description, he needs to be acquainted with the sciences; and as he is a part of the world of appreciation, he needs the social education that grows out of human association. Through the association of selves the individual becomes conscious of his relation to the Self. The idealist agrees with the pragmatist that the curriculum should provide for practical activities. The training of perception and of the imagination demands a life rich in activities. While the idealist conceives of the curriculum as being composed of something more than activities, he does not exclude or minimize the importance of teaching ideas that work, and stimulating the pupil to engage in practical activities. But there is a definite moral content of the curriculum which it is the business of the teacher to teach, namely conceptions of duty and of loyalty. These can probably best be taught through providing occasion for their exercise in some concrete way. For the

idealist there is something which may be called subject-matter which exists outside of the experience of the pupil. For the pragmatist nothing can be considered real except that which lies within the realm of one's own personal experience, and so there is no such thing as objective subject-matter.

(4) Conceptions of the Goal of Education.

When is an individual educated? When has he reached the goal toward which he is progressing? The pragmatist must answer these questions within the limits of experience. Education is a broadening of experience. Its goal does not lie outside of that which is experienced. The end of education is of course, an educated man; and an educated man may be described as a group of organized tendencies of behavior. (Page 17) The end of education is then the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior. The goal is practical activity. Dewey defines it as the reorganization of experience which adds to its present meaning and gives increased ability to direct its subsequent course. (Democracy and Education,p.89) Dewey insists that there should be no objective goals, but that education is a process whose end is in itself. This is an elaboration of the pragmatic position which tends to find all reality within experience. We may say that the goal of education for the pragmatist, then, is the reorganization of behavior to the end that the individual may be able to meet the practical demands of life.

For the idealist the end of education is ethical. The ultimate goal is the realization of selfhood, the union in acting and thinking of the finite with the infinite. The goal embraces something which is larger than the present experience of the finite being. The idealist realizes the importance of behavior, and of practical adjustment of the habits of the individual to his present environment. For the pragmatist behavior is the end of education, whereas for the idealist behavior is the means to a greater end. The goal is wrapped up in the conception of loyalty. In his cause the individual finds himself bound up with all other individuals and in its service he finds opportunity for the highest realization of selfhood. An education must not merely provide ways of behaving, but must result in conceptions of duty and prepare the individual to serve his cause.

V.

Summary, Estimate and Conclusions.

1. Summary of the Views of James and Royce.

We have reviewed the educational views of William James and Josiah Royce from the point of view of their psychologies and of their philosophies. In comparing these views we have found much of agreement regarding the practical technique of teaching and methods of procedure which are within the limits of experience, but different conceptions of their relative values growing out of different views of life. Pragmatism has shown itself to be practical. It seeks to expand experience with a view to developing workable capacities for behavior. Idealism is ethical. It seeks the union of the individual with the Absolute Self.

Both agree that the study of psychology is of value to teachers; James because it gives a grasp of the fundamental principles of conduct, Royce because it develops trained observers of mental life. In their treatment of psychology we have found different emphases. The pragmatic emphasis is placed on behavior and conduct, while that of the idealist is on the mental life. Mental life is primarily teleological for the pragmatist but only partially so for the idealist. As part of the infinite Self, it serves a higher purpose. There is a difference of opinion regarding the function of the will. James contends that there is a faculty of effort which may be

cultivated and strengthened while Royce thinks we live in a finite world of rigid necessity, our freedom being in our power to choose the Absolute. But he approaches the doctrine of effort when he urges the cultivation of a restless eagerness to do a rationally significant task, regardless of the pleasure element. In the treatment of instincts the emphasis of James tends to be individualistic, while that of Royce is social. Both men agree in according to the nervous system a position of central importance. The laws useful to the teaching art can best be stated in terms of the laws of cerebral functioning. Both agree that capacities for behavior grow out of participation in behavior. Activity is essential to learning. The individual has capacities for habits, the right formation of which constitutes an important part of education. We found agreement regarding the importance of learning the new in terms of the old, both in the acquisition of ideas and in acquiring new habits. Our authors favor positive teaching rather than repression. Inhibition of wrong ideas is to be accomplished through substituting right ideas. We found our authors agree that the teaching art is immediately concerned with the organization of behavior, though they differ as to the ultimate goal of education.

