THE CONTRIBUTION AND LIMITATIONS OF HUMANISM IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The subject with which this study will be concerned does not lend itself very well to strict definition because of the numerous shades of meaning given the term "Humanism" by modern schools of thought and the variety of movements which have claimed that caption in the past.

This study will begin with the simple definition which sets forth the one unifying principle of all theories, interest in man, and proceed toward a better understanding of the field by considering the historical development which culminated in Scientific Humanism. This is a rather recent development which seeks to unify the whole field of human knowledge and endeavor into one organismic view which exalts man as the sole determiner of his destiny.

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Inasmuch as the philosophy of John Dewey, which is a descendant from the positivism of Comte, has

the philosophical basis upon which the so-called Scientific Humanistic system was erected, it may be immediately seen how closely this problem is related to modern philosophy of education. Also, the fact that the ultra humanists have invaded the field of religious education, and are substituting a program of moral culture which establishes a religion of man for Christian Theism while ignoring completely the function of the latter in the organization of personality, should cause us to pause until the situation could be clarified. Coe, the great psychologist in the field of religious education, has expressed his indebtedness to John Dewey in his book.

The Humanists are more interested in the means than in the end of human life. Albeit, after science has applied all its knowledge to the developing of a method, it will still be our chief concern to examine the ends of life. Even though John Dewey has recognized the value of human personality, yet he has failed to give us a sound basis for that recognition, and in doing so, has laid the basis for a philosophy which tends to dissolve personality in a new pantheism.

Further, the modern Humanists are very active in corrupting the concept of religion. This they do by taking the term "God" with all the psychological content which that word possesses and using it in order to

attempt to array behind an exalted concept of man the motivation which Theism has marshalled through the centuries. Such an attempt should be guarded against. In order that we may understand the distinctions here, an investigation will be necessary.

Inasmuch as Humanism is a popular mood and finds expression in many of the popular publications of our day, it is quite important that we learn how to detect these subtle approaches which seek to undermine faith in God and to substitute a faith in the self-perfectibility of human personality.

C. METHOD OF PROCEDURE

As has already been briefly stated, this discussion will be introduced by a general preliminary definition, and will proceed to a better understanding of the contribution which the Humanistic philosophy has made to mankind. This will be accomplished by a reference to general historical and philosophical as well as psychological treatises. Whenever possible, reference will be made to the original sources which come from the pen of those who advocated such a philosophy.

It will be the purpose of this discussion to establish, wherever possible, historical connections between various humanistic movements and to evaluate their

influence upon modern thought. All this is in order to come to a fuller understanding of the modern movement known as Scientific Humanism. Using several leading recent books on the subject, an evaluation of the contribution which this type of philosophy has made in the field of psychology of religion will be attempted.

D. SOURCES OF STUDY

Inasmuch as this investigation is concerned [illegible]ly with the idea of Humanism in the field of religion we will be especially interested in two books by John Dewey: The Quest for Certainty, and A Common Faith. And in order to become acquainted with the most recent philosophical expression of Humanism known as "scientific" an analysis will be made of Oliver L. Reiser's book on The Promise of Scientific Humanism, and Baker Brownell's treatise called Earth Is Enough.

CHAPTER ONE

EARLY HUMANISTIC DEVELOPMENTS

THE CONTRIBUTION AND LIMITATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION

CHAPTER I

EARLY HUMANISTIC DEVELOPMENTS

A. A PRELIMINARY DEFINITION

Inasmuch as there are as many definitions of humanism as there are individuals who have given themselves to the consideration of that system of thought, it seems advisable to begin with a rather general definition as presented by a modern adherent to that philosophy, and to come to a better understanding of the various ramifications of the term as we proceed in the consideration of the subject from a historical standpoint. Even though this definition may not include all the various emphases of modern Humanistic thought, yet it gives us a general concept which would be agreeable to the thinking of most of the adherents as well as the critics of the modern school.

Therefore, as a preliminary statement, we will

define Humanism as

> "A system of thought which assigns a predominant interest to the affairs of man as compared with the super-natural or the abstract and which believes man capable of controlling those affairs."[1]

In a sense, men of all ages have been humanists, in that it was necessary for them to pay attention to the temporal things of life in order to maintain their existence on the earth. However, the modern emphasis upon the scientific method as the only pathway to reality is a relatively recent development in the quest for certainty.

In this chapter, it will be our purpose to scan briefly the history of the development of various types of humanistic thought from its origin up until the time of Auguste Comte, the forerunner of the modern humanistic philosophies as they find expression in the philosophy and teachings of John Dewey, which gave rise to the recent theories propounded by such men as Oliver L. Reiser and Baker Brownell.

Even though there may be no historical connection between these earlier forms of humanistic thought and the modern types which are based upon theories made possible by recent discoveries in the fields of chemistry

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1. J. A. Auer: Humanism States Its Case, p. 8.

and physics, yet it may prove exceedingly profitable for us to consider briefly the appearance of these various movements in the historical process. Even if we cannot establish definite historical ties between these systems of philosophy, a comparison will aid us greatly in understanding the most recent form, with which this discussion will be chiefly concerned.

B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF PROTAGORAS TO HUMANISTIC THOUGHT

The reason for our going back even before the time of Christ to find the roots of humanistic thought is to be found in our desire to evaluate the humanists on their own ground and not to omit arbitrarily certain claims which would appear as unfounded by many modern critics of that school. For one of the most prominent of the recent humanist philosophers has referred to Protagoras, the great Sophist of Abdera as "the first thinker in whom the humanist attitute becomes vocal and explicit."[1]

With Protagoras originated the phrase, "man is the measure of all things." This has become "the

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1. Schiller: Our Human Truths, p. 20.

great slogan of relativity," and assures man a place in the sun for the modern thinkers who base practically the whole of their philosophy upon Einstein's theory of Relativity and Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy. Moreover, "It is also the only principle surviving from early philosophy which is anterior to Plato's discovery of the 'Idea' and comparable with it in importance."[1]

When asked whether he believed in the gods, he replied that he had not lived long enough to ascertain whether they existed or not. He meant by this that within the brief span of his experience of life he had not been able to find evidence on such an obscure subject to substantiate the claims as to the existence of God or gods.[2] Here he makes a statement disavowing any belief in the supernatural, on practically the same grounds that the modern pragmatists disclaim any evidence from their experience that the God of Theism exists. This resemblance to the modern type of humanistic thinking is recognized by many theologians and philosophers. One of them, writing concerning Pragmatism today, said,

> "Strictly speaking, it is neither new nor American, for something very much like pragmatism is found

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1. Schiller, op. cit., p. 21.
2. Ibid, p. 22.

in the thought of the Sophist Protagoras."[1]

As a result of his statements, Protagoras was convicted of atheism and compelled to flee.[2] Because of his attempt to escape persecution, he was drowned in a shipwreck at sea, and since his books were burned, we have little from his own hand to understand more fully his entire philosophy of reality.

At any rate, there is a family resemblance between the modern humanists and the Greek Sophists of the fourth and fifth centuries. The speculations of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Leucippus, as well as the metaphysicians Herclitus, Parmenides, and Zeno no doubt led to despair of human ability to know the ultimate nature of reality.

> "For the Sophists generally, as for Protagoras in particular, the proper study of mankind was man . . . the measure of all things, in the sense that anything beyond his immediate concern and common grasp was a matter of indifference and agnosticism."[3]

In the intellectual atmosphere today is found the same general flux brought about by the crumbling of vast metaphysical and epistemological structures erected by Kant and Hegel. Later in this study, it will be found that there has been added to a skepticism about the

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1. Harkness; Georgia: Conflicts in Religious Thought.
2. Encyclopedia Brittanica, Vol. XVIII, 14th Edition, p. 60.
3. Dakin, A. H.: Man the Measure, p. 23.

physical world, an amused contempt for religion and philosophy. Other points in common between the Sophists and modern humanists, as this study will reveal, is their free inquiry, interest in public affairs, as well as their religious agnosticism.[1] But Dakin finds that their spirit of inquiry was somewhat superficial, and their agnosticism represented a temporary decay which expressed itself in the first three Christian centuries as a reactionary movement.[2]

C. ANCIENT ROMAN TYPES OF HUMANISM

1. Epicureanism

Paul, in his day, faced a world already full of various philosophies and religions. One of these, which was rather influential, was known as Epicureanism. Epicurus, the founder of this movement, believed that matter was the sole, final reality, that the entire universe was produced by a chance arrangement of atoms, that through the senses do we find the only safe guide in the search for truth, that death ends personality, and that the chief end of life is satisfaction, but

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1. Dakin, op. cit., p. 24.
2. Ibid, p. 26.

that real satisfaction comes only through virtue.[1] In their interpretation of the universe, and in their denial of personality, they are similar to certain humanistic groups today. However, it must be made clear that modern humanists are possessed with a far more intelligent and dominant social passion.

2. Stoicism

A superior religion is to be found in the philosophy known as Stoicism. It is like Epicureanism in that there is an emphasis upon the practical; i.e., philosophy was pursued for the sake of its bearing upon life. This is one of the most influential philosophies outside of the Christian religion,[2] and claimed a large number of the outstanding men of history such as Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Cicero, Cato, and the Caesars. These men gave classic expression to this philosophy and played a great part in extending its influence.

a. Its Basic Philosophy

Zeno and Chrysippus are responsible for the

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1. Stolz, K. R.: The Psychology of Religious Living, p. 76.
2. Dresser, H. W.: A History of Ancient and Medieval History, p. 147.

shaping of the system as a whole; unified and defined the thought which was characterized in later times by quite divergent views. Their philosophy concerned itself chiefly in meeting the needs for a philosophy of ethics, nature and religion, and was divided into Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Profiting by the contributions of Aristotle and Plato, they went back to the cosmology of Heracleitus, who believed that individuals were a part of the whole of the universe and possessed a spark of the divine, ever-living Fire. Thus we see that they sought a secure basis for their ethics in nature, and emphasized the metaphysical implications of their logic as a way of life.

b. Its Theology

The Stoics believed that reason pervaded the whole of the universe and that reason in man linked him with reason in the whole of things. Upon being asked "What is God?" the Stoics would often reply, "What is God not?" Zeno practically identified God and the universe, thus ascribing divinity to natural phenomena. The entire process is the outcome of Providence, a word which connotes Personality to people today who are familiar with the terminology of the Theistic religions, but not so to the ancient Stoics. Even though some of the

adherents to this philosophy urged men to believe in, follow, and obey God, their conception of God was nothing more than a pantheistic idea.[1]

> "Constantly picture the universe as one living thing with one substance and one soul; and mark how all things are referred to the single perfection of this; and how all things act with one impulse, how all are joint causes of all existing; and of what sort is the contexture and concatenation of the web."[2]

This is clearly pantheism or, as Julius Beloch calls it, the triumph of science over theology.[3]

c. Physics

By developing the cosmology of Heracleitus, the Stoics directly attacked the dualism of Plato and Aristotle.[4] The divine Fire originated all things and permeates the lower elements, earth, air and water. There seems to have been a development from the inorganic to the organic, and from the blind to the purposive. All nature is a necessary process and Fate rules over everything, yet man may choose to live in harmony with Fate. However, we must not think of this as a

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1. Stolz, K. R.: The Psychology of Religious Living, p. 79.
2. Quoted from Marcus Aurelius iv., 40, by T. R. Glover: Progress in Religion to the Christian Era, p. 227.
3. Ibid.
4. Dresser, op. cit., p. 150.

mechanistic conception but as more nearly an organismic[1] conception somewhat similar to the modern theory advanced by the so-called Scientific Humanists.[2] A single stuff which may be best described as matter-energy is the material out of which the entire cosmos is made. This cosmos, operating in space and time, repeats itself in long cycles under the control of the all-pervading principle. In this process, we find a rather strong teleological emphasis, and a large place made for force as contrasted with the material or the mechanical.

d. Its Ethics

The world of the Stoics was not merely materialistic, but it was also moral and the laws of natural science were made the basis for the ought of man's ethical nature.[3] It seems that the basis for his ethics was to be found in a deterministic nature, but there was room for a certain amount of freedom of the will in choosing whether man obeys the laws of nature or not. If man properly followed reason and, therefore, achieved harmony with himself and the universe, it gave him an inward calm under all circumstances,

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1. Glover, T. R.: Progress in Religion to Christian Era, p. 225.
2. Cf. Reiser, O. L.: The Promise of Scientific Humanism, p. xvii, 43, 102.
3. Dresser, op. cit., p. 151.

which was the Stoic ideal of life.[1] The troubled Roman, regarding himself a fragment of divinity, had two havens of refuge from the misfortunes of natural events or oppressive political rulers, and these were the universe and his own soul. All men being part of the universe were to be treated as though they belonged to the same class and race.[2]

As we said above, this is not a doctrine of fatalism, but man as an individual may enter into the process of eliminating the hostile or indifferent from the cosmos.

> "The moral life does not consist in mere contemplation of universal law or deity, but in active co-operation so that 'life according to nature' shall become a realized ideal."[3]

Therefore, evil exists relatively as part of life lived in contrast to nature.[4] We shall later see that this view is quite similar to the philosophical basis of the ethical system of modern Scientific Humanists.[5]

The basis for human action is, of necessity, somewhat materialistic, for it is through their action that men contact the external world. Therefore, great

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1. Fairweather, William: Jesus and the Greeks, p. 50.
2. Angus, Samuel: The Religious Quest of the Graeco-Roman World, p. 65.
3. Dresser, op. cit., p. 154.
4. Ibid, p. 155.
5. Reiser, op. cit., p. ix, xx, 282.

emphasis is placed on the dynamic character of the universe, activity, and force. The basis for their ethics is not to be found in a transcendent Being, separated from the world as the Nous of Anaxagoras or the unmoved Mover of Aristotle.

e. View of Man

"No teachers of classical antiquity set man so high in the universe."[1] In a world of caste systems and political oppression, the humanism of Stoicism, "called by the Roman humanities, was an ennobling, liberating, and creative force."[2] "The 'fiery breath' the Spermatic of life-giving reason, that animates all Nature, reaches consciousness in man."[3] Therefore, man is equal with God.

Man being an integral part of the whole, and the universe being the completion of himself, there was a tie of kinship between all men and between man and God. Therefore, it is natural for the Stoics to recognize the world of the individual and to be a humanitarian in all his efforts. Many of them are noted for their devotion to relief efforts, the giving of instruction

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1. Glover, op. cit., p. 232.
2. Stolz, op. cit., p. 77.
3. Glover, op. cit., p. 232.

to the ignorant and the improvement of the lot of the slave and the outcast. However, they did not go to the extent of advocating the freeing of the slaves, but proclaimed a philosophy which should make a man free and honorable even in bondage.

3. Stoicism Versus Humanism

Some similarities between ancient Stoicism and the modern form of humanistic thought have already been pointed out; therefore, a brief summary will be sufficient for the present chapter. A high regard for moral integrity based upon natural science, and depending upon the resources of human nature to overcome the hostile forces within and from without, the facing of harsh circumstances with equanimity, emphasis upon the practical aspects of philosophy which find expression in an effort to aid the underprivileged and the denial of the Personality of ultimate Reality are points in common to both the Stoics and the modern schools of Humanists. However, room must be made for the far more scientific outlook of modern humanists who propose to improve radically the state of man through the application of recent scientific discoveries to the ailing human society.

D. THE RENAISSANCE OR REVIVAL OF LEARNING

Much scholarly attention has been lavished upon that great transitional movement in the historical development of human thought commonly known as the Renaissance. It is commonly said to have dated from the time of the reign of Nicholas V (1447),[1] but a new spirit was felt even before this time and the principles of the movement had been long in the process of formulation. Some of the influences date back even to the time of the Crusades when travel, bringing about new contacts, aroused new interest in the affairs of men and inspired the re-thinking of much of the philosophy of the day.

The Renaissance, though generally considered as a literary movement originating with Petrarch, Bocaccio, and Dante, who was the ideal representative of the classic spirit of the Middle Ages, was also a period of rapid transition in the realm of philosophy. There had been some exchange of scholars among the various cultures beginning with the coming of the Greek scholar, Manuel Chrysoloras to Florence in 1397, but the fall of Constantinople in 1453 led to a general exodus of Greek scholars. This new interest in the classics in their original tongues influenced philosophic thought

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1. Turner: History of Philosophy, p. 425.

greatly in that it opened the way for the humanists to attack successfully the school men who had fostered the deplorable conditions produced by a degenerate Scholasticism. This humanistic development was not limited merely to Italy but spread into Germany and to the other countries.

There are many various forms which this thought took and there have been many various interpretations of the meaning of the movement, but they all agree that it represented a revolutionary attitude toward established forms of thought.[1] Freedom was the general watchword, which fostered enthusiasm for the dignity and position of the common man. This found expression in Germany in Hutten's nationalistic aspirations. There was a general spirit of enlightenment which attacked all formalism and hollow pretenses in the religious life.

> "In Germany at the end of the fifteenth century the domination of religious and philosophical formalism was absolute and invited revolt."[2]

This led to a conception of the Christian life as a schooling of self through the imitation of Christ, as was later evidenced in the philosophy and life of Erasmus.

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1. Fife: The Problem of Individual Freedom in the Humanists and in Goethe, p. 300.
2. Ibid, p. 301.

The Renaissance was also a return to nature, but this was tempered by the fact that the tone of the Italian civilization was set by cities, which focussed most attention on the activities of man as an outward, economic and social, rather than on the internal and spiritual, expression. Dakin very aptly points out the resemblances and contrasts between the humanism of the Renaissance and the modern expression of that philosophy.[1]

He shows that the modern humanism is quickened by a faith in human goodness, democracy, humanitarianism, and progress as a result of the philosophy of the eighteenth century and from the early theories of evolution. Even though the Renaissance later developed along these lines, it was at first quite at home under despotism and looked toward the past for a solution of their problems. In the second place, there was a youthfulness and a subtle appreciation of nature and human nature which is supplanted in the modern thought by science, practical inventions, industry and mass production. There seems to be a lack in regard to creative art and the humanities. Also, we see signs of the submergence of personality in a manner in which

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1. Dakin, op. cit.,pp. 26-28.

the Stoics neglected to place emphasis upon the whole of life including the emotions. However, there is some effort on the part of recent scientific humanists to restore emotion to its proper place.[1] It remains yet to be seen whether the modern technical corporate tendency will offer some new resources which will allow for the fuller development of the individual personalities.