We have shown that the pragmatist conceives of the child as a behaving organism with capacities for conduct which need to be organized in a way that will enable him

to meet the practical emergencies of this life. To the idealist the behaving organism is indicative of the presence of mental life. The child is a citizen of the ideal world, and hence is an immortal being of priceless worth. We have seen that the teacher, from the point of view of the pragmatist, is a director of activities. He must have the art of understanding the child and be able to guide him in the acquisition of experience. The idealist demands that the teacher shall also be a man of ideals with a clear conception of duty. He should not only be a director of activities but a leader who by precept and example encourages his pupils to reflect critically regarding duty and eternal realities. For the pragmatist the subject-matter was shown to be practical activity, while the idealish thinks a desirable curriculum should include conceptions of duty and loyalty. The pragmatist says realities exist only as experienced; the idealist says some realities exist to be experienced. For the one the end of education is found within experience, namely in the organization of behavior; for the other the end of education is objective. It is found in the realization of selfhood through the union in acting and thinking of the finite with the infinite. Behavior for the idealist is a means to a greater end.

2. Estimate of the Views of James and Royce.

Our general impression is that idealism tends to be

theoretical and abstract, leaving the teacher at a loss to know just what to do. Pragmatism, while very concrete and definite in dealing with present processes seems to lack ideals which give meaning and significance to life. On the other hand the psychology of the idealist seems to have some very practical suggestions, while the philosophy of the pragmatist leaves us at a loss to know just what is meant by 'practical'. Idealism is more difficult to grasp, but seems on the whole more gripping because it stimulates one to reach beyond the confines of present experience and lay hold on that which is eternal. Pragmatism seems easier to grasp because it is delimited by experience, and it pretends to free us from the bondage of apriorism and dogmatism but it leaves us groping blindly in the search for something of real value. One wonders if there is not something more desirable than freedom, if after all it is not better as Royce says, to be a spoke in the wheel than out of it.

We agree with James in his pragmatic interpretation of psychology as it relates to the art of teaching because it tends to bring theories, such as those of the laws of habit formation and of the association of ideas, out of abstract formulas and into the concrete world in which we live. The idealish, naturally fond of critical reflection, is apt to forget where common people live. The doctrine of the will is shunned by the leading pragmatist of our day (Dr. Dewey) but we agree with James. We believe the power of effort by which we hold fast to an idea is closely related to what Royce says about en-

couraging a restless eagerness to do a rationally significant task. While Royce attributes this restlessness to an instinctive love of novelty, or to an organic condition it is not unreasonable to suppose that the mental life may exert some influence in determining the course of conduct rather than merely "accompanying" what takes place.

While the function of will may be less than we formerly supposed it seems that man must have some power of choice. That his freedom is limited by conditions of heredity and environment is certainly true. But each individual has a sense of freedom. I have a consciousness that in certain respects I have a power of choice. That such feeling is quite universal is evidenced by the fact that we hold all but insane and maniacs responsible for their conduct. How can a machine, whether supplied with the fuel of meat and potatoes or of gasoline be held responsible for its conduct? The drunken driver of an automobile is held responsible first for getting drunk, but who ever heard of bringing a machine into court. And certainly the novel forms of conduct which Royce cites are such that there is no way of proving that they are due to organic or environmental conditions. What is supposed to be due to organic conditions which we really know nothing about can just as truthfully be supposed to be due, in part at least, to the influence of the mental self acting on the nervous system.

We believe that pragmatism falls short of being an adequate philosophy of life because it fails to give a true appreciation of individual worth.

By denying the existence of eternal realities it takes from life much of its meaning and leaves the individual in a sea of uncertainty. But in the very act of denial it asserts the existence of at least one eternal truth, thus contradicting itself as a philosophy of life. If it is eternally true that truth is the property of workableness in ideas, then we have at least one eternal truth, and are encouraged to believe there may be others. A philosophy which contradicts itself and takes from life much of its meaning is hardly adequate to meet the teacher's need. If we judge pragmatism pragmatically, it is good in so far as it works, but in the realm of morals and religion it does not work. The beliefs which have produced consequences so useful to civilization have no fruitful consequences if the realty of the object of the belief is doubted. The Christian, for example has been faithful to his cause when it offered nothing less than death itself. He believes in the reality of his cause regardless of immediate consequences. If each individual is to be left to decide for himself what is right and wrong in the light of consequences, and if we must wait until our beliefs have been applied and the results turned in before we can be assured of their truth, then there can be no definite moral instruction, and religious education has no place in the curriculum.