Even if the Italian Renaissance emphasized the importance of man, it did so at the expense of the worship of God, for there was a tendency to ignore Him.[2] This same tendency has generally been at least one of the results of the revival of emphasis upon man's ability to direct his own affairs. So modern humanism neglects God; i.e., all except the group of religious humanists who try to retain more of the influences of Theism than do the so-called Scientific Humanists who openly blame many of the ills of modern society upon the belief in the supernatural.[3]

During the papal reign of Leo X, Humanism reached its Golden Age in Italy, but the pillaging of

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 13.
2. Dakin, op. cit., p. 28.
3. Dewey, John: A Common Faith, p. 56.
   Cf., Reiser: The Promise of Scientific Humanism, p. 276.

Rome in 1527 sounded the death knell of humanistic thought.[1]

> "Those who value the great human inheritance which we have received as heirs of the ages, those who seek what is noble and worthy in life, those who wish to enjoy for themselves and their children a truly liberal education will always be grateful to the Humanism of Italy for its revival of the classical culture which, it may be predicted, will enrich the life of man as long as the minds of men seek wisdom and the souls of men love beauty."[2]

E. THE REFORMATION AND HUMANISM

The new life which had found expression in the Italian Renaissance led to a general awakening of interest in the ancient classics and a revival of the study of the Scriptures in the original languages. Naturally, a people possessed of a profound belief were profoundly moved when they were suddenly faced with the fresh discovery of these sources in ancient thought. A reconsideration of the Christian records as well as the works of the great philosophers struck the death blow to a Scholasticism which was already in a state of decline produced by internal causes.[3] Nominalism

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1. Johnson, W. H.: Humanism and Christian Theism, p. 18.
2. Ibid, p. 19.
3. Dresser, op. cit., p. 293.

gradually increased until it became a pronounced individualism created by the iron-clad philosophy of the church. This philosophy fostered a spirit of free thought which anticipated the modern spirit.[1] But in order that it may be clearly seen how this came about, a consideration of the influence which this "literary humanistic" movement had upon the leaders of the period known as the Reformation is necessary.

1. Erasmus

> "In the Humanistic movement in general and in the work of Erasmus in particular it can be said that the Greek language rose from the dead with the New Testament in its hands."[2]

And not only did Erasmus publish the Greek New Testament but he attacked the evils of a corrupt church. His chief contribution in this field was the well-known praise of Folly. Just as Erasmus believed that man could do something to save himself, he also thought that the church could reform itself.[3] For as Fairbairn says of him, "he was a Humanist, not a reformer."[4] "He loved his esoteric world," and remained a catholic to

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1. Dresser, op. cit., p. 293.
2. Johnson, op. cit., p. 24.
3. Ibid, p. 12.
4. Fairbairn: Christ in Modern Theology, p. 132.

the end of his life.

But contrary to the beliefs of modern humanists who agree with the statement that Erasmus was "the prince of Humanists," who "did more to extend the humanistic movement than has been commonly recognized,"[1] Erasmus saw the dangers of the new thought[2] and maintained to the last an allegiance to Christ as one appointed of God.[3] He assailed ceremonies in the church and held to the Reformed doctrine of the sacraments. But when it came to following Luther in his daring break with the Catholic Church, Erasmus rather felt it necessary to break with the great reformer.

Thus, it may be seen that the Humanism expressed in the criticism of the church and the social ills of his time was good as far as it went but that it was insufficient. The results of the hatching of the egg which Erasmus laid must be seen in a consideration of the works of Luther and the other prominent leaders of the Reformation.

2. Luther

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1. Potter: Humanism a New Religion, p. 73.
2. Cf. Johnson, W. H.: Humanism and Christian Theism.
3. Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 134.

For whereas the Italian Renaissance, arousing a new interest in the pagan classics, led to a revival of "pagan morality," or, better yet, pagan immorality, and a contemptuous tolerance of the outward observances of religion without faith in the doctrines they symbolized,"[1] in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and England it played into the hands of the Reformers. In Germany, we find Humanism and religion most evenly balanced in the scholarly Melancthon and in Ulrich von Hutten who was a "knight, patriot, man of letters, devoted to a liberty near akin to license."[2]

Luther, "a man of the people," was the most perfect embodiment of a combination of a true and deep sympathy with all mankind and the vision of God which are so necessary for the making of a Reformer. Even though Erasmus, the humanist, laid the foundation for the Reformation, it took Luther, the man with a deep sense of sin and a feeling of dependence upon God coupled with the liberalizing tendencies of the Humanistic movement, actually to move the people of Europe to action.

He was not other-worldly to the extent which

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1. Encyclopedia Brittanica, 14th Edition, Vol. 7, p. 977a.
2. Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 141.

some modern humanists would have us believe, but believed that practical faith should manifest itself in the great institutions of human life such as business, marriage, and national life, as well as one's ordinary contact with his environment.[1]

3. Calvin

Luther, finding through the original source escape from sin, had his complement in Calvin who, through those same sources, found "an ideal which men are bound to realize."[2] "Humanism taught Calvin the claims and the duties of the Christian Society."[3] This Humanistic influence appears to come from sources previous to the Italian Renaissance. For Fairbairn says of his philosophy of religion, "Calvinism is Stoicism baptized into Christianity, but renewed and exalted by the baptism."[4]

Some of the points in common are, a spirit of fortitude which is indifferent to suffering, and scorns the type of sentiment which simply pities at the

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1. Lindsay: History of the Reformation, Vol. II, p. 19.
   Cf. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 33-34.
   Cf. Dresser, op. cit., p. 295.
2. Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 143.
3. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 13.
4. Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 145.

expense of the love of existence. But his philosophy was far superior in that its Will was personal while infinite, gracious while absolute, making sure of all its ends and means. The influence of Stoicism was so important in the Reformation that Lindsay classes it with the three great influences of the movement.

> "The Holy Scriptures, St. Augustine, and the imperial ethics of the Old Roman Stoicism coming through Humanism were a trinity of influences on all the Reformed Churches."[1]

Calvin did not rest content with the intellectual aspects of this influence, but applied his Theology to the church and the state, thereby giving the practical results in the social processes of his time. In his social reforms and in the reorganization of the government may be found a "constructive work coextensive with the whole man and the state," and "in it lay all the possibilities of freedom and progress."[2]

4. Zwingli

In the work of Zwingli and Henry VIII may also be seen a greater influence of Humanism than was

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1. Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 13.
2. Ibid, p. 149.

included in the Peace of Augsburg. Zeingli's favorite teacher during his boyhood was Thomas Wyttenbach, "who was half a reformer and half a pure follower of Erasmus."[1] Bishops' Book and King's Book written during the Henrican period in England are full of instructions concerning a wholesome life, borrowed from Erasmus.

The beginnings of Reform in France, Italy and Spain were also closely allied to Humanism. Christian Humanists gathered around Marguerite d'Angouleme and Briconnet, the Bishop of Meaux, found solace in the Platonism set for their aim the reformation of the church and society in accordance with the principles laid down by Erasmus. It will be recalled by students of the Reformation that William Farel, the pre-cursor of Calvin, belonged to the "group of Meaux." Therefore, it may be clearly seen that it is difficult to over-estimate the influence of Humanism in the Reformation movement.

It was quite natural that a New Humanism should arise as a reaction against some of these tenets of the Reformation movement. With the escape from the traditional bondage of the church and a new-found political freedom there would naturally follow a

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1. Lindsay, op. cit., p. 11.

glorification of man's natural capacities. A new social consciousness was developing along with a pronounced individualism of Nominalism mentioned above. There was also quite a reaction against the Aristotelian type of thinking.

Even Luther and Calvin contributed indirectly to this New Humanism. In Calvin's making of the Sacraments into a mere symbol and the emphasis of Luther upon the application of religion to life in general tended to make God identical with human life. As Dakin expresses it in a recent book, "the process of sanctifying the secular gradually blurred into the secularization of the sacred."[1]

F. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS BEFORE COMTE

Faustus Socinus, whose influence was somewhat prominent during the latter half of the sixteenth century, was interested chiefly in the moral and intellectual aspect of religion and paved the way for rationalism. His point of view as it is expressed in the Racovian Catechism fosters a freedom of opinion which

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1. Dakin, op. cit., p. 34.

seems to be a forerunner of unitarianism, Ethical Culture and Humanistic statements of belief.[1]

Then came a period of cyclopedists, who are cherished by some Humanists today because they inserted their own rationalistic views in their works.[2] Chambers Cyclopedia, one of the most notable of these works, was translated into French by John Mill and later editions contained contributions by Rousseau, Voltaire, and Montesquieu.

Goethe was interested in the work of the cyclopedists, and made quite a contribution to Humanistic thought in that he emphasized the correlation of thought and action. He was also in harmony with the Scientific Humanists in that he opposed the Christian faith as an enemy of individualism.

> "In the swell of the wave of enthusiasm for the great, free individual the dogmatic structure of Christian faith came crashing down."[2]

In the catechization scene of Faust, in Werther, and Mahomet, we find the expressions of a positive religion. Werther expresses a sympathetic feeling for the entire human race and even greets the insects as his brothers. "Out of this intuitional yearning for an harmonious universe grew then the ideal of a religion of humanity."[3] Even though he believed in the

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1. Dakin, op. cit., p. 37.
2. Fife, op. cit., p. 309.
3. Ibid, p. 310.

essential good of mankind, he refused to accept the idea of a "Golden Age" in early times before man was corrupted with civilization. It will be seen later that the latter idea, which Goethe rejected, is acceptable to leaders of the Scientific Humanist movement today.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the humanistic spirit expressed itself in various forms. In the eighteenth, Alexander Pope gave some classic expressions which are frequently quoted by Humanists today. In the same century, the humanitarian movement in the Unitarian Churches in England opposed a number of the doctrines of the church and a movement using the same name continued the work of the Encyclopedists in teaching that the perfection of man could be achieved without divine assistance.[1]

But a movement was developing in America which was to be a parent to much of the twentieth century Humanism. In 1819 in Baltimore, William Ellery Channing preached a sermon setting forth the position of the Unitarians. Though Channing remained a Theist to the end of his life, the dignity of human

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1. Potter, op. cit., p. 76.

nature was fundamental in his creed.[1] In every individual lodged the germ of unbounded progree. Early in his life, Stoicism had a great influence on his general outlook.

This started a liberal movement which did not stop with the abandoning of the doctrines of the Incarnation and Atonement but led to the undermining of supernaturalism,[2] and later became the natural soil for Humanism. In 1825, the American Unitarian Association was founded in Boston. They openly questioned the supernatural and the existence of a personal God, and referred to God as merely a cosmic force.

G. SUMMARY

Thus, the development of Humanistic thought had been traced from the philosophy of Protagoras with "man the measure," through the ancient Roman types commonly known as Epicureanism and Stoicism, down through the Renaissance and Reformation to the time of Comte, who lived in the nineteenth century. It has been seen that practically all of these early movements have been characterized in varying degrees by a rejection of the

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1. Fisher: History of Christian Doctrine, p. 428.
2. Ibid, p. 432.

idea of a God, or an indifference toward the supernatural, a relativistic view of the whole of life, a belief in the innate goodness of man and the inference that deathwas the end of personality.

It has been found that Stoicism embodied numerous humanistic ideas which approached certain modern theories such as an "organismic" view of the whole of the universe, and an emphasis upon efforts to improve the lot of mankind in general. This Stoicism, through the revival of learning, had an influence upon the Reformation and much was absorbed into Christianity. And even though the Renaissance was primarily a literary movement yet it had a great influence over such leaders as Erasmus, Luther and Calvin, who made possible the great Reformation. There were Humanistic reactions to this movement such as was evidenced in the philosophy of Socinus.

Scholasticism had been practically destroyed and the way prepared for new outbursts of humanism in such men as Goethe, and the Frenchmen Voltaire and Rousseau. Later, under the able leadership of Channing, it appeared in America in the form of Unitarianism. But it yet remains for us to consider the beginnings of modern positivism and pragmatism which

prepared the way for recent developments in the field of Humanistic thought.

CHAPTER TWO

HUMANISM IN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

CHAPTER II

HUMANISM IN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Having briefly reviewed the repetition of humanistic developments in the early ages, it remains for us to consider the beginnings of the modern pragmatism in the form of Positivism which took shape in the latter half of the eighteenth century. In order to understand the movement of this influence, it will be necessary to briefly view the development of Psychology of Religion and to note what effect Positivism had upon modern religious thought, and how this, in turn, influenced modern pragmatism which forms the real basis for Scientific Humanism.

A. POSITIVISM OF COMTE

Following the various attacks upon the theistic position, which took the form of Deism in the seventeenth century and skepticism in the eighteenth century, Comte founded the Positivistic system which

denied that men could have evidence of the reality of cause, whether it be efficient or final.[1] He, as founder of the movement, taught that the word cause should be eliminated from our vocabulary.[2] Science could give no evidence in this respect for it was merely a record of observed phenomena arranged in accordance with sequence in time and likeness or unlikeness.

According to the law which he laid down, all human knowledge passes through three stages -- the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive. According to the first stage, which is also called the fictitious, man seeks for final causes in God. Then follows the Metaphysical or abstract, which is merely a transitional stage. During this period, man looks to the abstract forces of Nature for final causes. In the positive or scientific, man, through the discovery of exact laws, arrives at a conception of universal law. All knowledge is in the process of development, some branches are in the Theological stage, while others are more advanced.

This law he attempts to prove by stating that every individual passes through the same states in his

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1. Fisher, op. cit., p. 4.
2. Robinson, D. S.: Anthology of Modern Philosophy, p. 701.

mental development as the general mind passes through in the social development of mankind.[1] Also, he seeks to show that every science passes through the same process. One of the principal theoretical reasons which he gives in support of the law is that it simplifies knowledge. As we shall see, this latter reason finds support in more recent humanistic theories.

Social Physics receives special attention in a separate classification. The Positivist philosophy has examined the Theological and Metaphysical techniques as applied to social subjects, and found them inadequate; therefore, the new Social Physics must be adopted to round out the sciences of observation. When our fundamental conceptions shall have become homogenous, the Positivist state will be established by right of its natural superiority. In this state, the division of labor or specialization will be so worked out that there will be men working in special fields while other men coordinate the results from the various specialized groups, which shall, in turn, profit by the generalizations of the former group.[2]

In Comte's listing of the advantages of the

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1. Robinson, op. cit., p. 699.
2. Ibid, pp. 704-705.

proposed system, we note a dogmatism which eliminates all other possibilities. The first advantage is that,

> "The study of the Positive Philosophy affords the only rational means of exhibiting the logical laws of the human mind, which have hitherto been sought by unfit methods."[1]

According to his view, the Positivist philosophy has been rising since the time of Bacon, and that it is producing so much evidence that the metaphysicians are beginning to claim to ground their "pretended science" on the observation of fact.[2]

The three other advantages are that the Positivist philosophy will regenerate education, and the progress of the respective positive sciences, and will furnish

> "the only solid basis for that Social Reorganization which must succeed the critical condition in which the most civilized nations are now living."[3]

However, in establishing a sound social philosophy and ethics, Comte discovered before long that the element of religious worship must be introduced in order to make it acceptable to mankind. Therefore, following somewhat the social doctrines of his teacher, Saint-Simon,[4] he substituted Love of Humanity for Love

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1. Robinson, op. cit., p. 706.
2. Ibid, p. 707.
3. Ibid, p. 710.
4. Potter, op. cit., p. 77.

of God.

> "It is a principle as adverse to metaphysics as to theology, since it excludes all personal considerations, and places happiness, whether for the individual or for society, in constant exercise of kindly feeling."[1]

To love humanity is made the whole duty of man.

As a result of the adoption of the Positivist philosophy, "Social Feeling" will overcome "innate Self-love" through a training of the heart and intellect. This training consists in the mutual love of Man and Woman, which broadens into family loyalty. Reinhold Niebuhr, in commenting of this social philosophy, says,

> "Comte failed to observe that his great discovery was vitiated by the fact that the family is also the source of that 'alteregoism' which is a more potent source of injustice than the egotism of the individual. He realizes that rational discipline may extend social sympathy; but he does not see that human imagination may not only extend the boundaries which nature sets but may also impart such an intensity to the narrow loyalists, within the bounds of natural consanguinity, as to transmute them into forces of anarchy within the general community."[2]

He goes on further in his criticism of Comte by saying that a proper balance is not maintained between reason and impulse. Carrying this thought over into

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1. Robinson, op. cit., p. 717.
2. Niebuhr, Reinhold: The Nature and Destiny of Man, p. 109.

the field of naturalistic thought in general, he aptly remarks:

> "The fact that such a great proportion of modern thought since the eighteenth century preserves man's good opinion of himself in terms of a dubious naturalism which is not certain whether virtue is to be found in reason or in nature nor how the two are related to each other, is indicative of the degree to which modern man's easy conscience is derived from a false estimate of his transcendence over nature."[1]

This revolt of intellect against the heart is traced back to the Greek Metaphysicians. The only remedy is to be found in Positivism which, by a unity of method, would produce universal benevolence as the direct object of all our efforts.[2] Man would no longer be grouped under the vague and uncertain classification based on a Theology of the future state, but would be ranked in accordance with moral and intellectual merit. Even though he admits the impractibility of this method, yet he insists that it would unite human society into an "organism" which would function as a unit, by infusing "a religious spirit into every act of life."[3] In this order, crass individualism would disappear, and individuals would be regarded "as organs of one Supreme

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1. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 109.
2. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 718-719.
3. Ibid, pp. 722-723.

Being." He claims that "Positivism . . . will place this principle beyond reach of attack, by giving a systematic demonstration of it, based on the sum of our scientific knowledge,"[1] but the world still awaits the proof for such a pantheistic philosophy.

As it will be shown immediately, modern scientific humanism adopts practically the same philosophy with the same dogmatism. However, some of them, seeing how the system advocated by Comte fell into disrepute, try to find reason for the failure in the rigidity of his system which made no room for progress.[2] But Comte made room for progress[3] and his dogmatism has been excelled only by modern scientific humanists as we shall see immediately.

But Comte included the element of worship in his system and laid out plans for services as well as for the buildings in which they were to be carried out. These are followed to this day by some groups in England and South America.[4]

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1. Robinson, op. cit., p. 723.
2. Potter, op. cit., p. 77.
3. Robinson, op. cit., pp. 723-724.
4. Cf. Potter, op. cit., p. 78.

B. LATER POSITIVISTIC DEVELOPMENTS

The spread of liberalism during the nineteenth century was particularly outstanding in England under the leadership of Dean Stanley and others, and in Scotland under the leadership of Thomas Erskine and McLeod Campbell. Therefore, the way was prepared for the "unscientific Pantheism" of Matthew Arnold. God, he defined, as a "stream of tendency" which makes for righteousness. Thus, God became an impersonal divinity, and revelation was regarded as without a basis in intuition, and was reduced to an empirical conclusion which found expression in the Hebrew nation.

In giving expression to the substance of Christianity, he conceived of what he called the "method" and the "secret" of Jesus. The method of "inwardness" and the secret of "self-renouncement" are rendered effective in a "sweet reasonableness."[1] Even Buddhism has this sense of righteousness and the "secret of Jesus" but it lacks the method and thus falls short of an "unerring balance."

Also, in England, the philosophy of Hume was reproduced by John Stuart Mill, whose associational

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1. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 482-483.

psychology is expounded in his Inductive Logic. The mind to him was but a series of sensations with the possibility of succeeding sensations, and intuitions were based upon experience. Later in his writings he expressed some belief in a form of theism, but this was weakened by the appearance of Darwinism.

In Spencer, we find an advocate of the same type of philosophy as that of Hume and Mill, in that he traced intuitions to an empirical source. But this source was not to be found in the individual but in the race, which, through heredity, passed on the heritage of the individual.[1] This was Spencer's contribution to the Positivist creed, and it remained for Hamilton to furnish that creed with the ideas of the relativity of knowledge and the inconceivability of the Infinite. According to Spencer, mental phenomena emerge from the nervous organism which is the result of development. He resolves cause into the idea of force, thus giving a pantheistic character to his conception,[2] and denying personality. He also taught that religion had its origin with ancestor worship.

In understanding the spirit of the age, we

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1. Fisher, op. cit., p. 487.
2. Ibid.

must not overlook the influence which Professor Huxley's Agnosticism had over the thinking men of his day. Mind for him was but a collection or a series of sensations whose uniformity constituted the soul.[1] With him, man was not a personal agent, and, therefore, if there was a God, He was responsible for good as well as evil. This critical negation expressed quite clearly the spirit of the age which gave rise to the Positivistic scheme of philosophy.

C. HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

The method by which religion was treated psychologically did not begin with the branch of scientific inquiry known as Psychology of Religion.[2] For, ever since the days of Kant, thinkers in the field of religion had given attention to the psychological nature of religion. Anthropology and the history of religion also furnished so much material which was helpful to modern psychologists that they may be regarded as precursors of Psychology of Religion.[3]

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1. Fisher, op. cit., p. 489.
2. Harvard Theological Review, Oct. 1908, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 436.
3. Ames, op. cit., p. 6.

Psychology of religion is, therefore, a relatively young science whose origin dates between 1895 and 1900.[1] It is difficult to discover just who should be credited with having started it, but Pratt gives much credit to President G. Stanley Hall, of Clarke University.[2] Professor Starbuck also offered his experienced hand to

> "lift religion sufficiently out of the domain of feeling to make it appeal to the understanding so that it might be possible progressively to appreciate its worth and its essential elements."[3]

And this was at a time when the word "Psychology" was becoming a word of power with Zeitgeist, and one felt that "the key to everything and anything worth knowing must surely be in the hands of the omniscient psychologist."[4] One reason that psychologists were hailed as those who should deliver religion from the hands of scientists was the very fact that they accepted all religious phenomena as being fit material for their investigation. One prominent psychologist said:

> "The psychologist of religions accepts the facts of religion, the temples and priests, the sacred books and ceremonies, the faiths and customs which exist in such profusion throughout the world.

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1. Biblical Review, Jan., 1919, Vol. IV, No. 1.
2. Harvard Theol. Review, op. cit., p. 436.
3. Ibid, p. 69.
4. Pratt, op. cit., p. 435.

> He seeks to know the needs, impulses, and desires from which these institutions and activities arise."[1]

But these hopes were soon seen to be ill-founded. Professor James envisioned the outcome of such a subjection of the facts of religious consciousness to the "unsentimental" psychologist when he wrote,

> "As there thus seems to be no one elementary religious emotion, . . . so there might conceivably also prove to be no specific and essential kind of religious object."[2]

It soon became clear that the naturalistic attitude was to dominate the psychologists in the field of religion. This was consistently and dogmatically set forth by Leuba, who has been a prominent member of the recent humanistic groups.[3] But the trail blazer in this field in America was, perhaps, Starbuck who, in the book, "The Psychology of Religion," defined the topography of the field and inspired further investigation. His most valuable contribution is the classic typing of conversion experiences.[4] He also gave to the field much valuable research, even though his reliance upon the questionnaire method, as well as some of his conclusions, were unscientific. For instance, his conclusion that the principle factor in religious

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1. Ames, op. cit., p. 13.
2. Harvard Theol. Review, op. cit., p. 71.
3. Dakin, op. cit., p. 10.
4. Cf. Uren: Recent Religious Psychology, p. 51.

conversion was the sexual changes accompanying adolescence. Thouless and others have seriously attacked his position here.[1]

A year later, Coe published his book, "The Spiritual Life," which, even though based on the questionnaire method, was a forward step in the perfection of that method.[2] This notable work confirmed some of the conclusions of Starbuck and contrasted sharply in others. His main contribution was the discovery that temperament is a prime factor involved in religious life and experience.[3] He quite correctly observes that more emphasis should be placed upon the strength and Manliness of Christ.[4] And when he observes that the temperament plays a vital part in the form of expression to which the religious experience gives rise, he does not mean to deny that the demands of Christ are not realizable by everyone.[5]

In a later book, "The Psychology of Religion," Coe shows more clearly the influences of pragmatism. Even though he admits in his introduction that the "will-to-think" plays a vital part even with the

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1. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 49.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 52.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 59.
4. Cf. Coe: The Spiritual Life, p. 248.
5. Cf. Ibid, p. 260.

scientist, who always regards data from the standpoint of "particular interest," yet he seeks to uphold the empirical concepts of the psychologists who lay down the proposition that religion lies wholly within the natural psychological order. "Our life gets its meaning, its reality, by being social."[1] Thus the transcendental is ruled out from the start, and God becomes merely the social ideals of the race.

> "That is, the self-manifestation of God to us is precisely in this love that we experience toward one another, so that our communion with him lies in the attitude that we take toward the social motive itself."[2]

Religion is devotion to democracy which recognizes the ground of that devotion in the value of personality.[3] Religion is, therefore, natural, and there is no evidence of religious intuition or instinct.[4] Yet religion is deeply rooted in the nature of man,[5] and continually finds expression in social aspirations of the race.

> "The thought of God may, indeed, undergo yet many transformations, but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as the expression

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1. Coe: The Psychology of Religion, p. xiv.
2. Ibid, p. 260.
3. Cf. Ibid.
4. Cf. Ibid, p. 323.
5. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 217.

of the depth and height of social experience."[1]

He has made a definite contribution in that he has outlined the thinking of his day in regard to social origins, and has analyzed quite carefully the psychology of group conduct, as well as given quite an argument for the validity of the functional standpoint of the psychology of religion. However, this functional interpretation is based upon psychological and not biological function as is true with Ames.[2] He makes a contribution in that he shows from his own testimony that his views as here presented are a result of a disappointment in adolescence.[3] Later we shall discuss more fully the effects of this which Dr. Wyckoff calls a "trauma" or wound which fails to heal properly.

The most widely known contribution in this field was William James' book, "The Varieties of Religious Experience." It covers quite a wide range of religious phenomena employing the biographical method rather than the questionnaire. Too much stress is laid upon the abnormal experiences at the expense of the normal and commonplace.[4] This may be accounted for

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1. Coe, op. cit., p. 326.
2. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 219.
3. Cf. Coe, op. cit., p. xiii.
4. Cf. Harvard Theol. Review, op. cit., p. 441.

partly by the fact that James set out to prove a thesis, and this was the truth of pluralistic idealism.[1] He definitely breaks with philosophy and theology and denies that the metaphysical attributes of God can stand the test of his empiricism. And even though he takes it for granted that there is a "wider self" or a psychic "beyond," yet he destroys any theistic concept by asserting that all religious phenomena can be accounted for by psychological processes.[2] However, his setting forth of the real value of religion is a great contribution to this field.

Pratt, using the same empirical basis, came to the similar conclusion in regard to the nature of the religious consciousness. "The feeling mass" is directly related to the life of the organism and there is no need of the transcendental in order to have the religious experience.[3] According to his philosophy, authoritarian belief is dead and rational belief is dying.[4] The old philosophical arguments for the belief in God were destroyed by Kant. He concludes that we are faced with a dilemma,

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1. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 61.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 78.
3. Cf. Pratt: The Psychology of Religious Experience, p. 14.
4. Cf. Ibid, p. 194.

> "The arguments which the people can grasp are no longer tenable, while the arguments that are tenable -- if such there be -- the people cannot grasp."[1]

In concluding his defense of this "inner religious experience," he says,

> "This evidence which all the mystics bear to a vast reservoir of life beyond us, which is like ours and with which our life may make connections, is the one dogma of the Religion of Feeling. And as the many dogmas of the Religion of Thought follow the many dogmas of the Religion of Primitive Credulity into the museums and the history books -- the ghost of the world of departed faiths -- this one dogma, if religion is really to last, will be seen in its true light as the one doctrine of the real Religion of Humanity, because it is founded on the very life of the race."[2]

Even though he is somewhat pessimistic about the future of religion, he has paid his respects to the vitality of real religion in that he has supported the thesis that religion is rooted in the instinctive depths of human nature.

For our purposes here, it will not be necessary to take up in detail the psychology of religion as it is presented by Ames, in that, in general, his views approximate those of Leuba. Suffice it to say that Ames is committed to the functional viewpoint which adheres to the biological conception of mind.[4]

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1. Pratt, op. cit., p. 194.
2. Ibid, p. 304.
3. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 130.
4. Cf. Ibid, p. 121.

This latter idea has been successfully attacked by Coe, James and Uren, in that they have shown that the idea of an end largely determines the activity of the means of activity called forth by the necessity of adjustment.[1]

Ames had an exalted conception of this new psychology as comprehending art, morality, religion, and all the possibilities of human existence. This science is also to become a substitute for philosophy and theology.[2] Religion is always public and not personal; therefore, he fails to recognize "that society is as much the product of the individual as the individual is the product of society." He asserts the idea of social progress without giving any rational explanation of such progress. Since his views are quite similar to those of Leuba it will no doubt be profitable for us to turn to a consideration of the contribution of that psychologist to the field of religion.

D. JAMES LEUBA AND HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Leuba has made such a unique contribution to the field of psychology that Uren says of one of his

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1. Uren, op. cit., p. 123.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 129.

works,

> "Professor Leuba's Psychological Study of Religion is one of the most thought provoking books which has emanated from the naturalistic wing of the American School of Religious Psychology."[1]

Using the materials furnished by anthropology, sociology, psychology, private documents and the questionnaire, and applying the comparative and genetic methods, he arrives at some rather startling conclusions.

But first we must note something in his own experience which shall be of great benefit to us in evaluating the contribution which the field of psychology of religion has made. He says that

> "the ideal condition for the student of religion would be to have lived naively through religious experiences and then to have gained freedom from traditional convictions."[2]

And in a footnote, his adolescent experience is more fully described:

> "The author was brought up in a religious atmosphere. During adolescence and several subsequent years, he was deeply stirred by religion and passed through conversion. And although now he finds little acceptable in the Roman Catholic and the Protestant dogmas, he has retained a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of religious life."[3]

It will be necessary for us to discover the psychological basis of his philosophy in order to understand the

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1. Uren, p. 166.
2. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 275.
3. Ibid, p. 275.

biting criticism which Uren gives of this claim.

> "All lovers of religion, who read Leuba's interesting study, will certainly lay down the book with a profound wish that the able author had a little less of this sympathetic appreciation, which strongly resembles the friendship of Brutus for Caesar, whom he slew . . . Those religious leaders, who trusted it had been Psychology which should have redeemed Israel, should ponder well this important book, which is probably the most formidable and subtle attack on religion which has been published in recent times."[1]

In regard to the origin of religion, Leuba insists that belief in impersonal forces preceeded belief in personal powers or even animistic conceptions.[2] This he does by studying the child, whose mind he likens to the mental state of primitive man. In this view he is contradicted by a formidable group of social psychologists including M'Dougall.[3] He is on doubtful ground, also, when he insists that there are three distinct types of behaviour among primitive tribes: the mechanical, the coercitive, and the anthropopathic. But Ames in "The Psychology of Religious Experience" holds with many anthropologists that only in recent times have men clearly distinguished modes of behaviour.[4] In upholding this theory, Leuba is shy about admitting

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1. Uren, op. cit., p. 180.
2. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 78.
3. Uren, op. cit., p. 181.
4. Ames, op. cit., p. 33.

any relationship between magic and science. Yet he fails to find a solution of the problem of its origin, but takes the beginnings of science for granted.

God was gradually shorn of his individualistic qualities and the coming of science made Him altogether unnecessary.[1] In a more recent book, he asserts that "Nothing in contemporary anti-materialistic science countenances belief in the God of the religions."[2] Yet he finds in numanity

> "an urge tending not towards adaptation to what is, but towards a social world in which goodness and beauty would be realized."

This, he thinks, makes room for a legitimate faith in the existence in the "Universe of a Power, or a Trend" which makes for beauty and goodness in accordance with the laws of science.[3] Yet upon a naturalistic basis there is no accounting for beauty in the universe, regardless of what theory of evolution is advocated.[4]

In the distant past, the ideas concerning God and immorality were gradually transformed into instruments of usefulness, but are unnecessary today. Yet he admits that beyond the limits of science there extends

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1. Leuba, op. cit., p. 125.
2. Leuba: God or Man, p. 320.
3. Ibid, p. 318.
4. Cf. Balfour: Theism and Humanism, p. 88.
   Cf. Cairns: Riddle of the World, pp. 138 and 144.

"an infinite, dark realm where the will-to-believe may discern something of what it needs or wants." However, this must be kept vague and undefined in order to fit in with the naturalistic scheme of science.[1] In his survey and criticism of the theories of the origin of religion, he completely ignores the conception known to anthropologists as "mana." According to this view, there was originally a protoplasmic mass out of which came the individualized gods.[2] Leuba also tends to disregard emotion in the development of religion, whereas M'Dougall, along with Wundt, finds an instinctive and emotional origin of the religious consciousness.[3]

Leuba also seeks to separate morality from religion by making morality a separate development from supernatural beliefs. But McDougall rightly maintains that the two have always existed together. The fear of these higher powers made communities enforce certain moral regulations over the individuals.[4] Many social customs, supported by supernatural sanctions, exist today among primitive tribes.[5]

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1. Leuba, op. cit., p. 318-319.
2. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 186.
3. Ibid, p. 188.
4. Cf. McDougall; An Introduction to Social Psychology, pp. 313-314.
5. Cf. Ibid, p. 315.

But following practically the same idea concerning the throwing off of the sanctions in order to progress, Leuba comes to the conclusion that the throwing off of all of these religious sanctions would greatly benefit modern society.[1] But this has been ably reputed by numerous authors who pointed to instances in history where the destruction of the belief in supernatural weakened the moral fiber of the individual. Pratt, putting this question to a number of people,

> "If you should become thoroughly convinced that there was no God, would it make any difference in your life -- either in happiness, morality, or in other respects?"

discovered some of the great values of a belief in a Personal God.[2] Even though Pratt tries to minimize the eventual result, yet he clearly says that the belief in a personal God is of great moral aid which cannot be matched by a "categorical imperative."[3] He even refers to that profound statement made by Voltaire to the effect that if there was no God, man would have to invent one. He also reveals a sense of the supreme social value of a belief in God when he states,

"Another social value of the concept of God is His

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1. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 324.
2. Pratt: Psychology of Religious Belief, p. 265 ff.
3. Ibid, p. 268.

> character as the ultimate, unprejudiced, and absolutely infallible judge of my actions and my motives."[1]

McDougall, adding strength to this statement, says,

> "We must recognize that a firm and harmonious relation between them has been in every age a main condition of the stability of societies."[2]

It will be recalled that the ethical ideals of George Eliot crashed when they were no longer supported by divine sanctions.

But this philosophy has more detrimental effects when it is carried over into the life of groups than when it is applied to the individual, which is quite contrary to Leuba's view that

> "Humanity is the Great Being who lifts us up above ourselves and communicates to us the complements of strength we require in order to overcome our egotistic leanings."[3]

Reinhold Neibuhr admits that the pride of the group is based upon the attitudes of the individual, yet the social results are unconditioned demands upon the individual.

> "A distinction between group pride and the egotism of individuals is necessary, furthermore, because the pretensions and claims of a collective or social self exceed those of the individual ego.

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1. Pratt, op. cit., p. 269.
2. Ibid, p. 314.
3. Leuba, op. cit., p. 308.

> The group is more arrogant, hypocritical, self-centered and more ruthless in the pursuit of its ends than the individual."[1]

Even though Leuba admits that

> "The failure of Comtism is to be ascribed partly to the difficulty of providing satisfactory means for collective devotion,"[2]

yet he praises the "splendid outburst of generous enthusiasm" of the early days of the French Revolution and also of the Russian movement. But later developments have followed as a result of this application of humanistic philosophy to society.[3] Cairns goes on to show that Humanism and Bolshevism are one in their general philosophy.

> "Finally, both Bolshevism and Humanism alike have the same fundamental philosophy of the universe, that in the last resort it is a system of blind impersonal forces without a cosmic purpose or aim."[4]

Therefore, we fail to find in Leuba's statement a sufficient answer as to how such a society is to operate. This element is seriously lacking in the following statement.

> "The systematic introduction of scientific management for the establishment of accepted individual and social ideals in the mind of the

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1. Neibuhr, op. cit., p. 208.
2. Leuba, op. cit., p. 312.
3. Cf. Cairns, op. cit., p. 33.
4. Ibid, p. 34.