The trouble with making practical consequences the sole test of truth is that we have no way of telling what they are. We can measure A.Q. and I.Q. but we have no way of measuring the emotions, the attitudes

and the ideals of the individual. And we know these things have a great deal to do with determining conduct. Brightman in his "Introduction to Philosophy" calls attention to the fact that pragmatism when it is applied becomes vague and ambiguous in its meaning. "Just what is meant by practical and satisfactory? What seems practical to the burglar seems impractical to the moralist; what is satisfactory to the organic chemist is probably unsatisfactory to the college freshman."

While pragmatism looks to the future, it is hindered by the limitations of experience from seeing very far. It tends to emphasize out of proportion present concrete situations and problems to the neglect of guiding principles. For example there appeared in the New York Times (Jan. 20, 1926) an account of a criminal who had been brought to court during the critical illness of his mother. He was sentenced to prison, but before being taken was allowed to visit the hospital to tell his mother, "I'm free". The officers accompanied him to the door and waited outside while he conveyed this message. It was allowed because in the judgment of the attending physicians such information would materially aid her recovery. He was then taken by the officers to prison. Now apply the pragmatic test to this situation. What difference will it make? What practical consequences will follow from this act? If they are good then he did right, and told the truth. If they are bad then he did wrong, and told a lie. The physicians report that already the mother is showing

signs of improvement, attributed to the good news of her son. Suppose the mother gets well; the pragmatist would probably say the criminal did the right thing. As far as this situation is concerned it seems that it worked to tell a lie, because it made the mother well. But suppose that upon hearing at a later date that her son is in prison she suffers a relapse. Or suppose she gets sick again in a few years. She will then realize she is helpless. She can rely on nothing people tell her. She will now be in a state of mind that if something really good should happen she would with good reason doubt its reality. And so we see how what is pragmatically good for solving a particular problem in a specific situation may turn out to be decidedly bad in that it fails to take in all of the consequences. Pragmatism is weak in that it assumes the ability of the individual mind to grasp and determine in each specific case what the consequences will be. We are aware that James allows for the exchange of ideas and calls our attention to the fact that things run in classes so one decision may be applicable to a hundred like cases, yet pragmatism makes each mind the creator of its own truth, and allows no eternal guiding principles. For the sake of one good practical result the above mentioned man has exposed himself to a hundred dangers. If such a type of conduct becomes common it is hard to estimate the consequences. But the immediate is so much easier to see and so much more important just now that remote consequences are excluded from view.

We agree with Royce that truth is eternal, that there is an Absolute Self, a God. The philosophy of Loyalty, if believed in, makes life worth living, and gives unity and purpose to life. How we need in the United States today more of the philosophy of Loyalty! And if we are ever to be loyal to the cause of a World Court or a League of Nations, we must develop a loyalty in the home, in the school, in the church, in the state and in the nation, as a preparation for world and universal loyalty.

But we differ from Royce in his conception of the Absolute. He is all inclusive and in him we live and move and have our being. We can exercise our freedom in choosing him, but must go on serving in a world in which he exercises no immediate influence. The presence of evil is a necessary condition for the exercise of good for reasons of which only the Absolute is conscious. But it seems that such a monism which makes the Absolute everything, and as the Absolute is good then everything is good, tends to lead to a static condition, a tendency to be satisfied with things as they are. This idealistic conception gives human life immortal value, and through the exercise of freedom in choosing his cause of loyalty the individual finds something worth living for. But from our finite point of view this Absolute Self, while including us is also objective to us and so far as our relation to this world of description is concerned, the world in which we now live, we are left by the Absolute Self none the wiser as to how we may serve our

cause, nor are we to expect any help in time of trouble other than that we can derive from the consciousness of our oneness with the Eternal. If there are eternal truths we wish the Absolute might in some way indicate what they are. If there is a cause which demands our loyal service we long for something dynamic to supplement our weakness in rendering it. This idealism tells us there is eternal truth, but leaves us unenlightened as to what this truth is. For moral principles we must accept the best the experience of the race has produced, and act as though it were true because it is the best truth we know. This idealism gives us a cause, but leaves us in our impotence to serve it.