> young, for purging the individual from evil tendencies, and for the organization of the life-impulses into harmonious personalities, will mark a new era in the history of humanity in comparison with which the 'industrial revolution' will seem of little significance. The scaffolding of a science of character and personality stands erected, and the first experiments in application of that science are in progress."[1]

A perusal of Leuba's books will reveal that he does not sufficiently account for the presence of these "evil tendencies" nor has he shown just how society should be organized so as to bring about this elimination. Science is a tool and not a guide in the determination of values, he says,[2] yet he says that man's moral, aesthetic, and intellectual values have been given him by the race.[3] If "Disinterested Helpfulness and Generosity are among the finest traits of moral nature of man,"[4] and are shown in animal life also, then how account for all the evil which he bewails and lays at the feet of religion?

After "Leuba has demonstrated to his own satisfaction the groundlessness of all religious ideas,"[5] he recognizes that nothing is left to meet the religious and moral cravings of mankind, so he substitutes the

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1. Leuba: God or Man, p. 321-322.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 321.
3. Cf. Uren, op. cit., p. 192.
4. Leuba, op. cit., p. 285.
5. Uren, op. cit., p. 192.

worship of our ancestors in "a religion in which the idea of Humanity would play a role similar to the one given it in Comtism."[1]

> "This tabloid contains a great deal of the Cult of Comte, some of the best features of the naturalistic Ethical Culture societies, and selected elements of Eddyism, Mind Cure, New Thought, and other similar Therapeutic associations. Now, this syncretism is certainly not a religion, and will never be accepted as such by a majority of the 'enlightened mass' of mankind."[2]

E. SUMMARY

Thus far in the discussion, an attempt has been made to trace the development of thought which laid the foundation of modern pragmatism as it finds expression in that great American educator, John Dewey, whose influence has been great in the formulation of the recent Scientific Humanism. After noting in the first chapter the earlier expressions of a similar philosophy, careful attention was given to the philosophy of Auguste Comte, who laid the foundation for the naturalism as it found expression in a majority of the leaders in the field of Psychology of Religion.

It was noted that in the Positivism of Comte

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1. Leuba: A Psychological Study of Religion, p. 328.
2. Uren, op. cit., pp. 192-193.

was to be found the same suggested guide to reality as is found in more recent theories. And it remains to be seen how his theory of the three stages of thought has found a similar expression in the recent humanistic developments. Certainly the elimination of a personal God has been a point in common in all the movements thus far in the discussion. Even though this naturally leads to a relativistic view in regard to man and the universe, yet Comte had the audacity to leave only one alternative to Theism and that was a dogmatic Positivism.

It has also been seen that Comte has failed to recognize the fact that organized society can lead to organized and, therefore, more disastrous evils than can be produced by individuals. It was also made clear that he does not maintain a proper balance between reason and impulse in his dealing with the problem of sin in the world, and in the method by which peace between the intellect and the heart is to be restored within the individual. Then recognizing the necessity of religion in the life of man, he substituted the worship of Humanity, for the worship of God, yet failing to account for the appearance in Humanity of the genius and the saint as well as the murderer

and the people deluded by a belief in a God.

Later, it was seen that Positivism was enlarged by such men as Matthew Arnold, John Stewart Mill, and Spencer, who included the idea of intuitions as being a heritage of the race. The latest form which we noted before taking up a consideration of the influence of the Positivism of Comte on modern Psychology of Religion, was the Agnosticism of Professor Huxley.

Comte, it has been seen, contributed directly to the trend toward naturalistic humanism in the field of Psychology of Religion through Ames, James and Leuba, and also found expression in other leading men such as Starbuck, Pratt, and Coe. But this is not to say that the field did not make a great contribution to the field of religion. Their task was to blaze new trails in the study of religion as it finds expression in worship, conversion, and in dogma, might be better understood. It also showed that man was "incorrigibly religious;" i.e., that religion is instinctive. It also gave a psychological answer to the question as to why men become unbelievers and flee to such cults as Comtism, and Ethical Culture societies for refuge. This was shown by the instances where men received a

religious wound in youth called a "trauma" and never wholly recovered.

However, it has been shown that this worship of Humanity which was substituted for the worship of God fell short in many respects. It has been seen that the taking away of the belief in a personal God weakens one's moral fiber and that a social theory substituted leads to more rampant evils. A Naturalistic conception such as this fails to account for mind or for beauty in nature, or for the aesthetic nature in man to appreciate that beauty found in nature. This philosophy of Psychological phenomena also fails to account sufficiently for the appearance in society of evil, as well as the exalted conceptions of God, unless such a God exists, and becomes a personal giver of intuitions that produce such an effect. It also failed to show how any society could be set up to purge egotistical evil tendencies from the individual. A further discussion of this problem is inevitable in the forthcoming chapters.

It remains to be seen just how this movement influenced such great minds as John Dewey, who, in turn, influenced education, religious education, and thereby religion. It will be the next problem to attempt an

evaluation of humanism as it found expression in this great leader.

CHAPTER THREE

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

CHAPTER III

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY FOR THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

Inasmuch as there are numerous types of humanistic thought varying from the optimism of Nicolai Hartmann to the pessimism of Bertrand Russell, it is rather difficult to consider every phase of this movement within the scope of this brief discussion. Therefore, for the sake of simplicity, the divisions made by Dakin will be accepted,[1] and upon the basis of this division the most popular representative of the so-called mediating group will be selected for closer scrutiny.

Dakin divides the humanists into three groups: the optimistic, represented by Hartmann and Dr. Elmer More; the presimistic, including Bertrand Russell and J. W. Krutch; and a mediating group led by William James, F. C. S. Schiller, and John Dewey with his

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1. Cf. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

disciples. In this school, he includes Dr. E. S. Ames, Professor A. E. Hayden, Professor M. C. Otto, and Mr. Walter Lippmann. To this mediating group he also adds Professor J. H. Leuba, Professor R. W. Sellars, Dr. C. F. Potter, and Professor J. S. Huxley in England. The first group finds the nature of things well suited to the flowering of the highest moral and religious powers within us. Paul Elmer More of this group advances farther toward a religious point of view than do most humanists, in that he accepts a theistic position. However, he is classed among the "literary humanists" instead of with the philosophical school. The second school, believing that science is the only pathway to truth, and that outside ourselves, reality is indifferent to values, face with defiance and resignation the resulting material and social environment. This group is designated as pessimists because they stress the subjectivity, relativity, and the frustration of human desires.[1] The latter group deserves to be called the mediating school, because of their attempt to reconcile a broad cultural point of view with the abstract scientific points of view.

Since John Dewey is one of the most influential

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1. Cf. Dakin, op. cit., p. 16.

men of the humanistic movement, and since he belongs to the mediating school, he has been selected for study in this chapter. Through a brief review of the principal tenets of his philosophy, the implications of the entire movement may be better understood.

A. BASIC INFLUENCES PRODUCING THE "INSTRUMENTALISM" OF JOHN DEWEY

There are a number of general influences which must be mentioned in order that the experimental humanism of John Dewey may be understood. One of the most important of these influences was the advancement of the evolutionary hypothesis. The very year that Dewey was born saw the publication of Darwin's Origin of the Species, and since that time every year has seen a wider application of that theory. As Dewey's thinking developed, he came to accept this revolutionary hypothesis which has had a great influence over his entire outlook. One noticeable thing about his thinking is the unreserved manner in which he accepts this hypothesis.[1] "The starting point of his system of thought is biological: he sees man as an organism in an environment."[2] Therefore, it

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1. Okada, G.: The Significance of John Dewey's Philosophy for Religion, p. 15.
2. Ency. Brit., Vol. 7, 14th Edition, p. 297.

can be seen why the transcendental disappears from his philosophy, and change becomes the dominating factor in his view of the development of institutions, morals, beliefs, and values.

The second influence which has played a noticeable part in the development of the thinking of this great leader has been industrial revolution. This was brought about by the application of modern science to the realm of manufacturing and industry. This influence is clearly shown in his emphasis upon the practical. He is interested in bringing the best material resources of the world into the service of all the people. Therefore, great emphasis is placed upon the social implications of philosophy. According to his way of thinking, science becomes "an affair of civilization" and not of individual intellect and "all morality is social."[1]

The Democratic movement, which is much broader than just a caption for a political arrangement, also influenced Dewey's thinking. His writings reveal a courageous spirit of experimentation, high adventure, and cooperative sharing, which is common to the modern humanistic movement.[2] With this outlook on life, he

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1. Dewey, John: Human Nature and Conduct, pp. 314-316.
2. Okada, op. cit., p. 20.

feels confident that man can, in the future, control his own destiny through a unified effort toward values based upon experience. This is to be made possible through education as the soundest instrumentality of social, political, and moral reconstruction.

With these general influences in mind, some definite and more personal influences may be noted. In the following manner, he described his own early experience:

> "Teachers of philosophy were, at that time, almost to a man, clergymen; the supposed requirements of religion, or theology, dominated the teaching of philosophy in most colleges.
>
> "Just how and why Scotch philosophy lent itself so well to the exigencies of religion I cannot say; probably the causes were more extrinsic than intrinsic; but at all events there was a firm alliance established between religion and the cause of 'intuition' . . . . I do not mention this theological and intuitional phase because it had any lasting influence upon my own development, except negatively. I learned the terminology of an intuitional philosophy, but it did not go deep, and in no way did it satisfy what I was dimly reaching for. I was brought up in a conventionally evangelical atmosphere of the more 'liberal' sort; and the struggles that later arose between acceptance of that faith and the discarding of traditional and institutional creeds came from personal experiences and not from the effects of philosophical teaching. It was not, in other words, in this respect that philosophy either appealed to me or influenced me -- though I am not sure that Butler's Analogy, with its cold logic and acute analysis, was not, in a reversed way, a factor in developing 'skepticism.'"[1]

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1. Adams and Montague: Contemporary American Philosophies, Vol. II, pp. 15-16.

He was also deeply influenced by the leader of a movement which we have already had occasion to mention. In order that his reaction may be clearly detected, we quote his own words again.

> "In undergraduate days, I had run acoss, in the college library, Harriet Martineau's exposition of Comte. I cannot remember that his lay of 'the three stages' affected me particularly; but his idea of the disorganized character of Western modern culture, due to a disintegrative 'individualism,' and his idea of a synthesis of science that should be a regulative method of an organized social life, impressed me deeply. I found, as I thought, the same criticisms combined with a deeper and more far-reaching integration in Hegel. I did not in those days when I read Francis Bacon, detect the origin of the Comtean idea in him, and I had not made acquaintance with Condorcet, the connecting link."[1]

Thus, we see that Dewey was directly influenced by the originator of the Positivistic movement of the nineteenth century as well as earlier men who advanced a similar philosophy.

This same type of influence came also through the naturalistic school of psychologists which we have already discussed at some length. The chief person who influenced him in this way was William James; William James, having had a similar unsatisfactory religious experience. He went to Princeton to study for the ministry, but developed there "antipathy to all

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1. Adams and Montague, op. cit., p. 16.

ecclesiasticisms which he expressed with abounding scorn and irony throughout all his later years."[1] Having come to hate German metaphysics, he chanced to read an article by Charles Pierce on "How to Make Our Ideas Clear."[2] This article declared that in order to find the meaning of an idea, the consequences to which it leads in action must be examined. In speaking of the effect which this article had upon pragmatism, the Encyclopedia Brittanica states that,

> "Having its roots in the strict analysis of the real logic of the sciences made in the middle of the '70's by that extraordinary eccentric genius, Charles S. Pierce, it underwent, in James' hands a transforming generalization."[3]

Instead of asking for logical principles or premises, pragmatism looked toward fruits, facts and consequences, and defined truth as the "cash-value" of an idea.

> "Scholasticism asked, What is the thing, -- and lost itself in 'quiddities;' Darwinism asked, What is its origin, -- and lost itself in nebulas; pragmatism asks, What are its consequences? -- and turns the face of thought to action and the future."[4]

Dewey says that there were two conceptions

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1. Encyclo. Brit., Vol. 12, 14th Edition, p. 883.
2. Durant, Will: The Story of Philosophy, p. 557.
3. Ency. Brit., op. cit., p. 884.
4. Durant, op. cit., p. 558.

set forth in Psychology which greatly affected him. The first was the adoption of the subjective tenor of traditional psychology and an advancement to the conception of the functions of the minds as a "stream of consciousness." And the second was the return to an earlier biological conception of the psyche, an idea which "worked its way more and more into all my ideas and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs."[1] Just how his beliefs were transformed will be better understood from a study of the principal tenets of his philosophy.

1. His Theory of Knowledge

According to Dewey, an authoritarian system dominated the lives of peoples up until the coming of the experimental method, which found expression in the industrial revolution of modern times.

> "The central point in this system of authority was the conviction that knowledge is obtained by direct contact of mind with reality, supplemented by revelation; that the knowledge so attained by reason and faith would bring about, when projected into the happier estate of life after death, a direct possession and enjoyment of the ultimate reality, God."[2]

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1. Adams and Montague, op. cit., p. 24.
2. Beard: Whither Mankind, p. 319.

Using this definition as a basis, he concludes that this theory of knowledge isolated the method and outcome from the action itself.

But with the development of the physical sciences, this system of knowledge received a disastrous shock. But instead of the philosophers' actually examining how these things in science were accomplished, they set about trying to harmonize the new knowledge with tradition.[1] What he means to say is, that they should have accepted the new knowledge, and upon examination as to how it was achieved, adopted the experimental method as the sure road to knowledge, or, to state it better, to have adopted the scientific method as knowledge.

For knowing has completely abandoned the traditional separation of doing and knowing, and has installed doing as the heart of knowing.[2] This philosophy, as it is set forth by Dewey, has been termed "instrumentalism," because he believes knowledge to be merely an instrument to be used in the domination of environment.[3] Thereby, the nature of intelligence is conceived of as a method of action, and not as a residue

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1. Beard, op. cit., p. 321.
2. Dewey, John: The Quest for Certainty, p. 32.
3. Turner, op. cit., p. 675.

left over by a process of abstract thinking.[1]

When it comes to the extent of knowledge, Dewey tries to evade objections by stating in a general fashion that

> "Knowledge is possible as far as we can develop instrumentalities of inquiry, measurement, symbolization, calculations, and testing."[2]

For only through the adoption of the experimental method can the progress of natural knowledge be made secure and constant.[3] Thought suggests a course of action, called an hypothesis, in the face of a problem, so as to bring about a change in the conditions. The consequences from the following of this procedure permits the judging of the validity of the original idea, and also brings about further development. As an example of the unsuccessful wedding of thought and action, he points to the machine age and technology as bearing testimohy "to the reality, already affected, of knowledge as instrumentality of action."[4]

Upon the basis of this philosophy, Dewey criticizes modern educational procedure in that school is isolated from life and theory from practice. Science

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1. Kilpatrick, W. H.: The Educational Frontier, p. 305.
2. Beard, op. cit., p. 320.
3. Cf. Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 305.
4. Ibid, p. 306.

and technology should be allowed to influence the schools more deeply. What is needed in the educational system is a social philosophy based upon the needs as they are detected in present conditions.

It must be understood that knowledge is more than merely tested and authentic instances of experience. "It signifies events understood, events so discriminately penetrated by thought that mind is literally at home in them."[1] Therefore, rather than placing his confidence in "pure" science, Dewey holds that "applied science" is more scientific. For the latter is more interested in altering existing conditions in the light of "conclusions that are reflectively preferred."[2] Herein he fails to make a distinction between events and objects.

Objects are merely events with meanings. The mind takes events which naturally occur and converts them into objects by means of "inferences" as to the probable consequences.[3] Therefore, as to existences, there can be no adequate knowledge, and apart from mathematics all knowledge is historic. Man becomes merely a part of nature, and no longer holds the exalted position given him by traditional views.

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1. Dewey, John: Experience and Nature, p. 161.
2. Ibid.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 325.

> "Only as science is seen to be fulfilled and brought to itself in intelligent management of historical processes in their continuity can man be envisaged as within nature, and not as a supernatural extrapolation."[1]

According to this statement, intellect, instead of occupying a leading place among the faculties of man, is made a servant of the senses, in that it becomes an instrument.

Knowledge cannot be identified with acquaintance, recognition, definition and classification, for we cannot know events, but only "event-with-meaning." Even contemplation possesses too much of the aesthetic to be classed as knowledge.[2] Introspective doctrines composed the last stand for knowledge as immediate grasp intuition, envisagement, possession. Since the problems connected with the relation of immediate with mediate knowledge have not been solved, Dewey concludes that the problems are unreal and confines his theory of knowledge to a behaviouristic philosophy which destroys dualisms and metaphysical conceptions.[3] Therefore, knowledge is purely natural, human activity, and not universal truth, both imminent in, and transcending, human experiences.

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 163.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 331.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 20-21.

2. His Conception of Reality

Nothing sums up better Dewey's theory of reality than his quotation from Santayana, when he said that "every phase of the ideal world emanates from the natural," and that "sense, art, religion, society, express nature exuberantly."[1] Then Dewey takes him to task for enlarging his conception through a process which "is a transubstantiation of matter, a passage from existence to eternity." Dewey claims that he had tried to combine a view concerning the dynamic flux of nature with an eternity of stated ideal forms.

In the same manner, he claims that traditional philosophy has taken the results of the search for wisdom and converted them into a metaphysics which gives significance to the conclusion and not to the method which produced the result. This leads to a conception of Absolute Experience, when there is no reality beyond human experience.[2] This longing of mankind for that which is absolute, certain and infinite is explained on the basis that nature represents a happy combination of that which is relatively stable and that which is

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 58.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 59.

relatively contingent. This merely emphasizes the fact that there are

> "permanent and general objects of reference as well as temporarily changing events; the possibility of truth as well as error."[1]

In this manner, he deals a deadly stroke to all philosophy or logical processes which conceive of an absolute, or eternal, existence or Being.

> "Although absolute, eternal, all-comprehensive, and pervasively integrated into a whole so logically perfect that no separate patterns, to say nothing of seams and holes, can exist in it, it proceeds to play a tragic joke upon itself -- for there is nothing else to be fooled -- by appearing in a queer combination of rags and glittering gew-gaws, in the garb of the temporal, partial and conflicting things, mental as well as physical, of ordinary experience."[2]

It is interesting to note the place of ideals in such a philosophy of life.

> "A particular idea may be an illusion, but having ideals is no illusion. It embodies features of existence. Although imagination is often fantastic, it is also an organ of nature; for it is the appropriate phase of indeterminate events moving toward eventualities that are now but possibilities. A purely stable world permits no illusions, but neither is it clothed with ideals. It just exists."[3]

Yet, he seems to recognize that inexplainable human craving for an Absolute or perfect Being. Again he says,

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 60.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 62.

"We long, amid a troubled world, -- it seems inherent for perfect being."[1] But this longing is but a part of human nature to want a deity to worship and a devil to abhor, and its satisfaction does not require a transcendental being or existence.[2] Experience recognizing needs must project "satisfactions and completions." But satisfaction is not subjective, private or personal: it is conditioned by objective partialities and defections and made real by "objective situations and completions."[3]

Therefore, he concludes that all realities are social and scientific. "Society is individuals-in-their relations. An individual apart from social relations is a myth or a monstrosity."[4] Historically speaking, he considers early man as being biased in favor of an objective classification, which eliminated the subjective or personal interpretation. Modern science is also criticized for having reduced personality as far as possible to impersonal terms. "Science is grasp of reality in its final self-sufficing form."[5] Man, being continuous with Nature, has no "inner life" or

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 63.
2. Beard, op. cit., p. 318.
3. Ibid, p. 64.
4. Kilpatrick, op. cit., p. 291.
5. Dewey, op. cit., p. 135.

"consciousness" which sets him above nature, and "personality, it almost seems, is an insult to Nature."[1] Thus individuality tends to be lost in the "stream of consciousness" similar to the manner as described by William James.

3. A Definition of Value

Many of our values are but carry-overs from a time when men were unable through practice to control the forces of nature and to direct the on-going of events. In a time like that, it was natural for men to seek an emotional substitute which would give them a feeling of certainty.[2] Even today, men are afraid to leave values at the mercy of action, and tend to seek assurances that ideal goods should have a stable position in the realm of the ultimately real. Therefore, through a compensatory process, men project a perfect form of good into either a realm of essence or into a heaven above the skies.[3]

Classic philosophy is indicated for relegating practical activity to a realm of low-grade reality. Desire, being produced by imperfection of Being, drives

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1. Wieman: Normative Psychology of Religion, p. 366.
2. Dewey: The Quest for Certainty, p. 33.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 34.

man to the realm of passionless reason to find perfect reality. But

> "The chief consideration in achieving concrete security of values lies in the perfecting of methods of action. In the quest for certainty, the diversion of thought from the channels of intelligent action are but a baneful diversion."[1]

We conclude that

> "the essence of pragmatic instrumentalism is to conceive of both knowledge and practice as means of making goods -- excellencies of all kinds -- secure in experienced existence."[2]

Gains in science should be used not only to make values secure, but to improve our judgments of values and to increase them. But as long as the notion that knowledge is a disclosure of reality independent of knowing, science is helpless in its attempt to disclose new values. This dualism started breaking down in the time of Galileo, when it was shown that the description and explanation of natural phenomena in terms of heterogeneous qualities was inadequate.[3]

As a result of the separation of man and experience from nature, qualities we experience fall outside of the realm of nature. And since these qualities are the traits that give meaning and value, many thinkers

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 34.
2. Ibid, p. 36.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 95.

get the idea that they are more than subjective and find embodiment in a Being higher than nature.

But coming to a more definite statement as to what values are supposed to be, according to the instrumentalism of John Dewey, we note that values are connected with liking. Not all liking is included here, but only that liking which is approved by judgment, based upon an examination of the relation upon which the object liked depends.[1]

> "Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions and the results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our desires, affections and enjoyments."[2]

This type of values does not lead to conflicts, because the moral conflict comes as a result of choosing between things which are or have been satisfying and not between something known to be good and that which is known to be evil.[3] Dewey believes that there is no value except where there is satisfaction, yet certain conditions must be fulfilled in order to transform a satisfaction into a value. For in order that an object may be known, according to Dewey's conception, it must be determined as consequences of connective

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1. Cf. Dewey, p. 264.
2. Ibid, p. 265.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 266.

operations.

As a result of this process, science has been creating temporal values all the while, but a certain "operative knowledge" is necessary in order that they may be had and enjoyed. The amount of pains necessary to the control of their occurrence is the measure of the degree of value which we place upon them.[1]

But we must not get the idea that this is a matter of personal satisfaction based upon an egoistic utilitarianism. For, in fact, it destroys subjectivism at its very roots by making values to rest upon the change which is made upon the world and not upon the influence which is brought to bear upon ourselves. The classical philosophies did not place enough emphasis upon the objective social values to be created but were content with mere objects of contemplation.

> "The Aristotelian-medieval conviction that highest bliss is found in contemplative possession of ultimate Being presents an ideal attractive to some types of mind; it sets forth a refined sort of enjoyment. It is a doctrine congenial to minds that despair of the effort involved in creation of a better world of daily experience. It is, apart from theological attachments, a doctrine sure to recur when social conditions are so troubled as to make actual endeavor seem hopeless."[2]

This type of philosophy is helpless because of a lack

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1. Cf. Dewey, op. cit., p. 269.
2. Ibid, pp. 275-276.

of emphasis upon means. If the experimental technique were applied in the field of morals, and social relations, men's energies, rather than controlled from external authority, would be controlled and directed by intelligent judgment and endeavor.

B. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HIS PHILOSOPHY FOR RELIGION

Just as would be expected, the idea of activity is carried over into religion. Dewey quotes from another American thinker a definition of "faith" which gives the very heart of religion for an instrumentalist. "Faith is tendency toward action."[1] Therefore, faith, according to this definition, makes experience itself the sole, ultimate authority. This view is contrary to a majority of the traditional philosophies and the most widespread religions, because they have been of a "transcendental nature" and saturated with the supernatural, which signifies that which is beyond experience.[2] The reason for the development of religion is given as the fact that men, facing the flux of change in events, had to seek peace outside of it. But now

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1. Forum Magazine, Editors: Living Philosophies, p. 21.
2. Cf. Ibid, pp. 22-23.

science has a technique which enables him to become master of his own destiny.[1]

In "A Common Faith" Dewey develops the idea of religion apart from any idea of the supernatural, any conception of immortality or any of the "encumbrances" which have grown up about such ideas. Now, the main purpose is to determine just what are the beliefs connected with such a view of religion. Later it will be necessary to discuss the values of such a religion for the field of Psychology of Religion. The validity of the claim of such a philosophy to the title of "religion" will also be considered in a later chapter.

Religion has accumulated so many of these "encumbrances" that the real nature of religion has become so obscure that many people quite capable of genuine religious experience are unaware of the possibilities inherent within their attitudes.[2] Then, what is religion when stripped of all these historical accumulations which have hitherto hidden the real meaning of religion? In brief, it is devotion to an ideal. That does not mean that all faith in moral ideal ends is because of that fact religious in nature.

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1. Forum Magazine, op. cit., p. 24.
2. Cf. Dewey: A Common Faith, p. 9 ff.

> "The religious is 'morality touched by emotion' only when the ends of moral conviction arouse emotions that are not only intense but are actuated and supported by ends so inclusive that they unify the self."[1]

Further, this religious attitude signifies "something that is bound through imagination to a general attitude." This attitude is displayed in more than the "moral" phase of life, and finds expression in "art, science and good citizenship."[2] The sense of the dignity of human nature is as religious as is the sense of awe and reverence when it rests upon a sense of human nature "as a cooperating part of a larger whole."[3] This natural piety, therefore, rests upon a sense of nature as the whole of which we are the intelligent part, having the capacity to bring the rest into a relationship which is more humanly desirable. Furthermore, this scheme "does not depend for assurance upon subjection to any dogmas or item of doctrine." The validity of this claim will be fully investigated later in the discussion.

Suffice it to say that this statement is rather striking in contrast to one made a little later in the book.

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 22.
2. Ibid, p. 23.
3. Ibid, p. 25.

> "The mind of man is being habituated to a new method and ideal: There is but one sure road of access to truth -- the road of patient, cooperative inquiry operating by means of observation, experiment, record and controlled refection."[1]

Dewey concludes, therefore, that religious qualities are not bound up with the idea of the "existence of the God of theism," and the religious function in experience must be emancipated from the notion of special truths that are religious by their own nature, and peculiar avanues of access to that truth.

The part played by imagination in this type of religion is quite interesting.

> "In a definite sense, the only meaning that can be assigned the term 'imagination' is that things unrealized in fact come home to us and have power to stir us . . . the aims and ideals that move us are generated through imagination. But they are not made out of imaginary stuff. They are made out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience."[2]

The interaction between our aims and the existing conditions becomes the test of our ideals. "It is this <u>active</u> relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name 'God.'"[3] This union between the ideal and the actual can produce steady emotion which will drive man to achievement.

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 32.
2. Ibid, p. 46.
3. Ibid, p. 51.

In trying to justify his use of the word "God" here, Dewey writes,

> "Use of the words 'God' or 'divine' to convey the union of actual with ideal may protect man from a sense of isolation and from consequent despair or defiance."[1]

Nature produces both the things which give direction and the things which produce the discord and problems to be solved by the ideals. Science has broken down the dualism which made a distinction between the sources of good and evil.[2] Even though he insists that the church is senile to the extent that its influence is hardly felt today,[3] yet he blames the serious evils of our day upon the retarding effects of that institution and the belief in moral causes as the source of social evils.[4]

What is needed, therefore, in the field of religious attitudes is the transfer of the faith and ardor that has at times characterized religions in the past to a zeal for the improvement of human relations. The results of the adoption of such a religious attitude are best summed up by Professor Haydon.[5]

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1. Dewey, op. cit., p. 53.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 54.
3. Cf. Ibid, pp. 61-63.
4. Cf. Ibid, p. 77.
5. Krumbine: The Process of Religion, p. 265.

"The solidarity of the race, man's at-homeness on the planet, and the togetherness of men as children of the earth add new qualities to the love of man."

C. SUMMARY

In the preceding discussion, it has been revealed that the positivism of Comte played a prominent part in the fashioning of the modern conception of "instrumentalism," as it found expression in that great educator and philosopher, John Dewey. This influence came both directly from the contribution of Comte to philosophy, and also through the American Naturalists in the field of Psychology of Religion. It was seen that even though there were various individualistic forms given to the expression of the Humanistic Philosophy, the most popular and acceptable expression was to be found not in the Literary humanism of Babbitt and More, not in the pessimism of Bertrand Russell, but in the broad cultural outlook which found expression in the "Chicago" and "Columbia" schools founded by John Dewey.

After investigation, the sources of this mediating school were found to come mainly from three different influences: the advance of the evolutionary

hypothesis, the coming of the Industrial Revolution, and the democratic movement.

Then there were some personal factors which influenced the thinking of the leader of the mediating movement. The unsatisfactory, personal religious experience, left the way open for the philosophy of Comte, as well as the writings of the naturalistic psychologists, such as James and Leuba. As a result of these various influences, John Dewey developed his "instrumentalism" which has influenced American educational thought more than has any other philosophy.

Beginning with a biological conception, Dewey advances a theory of knowledge besides his own behaviouristic comeption which destroys all dualism and metaphysical ideas. The scientific method rules out all ideas of the transcendental, and confines knowing to human doing. Therefore, knowledge is neither acquired through the processes of intuition, revelation, nor through direct contact with reality, or through purely intellectual processes.

Reality is, therefore, confined to the experiences of man based upon the inter-relations of nature. The Supernatural and the Absolute are ruled out altogether, and all reality is included in scientific and social processes. Even individuality tends to be lost

in a "stream of consciousness" and the reality of self is made to be a possession of knowledge rather than knowledge to be the possession of self.

All values are natural and relative. By action of the judgment upon the satisfactions produced by objects and events turned into objects, new values are produced all the time. Therefore, modern application of technology to industry has greatly increased values.

What has been the result for religion? Religion has become the natural expression of mankind in a devotion to aims or ideals created by the imagination of man. "God" is only used to marshal the emotional content of the religions behind that which has proven satisfactory in the social processes of humanity, and to keep man from becoming too depressed in the face of evils produced by natural processes.

There is no supernatural to guarantee our beliefs and values, and no immortality to hope for as individuals. Neither are these present to give us pause in the presence of the infinite possibilities of life both for good and for evil, to give us moral stability in the fact of uncertain circumstances.

It still remains to be seen whether humanity

can be united by such a philosophy to produce the "goods" which shall prove satisfactory in the developing of the highest and best in all the individuals which exist as units of such a great naturalistic whole.

CHAPTER FOUR

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

CHAPTER IV

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

A. THE BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL TENETS AS SET FORTH IN "THE PROMISE OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

Thus far in the discussion, the historical development of the humanistic movements has been discussed beginning with the thought of Protagoras and proceeding through the Roman types to the contribution which humanism made to the Renaissance and the Reformation. Then modern expressions of this type of thinking were noted beginning with the nineteenth century philosophers and tracing the developments which followed in the field of psychology of religion. In the last chapter, the importance of "instrumentalism" for religion was considered. Now the principal development to be considered in this discussion remains to be investigated. Scientific Humanism, as it finds expression in such men as Oliver L. Reiser, Baker Brownell, and Francis Potter, represents the most recent development in this field. In order to get some idea of the tenets of their philosophy and their importance for

religion, a study will be made of some of their principal writings.

First of all, "The Promise of Scientific Humanism" will be analyzed in so far as it relates to the field of religion. But lest some would get the idea from the title that this is something entirely new and unrelated to the previous types of thinking upon this subject, they will be reminded of the fact that Oliver L. Reiser and Francis Potter, along with John Dewey, signed the Christian Manifesto in 1933.[1] This is an official statement which harmonizes practically every form of humanism in the present philosophical situation. Many instances of similarity will be pointed out between the "instrumentalism" of John Dewey and the humanism of Reiser as the discussion progresses.

The discussion begins with the assumption that the present world is in an excellent position to destroy itself, with the indication that it is in the process of doing so.[2] Many remedies have been advanced, including that of the Thomists, the "crisis" theologians, Nicholas Berdyaev, and the Oxford Group Movement. But all of these represent a "retreat from reason." Only the group known as "scientific humanists" maintains and

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1. Dakin, op. cit., p. 51 ff.
2. Cf. Reiser: The Promise of Scientific Humanism, p. ix.

asserts its faith in the powers of human intelligence to move forward and construct a better spiritual world based upon a scientific understanding of nature.[1]

If the modern world is to survive, its "culture patterns" as well as its "models of belief and action" will, of necessity, be replaced by a new mode of orientation or "semanitic reaction" which may also be called "global thinking." The ultimate goal of such an orientation is what has been termed the "World Sensorium."

It may be stated from the beginning that the new type of orientation is thoroughly evolutionary; i.e., it is based upon the idea that the human brain and the mind of man are but products of biological and social change.[2] Life on earth is supposed to have begun by the cooperation of specific enzymes, plus the power of potassium compounds to help orientate the molecular patterns, under the guidance of radiation. Cosmic rays, since the origin of life, have been responsible for giving the periodical excitation necessary to the mutations through which a "super-mind" is being evolved.[3] According to this view, there are three periods in the

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1. Cf. Reiser, p. x.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. xi.
3. Cf. Ibid, pp. 315-316.

historical process of development which are similar in some respects to the three divisions as laid down in the Positivism of Comte.[1]

Present conditions, as well as what we are, are the results of evolution, both biological and social.[2] Reiser is so afraid of dualisms it is almost surprising that he would attribute present conditions to two different sources. However, he very carefully attributes the evils in present conditions to social evolution.[3]

This intellectual evolution has proceeded through the following three periods:

(1) the pre-Aristotelian

(2) the Aristotelian

(3) the non-Aristotelian.

Early man's mind functioned in the first category and the modern, human mind is functioning in the second category, while the mind of the future (of which his is the precursor) will function in the third realm. This conception is not entirely peculiar to Reiser, for, as we have seen, it is similar to that of Comte in the nineteenth century. James Mark Baldwin, Lucien Levy-Bruhl,

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1. Cf. Reiser, op. cit., p. 242.
2. Cf. Ibid, pp. xi, 173.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. xiii.

Alfred Korzybski, and Kurt Lewin have also proposed similar theories.[1]

The first period is pre-logical in that man's mind operated upon the basis of an "animistic" conception which possessed no categories similar to the ones common to modern mental processes, and which fails to distinguish between the self and the not-self. In place of the Aristotelian categories, primitive man operated upoh an entirely different principle termed "participation." The axiom is "Everything is everything else."

On the next level, that of Aristotelian logic, we get clear distinctions.

> "The logic of Aristotle is a static logic; it is the base on what I shall term the 'fallacy of the absolute individuality of substance,' the subject of predication."[2]

This results in a set of dualisms which are not only contrary to a proper conception or philosophy of nature, but which cause the many conflicts of modern life. There is a dualism of "substance" and its "properties," the "thing" and its "behaviour," the "soul" and the "body," "space" and "time," "matter" and "causality," "time" and "eternity," the "absolute" and the "relative," "intellect" and "feeling," "reason" and "emotion,"

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. xii.
2. Ibid, p. xii.

"group consciousness" and "individualism."

The basis of the above dualisms is to be found in the logic of classes, which results in an "elementalism."[1] The ultimate basis of this is to be found in the "law of identity" and the "law of excluded middle" and the law of contradiction. The first of these would be represented by the logical statement that "A is A" and the second likewise would indicate that "A is either B or non-B." The entire basis of our philosophy must needs be reconstructed in order that we may attain unto understanding of the interconnectedness of things which will resemble primitive man's sense of "participation."[2] There will then be a union of the intellect and emotion which will resemble "primitive man's fusion with nature in mystical participation."[3]

The theory set forth by Reiser is completely "organismic" and "relativistic," based not only on the theory of evolution, but looking to Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy, and Einstein's theory of relativity for support. These theories, based upon the above naturalistic scheme, apply to the whole of life

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 16.
2. Ibid, p. xii.
3. Ibid, p. xiii.

whether it be religious, intellectual, economic, social, or whether it refer to men, beasts, or physical nature. All human beings are but cells in the "World Sensorium," and the entire human race appears as an "embryonic being developing here on earth," and culturally, each person as an individual is a focus of the "social 'forces' which make up the stream of human history."[1]

And this brings up a conception of history. History has often been thought of as that which is past, and the past considered as unchangeable. But according to the cultural interpretation, the past is what it is because of its influence upon the present. Through experience, we can change the effects and meaning which shall become an alchemy of events "that is grounded in time's living progress."[2] This sounds quite familiar after considering the philosophy of John Dewey which emphasizes action and experience, through which we may put a new meaning into events and objects. Through a consideration of conditions around us, we have the privilege of intelligently directing the future, and thereby controlling our own destiny.