We agree with James to the extent that we need a God "in the dust of our human trials." (Pragmatism P.72) We need a God who makes himself known to men, who is available for service in the struggle with evil. It is such a God that we find in Theism. Pragmatism, by limiting all reality to finite experience, leaves us floating about on the sea of uncertainty in a hopeless search for truth. Idealism assures us that truth is eternal and tells us our duty is to be found in the service of loyalty but leaves us bound in a finite world of rigid necessity without a clear conception of what, in the concrete situations of life, our duty is. Theism, like other forms of idealism, is full of mystery. But it dissolves more mysteries and solves more problems than it creates. The theistic God is the Eternal Truth the Absolute Self, but he is not remote from finite men who live in the world of description. He has revealed

himself in the Jewish Law, and the prophets, and finally in Jesus Christ. He is a God who answers prayer, who intervenes in this world which we conceive as material, in the interest of the righteous. In love and service we find guiding principles. In the teachings of Christ and in the dynamic of his spiritual presence we find the needed practical guidance and the strength needed to supplement our weakness. We have certainly without stagnation. The proof for theism, as James suggests, lies primarily in personal experience. We do not propose to prove it but to suggest that in theism we may find an educational philosophy which supplements the weaknesses and retains the desirable elements of the philosophies we have been considering. One should not dismiss lightly the high claims made for theism without at least considering the concrete evidence of its reality as found in the fact of the Jew, the fact of the Old Testament, the fact of the New Testament and the fact of the New Testament Church. Too often church traditions, extravagent claims and creedal controversies have so dimmed our vision that we have failed to consider how much of the good in our present civilization may have been influenced by the philosophy of theism.

We agree with both James and Royce in their presentation of the facts of the science of psychology and with the guiding principles which they give us. But as we have shown, we find their interpretations of the facts in the light of their philosophies are different, and we have pointed out wherin we think they are different and what the weakness is.

It is not within the purpose of our paper to present and defend an educational philosophy, but rather, by comparing two different views to come to a better understanding of the problem and gather some suggestions which will prove valuable to the individual in framing his own philosophy of life and of education. In view of the criticisms we have offered we suggest that, before a final conclusion is reached, the facts of the sciences, particularly of psychology, should be considered in the light of the philosophy of theism.

3. Conclusions.

From this study we conclude that:

(1) Great value comes from a comparison of two systems. When considered together the strength of the one reveals the weakness of the other, thus tending to prevent a one-sided view.

(2) The use one makes of scientific facts is largely determined by his philosophy of life. The different emphases of James and Royce in their psychologies challenges explanation until viewed in the light of their philosophies.

(3) A study of child nature is a necessity for the successful teacher. If he understands the instinctive tendencies active in a child, and can discern the ideas which are spontaneously interesting to him, he may cooperate with these forces, utilizing and directing them. Otherwise he may

"run against the grain" and fail. To this end a knowledge of psychology is essential.

(4) The child should be central in the educative process. The subject-matter should be selected and determined in the light of the needs of the child. His needs should be determined in the light of his physical and social environment.

(5) Every teacher should know that mental life is conditioned by cerebral processes, or that the nervous system is central in the learning process. Ignorance of such things as defective sense organs may lead to deplorable consequences. To know whether a pupil is ear, eye or motor minded will materially aid the teacher.

(6) Every teacher should know that the new is understood in terms of the old. New habits are related to old ones and new ideas to those already understood. This is one great secret of effective teaching. There are many other principles but this one we believe to be especially important.

(7) The end of education is both practical and ethical. Behavior is essential and necessary that we may serve a higher purpose.

(8) Finally, we conclude that both the pragmatism of William James and the idealism of Royce have a contribution to make to the individual in forming a philosophy of life. Pragmatism keeps us from

meaningless abstractions, and enriches the effectiveness of our present behavior; while idealism dignifies human worth, and gives meaning to the whole process. We suggest the possibility of finding in theism a union of the good qualities of these philosophies without their defects.

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