However, this is not to be done through individualism, but through "global Planning" in

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. xiv.
2. Ibid, p. 45.

accordance with field-plenum dynamics. In treating man in accordance with the organismic view, he stands in relation to society in the same manner in which particles stand in an electrical field.

> "We live in a cultural field, a milieu of folkways, institutions, laws and human group patterns of behaviour which extend indefinitely into space and time."[1]

In the further consideration of this view, the various phases will be taken up under three divisions:

(1) A Non-Aristotelian Logic

(2) Extra-Sensory Perception

(3) The New Alchemy

as representing the principal ideas contained in this philosophy.

1. Non-Aristotelian Logic

As was previously stated, all knowledge, reality and truth are relative as is shown by many contradictions which appear in the realm of modern science. These contradictions are presented in accordance with the Hegelian pattern of thesis and antithesis. The following table will give a clear idea as to what

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 45.

types of problems will be solved, or rather dissolved, by the adoption of a non-Aristotelian logic.

Thesis	Antithesis
1. An electron is a corpuscle.	1. An electron is a wave-phenomenon.
2. Radiation is undulatory.	2. Radiation is corpuscular.
3. The ether exists.	3. The ether does not exist.
4. The ether (field) is continuous.	4. The ether (space-medium) is discrete.
5. The velocity of light is constant.	5. The velocity of light is variable.
6. Every material body gives rise to an electromagnetic field.	6. Every material body does not give rise to an electromagnetic field.
7. The colr of this star is red.	7. The color of this star is blue (not red).
8. This solution is electropositive.	8. This solution is electronegative.
9. This cortical neurone is active.	9. This cortical neurone is passive.
10. The taste of this apple is sweet.	10. The taste of this apple is not sweet (is sour).

The first six antimonies are "truths" conditioned by physical relativity, the eighth one in an instance of chemical relativity, and the ninth of biological relativity, and the tenth of psychological

relativity. Therefore, by declaring that neither thesis nor antithesis is true, he proves the fallacy of "The absolute individuality of the subject, which is engendered by the law of identity."[1]

It must be realized that in trying to reconcile "thought" with "things" under the Aristotelian law of Identity, or "subject-predicate" logic, it was not realized that things which were functional were being hypostatized into "things-in-themselves." It is appropriate here that we refer to the philosophy of John Dewey in this connection with the idea of a table, he says:

> "When this standardized constant, the result of a seriesof operations and expressing an indefinite multitude of possible relations among concrete things, is treated as the reality of nature, an instrument made for a purpose is hypostatized into a substance complete and self-sufficient in isolation. Then the fullness of qualities present in individual situations have to be treated as subjective impressions mysteriously produced in mind by the real object or else as products of a mysterious creative faculty of consciousness."[2]

For proof of this hypothesis, Reiser turns to "primitive" man, and seeks to show that it came about only after sociological evolution.[3] Here he expresses doubt about his own theory and expresses himself as

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 47.
   See also chapter XV.
2. Dewey, John: The Quest for Certainty, p. 239.
3. Reiser, op. cit., pp. 18-19.

favoring social evolution but not biological changes to explain the mental evolution of the race.

> "In our own theory, therefore, we hold that the evolution of mentality (orientations or semantic reactions) is largely social, not biological, evolution."[1]

These detrimental effects of Aristotelian individualization are also shown to be the result of social evolution by the fact that some "primitive" peoples (cultures) have not followed this individualism-identity principle. These people do not even have words for "I" and "you" but merely designate the difference by pointing.[2]

Then he concludes by giving the reason for the collapse of the second type of orientation.

> "If we hadn't aimed at the impossible -- eternal and absolute truth -- and missed it so often, we might not so easily succumb to defeatism."

In relation to this, recall the philosophy of Dewey which emphasized the fact that we should have near-at-hand goals to achieve rather than striving for the impractical and absolute.

As a result, Reiser is opposed to "metaphysics" as an outworn and dispossessed form of philosophy which he calls "First philosophy."[3] This was an inquiry into

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 19.
2. Ibid, p. 19.
3. Ibid, p. 29.

the external essence of things, as opposed to the relative and accidental. This was the logic of absolutes which came to be the basis for the Scholasticism which dominated Christian thinking for centuries. And even though opposed to this type of thinking, he is willing to admit that

> "One of the deep-seated cravings of the human mind seems to be a desire for something permanent, for something eternally the same, changeless and absolute."
>
> "This faith in the eternal certainty of something permanent was voiced by Lewis Carroll, that otherwise subtle critic of conventional habits of thought, when he stated that the charm of pure methematics 'lies chiefly in the absolute certainty of its results: for it is what, beyond all mental treasure, the human intellect craves for. Let us be sure of something.'"[1]

Reiser refuses to answer several recognized objections to his theory.[2] The first of these is the fact that anyone who denies the Law of Excluded Middle, presupposes it, for if one says that it is not true, he is assuming that it is true or not true. It may also be argued that no matter how many-valued your logic, a proposition either possesses one of these values or it does not.

If the Non-Aristotelian logic does nothing else but to aid us in avoiding some of the dogmatism

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 59.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 66.

common to both fascism and communism, Reiser feels that this will prove to be a discovery of no mean proportion.

2. Extra-Sensory Perception

Just how does consciousness fare under such a system of thought which has as a basis a theory of emergent evolution?[1] Human consciousness becomes a new dimension, and an emergent from cortical bio-electrical processes.[2] On the human level, the "local" time of each individual is now through a process of "mutual aggregation" beginning to cohere into a new "group" time.

> "Telepathy, clairvoyance, and the like are regarded as faint anticipations of this dynamic unity whereby a new social whole is emerging."[3]

The emergence of the "group mind" presages the development of a "social nerve" establishing continuity between all minds.

> "Within this emergent social organism there can be 'simultaneity' of perception (telepathy) as a phase of the dynamical contact between the 'local' times of the individual personalities."[4]

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1. Reiser, op. cit., pp. 109-110, 276.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 294.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 224.
4. Cf. Ibid.

Since "scientific humanism" is trying to formulate normative principles to serve as guides for the future evolution of society,[1] it is Reiser's thesis that the cultural interpretation of history, the organismic theory of society, the theory of emergent evolution, and gestalt psychology all contain the foundational idea of a whole which integrates and controls the part processes.

In referring to the physiological gradients as gestalten, Reiser refers to the contribution which Dr. Charles M. Child, the eminent biologist, has made to the organismic theory in that he pointed out the fact that biological processes indicate that levels of higher metabolic rate are dominant over the levels of lower metabolic rate.[2] Also, in 1908, T. Brailsford Robertson pointed out the similarity between growth curves and the graph of an autocatalytic monomolecular chemical reaction. Noting these similarities he advanced the theory "that the 'master reaction' of growth is a mono-molecular autocatalytic reaction -- it speeds up as it goes along."[3] Although admitting that these theories have been disproved, he finds

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 264.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 267.
3. Ibid, p. 270.

great value in the speculations because

> "they gave impetus to the application of chemical laws to biological, psychological, and later social processes and behavior."[1]

He retains, however, the central ideas of these two theories and adds that of a third way of securing organismal coordination is "through the evolutionary elaboration of a special organ or unification."[2] The resulting synthesis will be the new humanism. Thus he concludes that "Between the individual and the social there is thus an isomorphism of structure, a transposable Gestalt." Therefore, the next objective of education is

> "The building of the world-consciousness, the international mind, that must replace the economic nationalism and patriotic motifs of present day mentality."[3]

Many of his statements in regard to this theory are based upon the work of Dr. J. B. Rhine of Duke University, who has carried on extensive experiments which he believes support the theory of extrasensory perception. But these experiments are not above question and the critics of the conclusions reached are numerous.[4]

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1. Cf. Reiser, op. cit., p. 271.
2. Ibid, p. 273.
3. Ibid.
4. Cf. Ibid, p. 275.

It will be observed that there are four elements involved in the theory presented above:

(1) the theory of emergent evolution

(2) a system of non-Aristotelian Logic

(3) the notion of a psychic ether

(4) the doctrine of "religious humanism."[1]

The fourth element will be more fully discussed immediately under the third division of Reiser's philosophy.

3. The New Alchemy

Reviewing this theory of evolution, Reiser concludes that if man waits upon the process to run its course, he will have to wait a long time before what Korzybski calls the "manhood of humanity" will be attained. No radically new changes are to be expected soon

> "unless, through radio-eugenics, we take the fate of biological evolution into our own hands, and in that case we may find it feasible to create or remake human nature to suit the requirements of our social engineers."[2]

Carrying out this humanizing of science puts a grave responsibility upon what Reiser has chosen to call the "alchemist."

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 276.
2. Ibid, p. 317.

How this conception fits in with all of his previous arguments concerning natural biological evolution is not very clear. For he had just united, in his conception, the whole universe into an organism which is gradually evolving into something higher and better.

> "Indeed, if the earth is a living organism, is it not to be expected that the terrestial electromagnetic storms and variations, inside the earth and around it, are literally and in fact planetary electroencephalograms? The earth, too, has its electrical brain waves wandering over the world cortex. At least this is the implication suggested by Dr. Rice's theory of the earth as a living being, with the human race serving as the neuroblasts of the developing superhuman embryo."[1]

Why then is it necessary for man to take his hand at stepping up the process if the process itself is good and progressive?

When it comes to the matter of religion, it is taken for granted that all religions are a product of evolution.[2] Following this evolutionary course, he recognizes the danger that there is of a recurrence of Christianity under the leadership of the followers of Aquinas, Calvin, Barth, and Brunner. Therefore, he believes it to be the task of the philosopher to develop a

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 315.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 320.

> "many-sided concept capable of versatile development, having its root in cultural history and its fruits in modern science."[1]

This philosophy is furnished by the modern alchemist who is to be the cultural engineer of the future.

> "The chemists today realize that they are the creators of the future; they now see that in their hands to a large extent rests the fate of the human race."

Here he is not speaking merely concerning chemical applications, but is including the psychological as well as other and religious implications. "Modern chemists, like the prophets of old, are forecasting coming events."[2] The result of this method for mankind will be "the control of human nature through the chemistry of the body." This prediction speaks of therapeutic effects, also, in that the alchemists hope to discover the "magic essence" which shall give to man the "kind of transformation and immortality" which he desires.[3]

> "Perhaps the modern discovery of the philosopher's stone will provide us with the binding thread, which was drawn so tight in medieval times as almost to strangle science, but which in modern times is so slack as to permit religion to be unscientific and science to be irreligious."[4]

Reiser traces the development of chemistry

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 321.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 323.
4. Ibid, p. 324.

to the alchemists who looked in vain for the philosopher's stone. Even Moses and Aaron were allowed some of the secrets known only to the initiated. Thus, we see that the early alchemists were not merely seeking the secrets necessary to the transmutation of metals, but the "regeneration of man's spiritual nature." Traditionally, it was thought that the alchemists had paid a great price for their secrets, men developed allegories which connected evil with knowledge, showing that knowledge came only through suffering. "Today we are once again alchemists."[1] Modern alchemists have, like Lucifer, passed on to the human race the torch of understanding, and have thereby invited the wrath of the gods. They have discovered that the

> "secrets of life and of consciousness lie wrapped up in such phenomena as involve the interaction of radiation (including light) and matter."[2]

Thus man, by imitating deity, may again improve upon her. "It is through imitating deity that man himself becomes more godlike."[3]

> "In the fumes of their chemicals, they envisaged the process of spiritual refinement and purification that would transmute the crude ore of biological nature into the nobler products of

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p332.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid, p. 337.

a sublimated self."[1]

B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF BAKER BROWNELL'S RELIGIOUS REALISM TO THE MODERN HUMANISTIC MOVEMENT

Baker Brownell is also one of those leaders in philosophical thought who is trying to popularize a humanistic interpretation of life, and in doing so he pays more attention to religion as such than do the two philosophers last mentioned. In Earth Is Enough, he sets forth quite clearly the basic tenets of his philosophy which is not so lacking in emotional, aesthetic, and mystical content as are the colder intellectualistic or purely scientific systems of thought.

But he, as did Dewey and Reiser, begins by attacking the metaphysical cleavage of the world brought about by the Christian conception. He accuses the church of creating a defeatist philosophy which segregated time from eternity, and enslaved men through fear to believe in a system of postponed values.

> "By force and rational abstraction, the Christian church built an eternity alien to the native meanings of the heart, outside of life; and fell with time into decay."[2]

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 338.
2. Brownell, Baker: Earth Is Enough, p. 7.

This caused despondency because life was left as a useless process, to be endured. "It looted life of final values to build heaven."[1]

Therefore, two realms arose as a result of the dualism of the "inner" life and "outer" world which later developed into the subject-object complex of the Western thought. In a manner quite similar to that described previously by Dewey, values were withdrawn from the "outer" world and hypostatized into "inner" abstractions.

But religion, according to Brownell, is not to be found in the Church or in a metaphysical system of this kind, but is something simple, direct, original. Organization fails to restore that type of experience with its promises of delayed values.

> "For religion, not sin, is original in man. It is appreciative living. It is the vital wholeness of a moment, a bright stain of reality that spreads across past and future, across the margins of inner and outer, of man and his environment and such abstractions. Like a smile, it is uniquely integral. It is direct and simple. Religion is just that native fusion and vitality of a situation that resists separation into feeling and the object of feeling."[2]

It may be noted here that Brownell's

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1. Brownell, op. cit., p. 8.
2. Ibid, pp. 10-11.

philosophy is similar to that of Reiser, in that it favors a return to a more primitive logic, but is different from that of both Dewey and Reiser in that he insists that science cannot take over the field of religion, for religion is not phenomenal so that it can be observed as such.[1] Religion is like love and poetry in that it must be proved or disproved by the aesthetic sense and not by scientific proof. By a mystical process, religion unites everything of all time into one aesthetic whole. Therefore, Brownell does not stress activity to the exclusion of reflection and contemplative living.

God, in the usual sense, has no religious reality. He is merely used for the purpose of enforcing morals when moral enforcement is not really religious, but social. Therefore, the church, in enforcing morals in such a fashion, has become secular and not religious.[2] In the same manner, modern industry is exploiting religion through a cleavage of production and consumption. Therefore, the church is a prototype of modern industrialism, which is inimical to religion.

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1. Brownell, op. cit., p. 21.
2. Cf. Ibid, pp. 69-71.

Brownell describes religion as being conceived in three ways: religion as salvation,[1] religion as the integrative moment of living,[2] and religion as the deep identity of being.[3] The first is less appealing in that it signifies that life is no longer religious, and, through the acceptance of an "unworldly" way of life, immerses the soul in a world of abstractions. Brownell concludes that religion of this kind "belongs to the sparrows, America, and those who cannot dwell in the intimate stuff of living."[4]

The second is too deep for symbols such as words, and is to be found in the experiencing of moments of growing grass, the child at play, or the man at work.[5] This type of religious life may involve the appreciative life manifested in timeless interludes,[6] and in the fusion of elements of alien patterns of life,[7] and in concrete identification.[8]

In order that this mystical realism may be more clearly understood, a description will be given

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1. Cf. Brownell, op. cit. p. 272.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 279.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 290 ff.
4. Wieman and Meland: American Philosophies of Religion, p. 198.
5. Cf. Ibid, p. 198.
   Cf. Brownell, op. cit, pp. 278-279.
6. Cf. Brownell, op. cit., p. 282.
7. Cf. Ibid, p. 284.
8. Cf. Ibid, p. 298-299.

of one of these rare moments of living when this "integrity of living" intensifies into an "identity of being."

> "It was a beautiful day. The water was almost calm, the sky blue, a few clouds. I was lying on my back, my arms outstretched beyond my head. I was looking upward, just doing nothing. I could see nothing of the town or the boats or people, only the sky, a few clouds. The water was in my ears. Sometimes it splashed a little. I could feel, or seem to feel, the slight pressure of the ripples. A gull was above me, a great bird flying, flying without motion. He was planing against the breeze, still, fixed by some strange tension there in space. Then I let go, somehow. I relaxed, settled down a little in the water. And I felt I was not anywhere. I was everywhere; I was always. I looked at the gull, at the clouds. I felt myself one with them as I imagined the gull felt himself to be. I made no separation. I was nowhere. I made no distinction between myself and them. There was no distinction. We were the same. I cannot tell you how it possessed me. I was somehow drowned in them; drowned, or shall I say awakened from the particular dreams of life? Drowned in being; awakened to being? I do not know. I lay there forever, which I suppose was a few minutes."[1]

This fusion of man and environment, present and future, observer and observed, is the reality of life which is beyond reason or words.[2] Therefore, "being, not knowing, is religious."[3]

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1. Brownell, op. cit., p. 249.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 311.
3. Ibid, p. 323.

C. THE INFLUENCE OF CHARLES FRANCIS POTTER ON THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

Religious humanism is possibly best represented in the socio-historical field by such men as M. C. Otto, R. W. Sellars; and A. E. Haydon, Professor of History of Religions at the University of Chicago, has written The Quest of the Ages which had been referred to as the humanist bible. In this book, he concurs with the anti-theistic position of Otto and Sellars, but he fails to rule out so completely cosmic support for human values. "In "The Quest of the Ages," in fact, Haydon has laid the groundwork of what might be termed the new theism."[1]

Also, in an article entitled, The Renaissance of Religion,[2] he summarizes the chief tenets of this type of philosophy. His social passion is clearly manifest in his attack upon supernaturalism and his faith in man's ability to create "A culture in which men may find fullness of life." He exultantly exclaims that "The dualistic other-world has lost its lure at last."[3] This kind of religion made it possible in periods of

"failure of nerve, of social tragedy and despair, to

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1. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., p. 265.
2. Cf. Krumbine: The Process of Religion, pp. 249-266.
3. Ibid, p. 257.

> find an anchorage for ideals in the security of an eternal, unseen realm,"

but now it is time for a new "religious orientation."

Religion has provided security and values, but since they have always been

> "mediated by the social milieu in so far as they ever were effective, there might be a distinct gain in the elimination of the escape mechanisms of extra-human reference."[1]

Man is but a child of the universe, and "all the sciences conspire to root man securely in the planet."[2] With the realization of this fact, there comes a feeling of security in a world where evil becomes merely maladjustment, of man to nature, of man to man, and of group to group.[3]

In such a world as this, man must realize his own responsibility and face it courageously for there will be for him "no refuge from defeat in the arms of God." Man with vision may, with renewed hope, using science and technology, learn the joy of living a shared life in a shared world. But if this is impossible, he is still opposed to a return to theism.

> "If it cannot be done and men must have illusions still, rather than return to the past it would be better to cling to the illusion, if it is an

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1. Krumbine, op. cit., p. 260.
2. Ibid, p. 262.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 264.

illusion that man will one day build a world of his heart's desire."[1]

Since this philosophical type of religious humanism has been considered somewhat at length, it is quite appropriate that some of the popularizers of the religious movement be considered, rather than going further into the consideration of the writings of these men. The most prominent men of this type, who, along with Oliver L. Reiser, signed the Humanist Manifesto, are John H. Dietrich, Curtis W. Reese, John Haynes Holmes, Charles F. Potter, J. A. C. F. Auer, L. M. Birkhead, Burdette Backus, Harold Buschman, R. B. Bragg, and Edwin H. Wisson.[2] Since it is impossible within the scope of this treatise to consider all of these men and their writings, and since they are in agreement in regard to the major tenets of their philosophy, as is made evident by their having signed the Manifesto, Charles F. Potter has been selected for further consideration.

Potter, the influential leader and founder of The First Humanist Society of New York, hails humanism as "a new type of religion altogether." In fact, it is such a new way of regarding religion that

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1. Krumbine, op. cit., p. 266.
2. Cf. Wieman and Meland, op. cit., p. 258.

> "you have to make over and broaden your definition of religion to get Humanism in at all, especially if you come from a Christian background."[1]

And since Potter seems to have come from such a background, and to have entered the Baptist ministry before turning to Unitarianism, he takes the privilege of enlarging our conception of religion.

Rejecting the supernatural, and fearing nothing from the mirage known as united Christendom,[2] and failing to find room for gods either outside or inside himself, he sets forth the first article of his creed as being, "I believe in man."[3] And expanding his conception of religion to meet the requirements of humanists in general, he says that "Humanism is faith in the supreme value and self-perfectibility of human personality."[4] This is to be brought about through a social process, for individuals cannot improve unless society improves.

Even though he finds much of the humanist philosophy in common with the Positivism of Comte, he tries to lay the blame for the failure of his philosophy upon several marked deficiencies. The first of

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1. C. F. Potter, op. cit., p. 3.
2. Cf. Ibid, pp. 5-7.
3. Ibid, p. 11.
4. Ibid, p. 14.

these was the lack of room for change and development in his movement as a result of limited knowledge and experience. The second of these defects was the inclusion of worship in his way of life, even though this was the worship of humanity. Modern humanism is not interested "in the worship of humanity, nor in any worship at all, but seeks, rather, the improvement of humanity."[1]

Even though God and the Absolute are rejected as unworthy of a Humanist, Potter, contrary to the thought of John Dewey, believes in the "contemplation of the beautiful, the good and the true," in order to get inspiration for self-discipline and earnest effort.[2] And though he finds fault with all previous religions, yet he does not deny that they have conserved some values.

> "If there be detected in an Humanist a seeming antipathy towards the older religions, it is due not to lack of appreciation of the values conserved in those religions, but to an impatience with the church as an institution which has so frequently stood athwart the progress of the human spirit."[3]

Here we get a glimpse of the reason for the rise of the modern humanistic movement. The reason may be

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1. Potter, op. cit., p. 78.
2. Cf. Ibid, p. 13.
3. Ibid, p. 12.

found in a decadent church, which fails to be awake to the living issues of the day.

Potter comes very near to giving cosmic significance to the universe when he asserts that "the universe has meaning," and that "personality is the explanation of the universe."[1] But the personality of man is held up as being the epitome of the evolutionary process, and it is through the personality of man that the meaning of the universe is discovered.

> "In this, Humanism differs from Theism, which has maintained that the meaning of the universe is not discovered by man but revealed by God."[2]

Imperfection naturally results as a result of the evolutionary process, but even at that, "Human personality at its best, imperfect as it is, is yet sufficiently worthy and admirable to justify the universe."[3] But immediately he weakens his position here by making the statement that

> "Of course that statement is still debatable, but after all, it is a matter of faith, and faith in man is the central doctrine of Humanism. It is a challenge to all men to dare to believe that human personality is of supreme value."[4]

Thus, it may be seen that Humanism is faith

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1. Potter, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
2. Ibid, p. 15.
3. Ibid, p. 16.
4. Ibid.

in man and nature. In turn, Theism is "an obstacle to human progress," heaven becomes an "astronomically impossible place," and evil in human nature is not nearly as "bad as theologians have taught him to confess" it to be.[1] "Humanism challenges a man to quit leaning on the everlasting arms, and to stop singing: 'Helpless I am and full of guilt.'" What is needed is, "a new humanistic movement like the Italian Renaissance."

Potter is willing to admit that dogmatic atheism is about as difficult to prove as the assertion that there is a God, yet he declares that practically all humanists would deny the existence of a "supernatural personal deity."[2] He also asserts that it is a mistake to connect godlessness and immorality.

It is commonly agreed among these religious humanists that "Human life is the thing of supreme worth in the world, and must be treated as the end of all human endeavor. This is the corner-stone of the religion of Humanism."[3] Therefore, humanism advocates reform through the process of the application of scientific methods to society and industry.

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1. Potter, op. cit., p. 41.
2. Ibid, pp. 48-50.
3. Ibid, p. 124.

D. SUMMARY

Previously, the discussion has been concerned with the historical development of humanistic movements. This chapter has dealt with the chief philosophical tenets of "scientific humanism" as the culmination of the humanistic thought of the ages. The various phases of the recent developments were noted through the investigation of the writings of the leaders in the various fields which related themselves to religious thought.

It was seen that an outstanding philosopher, Oliver L. Reiser, set forth an "organismic" view of the world which contained mystical elements involving a "World Sensorium." His chief arguments were based upon three assumptions;

(1) the validity of a non-Aristotelian logic

(2) the appearance of extra-sensory perception as an evolutionary development in the human race

(3) the authority of the new alchemists to become the prophets of the future.

It was noted that Baker Brownell adopted a non-Aristotelian logic in general, and contributed

many mystical elements to religion. Through a simple, direct experience of appreciative identification with nature, man attains to the truly religious life. Therefore, all dualisms are dissolved into the real "moment of universal living." Therefore, man through identification with nature finds the real source of value. "Being," and "living" are more important than "knowing."

Among the religious humanists, we found a group which is seeking to popularize humanistic thought through a definite, organized movement. Professor A. Eustace Haydon was shown to be one of the men who gave philosophical expression to this type of thinking, and Dr. Francis Potter was selected for further consideration because of his influential position as leader and founder of the First Humanist Society of New York.

Both of these men expressed a social passion arising from the conviction that man, through faith in his own powers, may use the discoveries of science in the developing of a new and better society. It was admitted that the control of nature through technological processes was fraught with both blessedness and peril, but they concluded that if this faith in human possibilities was an illusion, it was better to go down

believing in this illusion than to return to a theistic faith. At the same time, value was to be found in the contemplation of the good, the beautiful and the true. For them, the universe is found to have meaning, which does not rule out definitely and dogmatically all cosmic support of human values.

CHAPTER FIVE

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM VERSUS THEISM

CHAPTER V

SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM VERSUS THEISM

Thus far, the main purpose has been to understand the Humanistic movement throughout history, but it has come time to evaluate that movement in the light of the facts of Psychology of religion. Even though that science is relatively young, it is based upon centuries of human thought and progress. Long before any definite developments began in the field, philosophers were busily engaged with the problems of religion, knowledge, and experience. Therefore, from the standpoint of psychology, an attempt will be made to evaluate the contribution which Humanistic thought has made in the field of religion.

A. THE PRINCIPAL TENETS OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM

First of all, it will be necessary to review the principal tenets of the philosophy by noting its implications for the field of religion, and then its contributions will be pointed out and its limitations

indicated. If these limitations are serious, an attempt will be made to at least suggest how these limitations are to be met.

Throughout all the history of the Humanistic movement from the time that Protagoras set forth his philosophy, summed up in the words "man the measure," to the organismic theory advanced by Oliver L. Reiser in terms of a "World Sensorium," leaders in the movement have held to certain common tenets of philosophy and expressed a common faith. The first of these is the belief that man is a product, or at least a part, of nature. Before the development of the modern evolutionary hypothesis, this was set forth in a type of pantheistic philosophy similar to that of the Stoics.[1] Since the evolutionary hypothesis was advanced by Darwin and developed by modern scientists, man is accounted for purely upon the basis of biological[2] evolution, and mind is but a product of nature.

The second common tenet that shall be mentioned is that of "indifference and agnosticism" towards anything beyond man's "immediate concern and common grasp." This is true of Protagoras,[3] the Italian

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1. Cf. Ante, p. 13.
2. Cf. Ante, p.
3. Cf. Ante, p. 11.

Renaissance,[1] and also of John Dewey who lays stress upon attaining practical goals near at hand at the expense of all Absolutes and final ends.[2] When Protagoras was asked whether the gods existed or not, he gave quite a modern type of answer in that he said that he had not lived long enough to ascertain that fact. But many modern scholars have definitely attacked the idea of the God of theism, and some leaders among the religious humanists have referred to god as a mythical conception conceived by the mind of man for those who were too weak to face the problems of life.

All religions have, therefore, been attacked as an opiate of the masses. It served to give some meaning and value to life in a day of defeatism caused by oppressive rulers, but has lost its value since man has mastered physical nature and the modern democratic movement has freed men from the oppressionof tyrannical rulers. In fact, it has become such a foe of progress, that from the time of Comte humanists have found it necessary to attack all religions. However, it will be recalled that Comte, the founder of Positivism, found it necessary to incorporate his followers into a group

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1. Cf. Ante, p. 23.
2. Cf. Ante, Chapter III, p. 69ff.

which met for worship.

Also, the high regard for moral integrity based upon natural science has been common to leaders in general from the time of the Stoics to the present day. An explanation for this quality among the modern humanists will be considered more fully in the present chapter.

Man is the master of himself and nature because he has developed through an evolutionary process a higher type of intelligence than is found among the animals, but this dualism is tempered by the emphasis upon the likenesses between the two. Evil is only that which is left over by a selective process, or the ailing human nature produced by years of oppression and false philosophies. Man still possesses the necessary resources within his own nature to overcome hostile forces thus produced within himself and within nature.

The last of the aspects of the humanistic movement to be noted here is the fact that it has been inspired in general by a social passion which tended to put all men on the same level, by lending a helping hand to those who were unfortunate. This has been true from the time of the Stoics, and is merely emphasized by the intelligent and scientific outlook of the scientific

humanists.

B. THE CONTRIBUTION OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM TO RELIGION

What, then, is the contribution which "scientific humanism" has to make to the field of religion? In the first place, "scientific humanism" is a protest against hypocracy. When those people who repeat the creeds and subscribe to so-called Christian principles and then turn around and fail to do anything about conditions around them -- there is a sign that some type of reaction is necessary in order to call a decadent church to its task. Humanism cannot be properly understood unless this note of moral protest is taken into account.[1] Communism, though a scourge to the church, is a form of humanism which presents a challenge to that organization to produce fruits worthy of its beliefs. In a like manner, "scientific humanism" calls for "action" in creating a better world.

This demand may call for the changing of some traditional emphases in regard to the evaluation of man, and of his ability to respond to his God. Dr.

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1. Cf. Brown, William Adams: Humanism: What It Is and How to Meet It; in Humanism: Another Battle Line, edited by W. P. King.

Brown states the problem very aptly when he says,

> "It is, indeed, the contrast between Jesus' ideal of man, and what many Christians have made of that ideal, that helps account for the rise of humanism."[1]

We have also seen that Potter was willing to admit certain values to be common to religions, but he expressed strong antipathy toward a corrupt church,[2] which hindered progress. Too often this lack of progress has been due to a defeatist attitude similar to that described by Brownell, brought about by the placing of so much emphasis upon the sovereignty of God that the human elements were seriously neglected.

But man does have the ability to choose the higher life or to reject it. It was not a humanist who said, "I can do all things." Stronger emphasis must be put upon the Christian responsibility in creating a Christian social order and eliminating as far as it is humanly possible the defects which are so glaring in modern society. When a church pays lip-service to the religion of Jesus Christ and consistently refuses to follow Him in service for humanity, it is contributing to conditions which make for a humanistic philosophy.

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1. Brown, op. cit., p. 244.
2. Cf. Ante, p.

Humanism also makes a contribution in that it is an attempt to supply a method which avoids to a great extent the pitfalls of "utopianism" as well as those of the philosophy of mechanistic materialism.[1] Many of the problems of present existence are recognized, and man possesses freedom to deal with these problems.

Scientific Humanism is an attempt to supply that which is lacking in science. Science's aim is wholly intellectual and her method is statistical, comparative, and metrical. Therefore, science can probably point out many new goals, but lacks the power to impel men toward them because of a failure of the philosophy to take into account the entire nature of man. Scientific humanism is an attempt to give the feelings and emotions a place in the life of man alongside his purely intellectual powers. Reiser declares that

> "in an organismic or non-elementalistic view of human nature, this social dualism and consequent mental-emotional conflict is resolved."

And again he declares that,

> "There are those who say that emotion has no place in science, but this view expresses an inadequate psychology."[2]

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1. Rogers: English and American Philosophy Since 1800, p. 403.
2. Reiser, op. cit., p. 22.

Here he is seeking to strengthen the naturalistic position by destroying the weakness of the old position which, with difficulty, found room for the emotional and aesthetic powers of man.

Another point which we might mention in this connection is the fact that "scientific humanism" is "prospective" rather than "retrospective" in its view of life. It holds out great accomplishments for man in the future if he will but take advantage of the opportunity which is his of profiting by the mistakes of the past and putting forth efforts to apply his knowledge to the problems of life. This is a worthy aim from even a distinctly religious viewpoint.

And the last contribution which shall be mentioned here is the fact that the scientific humanists are busy trying to assimilate the newest facts of science, and to organize all knowledge into a consistent and unified philosophy. Too often the failures of the past have been due to a great extent to the failure of men to harmonize the various aspects of their knowledge and beliefs so that the several phases of life might tend to lead men toward a common goal. Therefore, in that it tends toward "a unification of scientific, religious, social and economic thought," it represents a worthy aim.

C. THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM IN THE FIELD OF RELIGION

The next question which must be faced is that of the ability of scientific humanism to psychologically account for the religious capacity of man, and to provide the philosophy which will be adequate and worthy of his confidence and faith. Does it come to grips with reality and provide us with a philosophy which will properly account for all knowledge of that reality? Does it conceive of reality ih such a manner that it will satisfy the psychological and religious nature of man? These are the questions which will engage our attention in the remainder of this chapter.

In the first place, a non-Aristotelian logic as set forth by Reiser destroys all the "laws of thought" in accordance with which the modern mind operates, and transforms them into symbols. This he tries to destroy through a relativistic evolutionary theory which discards the so-called law of identity. But in doing this, he destroys all logic which is the very basis of all thought processes. For it is an axiomatic fact that "A thing is identical with itself at the time and in the place indicated."[1] The fact that a thing may be

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1. Horne, H. H.: John Dewey's Philosophy Especially the Quest for Certainty, pp. 18-19.

in the process of change, or that a thing is pictured by words, or the fact that a thing may have a series of relationships with its environment does not destroy this axiomatic truth. Neither does the time element involved in its perception render invalid the conception of a thing in a given relationship, at a given time, and in a given place.

This brings up the entire theory of knowledge. The scientific humanist points to the changing beliefs of men and then immediately concludes that all knowledge and truth is relative. But there is no proof that the idea of change should extend to the realm of logical meaning.[1] There is a tendency to relegate an unchanging system of truth to a pre-Darwinian age, but consistent thought is dependent upon such a system even in a scientific age. Montague goes on to say that "change itself has no meaning unless the terms of the process remain fixed." One cannot speak of a man changing from youth to age or of species changing from simian to human without taking it for granted that the terms, "human," "youth," "age," and "simian" retain their meanings unchanged.

"What holds true of logical terms holds true

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1. Montague: The Ways of Knowing, p. 163.

> equally of propositions which are relations between terms. If the proposition that the earth has been spherical for the ten billion years prior to the year 1900 is true at this moment, then that proposition will always be true on pain of losing its meaning of a proposition. The earth might change tomorrow from a globe to a disc without changing the truth of the above proposition. In short, the maxims: True for one, true for all, and once true, always true, apply not only to all abstract or non-existential propositions, but to all other propositions in so far as they are made thoroughly unambiguous with respect to the time and space of the facts asserted."[1]

Therefore, it is quite evident that the laws of "identity," "excluded middle" and "contradiction" are not subject to change which is common to physical processes by which physical processes are perceived. For

> "between those processes and the logical relations which they reveal there is fixed a gulf which no change can cross."[2]

This confusion between "belief" and "knowledge" leads to a false conception as to the nature of knowledge as an objective reality. Allowing relativism of nature whether physical or psychological to be carried over into the field of logical propositions in this manner leads to nought but skepticism.[3] Scientific humanism, following the lead of the pragmatism of Dewey, which

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1. Montague, op. cit., pp. 163-164.
2. Ibid, p. 164.
3. Cf. Ibid, p. 164.

is a type of "futurism," looks to consequences rather than to the extent to which an hypothesis copies reality, in determining truth.

Montague says,

> "There is always a reason why a good hypothesis yields fruitful results for the future and that reason is its agreement with the present structure of reality."[1]

The confusion of terms here on the part of the scientific humanists in regard to "qualities" and "relations" is very striking.

> "The extent to which a theory agrees with or copies reality depends not on the resemblance of its terms or qualities to those of reality but on the resemblance of its relations to the relations between facts . . . In other words, it is relational and not qualitative resemblance or identity that constitutes significant truth."[2]

This definition of the law of identity leaves intact the "laws of thought" and at the same time takes care of change and the relational aspects between objects.

"Today the last citadel of absolutism is being attacked."[3] This statement shows just how revolutionary is this non-Aristotelian Logic which is being advanced. It immediately rules out all eternally true principles or externally existent realities in the face

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1. Montague, op. cit., p. 144.
   Cf. Reiser, op. cit., p. 14.
2. Ibid, pp. 144-145.
3. Reiser, op. cit., p. 59.

of an admission that

> "One of the deep-seated cravings of the human mind seems to be a desire for something permanent, for something eternally the same, changeless and absolute."[1]

In fact, there is a greater inconsistency than this, and that is in the fact that absolutes are set up by the scientific humanists in more ways than in their absolutistic statement that there are no absolutes.

After destroying all absolutes of the classical school, Reiser sets up "growth" as "a form of change to which the general theory of relativity does not apply."[2] Another implication is noted by Horne in reference to this idea of change in the philosophy of Dewey, which is equally true for scientific humanism.

> "Even if man depends on change, and his sense of dependence is quickened by the fact of universal change, the fact of his dependence does not change. Thus at least two changeless facts would remain for man; namely, change, and his dependence on it."[3]

It may also be noted in connection with the theory of knowledge that scientific humanism recognizes only one approach or source of knowledge to the exclusion of all other approaches. This type of philosophy sets up the "scientific method" as the only road

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 57.
2. Ibid, p. 223.
3. Horne, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

to knowledge. In fact, knowledge is reduced to a method and that is a process of inquiry. In contradiction to this viewpoint, many modern thinkers recognize a number of approaches to knowledge. Montague recognizes six or more methods as being valid within certain realms of philosophical inquiry.[1] In the field of religion, it must not be overlooked that the method of knowledge through Revelation is recognized by a large number of scholars.

> "A religion of revelation is thus alone able to do justice to both the freedom and the finiteness of man and to understand the character of the evil in him."[2]

In denying to man the process of intuition and introspection as approaches to knowledge, the scientific humanist reduces man to the stature of nature and denies to him the power of standing outside himself. Knowledge is no longer a possession of self, but self becomes a part of knowledge.[3]

> "But it is precisely the pure or transcendant ego, which stands above consciousness as the consciousness of consciousness and which expresses itself in terms of memory and foresight, which is the real centre of human personality."[4]

Thus we see that scientific humanism fails to recognize

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1. Horne, op. cit., pp. 233-234.
2. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 127.
3. Cf. Rogers, op. cit., p. 401.
4. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 72.

the self-transcendence of man over nature, and does not account for the psychological faculties which he possesses.

> "The obvious fact is that man is a child of nature, subject to its vicissitudes, compelled by its necessities, driven by its impulses, and confined within the brevity of the years which nature permits its varied organic forms, allowing them some, but not too much, latitude, The other less obvious fact is that man is a spirit who stands outside of nature, life, himself, his reason and the world."[1]

Now in regard to extra-sensory perception (ESP) it may be countered that this is only an uncertain and experimental hypothesis advanced as proof of humanity as being

> "a god in embryo, a developing being with the psychic powers -- omniscience and omnipresence -- which man has hitherto assigned to his God."[2]

It is recognized by Reiser himself as being at best a merely speculative hypothesis.

> "And thus we are confirmed in our conclusion that extra-sensory perception, defying the time-honored laws of Aristotelian logic in their scientific applications, is but a feeble and uncertain intimation of psychic powers yet to be evolved and perhaps eventually to become universal in the human species."[3]

The argument is based upon the works of such men as Dr. Rhine who recently published, with his

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1. Niebur, op. cit., p. 3.
2. Reiser, op. cit., p. 302.
3. Ibid.

co-workers, a volume, Extra-Sensory Perception After Sixty Years. In this volume, they try to answer "the deluge of criticism which has descended upon them."[1] Thus we see that the statement made in 1933 by Hornell Hart to the effect that "Experimental telepathy is, of course, very fragmentary and uncertain" still remains true.[2] Therefore, we would conclude that this is a very uncertain hypothesis upon which to build the faith of tomorrow.

It will also be noted that this idea is based upon the theory of biological evolution. If biological evolution has produced man with all of his physical and psychical powers, why must man take his destiny into his own hands, and direct the future development of humanity? Here seem to be two conflicting ideas bound into one system of thought. Onethe one hand, the evolutionary process seems to be friendly to man, and is developing him into a super-man; and on the other hand, man must take his destiny into his own hands in order to save himself from inevitable destruction.

The final criticisms of scientific humanism will be presented under the subject of the New Alchemy,

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1. Reiser, op. cit., p. 302.
2. Swift, A. L.: Religion and Psychical Research, in Religion Today, p. 214.

which seeks to control "human nature through the chemistry of the body." After destroying self-identity, this is but another attack upon the self-transcendence of man over nature. Personality is merged into the natural order, and becomes a victim of bio-chemical processes. Both the idea and reality of individuality which Christianity has fostered[1] are lost.

This philosophy fails also to account for sin in the nature of man and the opposing forces in nature. The modern tendency is to throw the main responsibility for sin and evil upon nature and thereby to evade the responsibility for such sin, and many pessimistic humanists declare that this is evidence for their agnosticism concerning the existence of God.

It has already been shown in Chapter II that the Naturalistic interpretation of the universe fails to provide for the moral needs of man in that his morals decay when the idea of God is taken away. It may be argued that some of the moral giants of the day are humanists, but an investigation will show that these humanists came from religious backgrounds, and have appropriated much of Christianity in their humanistic beliefs. The reason for the superior social quality

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1. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 70.

of modern scientific humanism is, therefore, due not to the influence of Epicureans, Stoics or the humanistic leaders of the Renaissance, but to the influence of Christianity.

Therefore, we conclude that Humanism is weighed in the balance and found wanting -- wanting in an adequate theory of knowledge which will account for reality and the psychical powers superior to nature; wanting in absolute and cosmic values which are necessary to stimulate men to the "action" which is called for; wanting in a theory which does not lose the individual in a "stream of consciousness" or in a "World Sensorium;" wanting in a remedy for the evil which pervades human nature; and wanting in social qualities which must be borrowed from Christianity. What, then, is to meet the needs called for by these striking inadequacies? May it not be a type of theistic belief which alone can survive as the religion of mankind? We shall briefly survey the powers which are inherent within this belief which may be used in meeting these needs and in creating a better world.

D. THE LIMITATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC HUMANISM MET ADEQUATELY ONLY BY CHRISTIAN THEISM

Many of the above-mentioned limitations are

based upon the failure to recognize in the first place the true nature of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. Inasmuch as religious humanism is based upon the philosophy of John Dewey, it is well that we note in this connection several very apt criticisms concerning the failure to properly interpret the Theistic faith. These are equally applicable to the scientific humanists.

In the first place, Dewey is mistaken in looking to Greek philosophy with its two worlds and not to Judaism and the teachings of Jesus for the origins of Christianity. Secondly, he fails to recognize the true value of religion when he denies that it is concerned with present experience. This accusation, it will be recalled, was especially pronounced in the writings of Baker Brownell. So, in like manner, the denial that the other world does not exist, is recognized as being but an assertion. Potter quite clearly recognized the fact that it was as difficult to prove the denial as it was to prove the positive assertion concerning the existence of such a world. Likewise, in asserting the accusation that Christians lived in another world, he fails to recognize the stimulus which Christianity has given to righteous living in this world and the enormous amount of social work which has been done under her

direction. Finally, he misses the very genius of religion in setting up the realization of possibilities instead of the worship of God the Father.

These inadequacies are met only in Theism, which gives room for all the fully recognized sources of knowledge, gives a sound basis for faith in values which are Absolute and eternal, gives a sufficient explanation of the self-transcendence of man over nature in the personality of a God who is the only sufficient explanation for his appearance on earth, provides an explanation of the sinfulness of man and provides a better remedy for it than the chemical control of the body or the formation of a "World Sensorium" which subjects the individual to the fate of the mass of mankind.[1]

From the historical and practical standpoints, Theism is clearly shown to be the necessary element in a religion which is able to capture the allegiance of the masses. For no religion has been able to survive without developing its theistic implications. In fact, "There can be no religion without Theism in a rudimentary or developed form."[2] It might be objected that Buddhism was not a theistic religion from the time of its

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1. Cf. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 68.
2. Uren, op. cit., p. 193.

inception, but it might also be revealing to note that it was but a system of philosophy and ethics until the death of its founder when the theistic implications were smuggled in from outside sources.

> "Primitive Buddhism ignored religion. It was only when in opposition to its first principles, it had made its founder its god, and had thus really become a religion, that the way was open for its general acceptance."[1]

Therefore, from all the evidence of history, we can but conclude that Humanism is but a temporary reaction to the rather discouraging conditions in a decadent church which refuses to recognize its task of reinterpreting itself to the world.

What, then, is the conclusion which may be safely reached in regard to the movement as a whole? It may well be concluded that this movement, insofar as it manifests itself as a reactionary movement calling attention to the real task of the church, is a real challenge to the Christian religion and has many elements which may be reincorporated into that system of belief and practice. But as to its influence on history, in general we must conclude that it but represents a mood appearing in a period of transition.

"In contrast with this widely prevailing and often

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1. Tiele, C. P.: Outlines of the History of Religions, p. 137.

> naive realism sophisticatedly expressed by sciences like physics and history (in so far as they seek objective facts of an external world), the boasted novelty of humanism in its restriction of religion to longings for objects held to be real only as echoes or reflections of the wishes for them suggests that humanism is less a permanent element of religion than the mood of a school and an age and that it rests, to a greater extent than theism, upon theory and psychological speculation."[1]

E. SUMMARY

In the present chapter, an attempt has been made to evaluate the humanistic movement in the light of the most recent developments in that direction and to compare the benefits to be derived from it with the contribution which Theism has made to the life of humanity throughout the ages.

It was discovered that scientific humanism was making some important contributions to the field of religion. The first of these was the fact that it was making a protest against hypocracy and decadence in the church. In the second place, it made the demand that the church re-evaluate the ability of man in dealing with the problems of good and evil and in creating a better world in which to live. Positively, Humanism has provided a method which attempts to avoid many of the evils

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1. Dakin, op. cit., pp. 129-130.

which previous scientific and philosophical movements have brought about in the world of thought. Several of these pitfalls were noted as being "utopianism" and mechanistic materialism.

Some specific contributions to religion are:

(1) the emphasis upon the place of emotion in science and life

(2) the value of a "prospective" rather than a "retrospective" viewpoint

(3) the attempt to reinterpret philosophy in the light of recent scientific and psychological findings and discoveries.

It remains for the church to awaken to her task of making religion practicable and appealing in a modern age of discovery and industrialism.

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

GENERAL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present study has proved itself to be a profitable one in that it has attempted to clarify the issues presented by the reappearance of a formidable movement which attempts to interpret man and the universe in a naturalistic manner. The principal discovery which has been made is the fact that the modern expression of that philosophy which attempts to make man the sole determiner of his destiny apart from unseen powers or external forces is nothing new or unheard of, but is similar to the revolts of the human spirit in the past. The principal philosophical tenets of the modern scientific humanism were found to be common centuries before the appearance of Christianity in the beliefs of Protagoras, and also in the forms of Stoicism and Epicureanism.

The earlier division of this investigation traced the development of this type of thinking from these earlier forms to the time of Auguste Comte in the nineteenth century. It was discovered that these earlier modes of thinking were characterized by certain

common tenets which are being revived today. They arose out of the desire to better the deplorable social conditions of the day which were being neglected by the existing religions. This reaction was somewhat similar to the reaction evidenced in the modern movement for social betterment and political reform which will elevate the lives of all the people of the world.

But, along with this social passion, certain beliefs were held which clearly revealed that this was a reactionary movement. Besides believing in the innate goodness of man, they also held to the philosophy which refused to take into serious consideration the beliefs concerning God, the supernatural, and immortality. This naturalistic and therefore relativistic interpretation of the world led directly to the inference that death was the end of personality, and that this life was the chief concern of man. Man was believed to be but a part of an "organismic whole" which functioned in accordance with established laws.

Later, it was seen that humanism took a different form, and was quite influential in producing a great religious upheaval known as the Reformation. Beginning with an Italian literary movement which reverted to the study of the classics of the past, humanistic

thought was directed into two quite contrary channels. In the hands of Erasmus and the German reformers, it was turned into a religious crusade which not only produced the modern Protestant movement, but also led to a purification of the Catholic church in the Counter Reformation. These effects were also felt in the movements led by Zwingli and Calvin in Switzerland, and in the Protestant reactions in France and England. But there was quite a contrary current which led to a new freedom in the indulgence of the baser passions of men, brought about by the rejection of the restraining force of the church and of religion based upon a belief in a personal God.

This latter turn which the humanistic movement took practically destroyed Scholasticism, and opened the way for newer expressions of the earlier humanism in the writings of such men as Goethe, and Voltaire. In fact, a prominent school of Encyclopedists grew up which boldly proclaimed the naturalistic philosophy.

The philosophy of Comte was found to be the fountain-head of the modern humanistic theories in regard to the nature of man, knowledge, and reality. All religions, views concerning God and immortality, as well as the idea of the innate sinfulness of man, were rejected and the Worship of Humanism was substituted for

the Worship of God. But it failed to give adequate explanation for the gross evils brought about by organized society, and it also failed to take into account the rise of the idea of God in a naturalistic universe.

This Positivism was traced through two channels to the modern expression of humanism in the philosophy of John Dewey and Oliver L. Reiser. In the first place, Comte's beliefs affected the American psychologists in the field of religion, and they, in turn, influenced John Dewey and modern educational thought. The most prominent of these psychologists were James, Ames, Leuba, Starbuck, Pratt, and Coe. These men made a valuable contribution to the field of religion in that they opened up a relatively new field for scientific inquiry and developed techniques for the evaluation of religious phenomena, but they also robbed religion of its vital elements and stripped the church of her principal tenets and beliefs. In the second place, Comte directly influenced that great educator, John Dewey, through his writings.

One of the most valuable contributions that psychology has made to the field of religion is the discovery that these reactionary leaders at the head of the humanistic movement have come out of religious backgrounds, and have had their faith destroyed by a "trauma"

or spiritual wound early in life. Among the other contributions which this psychological invasion has made are to be found the facts that man is incorrigibly religious, that his instincts demand the helping hand of a belief in a personal God through the channels of prayer and worship. This has proved to be the only adequate source of permanent help for man in a world of sorrow and tragedy.

In the philosophy of Dewey, religion naturally became merely a devotion to ideals and aims created by the imagination of man. All knowledge and truth is, therefore, relative and there is no Absolute to explain the origin of the earth or the evolutionary process which has produced man. Man is equipped to put meaning into the cosmic process, and to create values, but there is no God to guarantee those values, nor is there a correspondence between an objective reality and the materials of perception which is commonly designated as knowledge.

And even though Dewey is possessed of a social passion which seeks the elevation of all mankind through a liberative, educational process, and through the application of scientific knowledge to the economic world, yet we find here in the field of religion the same inadequacies which were so glaring in the religion of

Humanity presented by Comte. Only one of many accepted sources of knowledge is admitted, and reality finds no secure basis. The qualities of personality, common to man, are unaccounted for, and his emotional needs are unmet. The problem of sin and evil in the world is not adequately dealt with, for it has not been shown how that social organization can be brought about which will cleanse the individual from his selfish impulses and unify mankind into one brotherhood.

It has been seen that this well-known philosophy presented by Dewey served as the philosophical basis for "scientific humanism" and religious humanism. These modern forms of humanistic thought are best represented in such men as Oliver L. Reiser, Baker Brownell, and Francis Potter. Oliver L. Reiser presented the philosophical approach to religious thought based upon three principal assumptions: the validity of a non-Aristotelian logic, the appearance of extra-sensory perception in the evolutionary process, and the ability of modern alchemists to forecast the future. To this humanistic movement, Baker Brownell made quite a contribution to the mystical elements presented by the modern humanists in the field of naturalistic religion which regards such an experience as something simple and direct. Francis Potter seeks to

popularize the naturalistic philosophy by building up an organization which will enlist the same loyalty which has been found in the religious movements of the past. It was discovered that in trying to do this they have corrupted the language common to the religious field and have sought to provoke the same emotional reaction in the naturalistic field as has been provoked by religion.

This movement has made a contribution to religious thought in that it has called attention to the human element in religion which has been neglected by the established institutions in the past. It has also supplied a method which is very useful in the social application of modern scientific knowledge to the masses. It challenges Christianity to show forth faith through active service for all men. It has also been helpful in dispelling the theories of "utopianism" and mechanistic materialism which have been the sworn foes of religion in the past. It has tried to supply that which was lacking in science, by providing a synthesis of knowledge, and calling attention to the emotinnal nature of man.

These contributions should be of invaluable aid in the future to those who wish to interpret properly the religion of Jesus to the modern mind. They should

cause religionists to awaken to the needs of the future rather than to become decadent like the institutions and beliefs of the past. They should purify the Church and produce another Reformation in the life of that vital institution.

But it was found that this philosophy was lacking as a religion which could marshall the forces of the world for the building of a better society. Besides failing to give an adequate explanation of the personality of man, the presence of beauty, as well as of evil, in nature, and an adequate solution to that problem, it failed to show just how a society was to be organized to give adequate individual expression and opportunity in a unified universe where man and nature were one.

It also failed to show just how and why the cravings of man after God arose and as to just how these needs were to be met. Nothing was supplied in the place of religion to provide the resources for Christian living which are provided in a conception of a personal God. Nothing was given to satisfy that human longing for immortality which has found expression in the literature and art, as well as the institutions and customs, of the past. There was nothing to give that moral support which is necessary in an evil world, nor the consolation and strength in a world of tragedy and changing

circumstance, which are to be found in Christian prayer and worship.

Therefore, we must conclude that Humanism can never satisfy the needs of man without developing definite Theistic implications which are found to be the necessary characteristics of a living religion. This movement can serve only as a temporary reactionary movement which calls attention to the neglected elements of an adequate religion.

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